The Paper's reporter Zheng Shiliang
Xu Jinsheng (Zhang Jingyi)
Mr. Xu Jinsheng, professor of the School of International Cultural Exchange of Fudan University and researcher of the Center for Japanese Studies of Fudan University, has long been engaged in the study of the history of modern Sino-Japanese relations. He made full use of the original archives in Japanese to systematically study Japan's military espionage activities and propaganda offensives against China during the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the full outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1937, and published two monographs, "Research on the Military Espionage System of Modern Japan to China (1868-1937)" and "Research on Modern Japanese Propaganda Warfare against China (1868-1937)." In an exclusive interview with the Shanghai Review of Books, he introduced the relevant topics.
"Research on the Military Espionage System of Modern Japan to China (1868-1937)", by Xu Jinsheng, Fudan University Press, July 2015, 422 pages, 68.00 yuan
"Research on Modern Japanese Propaganda Warfare against China (1868-1937)", by Xu Jinsheng, Fudan University Press, September 2021, 387 pages, 88.00 yuan
At first glance at your book "Research on the Military Espionage System of Modern Japan to China (1868-1937)", I feel that this topic is quite rare, and the word "spy report" can immediately grasp the reader. In your early years, you studied economic history, and you also wrote a book "History of Japanese-funded Industry in Modern Shanghai", why did you turn to military espionage research later?
Xu Jinsheng: My undergraduate major was Japanese, and I felt that language was just a tool, or should it be combined with the major, at that time, several old gentlemen who did Japanese history research in China were very famous, including my later mentor, Mr. Wu Jie of the Fudan History Department. I was originally interested in history, and when I was about to graduate from undergraduate, I saw that Mr. Wu was recruiting graduate students, so I went to his graduate school. After graduating from graduate school, I went to Fudan International Cultural Exchange Institute to teach translation, Chinese and history classes to Japanese students, teaching for a living while continuing my research. I studied modern and contemporary Japanese history, but I focused on the history of Sino-Japanese relations in modern times, and the reason is simple: Japan's connection with China in modern times is really too close. As for why I wrote the "History of Japanese-funded Industry in Modern Shanghai", it is because there are many factories invested and built in Shanghai in modern Japan, especially cotton textile factories, and I often see various factories related to Japan in Shanghai, which arouses interest. I am in Shanghai, and it is convenient to collect historical materials. After doing this for a while, I felt that I could form a research system, and I wrote a lot of papers, because this is a topic in economic history, and finally applied for a doctorate in the Economics Department of Ritsumeikan University in Japan. After I got my Ph.D., I moved on to the direction of military history that I had always liked.
Espionage activities are the precursor and foundation of military activities and the core of military decision-making, so I focused my data collection on Japan's military espionage activities against China at the beginning, and at that time there was very little systematic research in this regard. In fact, there are many people who are interested in Japan's espionage activities against China, and there are also many related books. It's just that it seems that many of them are just telling spy stories, and there are only a few "celebrities" who are upside down, such as Kenji Doihara, or some more famous cases. However, Japan's military espionage activities against China do not depend on a few people, and the real espionage activities include many aspects, mainly relying on the continuous activities of most unknown spies for three hundred and sixty-five days. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Chiang Kai-shek once lamented: "None of the Japanese we have seen are not detectives, and none of them are not plainclothes teams." Major Casewell, who served as a military attaché at the French Embassy in China in the early 1930s, also said in his evaluation of Japan's intelligence work in China: "Japan's intelligence operations in China are very developed, and almost every Japanese in China is a Japanese spy agent." Whether these claims are exaggerated or not, they at least reflect the extreme prevalence of Japanese spies in China in modern times. Therefore, I would like to systematically sort out what kind of policies and guidelines Japan has established since the Sino-Japanese War, what kind of institutions it has established, and what kind of activities it has adopted to collect comprehensive and long-term espionage reports on China. In fact, since the Sino-Japanese War, every policy plan and aggressive act that Japan has adopted against China has been supported by a large number of espionage activities. Accurate intelligence is indispensable for Japan's military aggression to be carried out smoothly.
In your book, you limit the time of Japan's military espionage system to China in 1868, what is your consideration?
Xu Jinsheng: In 1868, Japan established a modern government through the Meiji Restoration, and regarded "rich countries and strong soldiers" as one of the three major national policies. Then, in order to achieve the goal of "strengthening the army", the Meiji government actively studied the Western military system and built a modern army. Although modernization had only just begun, the idea of external expansion that emerged at the end of the Edo period was revived. It was the era of imperialism, and the law of the jungle prevailed. If Japan wants to expand abroad, it is the strong neighbor of Tsarist Russia in the north that must be wary, and the one who can bully and oppress is China, which is weaker than itself. In fact, Japan has made it a long-term national policy to invade the Korean Peninsula and northeast China. In 1871, the government official Eto Shinpei put forward a proposal for the expansion of China, believing that for China, which was relatively poor and weak at that time, "once Russia jointly attacked with the United States and Germany, it would be able to win", so he advocated sending monks to China, which was also a "Buddhist country", to install traitors in it, or to send spies to investigate China's situation, and formulate a strategy toward China on the basis of collecting intelligence. In addition, in 1872, he was the first director of the Ministry of War, and the following year, the sixth director of the bureau in charge of intelligence work, Torio Koyata, also believed that it was necessary to study China's military situation, and after studying with Yamagata Aritomo, who was then secretary of state of the army, decided to carry out large-scale espionage activities against China, and formulated a spy plan for this purpose. Torio's spy collection program focuses on basic information on operations against China. As the Japanese military's earliest military espionage collection plan for China, the content of the three required reconnaissance of A, B, and C is not limited to the military, but also includes the politics, diplomacy, and economy that are closely related to the military.
Motivated by this expansion, the Army Staff Bureau was established in 1872, and in June 1873, the Staff Board was renamed the Sixth Bureau, which was responsible for surveying, mapping, and collecting war histories, military books, and political records, with Torio Koyata being the first director. In December 1878, under the active promotion of Aritomo and Katsurataro of the Army, the Meiji government decided to completely separate the military administration from the military order, and the Staff Bureau was independent from the Army Province to establish the General Staff Headquarters, which marked the institutionalization of the independence of the Japanese military command. After the establishment of the General Staff Headquarters, the first important measure taken in the field of foreign espionage was to strengthen espionage activities against China. The Guanxi Bureau under the General Staff Headquarters was responsible for "the coast from Korea to the Qing Dynasty," and the first director of the Guanxi Bureau was Gui Taro, who had always advocated strengthening espionage against China; in the more than six years that he led the Guanxi Bureau, he designed a strict spy system, formulated a spy plan for China, and regularly dispatched a large number of spies to China. This also laid the foundation for Japan's military espionage activities against China.
It was precisely because of the in-depth espionage activities against China that Japan was able to win the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. In fact, before the Sino-Japanese War, many Japanese were worried that they would not be able to defeat such a giant as China. However, Ito Hirobumi was full of confidence, saying that once the war really started, it would only be a confrontation with one or two Provinces of China, and the whole of China was just a mess, and it was impossible to twist into a force against Japan. Relying on the intelligence gathered over the past three decades, he already knew a good deal about the situation in China and would only assert it. So, 1868 was a starting point.
In addition to military activities, what other forms of intelligence collection does Japan have, can you please talk about it?
Xu Jinsheng: In fact, before the Sino-Japanese War, China was a very mysterious country for the vast majority of Japanese, and the Japanese people have always been very interested in China as a neighbor. Therefore, after the Sino-Japanese War, on the one hand, China was forced to open its doors, on the other hand, Japan's national strength gradually developed, overseas trade exchanges became more and more frequent, and more and more people went to China. Among them, there are many people who do surveys for various reasons. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, has conducted ongoing surveys on economic aspects, one of the purposes of which is to conduct trade, and there are a large number of trade reports every year. This is also an important academic topic now, Japanese scholars have long begun to study, and there are also scholars in Wuhan University who have been doing it. From Japanese officials to non-governmental organizations, there are too many subjects who come to China to investigate, with various purposes and organizations, such as the East Asian Tongwen Association and its subordinate East Asian Tongwen Academy.
As for my research, it mainly focuses on the military. Therefore, after the book was published, many people criticized me and said, why don't you write Aboutao, why don't you write about the East Asian Literature Academy, why don't you write about the Mantetsu Investigation Department? I can only answer that my personal energy is limited, the scope of attention is focused on the military's espionage work, and I am unable to pay attention to various investigation subjects. For example, Arao Seiko, although he took the funds of the Japanese General Staff Headquarters to do research in Wuhan, but his identity was no longer a soldier. Another example is Munakata Kotaro, who has also been doing espionage work for them with the funds of the Japanese Navy, writing a lot of reports, and now the translation of his diary has also been published. I have not paid attention to these things, but they still focus on the espionage work carried out by the military, although the Japanese military will also use civilian institutions or individuals to conduct investigations, and there are too many civilian institutions that carry out activities with military funds, which is the content of another book.
You have consulted so many intelligence materials collected by the Japanese army on China, what are the most impressive?
Xu Jinsheng: These materials may not be of interest to ordinary people, that is, boring data, hundreds of thousands of pages at once, but some of the information I was very surprised after seeing it.
One is "Waterway Chronicle", which is our Waterway Chronicle, which means waterway in Japanese. Because of the unequal treaty, China's Yangtze River has opened a treaty port, and foreign warships can enter and leave at any time. The Japanese army described the situation of the Yangtze River in great detail, almost to the point of being unbelievable, where there are lighthouses, where there are fishing fences, where there are obstacles, all of which have been recorded, and the hydrological changes have been recorded in detail, and every year. What impressed me particularly was that when the Japanese warships were stationed in the harbor, some local governments would entertain Japanese soldiers, and after these officers and soldiers landed, they would not only hang out in the streets, but also go to camping and training, recording all kinds of local situations along the way, which was actually a kind of espionage activity. In addition, there are military doctors on each warship, and the records of various aspects are very detailed, such as local epidemics, temperatures, etc. These materials have accumulated for a long time is very good intelligence, and when military operations are taken, they will know what preparations should be made. I originally planned to publish this set of waterways, but unfortunately, scholars in China who really need these materials may not be able to understand because of language relations, and scholars who can understand Japanese are not related majors, so they can only give up.
One is a report submitted to the General Staff Headquarters by japanese troops stationed in China. Every year, these garrisons submit annual reports to conduct detailed and comprehensive investigations of the Local Chinese Troops, which have been the case for decades, and have investigated the deployment of the Chinese Armed Forces, their comprehensive strength, and other aspects in a very meticulous manner. Once the Chinese military is mobilized, they are required to submit an interim report. In addition, there are periodic reports, which are designated investigation items by the General Staff Headquarters and are equivalent to the operations assigned to the Chinese garrison. The information I saw was mainly the investigation report of the Japanese army stationed in north China. I think that perhaps only Japan is the only country in the world that will conduct such an investigation of China, and the other powers must be very concerned about the situation in China, but they will never be as meticulous as the Japanese. Of course, as I said earlier, this intelligence is not only being collected by the main body of military espionage, but also by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also collecting intelligence in all directions through the consulate in China and sharing it with the General Staff Headquarters.
Many of the information collected by the Japanese army at that time should have been destroyed, right?
Xu Jinsheng: Too much was destroyed. According to Japanese scholars, on August 14, 1945, the Japanese government decided to accept the Potsdam Proclamation and ordered the burning of important classified documents. From the afternoon of the 14th to the 16th, the Headquarters of the Army, the General Staff Headquarters, the Ichitani, where the Army Province is located, and the Navy Headquarters, the Headquarters of the Army, and the Headquarters of the Navy, Kasumigaseki, where the Headquarters of the Navy, were burned, and almost all the official documents were burned. Because of this incineration, the basic materials necessary for the study of the history of the army and navy are lacking, leaving a blank space in the history of the army and navy and a mystery that has not been solved to this day." What we can see now is only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, many materials were originally designated to be destroyed, such as one of the regulations formulated by the General Staff Headquarters for the newly compiled "Secret Report of Reference Information" in January 1932 was "burned after use", and I don't know why it was left behind.
Your later study of propaganda warfare should have been extended from the study of military espionage, right?
Xu Jinsheng: Yes, propaganda and espionage are twins, and to ensure the success of military operations, it is necessary to have the cooperation of public opinion. Especially after the First World War, Britain's propaganda war was so successful that the Germans said they were defeated by Reuters. Therefore, after the First World War, various countries attached great importance to propaganda warfare. The study of propaganda warfare is more comprehensive, not only focusing on how the Japanese military manipulated public opinion, but also going deep into the perspective of the Japanese government at that time to understand its policy formulation and implementation in all aspects. Propaganda warfare is Japan's long-term strategy, serving not only the military but also the policy of invading China in an all-round way. Also since 1868, the Japanese government has attached importance to propaganda and linked it to foreign policy. In the Sino-Japanese War, it fully demonstrated how Japan used the tools of public opinion to cooperate with military aggression in its China policy.
For example, during the Sino-Japanese War, the center of public opinion in China was Hong Kong and Shanghai, because these two cities had a special international status, and there were many newspapers, especially English newspapers run by foreigners. Whether before or during the Sino-Japanese War, it was difficult for Chinese newspapers to get news quickly, with very limited sources and slow speed. At that time Chinese if they wanted to care about the Sino-Japanese War, newspapers were a very important channel. Whether it is Hong Kong or Shanghai, English newspapers are the fastest and most numerous, and readers will think that these newspapers are third parties after all, and that reporting on the war between China and Japan will be relatively objective. Therefore, many of the news published in Chinese newspapers at that time was translated from English newspapers. The Japanese consul general in Hong Kong and Shanghai was very concerned about how to use Chinese English newspapers to speak for Japan, and the operation method was very simple, giving money, and then making an appointment with these newspapers, and Japan would provide news of the Sino-Japanese War. In this way, the English newspapers in Hong Kong and Shanghai can indirectly influence the public opinion of the Sino-Japanese War. At that time, China's news was quite closed, and whoever could deliver the news faster could preconceived the image of their own interests and control public opinion in their own hands. This is the earliest and most successful example of Japan's propaganda war against China, which has been out of control ever since.
How did China confront Japan in the propaganda war at that time, and how effective was it?
Xu Jinsheng: Take the Jinan massacre as an example. In response to the public opinion war of the Jinan massacre, China has made great efforts and made relatively full mobilization, and the Nationalist government at that time attached great importance to propaganda, but Japan still had the upper hand in some aspects. The Japanese troops who invaded Shandong all set up "propaganda classes," which were also divided into "Chinese classes" and "European and American classes," the former targeting the Chinese media, the latter targeting the European and American media and the world media stationed in China. After the Jinan massacre, the Japanese side took out a large number of photos that were not conducive to the National Government and distributed them to the whole world, which can be said to be well versed in today's "there is a picture and the truth", especially at that time, public education was not yet popular, and the impact of the intuitive visual impact of photos was not known to be many times greater than the text.
In addition, an example of a Declaration can be given. The Japanese side has a deep connection with the Declaration for a period of time. During the May Fourth period, the people of Shanghai launched a collective protest movement, which was closely related to the "Japanese poisoning of tap water" incident. Intriguingly, while all the newspapers in Shanghai were reporting and criticizing the incident, the "Declaration" had been writing insisting that the poisoning incident was a rumor. Some people may say that the "Declaration" did not carry a palanquin for the Japanese, so how can it be regarded as helping the Japanese to publicize it? This brings us to the issue of Japan's public opinion warfare tactics, which have different standards for different targets. Some media should publicly publicize for Japan and say more good things; Some media, as long as they do not scold Japan, do not need to say good things; There are also media that are usually silent and silent, neither saying good nor bad things, and once the objective facts are published in Japan's interest, they must clearly explain the relevant facts one by one, which is probably the so-called "whitewashing" today. So, what kind of role can the Declaration correspond to? Speaking of which, at that time, Japan did know very well about the Chinese media, knew that some newspapers did not have principles, and scolded them for actually asking for money. This is also a social climate, because newspapers are not easy to make a living, and many tabloids live by cursing: I scold you desperately, as long as you send money, I will not scold.
Finally, I would like to ask you to talk about the historical data you used in your research.
Xu Jinsheng: The so-called "theory comes out of history" and the foundation of writing history lies in historical materials. Historical materials are indeed a feature of my research, and only a very small part of the historical materials I use have been used before. Whether it is Japan or China, scholars mainly dig into those famous newspapers, such as "Tongwen Hu Bao" and "Shuntian Times", especially "Tongwen Hu Bao", using many scholars, in fact, there are many important newspapers related to Japan, and they can continue to dig deeper.
The main part of the historical material I use comes from the Japanese "Asian History Information Center" website, which is JACAR in the commentary. The letter "A" indicates that the material is in the possession of the National Library of Public Documents, "B" indicates the collection of the Diplomatic Historical Materials Museum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "C" indicates the collection of the Defense Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. However, when searching for historical materials on this website, it generally only shows the first page, and it must be opened page by page, and it cannot be searched by keywords alone. It doesn't take ten years or eight years, and a lot of information is difficult to excavate. When I was collecting historical materials related to espionage reports, in addition to the espionage plan and espionage organization at the theoretical level, I also had to pay attention to the influence of the specific behavior of the main body of espionage, and many other relevant historical materials were excavated, so after the study of espionage reports, I published several sets of historical materials, such as: "Integration of Historical Materials investigated by newspapers and periodicals in China in Modern Japan", "Supplement to the Investigation of Historical Materials of Newspapers and Periodicals and News Agencies in Modern Japan in China", and "Integration of Survey Materials of Modern Japanese Soldiers in China". These are all by-products of research.
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