In the Ming Dynasty, the clan was divided into various places and lived in various places for a long time, and its grain supply was completely borne by local taxes, so the clan problem was more manifested as a local social problem. The Zonglu offering system formulated in the early years of the Ming Dynasty laid great hidden dangers for the economic and social development of the Ming Dynasty. During the Jiajing period, with the expansion of the population of the Zong Domain, the official offices in various parts of the Ming Dynasty fell into a comprehensive and powerless "Zonglu dilemma". The situation of the Shanxi clan is quite representative.
This "Zonglu dilemma" and disputes became one of the main motives and manifestations of the financial and social crises in the middle and late Ming Dynasty.
The fundamental crux of the emergence of the "Zonglu Dilemma" in the middle and late Ming Dynasty lies in the system of patriarchal support established in the early years of the Ming Dynasty. Under this system, members of the clan were not allowed to participate in the imperial examination, were not allowed to engage in the work of the four people, and lived completely on the grain provided by the local government. When the princes were first crowned during the Hongwu period, the types and quantities of the princes were very large.
For example, in February of the ninth year of Hongwu (1376), the number of annual offerings of the kings and princesses was determined, which stipulated: "The prince should have 50,000 stones of rice, 25,000 banknotes, 40 boils of brocade, 300 boils of silk, 100 boils each of yarn and luo, 500 zheng of silk, 1,000 boils each of winter and summer cloth, 2,000 taels of cotton, 200 yin of salt, 1,000 catties of tea, and 50 horses of forage per month." "With such an astonishing number of seals, it really has the potential to collect all the world's belongings to the descendants of Zhumen!
By the time of Gengyin in the leap month of the 28th year of Hongwu (1395), Zhu Yuanzhang, who had a large group of descendants, was limited by the financial resources of the imperial court and had to redefine the criteria of Zonglu: "The prince gave Lumi ten thousand stones, the county king two thousand stones, the Zhenguo general one thousand stones, the auxiliary state general eight hundred stones, and the Fengguo general six hundred stones." Lieutenant Zhenguo 400 stone, Fuguo lieutenant 300 stone, Fengguo lieutenant 200 stone. 2,000 stone for the princess and the attached horse, 800 stone for the county lord and the honorary guest, 600 stone for the county lord and the honorary guest, 400 stone for the county lord and the honorary guest, 300 stone for the county lord and the honorary guest, and 200 stone for the township lord and the honorary guest".
According to the calculations of Shiren Wang Shizhen, the average amount of grain for each member of the clan is five hundred stone per year, that is"
Compared with the hundred official years formulated in the early Ming Dynasty, the official of the first grade is only 900 stone, the official of the first grade is reduced to 600 stone, and the official of the seventh product is only 80 stone.
The determination of the Ming Dynasty's Zonglu support system made a very clear and direct correspondence between the population of the Zonglu clan and the number of Zonglu's needs, that is, the addition of a descendant of the Zhu family would increase the local finance of the Ming Dynasty by an additional portion of the grain expenditure. Over time, the various domains and their dependent populations grew sharply, and the most immediate consequence of this was the surge in demand from Zonglu. Compared with the clans of other provinces, the population of the Shanxi clan grew the fastest, and therefore the demand for grain increased the most rapidly.
During the Hongwu and Yongle years of the Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang's three sons, Zhu Hui the King of Jin, Zhu Gui the Acting King, and Zhu Mo the Prince of Shen, successively opened prefectures in present-day Shanxi Province, establishing a system of three clan kings, known as the "Three Great Provinces of Shanxi". Zhu Hui was the third son of Zhu Yuanzhang, who was made King of Jin in April of the third year of Hongwu (1370), and in the eleventh year (1378), he took over Taiyuan Prefecture (now Taiyuan City).
The King of Jin and the King of Qin, as the princes who had earlier and strong strength, had the largest number of seals, initially 50,000 stone, later changed to 10,000 stone, and later reduced to 9,000 stone, all branches of true color Lu rice;
Zhu Gui was the twelfth son of Zhu Yuanzhang, and in the twenty-fifth year of Hongwu (1392), he was made the acting king and opened the province of Datong Fu (now Datong City). When Zhu Gui was divided, the grain was 2,000 stone, which was later increased to 6,000 stone, and half of the rice and banknotes were supported; Zhu Mo was the twenty-first son of Zhu Yuanzhang, and in the twenty-fourth year of Hongwu (1391) he was made the Prince of Shen, and in the sixth year of Yongle (1408), he became the governor of Lu Prefecture (later changed to Lu'an Prefecture, ruling present-day Changzhi City).
The process of increasing the number of zonglu is also the process of increasing the tax burden in the region where the zonglu is located, and the amount of taxes collected by each region usually has a fixed limit, and the rapid increase in the supply of zonglu will inevitably bring heavy pressure to local finances. Local financial difficulties caused by the increase in Zonglu manifested themselves early in Shanxi. For example, in the seventh year of Hongzhi (1494), Zhang Shihua, the governor of Shanxi, requested that the Xiechi salt class be added to make up for the reign of the clan of the clan because "the time of the sect is becoming more and more prosperous, and Shanxi is tired and desolate, and Lumi is also lacking."
By May of the eighth year of Hongzhi (1495), Gu Zuo, the governor of Shanxi, said in the upper play: "The prosperity of the population of the Shanxi clan has also attracted great attention from the government and the public.
For example, the Qingcheng royal palace held the record for the highest number of births, and according to Yang Cheng, the governor of Shanxi in August of the fifth year of Hongzhi, at that time the king of Qingcheng had 94 children and 163 grandchildren, and the grain supported by a county king family exceeded 100,000 shi.
As the quantity of grain demand increases, the pressure on economically distressed regions becomes more prominent. The area with prominent contradictions between supply and demand in Shanxi was the first to push Shangdatong Province (now Datong City, Shanxi). The years of the Dai Wang system are all transferred by the prefectures and counties to which Datong Prefecture belongs. Due to the objective conditions on the ground, the economic situation of the members of the dai fu was already relatively difficult. "Gaidai is secluded on the poor side, and the resources of each sect are unplanned, and the state of poverty is different from that of Beppu."
However, the population growth of the Dai Wang Fu family is still quite amazing, for example, by the time of Hongzhi, the Dai Wang Fu family had given birth to more than 570 sons and more than 300 women, which brought a very heavy burden to the local military and civilians. For example, in June of the fifteenth year of Hongzhi (1502), Wang Gai said in his speech: "In the city of Datong, the county king, generals, and guests of honor were half of it, and its soldiers and people were left with no tolerance, and their grain reserves were almost exhausted. It is advisable to choose the nearest county to deal with the county king, generals, honorary guests and their relatives. Otherwise, it is also necessary to increase the amount of grain and expand its city, and ask the inspectors and inspectors to investigate and report on the situation. ”
In one city, half of the city was actually inhabited by the Zong Domain, so that the local military and civilians had no place to stand. For example, in September of the sixteenth year of Zhengde (1521), Yang Zhixue, the governor of Datong, said in the upper play: "The Daifu clan branch multiplies, and the Datong prefecture is often endowed with insufficient resources for the domain, and the sects are often destitute." Therefore, it was requested that the official silver stored in the Datong Treasury and the salt silver stored by the Shanxi Buzheng Department be transferred to Zonglu. It can be said that by the time of Hongzhi and Zhengde, the taxes collected in the Datong area could no longer meet the needs of Daifu Lu grain, and had to be offset by other fiscal revenues. In other words, the demand for grain in Daifu Lu has exceeded the share stipulated by local taxes (often called "years faction" or "annual quota"), and other financial resources are needed to be mobilized, which is the initial characteristic of the emergence of the "Zonglu dilemma".
If the "Zonglu dilemma" that appeared during the Hongzhi and Zhengde years was only partial, then by the early years of Jiajing, the nationwide "Zonglu dilemma" had been formed, and most of the areas with sectarian divisions could not afford to pay all the grain needed, and the difference was quite staggering. For such a grim situation, many courtiers were overflowing with worry.
These performances show us the various crisis scenes caused by the "Zonglu dilemma" in many ways. For example, on the afternoon of February in the eighth year of Jiajing (1529), Huo Tao, a Hanlin bachelor, pointed out in the above words: "Emperor Taizu first determined the world, feudal affinity, Lu system is poor, and the world is inherently eager to enjoy peace." For one hundred and sixty years, the sect branch has become more and more prosperous, and Lu grain has not been given. Generals and lieutenants descended, and those who played the grain were repeatedly... The land tax income cannot be increased, and the descendants of the clan are multiplying day by day, and the grain is not given for any reason. In the past, one county was used to provide for one king, and now it is provided for thousands and hundreds of people with one county, and the grain is not given... The endowment is limited, the food is infinite, and for a few decades, why do you want to improve the future? Among the provinces, the contradiction between the supply and demand of grain in Shanxi is one of the most prominent, so the Ming ministers also cited the Shanxi Zongfan as an example when discussing the "Zonglu dilemma".
For example, in June of the eighth year of Jiajing (1529), Huo Tao and others especially cited the issue of the Shanxi Domain as an example when discussing the population expansion of the Tianxia Domain: "In the early years of Hongwu, Shanxi was only crowned the first king of the Jin Domain, with 10,000 stones of the year and 10,000 stones, and now the king of Zengjun, Zhenguo, Fengguo, generals, and lieutenants, a total of 2,851, and the annual branch of Lumi is 870,000 wonders. From 10,000 stone to 870,000 stone, it is 87 times more. and Chashanxi Etian, 410,000 hectares in the first year, 380,000 hectares in the fifteenth year of Hongzhi, and 30,000 hectares in the reduction. Lumi increased from 10,000 stone to 870,000, and Etian decreased from 410,000 to 380,000 hectares. Take Shanxi and push the world can also be done. ”
For example, in September of the thirteenth year of Jiajing (1534), Huke Du Guan Huali and others said in the above words: "Whoever is in charge of the sect, the sect leader leads the people to play beggars for grain, and the more forbidden the crime, the more it should be responsible." But the ministers and others read all over the situation, which is nothing more than hunger and cold, marriage and funeral abolition, and poverty. and check the world's grain revenue rate is not given. For example, the three prefectures of Jin, Dai, and Shen in Shanxi used 956,000 grains per year, but the annual faction was only more than 842,000 stones, that is, this province, the world can know. After that, the wider the tribe, the more grain they had, and the extreme poverty of the sect, how could they sit idly by and watch the difficulties and not be in the region? ”
In November of the 32nd year of Jiajing (1553), Ouyang Duo again bitterly criticized the problem of Chen Zongfan in Shangshuzhong, pointing out: "Yongle added forty-one princes, county kings, and generals, twenty-eight women, and one hundred and twenty-seven, but not more, and at that time Lumi could not give all of it, and Shenfu was only six thousand stones... Today, there are nine thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight princes, nine thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight princes, nine thousand seven hundred and eighty-three women, and nineteen thousand six hundred and eleven, one hundred and fifty times the number of the early years. ... Moreover, if the private tax and grain have been reduced or increased, it is impossible to know where it is in the future, that is, there is no way to do it today. That is, in a province of Shanxi, 1.52 million stones of rice and wheat remain, while Zongmurulu rice should be 3.12 million stones; Henan Province has 840,000 stones and 3,000 stones, and Zongmuro Lumi has 1.92 million stones, which is the grain of the two provinces, that is, there is no water and drought, and the literacy is complete, which is not enough to provide half of the Lu rice. ”
In October of the forty-first year of Jiajing (1562), Yushi Lin Run proposed a long speech on the question of the Zong Domain, the content of which was roughly the same as that of Ouyang Duo, and the data cited were almost the same, such as saying: "There is nothing more difficult to worry about today than the Zong Domain." Therefore, the wealth of the world provides 4 million stones of grain for the masters of Beijing, and 8.53 million stones of Lumifan in various royal palaces, which is nothing less than double. That is, for example, Shanxi retains 1.52 million stones of rice, and 3.12 million stones of Lumi; Henan has 843,000 stones of rice, while 1.92 million stones of Lumi. It is the grain of the two provinces that is all lost, which is less than half of the rice supply. The officials and military salaries are all out of it! Because this recital is relatively comprehensive and profound, it has been quoted by various works such as Li Chunfang's "Regulations of the Zongfan" and Long Wenbin's "Ming Hui Yuan", and it was nearly ten years later than Ouyang Duo's performance, so the data of its performance should also be limited to the thirty-two years of Jiajing.
The grain of the members of the Ming Dynasty clan was supplied by taxes in various places, and the taxes collected by local governments were fixed and relatively limited, then, with the expansion of the population of the clan domain, the supply demand of Zonglu would inevitably exceed the supply capacity of the local people and local finances (mainly manifested in the number of taxes) at a certain time, which is called the "Zonglu dilemma". Of course, determining whether there is a "Zonglu dilemma" also requires a more objective identification standard.
We see that the ministers of the Ming Dynasty used several different criteria for judging the "Zonglu dilemma" when discussing the "Zonglu dilemma", some of which were inaccurate or lacked analogy. For example, Huo Tao compares the decline of the number of zonglu with the number of land, although there is a close relationship between the two, it lacks the intuitiveness of comparison. Many ministers often compared the total amount of grain (i.e., four million stones) transferred to Jingshi from various places each year with the total amount of Zong Lu, and this method was also not very convincing.
During the Ming Dynasty, taxes throughout the country and in the provinces were relatively fixed (see Table 1). In the Ming generation, Shanxi Province's tax revenue did not increase significantly, and even declined significantly, which is the so-called "decrease without increase".
Local taxes are divided into several items according to their diversion trend, such as starting transportation, internal allocation, and actual retention, and the real power of local officials is the last remaining actual retained amount, which is also the most important source of supply for officials, military food, and Lu grain. According to Ouyang Duo and Lin Runshu, the amount of data retained in Shanxi every year is 1.52 million stone, which should be an extremely important tipping point.
According to the data provided in volume 7 of the "Wanli Accounting Record", in the sixth year of Wanli (1578), the summer tax in Shanxi was about 591951 stone wheat, and the actual remaining wheat was about 443610 stone wheat; The autumn grain is about 1722851 stone rice, and the actual remaining 998484 stone rice, the total remaining is 1442094 stone. The amount remaining in Jiajing was reduced by nearly 80,000 stone. In contrast to the relative stagnant and declining trend of taxes and retained amounts, the demand for grain in the Shanxi clan is rapidly increasing as the population expands. For example, the most detailed information on the number of clans of the Ming Dynasty is the statistics of the "Jade Mou" in the early years of Longqing provided by Wang Shizhen's "Bishan Tang Collection".
Based on the number of personnel provided by the clan and the average standard of grain supply, we can roughly calculate that the total demand for grain in the Shanxi clan at that time was 4763620 stone, which was more than three times the number of Shanxi second tax reserves (1.52 million stone) (see Table 2). According to the "approximate number of years" provided by the "Wanli Accounting Records" provided in volume 32 of the "Wanli Accounting Record", the total number of members of the three major prefectures in Shanxi was 7,058, and the annual use of Ben Zhelu rice was 4637618 stone, which was also more than three times the number of two taxes (1442094 stones) retained at that time.
As far as the available data are concerned, from the early years of Hongzhi to the early years of Wanli, the annual growth rate of Lu grain demand in Shanxi is also changing. For example, in the 34 years from the eighth year of Hongzhi to the eighth year of Jiajing, the growth rate of Lu grain was 3.6‰, and in the five years from the eighth year of Jiajing to the thirteenth year of Jiajing, the growth rate of Lu grain rose to 19.0‰. In the 19 years from the thirteenth year of Jiajing to the thirty-second year of Jiajing, the growth rate of demand for grain was as high as 64.2%.
It can be said that this period is also the period when the demand for Lu grain in Shanxi is growing the fastest, and it is also the period when the critical point of survival (that is, 1.52 million stone) is fully broken (see Table 4). According to the average growth rate of 64.2%, starting from the thirteenth year of Jiajing, less than eight years, that is, before the twenty-first year of Jiajing (1542), the demand for grain in Shanxi had exceeded the critical point of 1.52 million stone. When the amount of grain demand in the Zonglu Domain is equal to the amount of the second tax retained in the locality, it proves that the place has not only fallen into a comprehensive "Zonglu dilemma", but also the "Zonglu dilemma" has reached an irreparable situation.
The overall "Zonglu dilemma" in Shanxi has fully emerged by about 20 years in Jiajing, and it has become irreversible. The actual situation seems to be earlier, for example, according to Huo Tao's slack in the early years of Jiajing, at that time, the Shanxi region had accumulated arrears of grain 1478852 stones to Wang Fulu, which was equivalent to the amount of Shanxi's two taxes in one year.
In the last year of Jiajing's reign, Wang Zongmu, the political envoy of Shanxi, went to the cloud of "Shanxi Calamity and Desolation": "Bichen found that the original amount of taxes and grain in this province was more than 2.287 million stones, and the people sent by him were about 500,000 in Datong, 170,000 in Xuanfu, 330,000 in the three passes (that is, Yanmen Pass, Ningwu Pass, and Yitou Pass), and 850,000 in grain from the emperors of each royal palace. Xuan, Da, and Three Passes, the people know that it is urgent, although the vertebral skin is peeled, but they dare not lack. As for Wang Lu's increasing number of grains, and the grain was not solved, even if the order was exhausted, it was still insufficient, so the various sects were short of expenditure for many years, and since the summer of the thirty-ninth year, the grain has not been given to it, and last year there were several two hundred people who died of hunger and plague. "The original amount here minus the number of Xuan, Da, and Sanguan Sects, that is, the amount of taxes retained in Shanxi Province, that is, about 1.3 million stones, of which only 850,000 stones were forcibly allocated to Wang Fulu, which is quite different from the amount that Zonglu deserves.
It can be said that when in the early years of the late Wanli period of Jiajing, the demand for Lu rice in the Shanxi royal palace greatly exceeded its annual quantity, or was equivalent to several times the tax grain retention in Shanxi Province, then these quantities were largely meaningless to actually pay. We see that in much the same situation as in Shanxi Province, on a national scale, since the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, the number of taxes mainly paid by rice and wheat has been stagnant or even declining for a long time, so there was inevitably a fiscal and supply crisis in the late Ming Dynasty.
For example, in the second year of Jiajing (1523), Yushi Liguan pointed out: "There are two taxes in the early summer and autumn of the country. wheat more than 4.7 million stone, 90,000 less today; There are more than 24.7 million stones in rice, and now there are more than 2.5 million less. And the clan chamber, the redundant officials, the number of internal officials, and the increase of sergeants, are all taken from them, and the endowment is daily loss, and the expenses are increased day by day. "The surge of Zonglu was undoubtedly an important factor in exacerbating the financial and supply crisis of the late Ming Dynasty.
In June of the fifth year of Longqing (1571), Ding Wei, Li Yonglu, Yang Jiaxiang, Zhang Guoyan and others pointed out in the upper play: "According to the general theory of the world, at the beginning of the country, there were only forty-nine princes, county kings, and generals; There are a total of 28,924 people in the "Jade Wall" today, and the annual grain is 8.7 million. The county and county lords and honorary guests are not in harmony. Compared with the beginning of the country, there are hundreds of them. The world's annual supply of Jingshi is limited to four million, and the grain of Zongmuro Lu is nothing less than doubled. It is the number of national lessons every year, which is not enough to provide half of the sect room. "In the context of the overall financial crisis in the whole country, the Shanxi clan could not receive help and help from other provinces at all.
In order to cope with the difficult situation in which Zonglu did not pay for it, officials at all levels in Shanxi also tried in every possible way to transfer help, but they had no choice but to do nothing. For example, salt administration is one of the important sources of fiscal revenue for local officials in Shanxi, so using salt and silver to pay Zonglu is the most common way of accommodation. "Shanxi is a narrow and poor people, and it uses heavy burdens, and the supply of rice and grain is not enough, and every salt profit subsidy." In the literature, you can often find examples of the government using salt to reach Zonglu. For example, in March of the fourteenth year of Jiajing (1535), Geng Yin, "Considering the lack of Zonglu in Shanxi, he ordered the salt of Hedong to transport the salt, summoned merchants to buy it, and compensated for both the official and the silver, and the latter was not an example." ”
In June of the second year of Longqing (1568), King Lechang of Shanxi was full of smoke: "There are many grain accumulations, and poverty cannot be saved." Begged for two cripples without salt to lead to help. The ministers of Hubu proposed: "The salt of the state is introduced, and it is specially used to help the border, and after repeated construction, the clan must not be discussed." Only the salt and silver stored in the state treasury can be borrowed. Muzong then decreed that 10,000 taels be allocated. It should be said that the negative impact of these relief measures is considerable, and many local officials oppose it. For example, in the 47th year of Wanli (1619), the first lunar month of Ren Yin, the governor of Shanxi, Wang Yuanyi, claimed in his speech that "the reform of the salt branch of the domain is extremely untrainable."
In fact, behind the serious imbalance between supply and demand, there are more complex and tricky problems, because a large number of materials confirm that there are many descendants of unnamed and untitled clans in the royal palace. Asking for a name is a prerequisite for asking for a seal, and the descendants of the sect who do not have a name cannot get Lumi. For example, in March of the eleventh year of Zhengde (1516), Jiang Gui, a eunuch who had been in charge of investigating the affairs of the Shanxi clan and others, said in the above play: "In the old system, the male and female men and women were married in the fifteenth year, and there was a division to pay Lu grain, and there was also a permanent period. In recent years, when the married, Gu Qi Jun King, could not do it, but the lawsuit was repeated and sought, so that women had 30, men had 20, and unmarried people, the grievances deepened, causing offending customs, and it was true that they were not only celebrating into one house, but there were still many kings in Shanxi and Henan. ”
Some county kings even deliberately obstructed their own people's requests for seals, such as Xin You in August of the 28th year of Jiajing (1549), and Zhu Junbai, the king of Xichuan, was punished for suspending more than 130 children of his own clan from applying for names. This is the second time he has been punished for delaying the petition. On the other hand, even if these petitions for names and seals are fortunate enough to be issued, due to the rapid population growth and complicated affairs, they are "like a mountain of volumes", and it is inevitable that they cannot be retained for a long time, and it is simply impossible to add seals in time. However, on the other hand, imagine that if these descendants of the unnamed clan were all granted the canonization, what kind of huge amount of grain would be needed in various parts of the Ming Dynasty?
In the early years of Longqing, it was said that there were "two major things" in the imperial court at that time: the outer border defense and the inner clan of the domain; In comparison, Zongfan is even more tricky: "Recently, according to the actual number of "Jade Mou", there are 28,491 items such as relatives, county kings, generals, lieutenants, and unnamed and unsealed and unsealed people. The county lord is not in harmony. It depends on the number of seals at the beginning of the country, and the total annual support rice is more than 8.6 million stones, which is more than twice as much as the 4 million stones in Caojian. The national Qin Si Sect room is all in the name of the wedding without losing time. Today, according to the "Jade Wall", there are 8,800 unnamed generals and 5,200 unsealed people. ”
The more peculiar thing about the figure provided by He Qiming is that it lists the number of unnamed and unsealed people in the clan domain, so we can infer that out of the 28,491 clan members, there are more than 14,000 unnamed and unsealed, nearly half of the total. The unnamed and unsealed have not yet received the Lu grain, and assuming that these clan members have been given the Lu grain they deserve, then the amount of Lu grain that the local government of the Ming Dynasty needs to pay is naturally far more than 8.6 million stone.
The grim reality has cornered the Ming government. However, the nightmare is far from over, "the sect has a new seal, Lumi adds a new point, year after year, there is no end." And now there is no place, then the sick country, the sick people, the sick sect, there is no one else. "Today, the country suffers from a lack of supply, and unexpected changes are in danger; In the sect office, they suffer from the lack of food and grain, and the situation of the upheaval is pitiful, and the public and private are trapped by it, and there is no other reason, and the good policy of giving and giving is poor, and the prohibition is too strict and the road to life is impossible. ”
Therefore, taking Shanxi as an example, from the beginning of Jiajing to the middle of Jiajing (to be precise, around 1541, in the twentieth year of Jiajing), the demand for Zonglu in Shanxi soared, not only breaking through the share of local tax middle-aged sect Zonglu, but also rapidly approaching and exceeding the total amount of tax retention on which Shanxi's local military and political operations depended. At the same time, the central finance of the Ming Dynasty and other provinces were unable to support and transfer assistance, so the official government of the region where the Zong Domain was located gradually fell into the "Zonglu dilemma" caused by the sharp increase in the number of members of the clan family, and it was irreversible.