Text | Jiang Ran Jiang
Edit the | Jiang Ran Jiang
In addition to theorists' predictions, it may be equally questionable whether an idyllic era of tranquility ever existed. In China, however, many classic Warring States writings foresee an era of virtue and tranquility, simplicity and harmony.
Does the era of simplicity and harmony really exist in China?
A key factor in the emergence of early wars
In terms of logistical practice, it must be admitted that the Chinese Neolithic period is still unknown.
However, most conflicts are localized, essentially raids and brief encounters by several soldiers on a day's march, and combatants may have carried enough food to sustain for a day or two.
However, with the rise of regional powers such as the Xia Dynasty, Sanmiao Dynasty, and Former Shang Dynasty, the conflict escalated to involve hundreds, then thousands, and some administrative and organizational measures had to be taken.
Archaeological finds provide evidence of the adoption and rapid expansion of agriculture during the Yongsan period, meaning that edible stores from millet to seeds already existed, can be found in every village, and were easily seized by troops in the fields.
In addition, the abundance of pigs and other mobile animals greatly increased the potential food supply, but could also trap armies in slaughter and cooking, leaving them vulnerable to the kind of raids that later generations advocated and exploited.
In the Neolithic period, and even during the Shang Dynasty, hunting, gathering of fruits and other foods still played an important role, and small gangs of a few hundred people may have found enough food in the surrounding uninhabited countryside.
Large-scale hunts in which hundreds of animals could be captured or killed before a campaign will also provide vital food.
In addition, since almost all settlements and villages, the most likely targets of this era were located near rivers and lakes, fishing and trapping offered another possibility, albeit somewhat time-consuming.
If armies advance on foot, not too far or too fast, thereby reducing the protein burden of hunting, some animals, such as sheep found buried in caravan chariots, may be grazing in large numbers.
In addition to the relative advantages and disadvantages of cattle and horses, the fundamental problem with providing feed is only weight and volume.
However, the limited troops sent before the Shang Dynasty may not have been accompanied by animals, and even the Shang Dynasty army had few chariots and carriages.
Their requirements are therefore low and it is likely that only horses and any cattle will be required to graze in nearby areas as power for so-called "carts" or large vehicles.
The rebuilt campaign showed that the merchant troops in the campaign were rarely stationed for long periods of time, thus avoiding running out of locally available fodder and food, or suffering many other logistical and health problems from stalemates and long sieges.
In the Eastern Zhou and late Zhou Dynasties, winter is generally considered the appropriate season for punishing and killing military activities, which coincides with the predominance of yin and the natural characteristics of metallic (autumn) and water (winter)-related elemental phases.
Thus, officials responsible for enforcing punishment appeared among officials associated with autumn, and some weapons manufacturers were classified as winter. In addition, military activities carried out at this time can take advantage of the calm of agricultural obligations to live on recently harvested crops.
However, oracle inscriptions indicate that the Shang Dynasty launched military operations throughout the year in response to external stimuli and perceived threats.
Despite having to endure the effects of cold weather, the ripening of nuts and the increase in agricultural reserves undoubtedly facilitate the autumn-winter movement, but are clearly not limited by their existence.
Warehouses and granaries are maintained in the core area, from which initial supplies for military operations can be distributed. In addition, the Shang dynasty constantly carved out new fields on the periphery and turned the conquered areas into farmland, especially in the west.
Troops who had to pass through these areas could take advantage of locally harvested and stored food, and some kingdoms seem to have retained food and animals.
Instead of giving them to the Shang dynasty as tribute, this not only reduced the initial quantity that might need to be distributed, but also reduced transportation costs and workload.
However, at least once, the Shang Dynasty also received a large number of animals, up to hundreds of cattle, and although many animals were consumed and used for sacrifices (before being consumed), some animals were certainly sufficient for military needs.
Under Wu Ting, the Shang Dynasty further cut military spending by sending submissive states and coercing allies responsible for maintaining the battlefield. They also seem to have provided supplies when necessary.
For example, an inscription preserves the question of whether Yu's original state would have met the needs of brigades (legions) on the march. The value of this contribution should not be underestimated.
As the Art of War states, "When the army transports grain far away, the nation becomes impoverished." When grain was transported to distant places, families became impoverished. People who are good at using the army will not deliver grain for the third time. ”
Although many Shang Dynasty battles may only take a few weeks, weapons problems remain. In addition to the piercing and smashing weapons carried from the very beginning, a large number of arrows had to be supplied as the campaign progressed.
For one engagement, carrying a total of 20 arrows in two barrels per archer may be enough, but even at a very slow rate of fire of 5 rounds per minute.
A day's confrontation or a fierce pre-conflict archery duel can also easily consume hundreds of arrows per person, as the large number of packages found from Shang tombs suggests that some kind of supply and resupply system must exist.
Opinions differ on whether the most basic administrative structure of the Xia clan includes officials responsible for weapons, or whether it is provided solely by individuals or the various Xia families.
However, as mentioned earlier, it is generally believed that the Shang Dynasty had a monopoly on the manufacture and large storage of weapons, although the Shang warrior elite had a variety of daggers, daggers, axes and bows.
Instead, it has been argued that the early Zhou Dynasty military announcement "Waste Stone" (which probably dates back to the early Spring and Autumn Period) contained in the Book of Shang provides evidence that the army provided its own weapons in the early Zhou Dynasty and, therefore, by projecting it backwards, during the Shang Dynasty.
However, the highly concise "waste rock" is a very uncertain collection, issued by an unknown commander before launching a campaign against the Yi people around the Huai River.
Although they were instructed to prepare armor and weapons by repairing, sanding and sorting out everything, there is no information about the origin of these weapons. The army was also ordered to prepare cooked rations, but whether the material was supplied by the government is unclear.
Even the officials in charge of weapons mentioned in the Rites of Zhou could not realistically imagine that such weapons existed in the Shang Dynasty, because he explicitly provided them to users, including those who were about to learn archery.
Different clans all seem to specialize in certain types of productive activities, whether deliberate or historically accidental. If so, they could be responsible for supplying or otherwise supervising all types of basic military items, from weapons to supplies.
Various ethnic groups with expertise in horses, cattle, and herding animals, such as the Chiang, as well as officials specializing in dogs and livestock, would also provide a ready-made nucleus for continued military operations and possibly hold temporary positions throughout the Shang dynasty.
In particular, the responsibility for providing meat in the wild seems to fall on the Chief Canine Officer. The standing border troops under these officials and the Shu state also appear to be farming locally for a living.
Finally, the nature and extent of road development in the Xiashang region would greatly affect the transportation of goods and materials and facilitate (or hinder) the movement of the army.
Although well-tammed roads have been found in many early sites, including Erlitou and Yanshi, all discoveries to date have been confined to early cities and towns, which is the natural focus of excavations.
It is unclear whether there were administrative officials during the Xia or Shang dynasties responsible for road improvements and early bridge construction, although the delivery of tribute and troops seems to have spurred the dispatch of crews tasked with clearing trees and simple upgrades to well-trafficked roads.
People in the context of ancient wars
There is no doubt that there is a reciprocal relationship between the opening of transport routes and the facilitation of commercial and military activities due to trade and administrative needs, including the passage of large numbers of troops.
Despite the analysis provided by a growing number of books on primitive or early wars, it remains opaque for society to move from peaceful and rural to a view dominated by military values in order to survive.
In addition to later imaginations and predictions of theorists who believe in the dogma of matriarchal equality, it may be equally questionable whether an idyllic era of tranquility ever existed.
In China, however, many classic Warring States writings have foreseen an era of virtue and tranquility, simplicity and harmony, whether natural or coercive.
To the stage when a member cares about war only when threatened, to the final isolation and the arrival of conflict, a sudden transformation.
References scattered throughout the broader pre-imperial material suggest that growing upheaval has plagued the highly idealized, semi-legendary ancestors of the saints.
Sun Bin pointed out that seven groups disobeyed Yao's orders, including two Yi groups and four central region groups, which he pacified by force.
Other observers believe that Shun found it necessary to conquer 14 recalcitrant entities, he attacked the Miao, then gave the same task to Yu and actually perished in a campaign against them.
When Yu finally took power, he found that 33 groups refused to give in and he had to "impose his teachings." Fortunately, Dongyi did not support the Miao in the conflict; Otherwise, the relatively weak forces of the Xia clan would be crushed.
Although these short quotes are unsubstantive and unreliable, they still accurately reflect the accelerating trend towards local and global conflicts, the failure of vaunted virtues to prevail, and the alleged reluctance to acknowledge what would later be called "providence", and alliance-building has become an important factor.
Even the neutrality of so-called natural allies can doom isolated people to defeat, foreshadowing the validity of the warnings made by Art of War a thousand and a half years later to stop the alliance and thus incapacitate the enemy.
Historians have traditionally identified the accumulation of wealth, class divisions, and the evolution of authoritarian structures as key factors in the emergence of conflict and early wars.
Although the temptation of material goods and the agony of scarcity undoubtedly lead to greed and greed, neither hierarchical structure nor class differentiation requires gangs of robbers to start plundering, since this is more profitable than farming and hunting.
When fights and conflicts break out, they inspire not only the need for defensive measures, but also respect for life-saving warriors, and respect for those who trample on cowardly and unprepared warriors, whose admirers include a growing number of villains.
At the end of Yangshao and the beginning of Longshan, specialized weapons of no use other than attacking and killing upright human enemies increased rapidly.
In addition to empowering users and courage, their growth coincided with the emergence of intensified population centers, demonstrating how low-intensity warfare can inspire creativity, organization, and authority.
The appearance of a huge defensive wall in Yongshan is considered one of the distinguishing features of the culture and has long been considered an important development in the unstoppable evolution of Chinese civilization.
This was a step towards realizing the concept that "the city was built to protect the rulers, and the Guo was built to protect the people".
Although dwellings are increasingly varied, and there is other evidence that an earlier hierarchical structure, such as ancestral halls, the lack of fortified interior quarters suggests that the focus of defense was external, pointing to unknown others, rather than place-oriented.
It is therefore designed to protect emerging power groups that increasingly claim authority over others.
In ancient times, it was only in the two capitals of Iro, Yonsei and Jeongzhou, that the inside of the palace and the fully formed encircled fortifications were discovered. Even the last capital of the Xia and Shang dynasties, located in Erlitou and Anyang, was known for its obvious fortifications.
Bibliography:
"Reading the History of Public Opinion"
Geographical Distribution Map of Ancient Chinese Wars
"Ancient Chinese History" Zhu Shaohou