MIND is a philosophical concept normally contrasted with the concept of body. Both concepts have acquired their meanings through so long-standing a set of metaphysical disagreements that neither can be defined in isolation from the controversial theories in which each is historically embedded. Most modern theories of mind and body are responses to distinctions laid down in the 17th century by Rene Descartes, who supposed the universe to be divided between two fundamental and irreducible sorts of substances, roughly corresponding to minds and bodies. These substances may be considered from a psychological perspective concerned with how the minds works or a metaphysical perspective concerned with its nature.
The spirit is a philosophical concept, usually in contrast to the concept of the body. The two concepts acquire their respective meanings through a series of long-standing metaphysical divergences that neither can be defined in isolation from these controversial theories that have developed through history. Most modern theories of mind and body respond to the differences proposed by René Descartes in the 17th century, arguing that the universe is divided into two fundamental and irreducible substances that roughly correspond to spirit and body. These substances can consider how spirit works from a psychological point of view, or its properties from a metaphysical point of view.
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES
Thought as a Criterion of Mind. Descartes claimed that thought was the essential property of mind which he appropriately termed res cogitans, or “thinking thing.” The essential properties of a thing are those it cannot coherently be conceived of as lacking. Descartes could not think of himself as lacking thought, since in the very effort to do so he must be thinking. But he could, he claimed, coherently conceive of himself as lacking a body, since he might only be dreaming that he had one. Hence, having a body occupying space—that is, a res extensas, or “extended thing”—is not essential to a thinking thing. In his view, bodies and minds are fundamentally different: bodies cannot think, and minds are un-extended in space. Since each can be conceived of as logically independent of the other, the mind can in principle survive the death of the body. While this conclusion is no proof of immortality, the hope of such a proof was never far from Descartes’ intentions, which shows that his concept of mind inherited certain features of the Christian concept of soul. But the logical separation of bodies from minds—or souls—immediately gives rise to problems. One is that the use of the concept of thought can be immediately considered as irrelevant to the understanding of bodily behavior.
Methods of psychology
Thoughts as spiritual standards. Descartes believed that thought was an essential attribute of the spirit, and he aptly called it a thinking entity, or "thought thing." The essential properties of a thing are those which are considered to be indispensable to each other. Descartes could not have thought that he himself lacked thought, for in such an endeavour he must have been thinking. But he claims that he can coherently imagine that he doesn't have a body of his own, because he may just be dreaming that he has a body. Thus, having a body that occupies space --- in other words, an extension, or an "extended thing--- is not essential to a thing of thinking. In his view, the body and the spirit are fundamentally different: the body cannot think, and the spirit cannot extend in space. Because, logically each can be conceived as independent of each other, in principle the mind can continue to exist after the death of the body. Although this conclusion is not evidence of immortality, hope for this evidence has never departed from Descartes' intentions, and it suggests that his spiritual concept inherits a certain characteristic of the Christian concept of the soul. But it is the logical separation of the body from the spirit --- or the soul--- which immediately raises all kinds of problems. One of the problems is that the concept of using the mind is immediately considered irrelevant to the understanding of bodily behavior.
We often refer to thought in explaining someone’s conduct—for example, a man’s digging is explained by reference to his thinking that there is gold in the ground. We also say that a dog is digging because he thinks there is a bone. Theologians would be reluctant to attribute souls to animals, and Descartes hesitated even to allow them minds. This means that however similar to human conduct animal behavior is, it must be possible to explain the latter without reference to mind or thought. But because the similarities are so great, the question arises as to whether we need to refer to thought at all in explaining human conduct. This problem was rendered acute through Descartes’ concession that what he believed to be other men acting as they do might not be men at all but cleverly designed automata. Moreover, he reasoned, since my own body is distinct from my mind, perhaps all bodily conduct can be explained through the same mechanical principles that cover animals or machines.
We often involve thought --- when explaining someone's behavior, for example, a person's excavation can be explained by referring to his belief that there is gold in the ground. We can also say that a dog is digging because it thinks there are bones there. Theologians were reluctant to attribute souls to animals, and Descartes did not even allow them to possess spirits. This means that no matter how similar the behavior of humans is to the behavior of animals, it is entirely possible to explain the behavior of the latter without involving spirit or thought. But because this similarity is so high, the question arises is whether we need to involve thoughts in explaining human behavior. Through Descartes' concessions, the question was raised so sharply that he believed that the actions of other humans could not be human actions at all, but rather cleverly designed automata. And he reasoned that since my own body was completely different from my spirit, perhaps all bodily behavior could be explained by the same mechanical principles as animals or machines.
These considerations immediately deprive the concept of thought of its common explanatory role, a consequence Descartes evidently was prepared to accept. So was Benedict de Spinoza, who argued that the belief that we cannot explain bodily behavior purely in bodily terms is simply owing to the fact that we do not yet know enough about bodies. This conjecture is strikingly confirmed by modern servomechanisms, machines to which we would be reluctant to ascribe minds, much less souls, but whose computational powers resemble and amplify human ones. Machines of this sort are different, no doubt, from bodies as conceived of by Descartes. But because our knowledge of electric circuit appears sufficient to account for the behavior of machines, reference to mind and to thought appear decreasingly relevant to our understanding the physical universe, including the human body.
These considerations directly deprive the concept of thought of its usual explanatory role, and Descartes was clearly prepared to accept this result. The same is true of Benedict de Spinoza, who argues that we cannot explain the belief in bodily behavior purely in terms of the body, simply because of the fact that we do not yet know enough about the body. This conjecture is strikingly confirmed by modern automatic control devices, which we do not want to attribute to spirit, let alone to soul machines, but those machines have similar and enhanced human capacities. There is no doubt that such machines are different from the bodies that Descartes envisioned. But because our knowledge of circuits seems to be sufficient to explain the behavior of machines, there seems to be a growing lack of relevance to our understanding of the physical world, including the human body.
Behaviorist View. This seeming irrelevance of thought is reinforced by the claims, and in some measure by the results, of behaviorist psychology, which allegedly eliminates all mentalistic explanation in favor of descriptions of differential responses to stimuli. Even verbal behavior is said to require nothing save an appropriate history of conditioning.
Behaviorist views. This non-relevance of this appearance of thought is reinforced by these claims, and is reinforced in part by the results of the behaviorist state of mind, which supposedly eliminates all explanations of mental action and supports descriptions of different responses to stimuli. It is said that even verbal action requires nothing, only a history of proper conditional action.
Behaviorists see the world not as divided into minds and bodies but as divided into two sorts of bodies: those that can be modified by “learning” and those that cannot. The latter are the province of the non-psychological sciences. The former are subject to the laws of psychology, which are merely law of conditioning, irreducible to non-psychological laws.
Behaviorists believe that the world cannot be divided into mind and body, but rather into two kinds of bodies: those that can be improved through "learning" and those that cannot be improved. The latter is the field of psychology. The former obeys the laws of psychology, which are only the laws of conditional action and cannot be reduced to the laws of non-psychology.
Behaviorism is thus vulnerable to attack from two sides. The extent to which its laws may be reduced to those of physiology challenges its autonomy. And the degree to which it can in fact account for such things as linguistic mastery—not to mention concept formation and even perception—without postulating something like an internal representational structure, is a challenge to its adequacy. But even if cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics should rehabilitate the pattern of explanation in which what we do is explained through what we think, this would not automatically reinstate Cartesianism. For the intuition of the behaviorist that there are two sorts of body thinks, and one sorts does not. Our bodies may just be the former sort. This makes it imperative to determine how Descartes construed thought, since he denied that bodies are able to think.
As a result, behaviorists are vulnerable to attacks from both sides. To a large extent, its laws may become those physiology that challenge its autonomy. And to what extent it can explain something like the grasp of language--- let alone the formation of concepts, and even the ability to know--- rather than to assume something like an intrinsic representational structure, is a challenge to its adequacy. But even if cognitive psychology and language psychology should restore patterns of interpretation, in which our behavior is explained through our thinking, this will not automatically restore Cartesianism. For the behaviorist's intuition has two kinds of bodily thinking, and one of them is impossible to think. Our bodies may be just the former. This makes us sure how Descartes interprets thought, because he denies that the body can think.
Faulty Criteria of Mind. Certain activities, such as judging, inferring, and deciding, exemplify what we commonly mean by “thinking.” But Descartes defined “thought” so widely that everything mental must be an instance of it---for example, feeling, willing, and imagining. And though subsequent philosopher often relegated these activity to distinct “faculties,” the question remains as to what makes each faculty “mental,” or if “being mental” is synonymous with “being a mode of thought,” then what must the faculties have in common to qualify as modes of though?
Flawed spiritual standards. Certain activities, such as judgment, reasoning, and decision-making, illustrate what we usually mean by "thinking." But descartes' definition of "thought" is so broad that everything spiritual is an instance of it--- such as feelings, desires, and imaginations. Although later philosophers placed these activities on the back burner of unique "faculties", the question remains, what makes each faculty "spiritual", or if the "existence of the spirit" and the "existence of the mode of thought" are the same, then what must these faculties have in common as the mode of thought?
Two epistemological criteria have at times been held central. (1) To be in any mental state M is to be immediately aware that one is in M, whereas one can be in a bodily state without being aware that one is. Moreover, we are never directly aware that we are in a bodily state but come to know this only on the basis of inference from evidence. (2) Since evidence is irrelevant to knowledge of our own mental states, our beliefs about our own minds are incorrigible—that is, they are not subject to revision or rejection in the light of future evidence. We cannot be mistaken concerning our own mental states.
Sometimes there are two epistemological criteria at the center. (1) M in any mental state immediately becomes aware of a center in M, while a center in a state of body is unaware of itself. Moreover, we are never directly aware of the state of our bodies, but only on the basis of evidence inferences. (2) Since the evidence has nothing to do with our understanding of our own mental state, our beliefs about our own spirit are immutable--- in other words, they cannot be modified or rejected based on future evidence. We can't go wrong with our own mental state.
There are difficulties with both criteria. It is objected to (1) that the mental has been identified with the conscious. But there may be mental states of which we are unconscious, as Freud held. And not only are we not “immediately aware” of these unconscious states, we may encounter great difficulties in finding out about them at all. And when we do, it will be by way of inference and hypothesis, in much the same way as we find out about the mental states of others, or, for that matter, about our own bodily states.
There are still some difficulties with regard to these two criteria. The argument against (1) is that spirit is not the same as consciousness. As Freud thought, the mental state we have may be unconscious. Not only can we not be "immediately aware" of these unconscious states, but we may also encounter great difficulties in fully understanding them. And when we do so, we can only speak of it through reasoning and assumptions, almost as if we knew the mental state of other people, or as if we knew our own physical state.
The objection to (2) is that there may be redescriptions, even of conscious states, that must be given in the light of unconscious beliefs and feelings, and until we know about the latter, we can easily be mistaken about the former. Even without recourse to the psychoanalytical concept of the unconscious, however, it is possible to argue that no description of a mental state is immune to revision in the light of future observations, unless we merely decide to hold it immune. But we could do that with any description of anything. There may be instances where it is difficult to see how our beliefs about being in certain mental states—pain is a favored example—could be in doubt. Even if this is allowed, the instances would then be too special to allow the immediacy of access or the incorrigibility that would enable us to define “the mental” as a class.
The argument against (2) is that even the conscious state, there may be a re-description of the situation, which must be based on unconscious beliefs and feelings, and that it is easy for us to misunderstand the former before we understand the latter. However, even without relying on the concept of unconscious psychoanalysis, it is possible that, on the basis of future observations, the description of mental states will have to have a modified debate unless we decide not to revise it. But we can describe anything. There may be examples where it is difficult for us to understand our belief in existence in certain mental states--- suffering is a good example--- may be questioned. Even if allowed, then these examples would be too special to be directly accessible or difficult to correct, so that it is impossible for us to define "spiritual" into a category.
Intensionality as a Criterion. A more promising criterion of mind is that mental states, in contrast to bodily states, are intensional—that is, they always have “objects” and so always are “of” or “about” something. This observation, if true, entails a logical difference between psychological descriptions, which are intensional, and non-psychological (physical) descriptions, which are extensional. A sentence is extensional when any term occurring in it may be replaced by another term without changing the truth-value of the sentence if the two terms stand for the same thing. This is not so of an intensional sentence. Thus even though “morning star” and “evening star” stand for the same thing (the planet Venus), it will not follow that because Smith believes the morning star is a star, he also believes the evening star is a star. For he might believe the evening star is a planet and not know that it is the same as the morning star.
Connotative as a standard. In contrast to the state of the body, a more promising spiritual criterion is the state of mind, which is both connotative--- that is, they always have "objects", so they are always "... of " or "about" something. If true, then this observation implies a logical difference between psychological descriptions, that is, connotations, rather than psychological (physical) descriptions, which are extended. When any term that appears in a sentence can be replaced by another term without changing the truth value of the sentence, it is extended if two terms represent the same thing. This is not an extended sentence. So even if "Morning Star" and "Twilight Star" represent the same thing (planet Venus), it cannot be because Smith believes that Morning Star is a star, he will believe that Twilight is also a star. Because he may think that Jupiter is a planet, and not know that it is the same as the morning star.
There are further differences between intensional and extensional descriptions. The objects of mental states need not exist---that is, one can fear, or hate, or believe in something that is not real. So it will not follow that because Smith believes in elves, elves in fact exist. In extensional description, by contrast, it is always valid to infer from the truth of the sentence “a is F” that something is F. If the sentences and descriptions of psychology then refer to mental states, and if the latter are indeed intensional, then the descriptions of psychology will have special logical features differentiating them from physical, or extensional, descriptions. Then the efforts to define such concepts as “belief” in term of dispositions to behave, or to respond in certain ways, would be doomed, since these descriptions are extensional.
There are further differences between connotations and extended descriptions. The object of the mental state does not necessarily exist--- in other words, one may fear, or hate, or believe in something that does not exist. Therefore, it does not happen that because Smith believes in the existence of elves, elves exist in fact. In the extended description, in contrast, it is always valid to deduce from the sentence that "lowercase a is an uppercase F" that something is a capital F. If the description of psychology in this sentence refers to mental states, and if the latter is indeed connotative, then the description of psychology will be different from the physical, or extended description, of special logical characteristics. Attempts to define such a concept as "belief" according to behavioral tendencies, or in some way of responding, are doomed to failure, because these descriptions are extrapolated.
This argument may furnish cognitive psychology with the basis for a critique of behaviorism, which can be brought out by considering under what conditions a piece of behavior is an action. It is an action when it is explained through the agent’s reasons. Whatever may be the connection between reasons and conduct—for example, whether the connection is causal—reasons, when they explain conduct, are themselves intensional. And while the behaviorist may say that the concept of action is one his program means to replace, “replacement” is itself a kind of action, so that if the behaviorist can have reason for doing things, so might his subject. And if psychology itself is intensional, it is unclear that intensionality can be eliminated without eliminating psychology. In any event, intensionality seems a better basis for asserting the autonomy of psychology than conditioning is.
This argument can provide the basis for a behaviorist critique of cognitive psychology, which can be judged under what conditions a behavior becomes an action. It is an act when it is explained by intermediary reasons. Whatever the connection between cause and behavior---- for example, whether the connection is causal--- cause, when they explain the behavior, they are inherent in themselves. Although the behaviorist would say that the concept of behavior is an alternative means of man's plan, "substitution" is itself an act, so if the behaviorist can have a reason to do something, then his subject can do the same. And if psychology itself is connotative, then it is unclear whether connotativeness can be excluded without excluding psychology. In any case, connotativeness seems to have a better basis for asserting the autonomy of psychology than the conditional effect.
Representation as a Criterion. It can be argued that not everything mental is intensional (Pain and other sensations may not be) and that not everything intensional is a mental state (pictures are always ”of” something). But even if they are not the criterion for the mental, the fact that mental states are intensional at all must say something important about the mind. No issue in contemporary philosophy is more complex than the analysis of intensionality.
As a standard reproduction. One might argue that not all mental activity is connotative (pain and other sensations may not be), and not all connotations are a state of mind (pictures are always about something). But even if they are not the standard of the spirit, the fact that the mental state is the connotation should fully illustrate something important about the mental state. There is no more complex problem in contemporary philosophy than the analysis of connotations.
But it has been argued that intensionality would have natural explanation if mental states were representations of the world, inasmuch as the logical features to which intensionality gives rise are typically found in descriptions of representations—for example, descriptions of sentences, pictures, and the like. And this would suggest that explanation in psychology would make an essential reference to the way the subject represented his world.
However, it has been argued that if the mental state is a representation of the world, then connotativeness will have natural explanatory powers, because the logical features caused by connotative can usually be found in the description of reproduction--- for example, the description of sentences, pictures, etc. This suggests that psychological explanations can make an important reference to the way a subject represents his or her world.
With this suggestion, however, the intensional analysis of mind connects with the explanatory role we noticed in connection with “thought”; for, explaining a man’s actions with reference to his thinking is pretty much to say that we have to take account of how he represent his situation. But representation, finally, cannot be very far from what Descartes thought minds were: he believed that the task of a res cogitans is to arrive at a true representation of the world. His life as a scientist was to find this representation, and his life as a philosopher was to convince himself of its certainty.
However, along with this opinion, the connotative analysis of the spirit is related to the explanatory role of the "thought" which we are preoccupied with; for to explain one's behavior by reference to one's ideas is almost as much as saying that we have to consider how he describes his situation. But reproduction, in the end, will not be far from what Descartes thought of the mind: he believed that the task of the thinking entity was a true representation of the world. His life as a scientist was to search for this reproduction, and his life as a philosopher was to convince himself of its necessity.
METAPHYSICAL APPROACHES
We have thus far examined the mind-body problem from the perspective of philosophical psychology. But the problem has traditionally been viewed as a metaphysical one, and indeed as the basic metaphysical problem, for the joining of mind and body---or of consciousness and its objects—was epitomized by Arthur Schopenhauer as the World-knot. It is a knot so densely inter-looped that philosophers have of often despaired of unraveling it and have sought instead to cut through it by insisting that the entire issue is nonsense of some deep sort.
Metaphysical methods
So far, we have looked at the mental-physical problem from the perspective of philosophical psychology. But traditionally the problem has been seen as a metaphysical problem, even as a fundamental metaphysical problem for the sake of the union of the mind and the body, or as summed up by Arthur Schopenhauer as a question of the --- consciousness of consciousness and its object. It is such a dense intertwined knot that philosophers often despair of unraveling it, insisting that the whole problem is nonsense to avoid it.
Dualist Theories. Be that as it may, the World-knot may be a tangle less because the components themselves are mental and physical than because each of them was defined from the beginning as a distinct substance. “Substance” is a term hardly used in technical philosophy today. It belongs to a family of largely abandoned concepts. But it was very vital in Descartes’ time, and certain features lingered on to complicate philosophy when the central concept had all but disappeared. Substances were by definition independent of one another in such a way that any causal interaction between them was impossible. Nevertheless, bodies and minds appear to interact: my arm normally moves when I want it to, I feel pain when I touch a hot trying pan.
Dualistic theory. Nevertheless, since their own composition is spiritual and physical, rather than because each of them is defined from the outset as a unique substance, the world knot may not be so tangled. The term "substance" is almost no longer used in today's philosophy of technology. For the most part, it belongs to a family of concepts that have been abandoned. But in Descartes' time it was very important, and while the central concept had almost disappeared, certain features remained entangled in complex philosophies. By definition, the substance is independent of each other, so that any causal interaction between them is impossible. However, body and mind seem to interact: my arms usually move when I want to make it move, and I feel pain when I touch a hot pot.
These intuitions appear to support the theory of interactionism, but that theory is ruled out conceptually in that bodies and minds are distinct substances. Where it not for the concept of substance, there would be no problem, and as it is there can be no solution. Certainly it would not be helpful to insist, with epiphenomenalism, or “one-way interactionism,” that bodies can act on minds but minds cannot act on anything. For apart from raising the question of why minds should be causally impotent, epiphenomenalism appears only to have revised the rules of meaning for “substance.”
These intuitions seem to support the idea of interaction theory, but the theory conceptually excludes the unique essence of body and mind. If it were not a substantive concept, there would be no problem, and there would be no solution to the current situation. The use of paraphenological theory or "one-way interaction theory" to insist that the body can act on the spirit and that the spirit cannot act on anything will certainly not help. For, apart from raising the question of why spirit should be invalid in causation, paraphenology seems to merely revise the rules of the meaning of "substance."
There is left only one possible theory, namely parallelism, according to which mental and bodily events form parallel series with no events in common. That leaves the intuitions to be accounted for, which would seem to favor interactionism. A number of quite ingenious solutions were advanced in the 17th century, most of which relegated to God the task of mediating between the two series. It is a standing miracle, and evidence of constant divine intervention, that a person’s arm should go up when he want it to. God causes the idea of warmth to form in a person when his body is close to the fire, and so on. This position is occasionalism, as defended by Arnold Guelincx and Nicholas de Malbranche, who used a rhetorical image for representing the two series. They are like two clocks, one of which strikes the hour when the other marks it, not because there is any causal interaction between the clocks but because they were designed to function in phase.
Only one possible theory remains, the theory of parallelism, on which mental and physical activity forms parallel series without any shared activity. This leaves an intuitive problem that needs to be explained, and it seems to favor interaction theory. Many ingenious solutions emerged in the 17th century, most of which entrusted God with the task of mediating these two series. This is an eternal miracle and evidence of the constant intervention of the Divine, for the human arm is raised when God wants it to move. When a person's body is close to fire, and so on, it is God who makes man form warm thoughts. This view, the theory of conjugation, was defended by Arnold Quillinx and Nicolas de Malbranche, who used an exaggerated imagery to represent the two series. They are like two clocks, one chiming the clock and the other following the other, not because of any causal interaction between the two clocks, but because they are designed to function the same way.
G. W. Leibniz exhaustively elaborated on occasionalism, but it and all the classical positions mentioned simply vanish when substance is given up as a relevant concept. When it goes, all that remains is to note that arms move when men want them to, and so on, and that the constant conjunction of volition and movement is like any causal connection to be found anywhere in nature. The relationship between mind and body, or between mental and bodily events, is no more (though certainly no less) difficult to analyze than any causal connection. John Locke and David Hume made an effort to discover the laws by which mental events are related to one another, on the assumption that such laws are similar to the law of physics.
G. W. Leibniz elaborated on the theory of conjugation, but when substance was abandoned as a related concept, the theory of equinox and all the classical ideas mentioned disappeared. When it disappears, all that remains is when one wants the arm to move, to notice the movement of the arm and so on, and the constant combination of will and movement, as is any causal relationship found in nature. The relationship between the mind and the body, or between the mental and physical activities, is no more difficult to analyze than any causal relationship (though certainly quite a few). John Locke and David Hume made efforts to discover the laws of interrelatedness between mental activity, assuming that these laws were similar to those of physics.
Monist Theories. Even to speak of causal relations between two kinds of events, mental and physical, may be regarded as implying a metaphysical stand at the outset. For philosophers known as monists have often insisted that there is only one kind of event because there is only one kind of thing out of which the universe in made. This one thing may be mental, in which case the position is idealism. It may be material, in which case the position is materialism. Or it may be neutral as to the distinction between mental and material, a view known as neutral monism and vigorously defended by William James. Each of these positions has the complex task of showing how the obvious distinctions between mental and material are to be explained.
The theory of the monists. It is even worth mentioning that the causal relationship between mental and physical activities can be seen as implicitly metaphysical positions in the first place. For philosophers known as monists usually insist that there is only one outcome, because there is only one circumstance that created the universe. This thing may be spiritual, in which case the position is idealism. This thing may be material, in which case the position is materialism. As for the distinction between spirit and matter it may be neutral, a view considered neutral monism, and William James has vigorously defended it. Each of these views has a complex task of showing how to explain the clear distinction between spirit and matter.
Currently the most actively discussed position is a form of materialism known as central-state identity theory, according to which mental states are simply identical with certain states of the brain or of the central nervous system. They are identical in the way in which a stroke of lightning is identical with a shower of electrons. In part this theory is subject to scientific confirmation, but in part it is more than a scientific itself encapsulates virtually every philosophical problem there is. To the degree that mental states are intensional, however, then so must brain-states be intensional, since mind and brain are one.
The most active point of view at present is a form of materialism known as central state homology, according to which mental states are identical to some state of the brain or central nervous system. They are as similar as lightning and electric rain showers. Procedurally, this theory is scientifically confirmed, but to some extent it is not just a science, but in fact it encompasses various philosophical questions in itself. However, in fact, the mental state is connotative, then the state of the brain must also be connotative, because the spirit and the brain are one.
This conclusion, if true, entails that the human body, and any body that has a brain or a nervous system, must have many of the features commonly attributed to minds and be organized in ways that are very complicated indeed. And the laws of explanation that cover human behavior must still take into consideration the way the organism represents its own situation, even if the representing is finally done by the brain.
If true, then this conclusion includes the human body, and any part of the brain or nervous system, which must have many characteristics that are normally spiritual and constituted in very complex ways. The explanations of these laws, which cover human behavior, must also take into account the way in which organisms express their own situation, even if this manifestation is ultimately done by the brain.
The identity theory, of course, entails that the mind and body are inseparable, a position that will raise severe questions for those who are concerned with whether there is survival after death. The death of the body would be just the death of the mind, since body and mind are the same, but there is still conceptual room for bodily resurrection and hence for resurrection of the mind.
Of course, the spirit and body implicit in the doctrine of identity are inseparable, and one view raises serious questions for those who are concerned about surviving after death. The death of the body is the death of the spirit, because the body and the spirit are one, but there is still room for the resurrection of the body conceptually, and therefore for the resurrection of the spirit.
A further aspect of the identity theory lies in its therapeutic implications. Inasmuch as mental disorders would ipso facto be brain disorders, so modification of the brain would be modification of the mind. On the other hand, modification of the mind is just modification of the train, and our mode of access to the brain might in part lie through the understanding of the patient. Some room still remains for the “talking cure” of the sort variously pursued in psychoanalysis, as well as for the chemical treatment of depression and other pathologies. The identity theory is as entangled and debated a matter as everything in this subject has been form the beginning.
A further aspect of the same theory lies in its therapeutic effects. Because mental disorders are actually brain disorders, so the repair of the spirit is the repair of the brain, on the other hand, the repair of the spirit is the repair of the brain, and the way we come into contact with the brain is to some extent through the understanding of the patient. There is still some room for pursuing a variety of different "talk therapies" in psychoanalysis, as well as chemotherapy for depression and other mental abnormalities. The doctrine of identity as a question that has been entangled and debated, as everything in this discipline has been, from the beginning.
ARTHUR C. DANTO
Author of “Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge”
Arthur C. Danto
Author of "The Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge"
Translated august 2, 2021
(Translator's note: This entry is listed in the 1985 edition of the Encyclopedia of Great Beauty, vol. 19, pp. 148-151)