After the outbreak of the Ukrainian war, many people criticized the use of precision-guided weapons and the small reserves of the Russian army, believing that this significantly affected the speed of the Russian army's advance and greatly increased the casualties of the Russian army. Earlier, the internet often saw the mention of the term "wartime production capacity", which means that as long as the war ends, a country can quickly turn into wartime production capacity, and then continuously produce new weapons, weapons that are ten times more than usual production, a hundred times more weapons, and deliver them to the troops. So, how did Russia and Ukraine perform this time?
For Ukraine, I am afraid that the term "wartime production capacity" no longer exists; or rather, only residual production capacity remains. This is also the case that Russia, out of consideration and limitation in all aspects, has seriously insufficient firepower strike frequency and scale, and lacks attacks on energy, electricity, communications, transportation and other infrastructure. Where is Ukraine's wartime production capacity? Of course, in Russia's long-range, air-fired attack on its entire territory, it was reduced to a "broken wall".
This shows that a small and medium-sized country has no concept of wartime production capacity when facing a large country with strategic strike capabilities (not too far away). In fact, Ukraine is not a small land area, 600,000 square kilometers, close to twice that of Germany; the population of Ukraine is not small, more than 40 million people, about half of Germany. But it is such a medium-sized country with standards, under the "non-all-out attack" of some russian forces, wartime production capacity can only become "wartime wreckage".
Medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long-range surface missiles, the strike range of these modern weapons, has been concentrated in the range of 800-2000 kilometers (the maximum range of the US long-range ground missile has reached about 1000 kilometers), while Germany is only about 800 kilometers long from north to south, and France is only nearly 1,000 kilometers. As far as these countries are concerned, if the US side wants to fight them, as soon as the war ends, the entire territory of these countries will be within the scope of an all-round attack at the first time, and there will be no front line or rear; arsenals, fighter production workshops, shipyards, and even oil depots, power plants, and so on, will be destroyed in a short period of time. Want wartime capacity? It doesn't exist.
For Russia, it is only because the land area is very large and the opponent is too weak (basically lacking the ability to strike at Russia), so it is basically not affected by this aspect. However, Russia continues to be criticized for the serious shortage of "precision-guided weapons". Of course, Russia is not currently considered a "wartime production capacity" because it is not fully mobilized at home. However, not adequately prepared in advance is a problem. And even if the war is fully launched, because modern weapons (especially heavy equipment) are highly sophisticated, the manufacturing cycle is relatively long (such as 1 year for fighters and 3-7 years for battleships), it is difficult to meet the needs of a short period of time.
At present, the pace of war is too fast, and because of the impact on the economy, politics and other aspects, it is often hoped that the war will end in a short period of time. This relatively long production cycle, even if it is fully launched, is difficult to meet the needs of the early stage of the war. What a country can rely on is basically a pre-war reserve. Unless, what you want to fight, is a long war of medium and low intensity against weak and small countries, such as the US security war in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This question is of particular reference significance for us to collect bay bays in the future. In order to avoid the interference of the US side as much as possible, once we hit the Taiwan side, we will basically strike a very high-intensity rapid strike and will strive to achieve the goal of the campaign within a few days. In this case, our firepower strike density will be very large, of course, the demand for ammunition will also be very large. In this very short period of time, there is no wartime capacity.
At the same time, it should be noted that, in general, the best way to avoid equipment losses and casualties is to first use long-range strike weapons and air power to destroy the key military objectives and infrastructure of the other side, and then when the other side is almost bombed, the army will enter the ground to advance. However, for us, due to the need for extreme time, we cannot adopt this kind of blow. After the first few waves of strategic and tactical strikes, the Navy and the Army will jointly carry out operations, and the equipment and casualties will increase a lot.
Once the US intervenes, the situation will be even worse. An essential difference between us and the Russian-Ukrainian war is that Russia and Ukraine are connected by land, and the Russian army can directly push sideways. The mainland and the bay are separated by a strait of one or two hundred kilometers, mainly relying on the navy and air force, and it is much more difficult to cross the sea and land than to push sideways on land.
The United States may not necessarily strike targets on the mainland, but it may strike at our landing ships. Our large landing ships are only a few dozen, and the number is not much. And once the US side destroys our landing ships, no matter how strong the army is, it will become a decoration. Therefore, the large-scale construction of large-scale landing ships and the guarantee of air and sea supremacy are necessary.
If the production and reserve of equipment and ammunition before the war are not enough to meet the needs of the entire war, then once the war starts, what is lost is the lives of the soldiers and the hope of victory. Other aspects of combat readiness can also be partially referred to. What we need to pay attention to is that the low proportion of military expenditure before the war is not an honorable thing, but a lack of combat readiness.
Author: Dawn Defense