Image source @ Visual China
In the appearance of the |, the author | Zhou Xiao zhang yi, and the editor | Fu Xiaoling Mu Mu
As we all know, from the beginning of last year to the present, Haidilao's stock price has retraced close to 90%, because the fundamentals are wrong.
The mainstream attribution of the market is that Haidilao bet on the wrong cycle, against the trend of expanding stores, in the economic downturn stage, not only did not squeeze out the "peers", grabbed the share, but fell into the mire.
The logic of investors may lie in the fact that since it is a problem of expansion, the "Woodpecker Project" solves the problem from the source, and Haidilao may be able to reinvigorate its strength.
This is not the case with our view:
The real role of the woodpecker plan is limited, and the dilemma of Haidilao is not the diversion of customers caused by the over-closure of stores, but more of the transformation of the "limited conditions" of success in the past - the mainstream consumer population has shifted with the changes of the times.
In other words, Haidilao's past "beauty" was based on the "characteristic service" to meet the consumption preferences of specific groups of people in that era; in the face of the new mainstream consumer group, it did not play a role, or even had a negative effect.
This article will explore and analyze both throttling and open source.
The Woodpecker program treats the symptoms rather than the root causes
At first, we had the same expectations, after all, there are the same types of successful targets in front.
In the article "Starbucks Apocalypse: How to Find the Rebound Inflection Point of the "Haidilao"", we have reviewed that Starbucks and Haidilao had similar expansion problems in 2008. After that, through large-scale store reduction, the cost of its stores immediately fell sharply.
Subsequently, with the increase in revenue brought by the improvement of product strength, the net profit reacted quickly.
Back to Haidilao, it should theoretically be a similar improvement trajectory. However, when we disassemble the cost side, we found that there was a big deviation between the actual and the expected.
According to the February earnings forecast, Haidilao's loss in 2021 is expected to be 3.8-4.5 billion yuan, of which the one-time loss related to expansion is 3.3-3.9 billion yuan.
That is to say, the annual loss of Haidilao in 2021 is basically generated by the expansion of stores.
In other words, even if you don't count the loss of store expansion, Haidilao's performance in 2021 is not good. For example, according to the 2021 financial forecast: 2021 may be a slight floating loss, but basically can achieve a revenue balance point.
In this way, the "Woodpecker Plan" is closed, and the stop loss is only one aspect, and the core is to optimize and improve operational efficiency.
However, this bridge section does not seem to be interpreted according to the script.
In terms of the cost of personnel, one of the largest expenditures, under normal conditions, Haidilao has an average number of 77 employees in a single store due to the large demand for service personnel and the large area of stores, which is much higher than the industry level. It's just that the human effect is also very high, and the overall balance.
And the woodpecker plan "shrink the store without layoffs" strategy, the excess personnel will be assigned to other stores, raise the number of single store labor, the cost is not reduced, not to mention, but also to reduce the efficiency of the store.
You know, Starbucks laid off employees that year, many executives were also listed, and even the headquarters directly cut a quarter. As a result, starbucks was reduced from 20 to 14 people by maintaining the same single store.
In addition, in terms of raw materials, Haidilao's supply chain management capabilities are the best in the industry, which in itself is an advantage of upward bargaining. However, after a wide range of store closures, the scale of procurement will decline accordingly, and bargaining power may be affected.
Taken together, the store reduction plan can be effective in the store rent, after all, the closure of the store can be quickly reduced. The woodpecker program has played a role in "stopping loss", and the optimization of the efficiency of single-store operation seems to have disappeared.
Of course, it is good not to bleed anymore. If Haidilao, which is lightly loaded after shrinking the store, can be like Starbucks, the revenue growth will improve, and it is still expected to get out of the quagmire.
So, what is the actual situation?
But in fact, his other statement that did not attract much attention hid a larger crisis.
It was about the general taste of Haidilao, Daniel Zhang said lightly: "The taste is not too big a problem, and there is a difference between the catering industry and the rocket." There are standards for rockets in the sky, and there are no standards for catering. ”
As shown in the chart below, as of February 2020, the proportion of users who chose Haidilao because of "intimate service" was close to 40%.
Perhaps this is the case, giving Daniel Zhang the illusion that "a fresh service trick can still eat all over the sky".
However, as far as our analysis is concerned, after the epidemic, the external restrictions that contributed to the success of Haidilao have undergone great changes.
Before the epidemic, Haidilao, with its ultimate service and high-end positioning, hit the needs of the core user groups after 80 and 85, so even if the taste is not outstanding, it is also the best choice for its family meals and company team building.
But when the epidemic swept through, these core user groups were held down.
After the epidemic, the economic situation is grim, and the income of these family pillars has been affected to some extent, just look at the wave of layoffs, income shrinkage, and mortgage pressure.
That is to say, the core consumption main consumer group and the milk father group that eat the characteristics of Haidilao's service are not moving.
This is also confirmed by the data, as shown in the following figure 2019-2020, the proportion of consumers over 30 years old in the catering market is decreasing.
The main force of overall consumption is transforming into a young group after 95. The same is true of Haidilao's user trends.
The main user structure of catering is almost reconstructed, so can the characteristics of Haidilao still stand?
To put it simply, in the eyes of the post-95 generation who are "socially afraid" and emphasize "privacy" in dining, Haidilao's "subtle service" has become pressure.
Aiming at this "change", the peers who have been constantly narrowing the gap with Haidilao in service have targeted the moderate service slogan of "no interference with dining, no forced shabu-shabu".
I have to say that the effect of "seeing tricks and dismantling moves" is good. It can be seen that in some major cities, Haidilao no longer has an absolute advantage in the hot pot service list.
Service differentiation is declining, the advantages are gradually filled in, we still have to return to the catering industry based on the foundation - products. And this piece, the main force of new consumption young people always like the new and tired of the old.
Based on this, the promotion of new businesses is no longer limited to product taste, dining environment, decoration style, and even early adopter psychology, etc., may become the main marketing point.
It can be seen that in order to cater to the preferences of young people, the wind direction of the catering market changes in near real time.
For example, a few years ago, Korean food and Japanese food were niche in China, but now there are 58,000 stores in the sushi category alone. The still fresh Southeast Asian, South Asian and other cuisines have also exceeded 10,000 in China.
In the case of Thai food, according to ai media consulting data, 73.8% of consumers are attracted by the taste of Thai food, and 63.6% are patronized by Thai decoration.
Back to the hot pot track, consumers have changed from the pursuit of taste stimulation to the pursuit of health in products in the past two years.
In terms of environmental services, a new trend of partial patriotism has emerged, and a number of hot pot restaurants that integrate new elements such as mahjong, Chinese dolls, and traditional Chinese medicine have emerged.
Based on this, the old hot pot enterprises have to seek new battles.
For example, the soup of sipping and sipping has launched the "hot pot + tea" model, which is currently performing well.
According to the minutes of the January 2021 silent period roadshow meeting: In the composition of the revenue, tea revenue accounts for 20% of the total operating income, and the relatively high gross profit of milk tea can create profits for the company.
Haidilao has also made many attempts, such as the launch of the milk tea category, but so far it has only been tried in some stores, and it has not caused much repercussions.
Of course, it is not only by blindly seeking innovation that we can break through.
According to statistics from the China Food Association Fast Food Committee, nearly 90% of consumers will choose to consume restaurants because of a specific taste or single product.
Based on such demand, the catering industry is also carrying out a differentiated layout in the direction of "big items", trying to shape core advantages by strongly binding star items and brands.
The direction of the goal to be achieved is similar to the smoothie products in many tea shops, but when it comes to Spirocer, you will immediately think of Starbucks.
At present, in the hot pot track, the "extreme hair belly" single product of the Banu hairy belly hot pot is set up; in the fish track, the main sauerkraut fish products of the Taier sauerkraut fish have achieved good results.
For example, during the Spring Festival just past, banu's total turnover in the Beijing market increased by 57% over the same period in 2021, and the turnover rate reached 5.66. In the 5 years since the launch of Tai'er Sauerkraut Fish, the number of stores has expanded to 126, and the turnover rate was nearly 5 before the epidemic.
However, the wind direction of the "big single product" is so clear, and Haidilao rarely has a clear action.
Failing to cater to the main force of new consumption, and achieving no achievements in the mental cultivation of large single product users, Haidilao has gradually lost its attractiveness.
In the following figure, the top ten hot pot category praise lists in first- and second-tier cities are randomly selected, and Haidilao is not seen. The list is a single category or a theme hot pot and other Internet celebrity categories.
Such "open source" is not good, haidilao's overturn rate recovery, and other brands have opened up a big gap.
And after the implementation of the woodpecker plan, the improvement is also limited - during the Spring Festival holiday in 2022 (Chinese New Year's Eve to the fifth day of the first year), the average number of Haidilao stores recovered to 70% of the same period before the epidemic in 2019, but it was still less than 4.
However, judging from the outdated remarks of its helmsman Daniel Zhang, the current situation is that Haidilao obviously does not pay attention to this aspect.
brief summary
From the admired catering business model to the down-and-out Chinese concept abandoned by capital, Haidilao's service legend is slowly coming to an end, and the reason is not the drag of the crazy expansion against the trend, but the change of external restrictions caused by the epidemic.
In 2022, it is not yet known whether China's catering industry can recover, but embracing consumers in the new era will still be an important trend.