At the end of the Cold War, the third largest nuclear power on earth was not Britain, France, or China. It's Ukraine. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a slow process, culminating in December 1991, which meant that newly independent Ukraine inherited about 5,000 nuclear weapons that Moscow had stationed on its territory. The underground silos of its military base are equipped with long-range missiles carrying up to 10 thermonuclear warheads, each of which is far more powerful than the bomb that leveled Hiroshima. Only Russia and the United States have more weapons.
The dismantling of these arsenals is often hailed as a triumph of arms control. Diplomats and peace activists have made Ukraine a model citizen in a world of potential nuclear powers.
But history shows that denuclearization is a chaotic upheaval, accompanied by infighting, reversals and discord between the country's government and military. At the time, Ukrainian and American experts questioned the wisdom of atomic disarmament. Some argue that lethal weapons are the only reliable means of deterring Russian aggression.
Today, Ukraine has no easy way to produce or obtain the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb. Even so, as Russian troops besieged the country and waged shadow wars in its easternmost provinces, nuclear geniuses came alive again.
"We gave up this capability in vain," said Andriy Zahorodniuk, a former Ukrainian defense minister. Speaking about The security assurances that Ukraine has exchanged for nuclear weapons, he added: "Now, whenever someone asks us to sign a piece of paper, the response is: 'Thank you very much.'" We already had one some time ago.
Western analysts say the current mood in Ukraine tends to romanticize the past of the atomic age. Mariana Budjeryn, an expert on Ukraine at Harvard University, said, "The bottom line is, 'We have guns, we gave them, now look at what's going on.'" "At the political level, I don't see any form of reconsideration. But at the grassroots level, that's the story.
"Regret is part of it," Dr Budjeryn, from Ukraine, added in an interview. "The other part is how you feel about injustice."
At first, Ukraine hastily removed Soviet weapons from its territory. Relatively small warheads on bombs, shells, mines, and short-range missiles are the easiest to move and most likely to fall into enemy hands. Even harder to move are long-range missiles, which weigh up to 100 tons and are nearly 90 feet high.
In January 1992, a month after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's president and defense minister ordered military commanders and their subordinates to swear allegiance to the new state — a decision that would impose administrative control over the remaining weapons. Many refused, and the soldiers who managed Ukraine's nuclear forces were caught up in a period of nervous confusion about the fate of the nuclear arsenal and the state in which it operated.
Volodymyr Tolubko, a former nuclear base commander elected to Ukraine's parliament, believes that Kiev should never give up its nuclear superiority. In April 1992, he told the U.N. General Assembly that Ukraine's declaration of a non-nuclear state was "romantic and immature" and insisted on keeping at least some of its long-range warheads. He said the remaining missile force was sufficient to "deter any aggressor."
Although his position has never received widespread support, according to Ukraine's detailed history of nuclear disarmament, this "has exacerbated existing tensions".
In the summer of 1993, John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent international relations theorist at the University of Chicago, was no stranger to controversy and offered his views on the issue of atomic detention. He said in Foreign Affairs that a nuclear arsenal is "essential" if Ukraine wants to "keep the peace." Deterrence, he added, would ensure that the Russians "will not act to win back Ukraine because their relations with Ukraine have been bad." ”
In Kiev in 1993, the government even considered controlling its nuclear missiles and bombers. But that never happened.
Instead, Ukraine launched. She demanded that, in exchange for nuclear disarmament, she needed absolute security assurances. This is the core of the agreement signed in Moscow in early 1994 by Russia, Ukraine and the United States.
At the end of 1994, the commitment was fulfilled. The agreement, known as the Budapest Memorandum of Understanding, was signed by Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States, promising that no country would use force or threats against Ukraine and that all countries would respect Ukraine's sovereignty and existing borders. The agreement also stipulates that in the event of aggression, the signatories will request immediate action from the U.N. Security Council to help Ukraine.
Dr. Budgering, a research analyst at managing the Atom project at Harvard's Kennedy School, said that while Kiev failed to get what it wanted — the kind of legally binding guarantees that a formal treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate would provide — it was assured that Washington would take its political commitments as seriously as it did its legal obligations.
In May 1996, Ukraine saw the last of its nuclear weapons shipped back to Russia.
Russia called the attack a destabilizing act that violated a ceasefire agreement and raised concerns about further intervention by Ukraine, which could drag the United States and Europe into a new phase of conflict.
Location of the Kremlin. President Vladimir V. Putin, who has increasingly portrayed NATO's eastward expansion as an existential threat to Russia, said Moscow's military buildup was a response to Ukraine's deepening partnership with NATO.
In an interview, Budapest memo negotiator Steven Pifer and the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, now at Stanford University, said the "collective defeat" of Washington and Kiev over the rise of people like Vladimir V. Putin undermined diplomatic feats. After Russian troops invaded Crimea in early 2014 and escalated the proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Putin argued that the Budapest deal was invalid.
"For eight years, they've been fighting a low-level war," Mr. Piffer, who had just returned from Kiev, said of the Ukrainians. "You can't find a bullet in the store. Many civilians arm themselves.
Dr. Budjeryn, author of the upcoming book "Inheriting the Bomb" by Johns Hopkins University Press, said the invasion of Crimea and the protracted war in Ukraine led to a series of calls for rearmament.
In March 2014, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vladimir Ogretzko noted that Ukraine now has the moral and legal right to restore its status as a nuclear state. In July, an ultra-nationalist parliamentary bloc submitted a bill to restore the arsenal. Later that year, a poll showed nearly 50 percent public support for rearmament.
Last year, Andriy Melnyk, Ukraine's ambassador to Germany, said it could turn to nuclear weapons if Kiev could not join NATO. "If not, how do we guarantee our defenses? Mr. Melnik asked. The Foreign Ministry denied that such an option was being considered.
Western experts, including Dr. Budjeryn, see Ukraine's incitement and threats as pointless gestures, because if Kiev chooses to rearmament, it will face scientific, logistical, financial and geopolitical challenges. Kiev is likely to encounter the same dilemma faced by Tehran, which has been working tirelessly for decades to acquire the technology and materials needed to build a nuclear bomb — something that Ukraine clearly lacks.
More broadly, experts fear that the current crisis will transform Ukraine from an example of arms control interests into an example of atomic disarmament risks and push the world's Iranians and Saudis to continue their own nuclear weapons programs.
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said that "if no diplomatic solution is found, it reinforces the impression that nuclear-weapon States can intimidate non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby "reducing" the impetus for disarmament.
Former Ukrainian ambassador Tony Piffel said in interviews and 2019 analysis that the high cost of rearmament would eventually isolate Ukraine in any crisis or confrontation with Russia.