(April 30, 1945)
Comrades: I would like to talk about two issues, one is the question of the anti-Japanese national united front, focusing on the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the other is the question of lessons learned from the united front. Taken together, it is all about the question of the united front.
I. On the Anti-Japanese National United Front
Since our Party put forward the idea of the anti-Japanese national united front and last year when it put forward the idea of a coalition government, it has developed and is actually a thing. The coalition government is the highest form of political power of the anti-Japanese national united front. The Kuomintang has always opposed our ideas, whether it is the anti-Japanese national united front, the democratic republic, or the coalition government. Because he stands in the interests of a very small minority and opposes the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people that we represent. Comrade Mao Tse-tung told us in his political report "On Coalition Government" that this is a struggle between two lines. On the one hand, the Kuomintang government oppressed the Chinese people to carry out the line of passive resistance, and on the other hand, it Chinese the line of awakening and uniting to carry out the people's war. As we know, the anti-Japanese national united front has been brewing for a long time, and it has gradually developed in this direction almost after "9/18." From "918" to the present, it can be divided into five stages. The first stage was from "9/18" to the Xi'an Incident [; The second stage is from the Xi'an Incident to the "July 7" Incident; The third stage is from the "July 7" incident to the retreat from Wuhan; The fourth stage is from the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee in 1939 to the meeting of the National Political Participation Committee last year; The last stage continues from the formulation of the slogan of our coalition government to the present. In these five stages, the two parties of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have long had differences of principle and serious struggles on the question of anti-Japanese resistance and democracy throughout the country.
The first stage, from "918" to the Xi'an Incident, lasted more than five years. The center of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists was whether to resist Japanese aggression or not to resist Japanese aggression. What we, on the other hand, put forward before the people of the whole country is a demand for the cessation of the civil war and the unanimous resistance against Japan. What the Kuomintang authorities put forward and insisted on in front of the people of the whole country is that "if you want to take the outside world, you must first settle inside," which is actually the policy of civil war. After September 18, we proposed to the kuomintang troops that an armistice agreement be concluded under the three conditions of stopping the offensive, giving the people freedom and arming the people, so as to unanimously resist Japan. Comrade Mao Zedong has already written in his report. Our call was echoed by a number of Kuomintang troops. For example, the Chabei Alliance Army, the Fujian People's Government, and the Nineteenth Route Army, and later the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army, all responded to us and cooperated with us. Some other local armies, although they do not fully agree with our slogans, also cooperate with us in some way. Even the troops of the Kuomintang Central Committee, when they attacked us in Jiangxi, advocated driving to North China to resist Japan. But how did chiang kai-shek of the Kuomintang deal with it at that time? For us, it is a constant "encirclement and suppression", an even more rampant civil war. For those friendly forces that cooperate with us, it is to attack them, disband them, destroy them. As for his own concubine army, he issued such an order, "Those who talk about the anti-Japanese will be killed without forgiveness." That is, whoever dares to say more about the anti-Japanese resistance will kill him. Later, when the Events in North China occurred in 1935 and the main force of our Red Army went north, we put forward the slogan of the anti-Japanese national united front and the idea of a democratic republic, and in a letter to the Kuomintang in 1936, we proposed to convene a national defense conference, launch a war of resistance, convene an elected national assembly, and realize a democratic republic. In action, we crossed the Yellow River in the east to resist Japan, responded to the "129" movement in North China at that time, and set off a nationwide salvation movement. At this time, the Kuomintang authorities sent large troops to Shanxi to stop us from resisting Japan, with the aim of wiping us out in the northwest. During the Xi'an Incident, I once asked Chiang Kai-shek: "We demand an end to the civil war, so why don't we stop it?" He said, "I'll wait for you to come to the northwest." I said, "We've been in the Northwest for over a year." "He had nothing to say. His meaning was clear: to wipe us out in the northwest. So before the Xi'an Incident, there was also a battle at the Mountain Castle. The east side is also blocked, and the west side is also blocked, that is, to destroy us. He vigorously oppressed the salvation movement throughout the country, and finally the seven gentlemen were imprisoned. Therefore, at that time, Comrade Mao Zedong wrote a letter from our Party to the Kuomintang saying: "Patriotism is guilty, and unjust imprisonment is all over the country; The traitors have rewards, and the traitors celebrate each other. "Even so, because we have constantly demanded, and the people of the whole country have constantly called for the cessation of the civil war and the unanimous resistance against Japan, the Kuomintang first sent two representatives to Wa Yao Fort to negotiate, and then we sent our representative Comrade Pan Hannian to negotiate with them. What was Chiang Kai-shek's idea of negotiations? At that time, he regarded us as surrenders and wanted to recruit us, and until before the Xi'an Incident, he still had this idea, and he wanted to make our army up to three thousand to five thousand. As for the many troops in the Kuomintang army who were willing to resist Japan, especially the Northeast Army, they were oppressed. Chiang Kai-shek once said to General Zhang Xueliang: "Your duty is to suppress the Communists, and you are not allowed to go to Suiyuan to resist the war." If not, replace you. Later, when the Xi'an conference was convened, Chen Cheng came, and Jiang Dingwen also came, and he was ready to replace Zhang Xueliang with Jiang Dingwen. Thus forced out a Xi'an incident. With regard to the Xi'an incident, our party adhered to the principle of peaceful settlement, obtained the consent of Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, and released Chiang Kai-shek back. What was the specific promise made by Chiang Kai-shek himself at that time? It is "I will never fight a civil war, I must resist Japan." But after Zhang Xueliang sent him to the south, he detained Zhang Xueliang and sent Yang Hucheng out of the ocean. In this way, it excited the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army, and almost destroyed peace. Moreover, he used the army to oppress him, sent spies to provoke, and made a scene to kill Wang Yizhe. It can be seen from this that after the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident, his idea of civil war has not died, and he has never died. It can also be said that Song Ziwen was also the so-called messenger of peace who negotiated at that time, when he promised to be responsible for reorganizing the Nanjing government after Chiang Kai-shek went out. As a result, this statement has been spoken for eight years and has not been fulfilled. When I met him in Chongqing last year, I said such a sarcastic remark, I said: "I have not yet announced to you the promise you promised at the time of the Xi'an Incident." "It turns out he hasn't been cashing in. So in this first stage, although the civil war has stopped and peace has been achieved, it has been forced out. This is the policy of our Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong: to force Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. But Chiang Kai-shek's heart of civil war did not die.
The second stage, from the Xi'an Incident to the "July 7" War of Resistance, lasted about half a year. At the center of the debate between the two sides is whether to really prepare for the War of Resistance or to prepare for the War of Resistance. At that time, in the telegram sent by our Party to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee and in the report of Comrade Mao Zedong at the Party's Congress of the Soviet Union, they all said the following: We must truly practice democracy and freedom and truly prepare for the War of Resistance. To be truly prepared for the War of Resistance, there must be democracy. Our central slogan is democracy to promote the War of Resistance. What was the Kuomintang's policy at that time? It was to "root out the red calamity" and delay the War of Resistance. It is to eliminate and eradicate the activities of the Communist Party, that is, to drag the War of Resistance under the pretext of preparing for the War of Resistance. This was Chiang Kai-shek's thinking at that time.
Let's look at the facts. In February 1937, we sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee, making four promises and five demands. The four promises were made to the effect of agreeing to reorganize our army, to transform our Soviet zone into a democratic border zone, to stop armed insurrection to overthrow the Kuomintang regime, and to stop the policy of confiscating the land of the landlords. The five demands were to the effect that the Kuomintang should stop the civil war, give the people freedom and release political prisoners, convene meetings of all parties, truly carry out preparations for the War of Resistance, and improve the people's livelihood. And what was the Kuomintang's answer? It is a resolution that "eradicates the evil of the dead." There were four articles in that resolution: the abolition of the Red Army, the abolition of Soviet power, the cessation of red propaganda, the cessation of the class struggle. This thing is pun-curd, because the Red Army changed its name, it can also be said to cancel the Red Army, but the Red Army still exists; The Soviet District changed its name, which can also be said to cancel the Soviet District, but the Soviet District still exists. The so-called cessation of class struggle and the cessation of redistributive propaganda means that we are not allowed to engage in political activity in the areas ruled by the Kuomintang. At that time, on the one hand, there was peace, and on the other hand, the article was ambushed. This article has been buried until now, or to abolish our army and regime. At that time, there was also a movement in the Kuomintang to cooperate with us. This part of the people, Sun Ke, Feng Yuxiang, and others, also proposed a resolution to restore Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three major policies, but it was not passed. At that time, we advocated the convening of an elected National Convention and the formation of a democratic government. Comrade Mao Zedong gave a report at the May Congress, and I wrote an article on the orders of the Central Committee, which was very much approved by the democrats at home and abroad. But what was the Kuomintang's answer? Conduct arranged elections for deputies to the National Convention. The bane of the Congress, which is now being prepared, was sown at that time. At that time, we advocated convening a meeting of various parties, but the Kuomintang came to a Lushan talk meeting, and instead of everyone sitting down and holding a round table and discussing together, we used the Kuomintang as the master and invited everyone to talk. Until the last time Wang Shijie negotiated with me, he still wanted to adopt and propose to organize some kind of political consultation meeting, but the result was still a talk meeting. However, at the time of the Lushan talks, the Communist Party did not have a part, and it was secret that I did not show up with Comrades Lin Boqu and Bogu, and now the method they proposed was to give a "publicity.", which I think is the difference. Our negotiations with the Kuomintang took place once in Xi'an, once in Hangzhou's West Lake, and twice in Lushan. The targets of the negotiations were Gu Zhutong, Chiang Kai-shek, and others. The content of the negotiations is to make them recognize our army, our border areas, the legitimate status of the parties, and the organization of a coalition of the parties, that is, the united front. What was chiang kai-shek's answer from the Kuomintang? He only allowed us to form three divisions (forty-five thousand men), which has remained so until now, and in any case he will not be given a command headquarters, but will be under direct command. What about the border area? It was admitted, but then it was overthrown. Chiang Kai-shek once said to Commander-in-Chief Zhu: "You still want the border areas after the War of Resistance!" "He wants to give a commander-in-chief the name of the border area." As a result, Pingxingguan fought a victorious battle, and he admitted that it was adopted at the 333rd session of the Executive Yuan. Retreating to the south, he shelved the resolution and has not yet recognized it. It is even more absurd to our Party. We demanded the legal status of all parties and the establishment of alliances of all parties, but at the first talk in Lushan, he dared to say: "Please Mr. Mao and Mr. Zhu to go abroad." "You see, he would think so!" We negotiated with him so well, but he dealt with us by sending Yang Hucheng abroad. On the issue of issuing a declaration on the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, at the second Lushan talk, we brought the drafted declaration, and he wanted to change two sentences by hand. But he did not publish the revisions, always trying to obliterate the legality of the Communist Party. If the "August 13" had not been launched, we would not have been allowed to establish the organization of the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and the General Headquarters of the Eighteenth Group Army. Commander-in-Chief Zhu and I went to Nanjing with Chief of Staff Ye Jianying, and at first Chiang Kai-shek had not yet decided to give the name of the Eighth Route Army, but when the battle came to Shanghai, he ran back from Lushan and felt that this was an all-out war, so he issued the number of the Eighth Route Army, followed by the number of the Eighteenth Group Army, asking our army to fight. Later, the manifesto was also issued, but Chiang Kai-shek made another speech, on the one hand, to recognize us, but on the other hand, to abolish the Red Army and abolish the Soviet zone. He said that we are a faction, did not recognize that we are a party, and stressed whether we should concentrate under the leadership of the Kuomintang or deal with us in the spirit of Ah Q.
These experiences prove that our ideas have lifted the people of the whole country. The peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident promoted the nationwide War of Resistance. In this way, the War of Resistance was forced, the negotiations were forced, and the united front was forced. At the same time, it proves that only the people have the strength to force it. It also proves that Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist ideology is unchanged.
The third stage, from the "July Seventh" War of Resistance to the retreat from Wuhan, lasted about a year and a half. The center of the struggle during this period was whether it was an all-out war of resistance or a one-sided war of resistance. The slogan of our Party is protracted war, people's war, an all-round war of resistance and a war of resistance of the whole nation. And the Kuomintang? They want to fight a decisive battle quickly, allowing only the government to resist the war and not allowing the people to rise up, so as to oppose our protracted war, the people's war. The first is the controversy over the issue of sending troops that occurred after the "August 13" period. The policy of our Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong is to send troops in batches and not to go out at once. We mainly went to North China to carry out independent guerrilla warfare in the mountains, to create a battlefield in North China, and to make preparations for a protracted war, so that we could win victory. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, demanded that we go out at once, and designated only a small area northeast of Mount Wutai (such as Laiyuan and Weixian) as our defense zone, in an attempt to call the Japanese to encircle and destroy us in that mountain.
On a national scale, the policy of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong is to persist in protracted warfare. And the Kuomintang? It's a fantasy quick win. They felt that just a few successful battles could provoke international interference. The best hope was for the Soviet Union to send troops, followed by Anglo-American intervention in Shanghai. So they fought a trench war, transferred one or two million troops to Shanghai, and took them to fight, sacrificing greatly. Before Nanjing was about to be lost, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Stalin and said: Ah! I can't live in this place anymore, please hurry up and send troops! He also demanded the conclusion of a military agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union had already helped China in the War of Resistance, aided arms, aircraft, and signed a non-aggression pact with China to help politically. As a result of Chiang Kai-shek's trench warfare, he lost a lot of the main force, so when he retreated in Nanjing, he was once shaken and wanted to negotiate peace, but it did not succeed, because the conditions in Japan were very harsh, and the main thing was that the climax of the war of resistance in the whole country had already risen, and he did not dare to surrender. As a result of the different policies and practices adopted by the Kuomintang and the Communists, as a result, we created guerrilla battlefields and base areas in North China, and he lost a large piece of land in North China and Central China, until Wuhan retreated, and in many position battles, he lost a lot of troops. This is a different view on the strategic side. Of course, at that time in Wuhan, we had our own mistakes. That is to say, the comrades who were doing leading work in Wuhan at that time, including me, focused on believing that the strength of the Kuomintang could win the battle, and despised the development of our own strength; In war, it emphasizes mobile warfare and despises guerrilla warfare. Therefore, during the Wuhan period, our work in the Yangtze River Basin did not take advantage of the retreat of the Kuomintang army to go to the countryside, mobilize the peasants, and extensively develop guerrilla warfare as in North China. In the Wuhan negotiations, we continued to adhere to the idea of a coalition of parties, that is, to establish a united front organization, formulate a common program, and reform the political institutions at that time. And the Kuomintang? They put forward the slogan of a political party, a doctrine, a leader, and they want to absorb us into the Kuomintang and dissolve it. They called it the "policy of dissolving the communists" at that time, as if they were going to take water to turn us into a commune. The Kuomintang is Lin Daiyu made of water, but we did not do Jia Baoyu, and we can't make it. In addition, they proposed that as long as you add it. We say that it is okay to form a united alliance, you are one, we are also a part, each with its own independent organization. When we go into the Kuomintang, we must maintain the independent organization of our Communist Party, just as we did with the first Kuomintang-Communist cooperation during the Period of the Great Revolution. But Chiang Kai-shek did not do it, he said, there can be no party outside the party. We say, you have factions in the party, and what does it matter if you have a party outside the party! He said, you can join the Party as a communist, don't be outside. He just wants to melt us down, and of course it doesn't make sense to use this method. He organized the Three Youth Leagues, and we also advocated joint participation in and development of the youth movement, but Chiang Kai-shek did not do anything, he wanted to use the Three Youth Leagues to abolish all youth organizations and unify them with him, and no other party was allowed to operate in them. Of course, this does not make sense. His policy toward us behind enemy lines is to let us fight the enemy behind enemy lines and weaken us. Just as Comrade Zhu De said that day, the Kuomintang quickly withdrew in northern China, and we could not but go. Therefore, during the Wuhan period, he promised us to go to North China and Shandong to develop guerrilla warfare. Comrade Xu Xiangqian took the 115th Division to Shandong and got his consent. However, when he saw that our guerrilla warfare had developed, the people's forces had developed, and that base areas had been established, he was afraid, so he immediately followed and sent Lu Zhonglin and Zhang Yinwu to lead troops to rub with us. Politically, we advocate reforming politics and establishing organs of public opinion. At that time, on the one hand, he was engaged in the Suffragette Council, and on the other hand, it was still a one-party dictatorship, which was only a "guest organ" and dissolved some people's organizations.
At this stage, we can see that the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek's theory of quick victory has failed, and it has failed to rely on foreign countries to participate in the war, speculation has not succeeded, and surrender has not dared. He was forced by the strength of the Eighth Route Army and the strength of the people not to move toward a protracted war, and he could not but express a little progress in politics. But his speculative and reactionary nature continued to be retained.
The fourth stage, from the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang in 1939 to the open negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists last year, last year, lasted for six years. The center of the controversy between our Party and the Kuomintang, that is, as our Party said in the "July Seventh" Declaration of 1939, we insist on resisting the war, unity and progress, while the Kuomintang wants to compromise, split, and retreat. This struggle continues to this day. In these six years, we have advocated active resistance, seeking progress, and relying on ourselves. On the one hand, we demand that the Kuomintang be able to do so; On the other hand, we have made achievements behind enemy lines, created nineteen liberated areas, and developed a large number of troops, which proved that our method was correct, so that we could support the frontal battlefield of the Kuomintang and promote the democratic movement throughout the country. But what about the Kuomintang in these six years? It is the opposite, that is, what we often call passive resistance and active anti-communism. In his report to this meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong also analyzed the system in which they relied on foreign help, waited for victory, and colluded with the enemy's puppet army to create a civil war. Because of this, in these six years, there have been three anti-communist upsurges and three negotiations.
Regarding these two "threes", we can also say a little. There is a hat at the beginning, which is the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang. The Fifth Plenum was held after the evacuation of Wuhan in January 1939. At that time, our Party sent a telegram with the attitude of demanding progress, opposing Wang Jingwei's surrender, advocating a strict reorganization of the anti-war line-up, a refresh of politics, and a reform of the government. However, the answer of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Plenary Session was that there was a "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Other Parties," which was adopted in principle at the meeting, and after the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang formulated many restrictive methods for our army, the border areas, the Communist Party, the people's activities, and so on. To sum up, there is only one leader in the War of Resistance, and military orders and government decrees must be unified. This has been the case until now. Second, we should abolish "specialization," oppose the so-called "feudal division," and encircle and blockade the border areas. This has also been done until now. Third, it is no longer allowed to be called the Eighth Route Army, but only the Eighteenth Group Army. What does this mean? The Eighth Route Army is an army establishment in peacetime, that is to say, there are also ordinary times, and the Eighteenth Group Army is an army organization during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The article is here. But the people of North China answered him: it was still the name of the Eighth Route Army, and the words of the Eighteenth Group Army were not easy to pronounce. Chiang Kai-shek's enactment of this article was a step in his preparation for the abolition of the Eighth Route Army. Since then, he has constantly driven the team to North China and rubbed with us. There were Zhu Huaibing, Shi Yousan, Gao Shuxun, and Tang Enbo. And we will also cancel our offices, only the offices in Xi'an and Chongqing will exist, and the rest will be cancelled. Therefore, the Pingjiang Massacre occurred, the Zhugou Massacre occurred, and the Guangdong Shaoguan Office and the Guilin Office were also cancelled. These were all things that happened during that period. Fourth, communist organizations were not allowed in the Kuomintang areas. So after discovering the secret organization of the Communist Party, it was destroyed. There is no secret popular movement, and no propaganda. Therefore, the Xinhua Daily was often inspected and detained, and many articles of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong were not allowed to be published. The policy of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang in 1939 has been implemented for seven years. When we say that the Kuomintang passively resisted the war and actively opposed communism, it was at that time that it began. Of course, the roots come from history.
With this hat, there are three anti-communist upsurges underneath. For the first time, Comrade Zhu De has already said, it began with the attack on the border areas, the cancellation of our offices, and the creation of the Pingjiang massacre. The most important thing is in North China, from the new military change all the way to Zhu Huaibing and our friction. After that, Chiang Kai-shek could not continue to fight and failed. Comrade Zhu De is quite right in saying that Chiang Kai-shek is afraid of one thing and afraid of strength. You have the power to wipe out his stuff clean, he didn't say it. Zhu Huaibing was wiped out, and Chiang Kai-shek never mentioned this matter. He had no choice but to pinch his nose and ask Wei Lihuang to negotiate with Commander-in-Chief Zhu and demarcate the Zhanghe River. The first anti-communist upsurge passed, and then came the first negotiations. Our approach is reasonable, beneficial and disciplined. We won the battle without pride, or negotiated with him. We are tolerant of each other. That time I went out to negotiate. As soon as we negotiated with him, he wanted to get a little cheaper. At that time there were four things in the negotiations: the legitimacy of the Party, the recognition of the border areas, the increase in the army, and the division of the combat areas. The center is in article IV. He just wanted to drive us north of the Yellow River and not the New Fourth Army to be south of the Yangtze River. At that time, there were several "norths": Shandong was Lubei, Shanxi was Northern Jin, and there was a yellow river north. He wanted to send us all north, which was really "throwing in the north". Then we didn't do it, so there was a serious debate. He made no concessions. We made a little concession and promised the southern Anhui troops to retreat to the north of the Yangtze River, also a "north", called Jiangbei. But he did not do it yet, and came a He Bai "Haodian" [318] who asked us to go north of the Yellow River, which is also a "north". He insisted on the Central Prompt, which led to a second anti-communist upsurge. This began in the winter of 1940 and was ambushed from the Northern Soviet War. The Northern Jiangsu War was his conspiracy, and he originally wanted to start from Northern Jiangsu first and then fight southern Anhui. Because our strength in northern Jiangsu was small, he had two armies[320] of Han Deqin and Li Shouwei there. They try to press on the north and a dozen in the south, and we only have to "drink water"! He knew that he was mistaken, because northern Jiangsu had the leadership of Comrade Liu Shaoqi and corrected Comrade Xiang Ying's mistakes. Comrade Chen Yi led the army, implemented the correct policy of the central authorities, and came to a "retreat and retreat." When he called, we would retreat first. Later, a counterattack came at the Yellow Bridge, eliminating the two divisions. Chiang Kai-shek pinched his nose and did not speak, but he wanted revenge. After the end of the Northern Jiangsu War, Wang Maogong went to Gu Zhutong to arrange the anhui incident, but on the surface he still wanted to paralyze you. I was in Chongqing at the time. On Christmas Day, December 25, the day Chiang Kai-shek was put back after the Xi'an Incident, he suddenly invited me to his place and talked about our friends in distress and poured rice soup. I saw that the rice soup was not delicious, which aroused my vigilance, and I quickly sent a telegram to Comrade Mao Zedong, saying that there was an article in it. Sure enough, within ten days, he set out to encircle the troops in southern Anhui, and came the second anti-communist upsurge. Because the comrades leading the troops in southern Anhui at that time made mistakes, they suffered losses. He became even more arrogant and announced the cancellation of the new Fourth Army. But our Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, fought back, and he did not recognize our recognition. Since then, the New Fourth Army has become an army under the leadership and command of the Communist Party, not under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, so it has grown from 100,000 to 300,000 people, from the region of three provinces to the current seven or eight provinces. This was the second anti-communist upsurge. When the struggle for the Second Senate was victorious, the second anti-communist upsurge was over. From the second anti-communist upsurge to the second negotiation, the interval was long, because it was a complicated period, including the Japan-Soviet agreement, the German-Soviet war, the Pacific War [195], and the Xinjiang issue. The second negotiation took place in the second half of 1942, but there were also some minor contacts beforehand. After the conclusion of the Japan-Soviet agreement, followed by the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, Chiang Kai-shek was afraid that Zhongtiao Mountain would not be able to hold it, and hoped that we would cooperate, but the main thing was to test whether we could fight Japan. We expressed our cooperation in combat, but Chiang Kai-shek was afraid of us and did not want us to cross the line of the Zhanghe River and to restrict our combat, which made it difficult to cooperate. He is in Zhongtiao Mountain, how do we fight in the north of Zhanghe? At the same time, he did not give us combat orders, but told us to fight ourselves. We want to add a little, he said, as long as you fight, I will not fail you. We fought, and he broke his promise and broke his promise. It was a contact. Later, on the eve of the Pacific War, the situation in China was very tense, and Japan and the United States had the possibility of compromise. In order to prevent japan and the United States from making compromises, we said that we were still in agreement with him on the issue of anti-Japanese resistance, so we participated in the political meeting. At that time, there was a condition that General Ye Ting should be released (General Ye Ting was very brave in the Anhui Incident, standing at the forefront of the struggle against the Kuomintang). Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this condition and was guaranteed by Zhang Qun. We asked the Suffragette to be released before the Senate, but he did not do it. At that time, Comrade Dong Biwu [325] and Comrade Deng Yingchao were both in Chongqing, and the two people only attended one person, and he came to this hand, and we also came to this hand. The political meeting was held, but he still did not let go. According to recent news, General Ye Ting was recruited by Chiang Kai-shek to go to the secret service of Dai Kasa in Chongqing. There is no one in the world who is untrustworthy than Chiang Kai-shek. This is a small negotiation of this period. Before the negotiations in the second half of 1942, Chiang Kai-shek still wanted to come up with a set of tactics, because at that time the Xinjiang issue was solved, and he was a little overwhelmed, he said: "I went to Xi'an to ask Mr. Mao Zedong to come out and talk." Later, Commander Lin Biao went to conduct the second negotiation. At that time, we still hoped to find a way to unite in the War of Resistance, so we expressed our solidarity in the Party's "July 7" Declaration in 1942. Chiang Kai-shek thought that we were a bit of a concession, and the conditions put forward were even more stringent, insisting that our army should not be more formed, that it would still be eight divisions, that the party would be legal only after the army was formed, that the border areas should be changed into administrative regions, and that the combat areas should be moved northward. The negotiation dragged on for a long time, in fact he didn't want to solve the problem. He wanted to continue to speculate, hoping that there would be a War between Japan and the Soviet Union at that time, and once the Japanese Soso started, he would drive us to the north and carry out his original plan, so he would delay. Lin Biao and I went to see Zhang Zhizhong, and he openly said, "It's not a drag yet!" Here are the articles again, which result in dragging out a copy of "The Fate of China" and dragging out a third anti-communist upsurge. At that time, when the Communist International was dissolved, Chiang Kai-shek thought that there would be a dispute in our Party, so he took this opportunity and came to abolish the Communist Party of China, and also came to encircle the border areas and beat us in the heart. The first anti-communist upsurge hit North China, the second anti-communist climax hit Central China, and the third anti-communist climax hit the northwest. We exposed him, and the people of the whole country sympathized with us. In international public opinion, both the Soviet Union and Britain and the United States oppose China's civil war. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek's third anti-communist upsurge was suppressed. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee, Chiang Kai-shek expressed his willingness to solve the problem politically at the National Participation Conference, but he came up with a word of eight characters, saying that we "sabotage the War of Resistance and endanger the country." The third anti-communist upsurge passed, and we said we could always talk if he was willing to settle it politically. Therefore, last year, Comrade Lin Boqu went out to conduct the third negotiation. This negotiation coincided with the period of the constitutional movement, and we expressed our intention to practice democracy and constitutionalism, and put forward three political questions, the specific issues were first seventeen, then nine, and the other eight were changed to oral, so that there were twelve official documents. From Xi'an to Chongqing, we have been talking for almost half a year, but we have not yet achieved results. Chiang Kai-shek came to the second "Central Prompt Case", and concentrated on it to ask us to do three things: First, all the troops other than the ten divisions were cancelled within a time limit. Second, it was stipulated that if ten divisions were to be concentrated there, they had to go there. Third, all governments in the Liberated Areas behind enemy lines were handed over to the provincial governments in exile in Chongqing. Of course, we cannot accept such conditions, and the negotiations ended after Comrade Lin Boqu's report to the National Committee of Political Participation.
It can be seen from these three anti-communist upsurges and the three Kuomintang-Communist negotiations that the Kuomintang's policy of continuing to oppose communism and civil war was particularly evident in the fourth stage, so that they were full of anti-communist ideas during the negotiations, and when the anti-communist upsurge began, they fought, which was the civil war. Nevertheless, the article has not yet been concluded, and there are new articles: either a fourth anti-communist upsurge or a fourth negotiation. As a result, it was not an anti-communist upsurge but the continuation of negotiations. The negotiation was attended not only by democrats from the third party, but also by foreigners; At the same time, the negotiations were open. This is a different point from past negotiations, and it is a new stage.
The fifth stage, from the formulation of the slogan of our coalition government to the present. At the heart of this negotiation is that we propose a democratic coalition government, and the Kuomintang wants to continue the one-party dictatorship. This is a struggle, a struggle between the two lines mentioned in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report. Our policy is to convene immediate party meetings to form a provisional coalition government and, after the war, to convene a National Convention to form a formal coalition government. The Kuomintang's policy is not to abandon the one-party dictatorship, to organize the National Convention, and to continue the one-party dictatorship. The struggle has become more acute in the past six months. Such struggles have further invigorated the democratic movement throughout the country and made the idea of the establishment of a coalition government more supported and sympathetic to democrats at home and abroad. Because of this, the negotiations continued, so there was Hurley to Yan'an and my two outs. Hurley signed a five-point agreement with us in Yan'an, agreeing with the policy of a coalition government proposed by Comrade Mao Zedong of our Party. These five main contents are: in order to jointly defeat the Japanese bandits to build a new China, it is necessary to unify under the coalition government; It is necessary to establish a coalition government of all parties and factions without party or faction, and to establish a joint command representing all the forces of resistance; Freedom must be given to the people, democratic reforms must be introduced; It is necessary to recognize all the anti-Japanese forces, equip all the anti-Japanese forces, and unify all the anti-Japanese forces (unify with a coalition government); Recognize the legitimacy of all parties. Not only did we propose these five points, but U.S. Ambassador Hurley also signed them. He recognized these five points, so I went to Chongqing to realize this policy, the policy of the coalition government. But Chiang Kai-shek refused. After I returned to Yan'an, Hurley continued to invite, and I went out again, proposing that in order to realize a coalition government, a preparatory step could be taken, starting with a meeting of all parties and factions, that is, a meeting of representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, the Democratic League, and non-party elements, to discuss how to reorganize the National Government into a coalition government, how to draft a common program, and how to abolish the one-party dictatorship. This time, Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang still did not agree, but instead shouted something like, "If you want to unite with the government, you are overthrowing the government, and a party meeting is a meeting to share the booty." Completely obliterate our claims. He still wants to continue the original policy. From the "Case of Eradicating the Extreme Scourge" to the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Other Parties," the historical proposition is that we should hand over military power and political power. This can be fully seen in Chiang Kai-shek's speech on March 1 this year, which asked us to hand over to him both the army and the government behind enemy lines. What does He give us? Not a coalition government. What he can give us is to join the government as a guest. We have been this guest for eight years, and we are still rare to be this guest? Of course, it is absolutely impossible to hand over military power and political power. But Chiang Kai-shek still wants you to do this, he says that you can give legitimacy to the Communist Party, but that is the legitimacy of tying up our hands and feet, and what is the legitimacy of tying up our hands and feet! Of course, it is clear that there is another hand behind such a proposition, that is, the National Convention announced on March 1 that the National Assembly will be held on November 12 this year, but this is still the National Convention that the Kuomintang held eight years ago. In the name of returning the government to the people, he actually wants to recognize the legitimacy of the Kuomintang dictatorship by convening a one-party national convention and adopting a one-party autocratic constitution. If anyone comes out against you, he says that you are divided, he will unite you, you will not be united by him, he will crusade against you, this is the civil war he has prepared for a nationwide scale. His approach is completely antithetical to ours. Today, in addition to the fact that the War of Resistance can be said to be the same in this regard, as for how to resist the War of Resistance, it is completely two sets. We want victory — complete victory, democracy — new democratic democracy, unity — democratic unity, not only domestic unity but also international unity. The Kuomintang is a different set, not to win a complete victory but to attempt to compromise and surrender, and in the future it will be able to use Japanese capital and weapons to fight a civil war, to integrate the puppet army into a civil war, not to be democratic but to maintain dictatorship, not to unite but to split, to sow discord in the international community, to try to help Britain and the United States to help a "Skoby", and the Kuomintang is this line.
From the development of the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party since "9/18" to today, large-scale civil wars have generally ceased and a war of resistance has been launched, which is the success of the united front. We have created and expanded the Liberated Areas, inspired the Chinese people, and promoted the democracy movement in China. However, even under the War of Resistance, there was still a partial civil war, which was still full of anti-communist, anti-people, and anti-democratic actions, which were practiced by the Kuomintang. This antagonistic struggle continues. On the one hand, we oppose this reactionary line of passive resistance, but on the other hand we leave room for negotiation. Three anti-communist upsurges into three negotiations, and three negotiations continue after that. Negotiations are for victory, for democracy, for unity, and such negotiations have a role; otherwise, if it is really a talk meeting, there will be no result. This is the situation of the anti-Japanese national united front for a long time.
On the issue of lessons learned from the united front
We cannot speak of lessons learned without linking them to some erroneous issues during the ten years of civil war or even the period of the Great Revolution. During the Great Revolution we had an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national united front, but later this united front was broken because the Kuomintang reactionary clique betrayed the revolution. The advanced forces of the Communist Party, the proletariat, were defeated and had to retreat into the countryside, to mobilize the broad masses to carry out the agrarian revolution, to establish the Red regime and the Red Army in the form of congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers. The united front in this period was the national united front against feudal oppression and against the workers' and peasants' rule of the Kuomintang. After September 18, we turned to the anti-Japanese national united front. Therefore, the united front in the three periods of the Great Revolution, the Ten Years of Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan had different forms and natures. However, the united front in these three periods belonged to the united front of new democracy, because new democracy was the political foundation of the united front in our three periods. The united front of new democracy is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front of the masses of the people led by the proletariat. Comrade Mao Zedong said very clearly that to build a consolidated united front of new democracy, it is necessary to clearly understand the three questions of the enemy, the contingent and the commander. In the course of revolutionary development, the question of the united front is very complicated because the relations between the enemy and ourselves and the camps of struggle change from time to time, and the situation changes frequently. We should study the lessons of the united front in the light of the three aspects pointed out by Comrade Mao Zedong.
Now let's start with the enemy side.
The enemy of the new-democratic revolution is imperialism and feudal forces. This remained unchanged throughout the period of the New Democratic Revolution. But imperialism is not only one, but the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in the country have different factions and groups, and these enemies are often inconsistent, so the enemy's strongholds are changing. In this way, it is not a simple matter for us to recognize the enemy, it has become a complex problem. Sometimes the enemy works together to oppress the masses of the people. For example, when the Great Revolution failed and the reactionary forces in Nanjing and Wuhan cooperated, the so-called "Ninghan cooperation", imperialism stood behind them and unanimously oppressed the revolution. But this was not the case for more than twenty years, and many times the enemies were separated. After "9/18", it became clear that Japan invaded and occupied China by force, and they were separated. After the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, it became even more obvious that Britain and the United States stood against Japan and became allies of China's War of Resistance. Therefore, imperialism has a division and a combination, and the separation time is still long. As far as the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China were concerned, when the Northern Expedition was against the Beiyang warlords, some feudal forces, big bourgeoisie and warlords in the south came to the revolutionary front to speculate and seize the leadership. During the ten years of civil war, the enemy's offensive against the Red Army was also inconsistent. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Anglo-American big bourgeoisie turned around and stood against Japan in the war of resistance, but at the same time colluded with Japan. In this way, the enemy has a division and a combination, and the situation is more complicated. In particular, the representative figures of the various classes are not fixed. Representation changes, and what is not an enemy can also become an enemy, often confuses us. In the early days of the Great Revolution, Chiang Kai-shek played the role of some general bourgeois representatives, but after the Zhongshan Incident on March 20, 1926, he quickly turned to the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In the early days of the Great Revolution, Wang Jingwei was the representative of the bourgeoisie, and in the middle of the Great Revolution, he was very radical, close to the petty bourgeoisie, but during the Wuhan period, he turned to the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In short, the representative figures of the various classes can be changed. During the entire period of the new-democratic revolution in China, there were great changes in the imperialist and feudal forces, especially during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. In the course of these twenty-five years of revolutionary struggle, the united front we have encountered has undergone so many changes, so great, and so complex that it requires us to have a sober mind, to be good at investigating, studying, and analyzing problems. The ideology represented by Comrade Mao Zedong can correctly understand the contradictions and changes in the process of historical development, can understand and analyze the enemy at any time, and can put forward the correct policy for defeating the enemy. All kinds of "Left" and Right opportunism, on the other hand, are ignorant of these things, and first of all many mistakes have occurred on the question of understanding and dealing with the enemy. The mistakes of the right often treat enemies as friends. The most obvious thing is that the Northern Expedition reached Wuhan, chiang kai-shek killed Chen Zanxian in Jiangxi, and after firing a knife at the Communist Party, day by day he went reactionary, and it was very clear that he wanted to go to the enemy's side, but at that time, people like Chen Duxiu in our party, who still advocated continuing to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, did not understand the changes at this juncture of change. The mistakes of the "left" often regard friends as enemies. In the period of civil war, the petty bourgeoisie and even the petty bourgeois elite were our friends, especially after September 18, when the middle class could be friends, while the "Left" view that they were enemies and the most dangerous enemies was wrong to such an extent.
Some enemies have two sides under certain conditions. In forming a united front with them, comrades with right-leaning views pay attention only to the side with which they can unite and forget their reactionary nature. For example, in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the chiang kai-shek clique of large landlords and big bourgeoisie participated in the War of Resistance, but still retained his reactionary character. The mistake of the right-leaning was to wipe the powder for him and obliterate his reactionaryness. During the Second Wuhan Period in 1938, it was wrong to say that the Chiang Kai-shek clique was not a fascist or a warlord. Chiang Kai-shek is indeed reactionary, he is a warlord and a fascist, and it is okay for us not to emphasize this aspect at certain times, but it is wrong to wipe rouge and powder for him. Comrades with "Left" views see no change at the juncture of change, pay attention only to the reactionary nature of these enemies, and do not see the aspects in which they can unite. For example, at the Wa Yao Fort Conference in 1935, Comrade Mao Zedong estimated that the Chinese bourgeoisie, and even some of the big bourgeoisie, might turn to the War of Resistance, and the comrades of the "Left" viewpoint at that time did not believe it and did not know how to unite with them to promote the War of Resistance.
The inconsistencies in the strongholds of the ruling class must be clearly distinguished of which nature. For example, in the current rear area, there are many local powerful factions that oppose Chiang Kai-shek's fascist dictatorship, and of course we can unite with them at this point. But we must understand that they themselves still represent the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, and that there is no fundamental difference between them and Chiang Kai-shek in opposing democracy, nor between them and the incompleteness of the War of Resistance. Therefore, their contradiction with Chiang Kai-shek is a contradiction between the strongholds of the ruling class. The "Left" view does not recognize this contradiction and holds that all enemies must be overthrown within a certain period of time. But if you want to bring down everything, you can't bring down everything.
Enemy fortifications are subject to change. The right view treats those who were friends yesterday and who have become enemies today as friends. For example, Wang Jingwei of the first Wuhan period just mentioned, in the past he did cooperate with us on behalf of the bourgeoisie, but after arriving in Wuhan, he was influenced by the big bourgeoisie day by day, moving towards reaction and going to the enemy's side. Comrades with right-leaning views still consider him a reliable friend, believe in him, and rely on him. The "Left" view treats those who were enemies yesterday and those who may be friends today as enemies. For example, before "9/18", the Nineteenth Route Army attacked us in Jiangxi on behalf of the interests of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, but after "9/18", the climax of the national revolution came and cooperated with us in Fujian. Comrades with "Left" views still regard them as enemies and oppose them. All this shows that the enemy's camps are extremely inconsistent, extremely inconsistent, and extremely volatile. We should analyze it well and apply Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of using contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and breaking through each one, so as not to make the mistake of "Left" and Right.
And then there's the team side.
The new-democratic united front, with the proletariat, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie, and even sometimes some big landlords and big bourgeoisie, also comes to participate, so this contingent is very large, very complex, unbalanced in strength, and not easy to unify. We must be very clear about such a contingent, we must be able to analyze it, we must know how to win over the majority of the contingent, to oppose the minority in this contingent who are vying for our leadership, and to struggle against them. Mistakes are made without understanding this.
The proletariat is the backbone of this contingent. The proletariat is highly conscious and capable, but it is small in number and strength, and in the new-democratic revolution it must rely on one of the most reliable allies, the peasantry. The peasants are the main force of this contingent, and as Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, four of the five fingers are accounted for. China's war is actually a peasant war, and without the peasants, we can't fight a good war. During the Northern Expedition, the majority of the troops themselves, whether they were cooperating forces outside the army, were peasants. At the time of the civil war, it was clearer to rely entirely on the peasantry. It was the same during the War of Resistance. With farmers, we can move in and out; Without peasants, a small number of troops advance alone, and there is no place to retreat. Whether it is the "left" leaning or the right leaning, it is precisely because they do not know the peasants and forget the peasants. The mistake of the "Left" tendency is not to rely on the peasantry, but only on the proletariat to charge, and as a result isolate itself. The mistake of the right is to rely on the bourgeoisie, even on the big bourgeoisie. In the later period of the Great Revolution, during the Wuhan period, the bourgeoisie was considered reliable, and even the strength of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie such as Tang Shengzhi and Feng Yuxiang was regarded as dependence, rather than relying on the peasants. In the second Wuhan period, in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, some comrades did not rely on the peasants, but on the big bourgeoisie, believing that the army led by the Kuomintang would be able to win the battle and forgetting the main strength of the peasants. This kind of reliance is very dangerous, not only to lose the battle, but also to be captured by others. In the second Wuhan period, because the central line was correct and our main force was in North China, we did not fail as we did during the first great revolution, but there was still danger. Later, there was a weakness in the work of the rear area, that is, the democracy movement did not penetrate deep into the countryside.
The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a fundamental force in the ranks of the new-democratic revolution. With this power, it is necessary to unite with the peasants, and even if we do not unite with the peasants, relying only on the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie, we will not be able to win the revolution. The right-wing view holds that victory can be won by relying on the urban petty bourgeoisie and the workers. This is not true. The "Left" view is that even the urban petty bourgeoisie does not want it. The typical representative of the urban petty bourgeoisie is the intellectuals, who believe that intellectuals have no role. This is also not true. Before and after the defeat of the Revolution, it used to rely only on the workers and the intellectuals of the city. For example, the Guangzhou Uprising mobilized only the urban workers and the teaching group with intellectuals as the main component to launch an uprising, without relying on the peasants or planning to retreat to the countryside, so the Guangzhou Uprising failed. The same was true of the Shanghai uprising, which tried to rely on the workers of the city and some of the urban intellectuals to persevere in Shanghai, where the enemy was strongest, and failed. Now it is time for us to enter the big cities again, and of course our main force now is in the countryside. Comrades who are engaged in urban work in the occupied areas must understand that only by cooperating with the countryside can we move forward and retreat freely, and only when the workers and peasants and petty bourgeoisie are combined can we have strength.
In the united front contingent of New Democracy there is also a liberal bourgeoisie, which we call the Middle Force. Comrade Mao Tse-tung tells us that this is a weak and wavering class, that the proletariat should win him over, unite with him, at least make him neutral, but not rely on him. The right view is wrong to forget the peasants, to forget the masses of workers and peasants, to rely on the liberal bourgeoisie. The "Left" view, which denies union with the liberal bourgeoisie, is also wrong.
Parts of the big big bourgeoisie sometimes join the united front, but they carry obvious duality. The bourgeoisie has its two sides, and the petty bourgeoisie has its two sides, but the two sides of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are more pronounced, and the reactionary side of them is deeply rooted. Therefore, in cooperating with them, we must always be on guard against them, oppose their reactionary nature, and must not rely on them. At the end of the Great Revolution, during the Wuhan period, not only relying on Wang Jingwei, but also relying on Tang Shengzhi and Relying on Feng Yuxiang, the result was empty. This was one of the lessons of the defeat of the Revolution. There were two armed forces at that time. One is the armed forces of our Party, including the Twenty-fourth Division of Ye Ting [369], which is under the direct leadership of our Party, and at the same time there are the armed forces of the broad masses of workers and peasants, from Guangdong to Wuhan, especially in Hunan, which is our strength. The other is the armed forces of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. At that time, our party's policy was not oriented toward its own strength, but at the strength of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, Tang Shengzhi's army, and Feng Yuxiang's army. I remember most obviously that after the crisis in Wuhan and the "Ma-Ri Incident," the Central Committee of our Party still looked up to Feng Yuxiang, the so-called peasant leader and General Christ. At that time, whether it was the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, or even foreign comrades, everyone looked up to him. When Feng Yuxiang traveled from Tongguan to Zhengzhou, the head of the Wuhan Nationalist Government took a special car to pick him up, and our party also sent Zhang Guotao to pick him up. As a result, Feng Yuxiang met with Chiang Kai-shek in Xuzhou, and a big reaction came, betraying all the people in Wuhan, so Wuhan was completely frustrated. This is the evil consequence of relying on the armed forces of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and not on their own armed forces. Of course there was also the question of the agrarian revolution, but armament was a central problem, which could be seen at the time. In the second Wuhan period, it was also an opportunistic mistake to think that the Kuomintang army could cooperate well with him without reform.
From this we can see that our anti-Japanese national united front, including the proletariat, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie and a part of the big bourgeoisie, such a large and complex contingent, if not clearly understood, will make mistakes of the "Left" and the Right. The leadership of our Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong analyzed this contingent and divided the people in this contingent into three categories: one is the progressive forces, that is, the workers and peasants petty bourgeoisie; One is the middle force, that is, the middle class; One is the stubborn forces, or the reactionary forces, the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The local power factions are close to the middle, or between the middle and the stubborn, and are close to the reactionaries in terms of class, and they play the role of the middle forces in opposing Chiang Kai-shek. On the basis of the analysis of these three forces, we have drawn up the policy of developing progressive forces, winning over the middle forces, isolating, dividing and attacking the stubborn forces, that is, uniting the majority, opposing the minority, and attacking the most stubborn forces. This is not the case with the right's view. At the end of the Great Revolution, Chen Duxiu advocated not distinguishing between left, center, and right, for fear that people would say that we would divide them. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie did not like us to divide the left into the center and right, and Chen Duxiu became the answering worm of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. Regardless of whether it is left or right, the left will run to the middle and finally run with the right. The second Wuhan period repeated this mistake. At the December conference of 1937, some people again advocated that there should be no distinction between left, center, and right, as long as there is a distinction between anti-Japanese resistance and non-resistance, between anti-Japanese resistance and pro-Japanese, except for the pro-Japanese faction, the rest is a monolith, and all are resolutely anti-Japanese. This was influenced by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Therefore, in the second Wuhan period, the warlordism and fascism of Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang were obliterated, and they were considered to be generally tall, generally beautiful, and generally beautiful when standing together. Left, center, and right should be divided, and the points are right, not wrong. The "Left" view is to believe only in the proletariat, in the vanguard of the proletariat, divorced from all the masses, and not to unite with the people in its own ranks. This is also not true. Therefore, whether it is the mistake of the "Left" or the mistake of the Right, they do not understand Comrade Mao Zedong's analysis of the Left, the Center, and the Right, how to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, isolate the stubborn and reactionary forces, and as a result isolate themselves. This is our analysis of the contingent of the united front, and we should have such an understanding, without which mistakes will be made.
But it is not enough for the team to be divided into left, center, and right, but there is also a further strict distinction. There must be a strict distinction between such a large contingent, outside the proletariat, with the participation of peasants, petty bourgeoisie, liberal bourgeoisie and even sometimes the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. The proletariat is the leader and leader of this rank, and the rest of the classes are distinguished from him. Not only the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie, but also the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, are also distinguished from the proletariat. Therefore, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that in the united front, we should uphold independence and self-determination. Independence and self-determination refer to the independence of the proletariat, which has its own independent policies and independent ideas. He was going to unite with others, not assimilate into them. Where there is a difference, there is a struggle. The unity of the proletariat in the united front is to speak of unity with others under the condition of upholding independence and self-determination, and not to be influenced by other classes. Comrade Mao Tse-tung often said that we are the most susceptible to the influence of other classes in the united front, so it is wrong not to advocate distinction. The right view is not to argue for distinction. During the Wuhan period of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, some people advocated that we were "seeking common ground rather than disagreeing", that is, there were only the same and not the same. It is not known that our proletariat is different from other classes. Some comrades do not understand this principle of unity and distinction. If there is no difference, it is mixed with others, and it must be influenced by others. The "Left" viewpoint is that it is necessary to carry out communist education in the period of the agrarian revolution, to make everyone have socialist ideas, and not to understand that new-democratic education should be carried out, that is, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal new-democratic education for the masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. The indifference of the Right, the "Left" method of emphasizing distinction without seeking today's unity, are all incorrect, both are influenced by other classes, not the ideas of the true proletariat. The mistakes of the Right were influenced by the big bourgeoisie. Because working with him is easy to be influenced by him. They had a better attitude, invited us as guests, ate tea and dinner, and made no distinction, and put forward the propositions of the big bourgeois big landlords as their own. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the mistakes of the Right, in general, are more likely to occur in union with the bourgeoisie; What about the "left"? Generally speaking, it is more likely to occur when there is a split with the bourgeoisie. This is also pointed out in our Party's Resolution on Certain Historical Questions. At the same time, because there are many elements of petty-bourgeois origin in our Party, when we are in difficulty, when we are oppressed by the big bourgeoisie, we are easily influenced by the petty bourgeoisie, and it is easy to have "Left" sentiments. These are all mistakes influenced by other classes.
Then there is the question of leadership.
The proletariat is more advanced than other classes and should lead other classes; this is what Comrade Mao Zedong called "commanders." But the proletariat is not a natural commander, not from the peasantry all the way to the big bourgeoisie, who publicly promotes you and recognizes you as commander. During the Period of the Great Revolution there was a Peng Shuzhi who wrote an article saying that the leadership of the proletariat is natural and should not be contested! This is completely contrary to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's idea of fighting for leadership. The leading apparatus must fight with force, because leadership is contested by people against the proletariat and with the Communist Party. Not only the big bourgeoisie, but also the liberal bourgeoisie, and the petty bourgeoisie. They always have to lead the team according to their ideas. But the most important force in the struggle for our leadership is the Kuomintang, which represents the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, which is the ruling clique. Therefore, in the united front, it is mainly the Kuomintang and the Communist Party that are vying for leadership, and the big bourgeoisie has become the main object of our struggle. Because a team has two commanders, there will be a fight, and there will always be one in the middle of the two. In the early days of the Great Revolution, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party united into one team, but after the defeat of the Great Revolution, they separated their families and became two teams. Until now, there are still two teams. One is the proletariat, represented by the Communist Party, which has developed to the present day with liberated areas and armed forces of the people. The other is the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, represented by the Kuomintang, leading a contingent that has been under the rule of one-party dictatorship for eighteen years. These two detachments are fighting there, and the objects of both sides are the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie. It is not true that we only win over the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. We also want to fight for the liberal bourgeoisie. The two sides have different approaches to fighting and leadership. The Kuomintang adopted an oppressive method, oppressing not only the workers and peasants, but also the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie. Our approach is to cooperate with all forces that can be fought for. We have the best relations with the peasants, as well as with the petty bourgeoisie. As for the liberal bourgeoisie, the method of leadership differs, as in relations with friendly forces. This was the method in the early and middle periods of the Revolution. The first problem here is that the liberal bourgeoisie is not so obedient and often argues about independence. Therefore, our leadership over the liberal bourgeoisie can only be the leadership of the principal questions, and cannot be complete leadership. Of course, under another condition, we can lead not only the liberal bourgeoisie in substance, but also formally. In the Liberated Areas, for example, the liberal bourgeoisie may also be formally under our leadership, but its independence will remain.
Can the big landlords and big bourgeoisie sometimes be under our leadership? From the experience of history, it is also possible to lead on a temporary or one issue. Generally speaking, when their power is small, they can be led by us. For example, after March 20, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek did not want to be under our leadership, but he did not have the strength to carry out the Northern Expedition, so he asked us to help him, and asked the Soviet Union to help him. At this time he is still under our leadership, but this is unreliable, because he is ostensibly led by you, but in fact he is ready to split with you. Another example is what Comrade Zhu De said in his report that day, when the enemy in North China was besieging the Ninth Route, the Kuomintang army was in a very difficult position, and he asked us to take the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Zhu. But that was temporary, and as soon as he and his rear were connected, they were going to run away and hit us instead. So we should always be vigilant. On the question of whether or not to resist the war, Chiang Kai-shek was under our leadership, and it was we who promoted his war of resistance. But how to resist the war, he must follow his methods, and he is unwilling to follow our methods and is not subject to our leadership. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie can be led by us only as a last resort, on a certain question, and as soon as they have the strength and foreign aid, they will immediately split with us. Therefore, on the question of leadership, the proletariat leading the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie can do a very good job and be very intimate. As for the liberal bourgeoisie, although he is independent, he can still lead. As for the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, generally speaking, they cannot be led, but can only be led on certain issues and in a certain period of time.
Many of the successes of our Party in several periods of history have been due to the implementation of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas and lines on the question of leadership. "Left" and right opportunism has turned the tide the most on the question of leadership. It can be said that the "Left" leaning to the right does not understand the issue of leadership and does not know how to strive for this leadership.
The right-leaning view is that there is no need for leadership. Chen Duxiu in the later period of the Great Revolution did not want leadership, believing that the so-called natural leadership was enough as long as he said a cool word; in fact, he felt that since it was a bourgeois revolution, the leadership was bourgeois, and the proletariat was at best carrying a palanquin, and at most engaging in some freedom of assembly, association, speech, and strike. On the peasant issue, Chen Duxiu did not even approve of rent reduction and interest reduction, let alone solving the land problem. At that time, many slogans were posted, two slogans, one to establish the leadership of the proletariat, and the other to fight for the future of non-capitalism. At the Fifth Congress of our Party, there are many such slogans. But slogans are slogans, but in fact they are abandoning leadership, believing that leadership is natural and needless to fight. Therefore, in policy, we will not develop the armed forces of workers and peasants and will not establish a government led by workers and peasants. Although at that time, Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei and other provinces, as well as some county governments, belonged to the Wuhan government, Chen Duxiu suppressed the struggle of workers and peasants, and everything was withdrawn, and the result of the concession made the Great Revolution fail. This was the first mistake of the Wuhan period.
The second mistake of the Wuhan period was also not to understand this leadership issue. At that time there was an explanation that as long as the War of Resistance was reunification, that Chiang Kai-shek's government was already a unified government, that Chiang Kai-shek's big-bourgeois government had begun to democratize, and that the people had been fully freed. That is to say, the big bourgeoisie is very good, very democratic, very unified, that is, it recognizes the leadership of the big bourgeoisie, so in terms of policy, it does not want democratic reforms, and it does not improve the people's livelihood. However, at that time, the Party Central Committee emphasized the two points of democratic reform and improving people's livelihood. During the Wuhan period, the abandonment of leadership was also manifested in not attaching importance to the development of the enemy lines, not advocating the establishment of political power behind the enemy lines, and advocating that everything should go through the united front. If this united front is led by us, of course it is very good. But in reality, the Kuomintang does not recognize our leadership. The united front he recognizes is to unify the contingent we lead into his military and government decrees. Therefore, everything that passes through the united front is actually everything that passes through the military and government orders of the Kuomintang. At that time, seven unifications were put forward, that is, unified command, unified organization, unified armament, unified discipline, unified treatment, unified combat planning, and unified combat operations. Isn't this a military order that is unified under the Kuomintang? Aren't they all unified to him? Another example is the proposal that the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region must also be approved by the Kuomintang before it can be established. Isn't this a decree unified with the Kuomintang? As a result of this concession policy, three mass groups were disbanded in Wuhan, and later an anhui incident was created in central China. This is to say that we should always beware of opposition to us, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung said, and not to raise the Kuomintang's propositions to ours, but to reduce our propositions to the kuomintang's side, that is, to make the right-leaning mistake in the struggle for leadership.
"Left" opportunism has also turned a lot of strings on the question of leadership. To put it simply, they do not understand the new-democratic character of the Chinese revolution, think that they have crossed the stage of 1905-1907 in Russia, are anxious to change, strive for a non-capitalist future, and emptyly call for proletarian leadership. The policy of being "Left" has separated itself not only from the petty-bourgeois masses, but also from the masses of workers and peasants, causing serious losses. Some of the "Left" viewpoints of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression were also unclear on these issues; as long as there is struggle, there is no unity, and there is no understanding of Comrade Mao Zedong's tactical principle that there is unity and struggle in the united front, and that there is reason, advantage, and moderation in the struggle.
Therefore, the question of leadership is the most concentrated issue in the united front. The right is to give up leadership, and the "left" is to isolate itself and become a "commander without soldiers" and a "commander of the air force." It can be said that the right tilt is to send the whole team out, and the "left" tilt is to push the whole team out.
The above is a comprehensive understanding derived from the review of historical experience. I myself made many mistakes in the three periods, especially in the last two periods. Today, when I talk about the experience of the united front, I feel that we should see the seriousness of the mistakes. Of course these errors have been corrected. If in the future we do not have a clear understanding of the enemy, the troops, and the commanders, whether there is still unconsciousness or blindness at that point, mistakes will be made at that point. This is true for me personally, and it is also true for all our comrades in the Party.
*This is a speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.