Wu Xinbo: Where will the international system of post-Russian-Ukrainian conflicts go?
Author: Wu Xinbo is the dean of the Institute of International Studies of Fudan University
Source: Global Times; Center for American Studies, Fudan University
WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has aroused strong concern from the international community, has lasted for more than 100 days. This is no longer just a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but also involves major differences, contradictions and conflicts on the international system. From the Russian side, it launched a special military operation against Ukraine, one of the main goals is to end the hegemonic position of the United States in Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov made it very clear that this is to end the world order dominated by the United States and promote the emergence of an equal international community. The reaction of the United States and the West to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is also unprecedented. The sanctions imposed by the United States and the West are not only a kind of suppression of Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but also aim to cut off the trade, finance, technology and energy ties between the West and Russia, and reconstruct the global economic and trade system and the global governance system. So whether it's Russia or the United States, their goals in this conflict are systemic.
Three shocks to the post-Cold War system
Russia was invited to join the Western Group of Seven in 1998 and became a member of the Group of Eight, and in 2001 China joined the WTO, marking the basic formation of the post-Cold War international system. Russia and China, america's two main rivals during the Cold War, were included in the system. It can be said that when the United States brought China and Russia into the system, it transcended geopolitical and ideological differences, because the United States was looking to build an inclusive and global system. But over the next 20 years, the system suffered three major shocks.
The first was the Iraq War. By waging this war around the United Nations, the United States clearly challenges the dominance of the United Nations in international security and a set of important norms established by the United Nations Charter. It not only impacted the United Nations system, but also the United States' alliance system, because some of the core allies of the United States at that time, such as France and Germany, were firmly opposed to the Iraq War. Despite this shock, the international system has only been damaged and has not broken down. Why is there no rupture? There are two main reasons. First, under the circumstances at that time, the strength advantage of the United States was too strong, and the response of the international community to the United States was limited. Despite the dissatisfaction of many countries, they dare not and do not have the ability to fight back against the United States. This is the unhealthy side of the international system dominated by hegemony. Another reason is that the United States paid a heavy price in the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then adjusted itself, and after Obama took office, the United States has retreated toward multilateralism.
The second time was when Trump was in office. One manifestation of the impact of The Trump administration on the international system is unilateralism and "withdrawal from the group", which has caused serious harm and damage to many international mechanisms and rules. Another manifestation is the launch of an unprecedented trade war against China, which has hit the global supply chain and industrial chain and undermined the rules of the international economic and trade system. As a result, during the Trump administration, the international system was damaged, international rules were undermined, and the international order was weakened. After Biden took office, on the one hand, he repaired some multilateral mechanisms and alliance systems, but on the other hand, he inherited a series of trump's practices, especially in China policy, to reconstruct the international economic and trade system and rewrite international economic and trade rules. In this sense, he continues the damage that Trump has done to the international economic and trade system.
The third is the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Western sanctions. With only the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and no Western sanctions, its impact on the international system is still limited, because it is a local war after all. However, the multiple rounds of sanctions launched by the West against Russia are not only unprecedented in intensity and scope, but also seriously undermine the existing international rules, and the impact on the international system will be huge and long-term.
Four emerging trends
At present, there is a resonance between the US strategic competition with China and the sanctions against Russia. The post-Cold War international system is trying to transcend geopolitics and ideology, but since Trump launched a strategic competition with China, the United States is re-prioritizing geopolitical and ideological factors in foreign policy. There is more emphasis on geopolitics and so-called "values" in relations with China than on globalization and markets. Therefore, the continuation of the US strategic competition with China and the sanctions imposed on Russia have jointly promoted or exacerbated four major trends.
The first is the "weaponization" of interdependence. Economic interdependence is manifested in markets, technology, finance, etc., and is the result of economic activity. But they are now being used by the West as an important weapon against China, Russia and other countries such as Iran, North Korea, etc.
The second is the "security" of economic relations. The logic of globalization is the logic of the market, which is to lay out investment, production, sales, etc. from the perspective of maximizing economic benefits. But today, the United States and some Western countries are paying more and more attention to the security aspects of economic relations, whether it is technology, investment or industrial chain layout, the first consideration is the so-called security issues. The "security" of economic relations has greatly undermined or even reversed the logic of globalization.
The third is the "instrumentalization" of international public goods. The dollar, as well as the dollar-based international payment system, has become part of an international public good and is supposed to remain public, but is now increasingly being used by the United States as a foreign policy tool.
The fourth is the "ideologicalization" of international relations, or the so-called "value-based" in Western parlance. Today's international relations are increasingly lined up according to so-called "values." Biden recently came to Asia to promote the "Indo-Pacific strategy", and one of the main banners is "values".
Three consequences
In this context, important changes are taking place in the global economic and trade system, the global governance system and the international relations system.
The first is the transformation from economic globalization to economic collectivization. The world is gradually being divided into different trade, technology and currency blocs. We have seen the West, especially the United States, "de-Sinicized" in trade, technology, investment, and industrial chains, and we will also see many countries in the world "de-dollarization" in the field of currency. The United States uses the using the using the dollar as a weapon to impose sanctions on Russia, which may put pressure on Russia in the short term, but in the long run, it weakens the international credit of the dollar, leading many countries to consider reducing their dependence on the dollar.
The second is the weakening and even fragmentation of the global governance system. For example, at this year's G20 meeting, the United States asked that Russia not be allowed to participate. Whether the G20 can truly play its role as the main platform for macroeconomic coordination of the world economy in the future is a question mark. At the United Nations, the differences between Russia and China with the United States and its allies are becoming increasingly apparent. This phenomenon will also gradually spill over into other global governance mechanisms such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Cooperation in global governance has gone beyond geopolitics and ideology, but the United States is now increasingly introducing geopolitical and ideological elements to these platforms, which will weaken the functioning of the global governance system and even lead to a degree of fragmentation of the system.
The third is the restructuring of international relations. Whether it is the UN General Assembly's resolution condemning Russia, the Western launching of sanctions against Russia, or the suspension of Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council, the division of the international community is obvious and serious. It sends a signal that today's international relations, dominated by cooperation and the search for consensus, are fading and are increasingly divided into two camps of confrontation and an intermediate camp. The middle camp does not want to choose sides, but adopts a problem-oriented and practical attitude, taking different positions in different problem areas.
How far will this trend go? It depends not only on how the United States and the West treat Russia, but also on how they treat China. Although Russia wants to end us hegemony, from the perspective of ability and policy orientation, Russia is more of a deconstructive role, that is, to weaken the hegemonic domination of the United States over the system, but the formation of a more equal international system may depend more on the choices and actions of China and the wider developing countries.
*Disclaimer: This article only represents the personal views of the author and does not represent the position of this official account
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