The new issue of Culture magazine will be launched in February 2022
Pictures are subscribed to in the Culture Vertical and Horizontal Micro Store
Submission email: [email protected]
"Culture Horizontal" postal code: 80-942
✪ Dmitri Trenin; Aaron Miller
✪ Grain People, Shu Yao (Translation)
【Introduction】
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a national televised speech announcing the recognition of Uzbekistan and Eastern Europe as independent states.
Subsequently, the Committee of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution granting the President of Russia the use of federal armed forces outside Russia.
The Crisis in Ukraine appears to have moved beyond the usual track of diplomatic mediation. What is the meaning behind Putin's unexpected actions?
In this interview, prominent strategic analyst and former Russian military intelligence colonel Dmitry Trinin, who was in Moscow at the time, described the change in the atmosphere in Moscow after Putin's hour-long televised speech and analyzed the possible direction of events on the basis of the latest developments in the Ukrainian crisis.
First, Trinin pointed out that Putin's declaration of recognition of the independence of Uzbekistan and Eastern Europe is an attempt to end the first stage of the conflict in a way that wants to suppress the first stage of the conflict, rather than actively expanding the conflict.
He believes that Putin's move is to "avoid risks" rather than take risks. However, if the Exchange of Fire in the Donbass region continues, the possibility of escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Second, Trinin analyzed the impact of the Ukraine crisis from the perspective of Russian domestic politics.
The Russian state and society are undergoing a profound transformation and are transforming themselves with true Russian values.
Russia will strengthen its alliance-building with Belarus and the Eastern Region and move towards a vision of a stronger Russia.
Finally, Putin has lost hope in a European partner, and the only one he is looking forward to is US President Joe Biden.
Biden's experience with Soviet leaders and the relative support of U.S. domestic elites have made Putin more willing to negotiate with him.
But it is very likely that Putin can only bring the United States to the negotiating table by coercive means.
Putin's nationally televised speech and his signed article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" published in June 2021 are highly consistent in many historical expressions.
This time, Trinin reminded, adopted a more forceful language and made statements in a more important and public context.
This means that Putin's vision of a solution to the Ukrainian problem has begun to enter the real agenda.
This article was originally published in the "Carnegie Moscow Center" of the United States, compiled and first published by the "Eurasian Society for Systems Science", which only represents the author's views and is for the consideration of all.
Understand Putin and Ukraine
After President Putin delivered a nationally televised address and announced his recognition of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, it seemed difficult to judge the direction of the situation. Putin seems to be prepared for diplomacy on the one hand, and conventional or hybrid warfare on the other. What exactly is Putin's goal? Is there a negotiated outcome that Putin is ready to accept that could end the crisis? How did he interpret the Biden administration's response? Aaron Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, spoke about these issues.
What message did Putin's televised speech convey?
MILLER: Let me ask you a question about mood and atmosphere. When you were in Moscow, how did you feel about the atmosphere there? A week ago, you thought Putin wasn't really preparing the public for any major conflict. So I wonder what the atmosphere is like there right now?
Trinin: After Putin's televised speech last night, I felt that the atmosphere in Moscow had changed a lot. He gave a 70-minute speech, beginning with a history of Russian-Ukrainian relations and the history of Ukraine. After discussing the issues at hand, in particular European security or, more precisely, Russia's attitude towards European security, he spoke of the need to recognize the Republic of Donbass. Halfway through the speech, many thought that Putin was about to announce his imminent invasion of Ukraine. Of course this is a possibility that I never envisioned, and I never thought that the actual goal of Putin's massing troops on the Ukrainian border was this. He started by raising the tone and then to a very low level, declaring the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, something that Russia could do at any time in the last seven or eight years, and many want Putin to do so, and on the Ukrainian side, it is difficult to meet any resistance. To this day, I am still very confused about what is happening now and the near future. As for what will happen tomorrow? It's hard to say, there's too much uncertainty.
MILLER: If Putin were planning a massive military campaign, would he have to talk about the inevitable sacrifices and costs? Could this serve as a reliable indicator that he will make a difference in broader military operations outside of Donbass?
Trinin: I think the conflicts that Putin has been involved in before are quite partial and limited, and the conflicts with Ukraine are different. It is a great power, a neighboring country of 40 million people, closely linked to Russia on a long border. From this point of view, if the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine is further intensified, it is bound to have a major impact on Russia in its own country. I think if he does plan anything on this scale, he will have to start preparing the Russian people for what might happen next. The reality is that Russian state-run television has been mocking the predictions of the U.S. government or U.S. officials who believe Russia could send troops to invade Ukraine. It's like a carnival in many ways. But the came to an abrupt end last night. People have become much more awake than at any time in the past few months.
MILLER: According to your assessment, what is the current development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? Where do you think Putin is going?
Trinin: It seems to me that the prologue has just ended, and the main film has not yet begun. My mistake was that I thought that the end of this phase would be for Russia to continue to push its own core demand that Ukraine not join NATO, that NATO not meddle in Ukraine, and that NATO withdraw its military infrastructure from Eastern Europe. At the same time, based on exchanges between foreign affairs departments over the past few weeks, sit down with the United States to discuss arms control and rebuild bilateral trust. In my opinion, this scenario is quite believable.
Contrary to this assumption, Putin's choice to recognize the Republic of Donbass means that Russia is giving up its moral high ground – at least in Russia's eyes, it has always been a loyal defender of the Minsk Accords, while the other side, especially Ukraine, has failed to meet its obligations. It all happened against the backdrop of the re-initiation of shelling in Donbass and the orders of the republics to evacuate the inhabitants of Donbass to Russia. For many, the origin of all this is still to be determined. What is clear, however, is that Putin is indeed prepared to end this phase of the dispute. From this point of view, my theory is nothing more than a theory. Between Last November and the three months to date, Putin has been trying to demonstrate his determination to use military forces around Ukraine by massaging them.
I think in the last few days he has made a decision that on the most important issues, especially on the Minsk Agreement, there is nothing that can be obtained from the United States. This agreement will not be put into practice. I think that's how he ends the conflict at this stage, in a way that wants to suppress the pre-emptive. Of course, this is just my guess.
▍ Putin is not taking risks, but avoiding risks
MILLER: There's a saying that Putin is becoming increasingly isolated, not only because of the coronavirus, but also because of the hardliners all around him. He did not seem to understand the effects of his series of actions and their consequences. In fact, I think some media have even begun to doubt Putin's rationality. It's not just a matter of theory. This involves Putin's logic as well as his tactical and strategic issues. Do you agree with these views?
Trinin: I have to say it one by one. I agree with the isolation statement because we all find ourselves more isolated than ever before. And this is undoubtedly a bold attempt for those who shoulder the heavy responsibility of the country. As for the irrational argument, I don't think it's true. Nor do I believe in reckless claims. I think Putin has been using the Western media to image him as a tool to pressure his opponents in the image of a reckless, immeasurable, irrational person. I am confident in this judgment.
MILLER: So there's a chain of logic in Putin's methodology. But this is a departure from his previous limited model of action in Georgia, Crimea and even Syria. Putin relies on regions where there are strong supporters. He has distinct geopolitical advantages in Georgia and Crimea, and long-term stable allies in Syria. The worst-case scenario shows that what Putin is doing now is breaking through the previous relative risk-averse strategy. Can it be interpreted in this way?
Trinin: I'm afraid not. In my opinion, this is the least risky move Putin can take, at least it can put an end to this crisis. Many people were very much looking forward to his all-out offensive, even to Kiev, to bomb the city of 2.8 million innocent people, and to drive all the way, maybe not leaving, but definitely crossing the Dnieper River. You can imagine that he would do these brainless things. There is an area very close to Russia with a long border. It has been supported by Russia for 8 years, which has also planted its own forces there, perhaps not regularly, but certainly with instructors and volunteers, and others helping local militants rebel against the Ukrainian army. It's clear that in Donbass, Russia is seen as a savior because these people have been living in distress since 2014. For now, at least, their lives are expected to achieve some kind of stability, because they are likely to be admitted to the Russian Federation at some point in the future. Of the nearly 4 million people living in Donbass, about 800,000 already hold Russian passports, and another 1 million to 1.2 million are waiting in line.
Again, this was the least risky step Putin could have taken. Another option was to call a halt to the exercises, send his troops back and return to Moscow empty-handed, because he had failed to achieve the most important goal he had set for himself. That is my view of the current situation.
MILLER: If this step is indeed risk aversion, can it be seen as a pre-storm calm? Are there still huge risks in the future? Is there any debate about this? Or has Putin decided that this is the first step towards achieving more ambitious aspirations or a series of goals involving major military operations against Ukraine?
Trinin: A little bit of both. First of all, what I mean by this risk aversion measure is almost risk-free, and certainly not that it doesn't exist at all. Should Russian troops reach the front line of what they call the line of contact on donbass, as they wish? Should they be shelled or shot by Ukrainian troops on the other side of the line of defense? If this is the case, there will be direct conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russia cannot stand there, but will start to act.
The areas under the de facto control of the two "independent" republics in eastern Ukraine and the extent of claimed sovereignty. Image source: Internet
One more thing. The republics just recognized by Russia were born on the territory of two regions of Ukraine. Part of these territories is now controlled by Ukraine, and the constitutions of the two republics effectively claim the territory of their respective regions as national territories. In the midst of a conflict, there may be opportunities, impulses, or other factors that push the Russian military to the brink of regional conflict, or even beyond it. That's why I said there's a lot of uncertainty about what we're going to do next.
On the one hand, this may be a gradual downgrade of events. If all sides remain calm on the line of contact, no one shoots at the other side. Otherwise, this could be the last step before a full-blown invasion occurs. But I must tell you that this is the last thing I will say in this part, that Putin does not exactly need to deploy his forces to The Donbass to launch a major offensive against Ukraine.
MILLER: Thank you for your modesty, especially for your courage to admit that you were wrong in your judgment. But I was impressed that the U.S. intelligence community had judged that Putin planned a massive military campaign against Ukraine. The deputy secretary of defense told Carnegie on Sunday that Putin was not interested in Ukraine's security guarantees. He just wants Ukraine. Our colleagues Eugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss wrote an interesting article, Ukraine: Putin's Unfinished Business, which they believe is what Putin wants. What was he thinking?
Trinin: Maybe that's a mistake. In my opinion, there are two more problems here. I argue with one of the two authors that Putin's goal over the past 3 months has been to get the United States to provide him with some security. Ukraine is, of course, part of it. It is important to note, however, that Ukraine, while at the heart of geopolitics, is not at the heart of its personal goals.
I very much appreciate Putin's article on Ukraine published in June 2021. He is passionate about Ukraine. He truly believed that Ukraine and Russia were inherently inseparable, and that anyone who tried to divide the two was a traitor, both for Russia and Ukraine. That's my summary of the main points of this article. Last night he shocked a lot of people, saying that Ukraine as a country is a Bolshevik creation and should be called "Leninist Ukraine" more precisely, because Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev have been adding territory to Ukraine, although the name of the latter has changed from time to time. Some time ago, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stopped talking about the Ukrainian government and began talking about the Kievan regime. Putin also mentioned this. He has certainly said something similar before, but recent statements have pointed out that they believe that the Kiev regime is an illegitimate regime created by the coup. In addition, he said Russia would hunt down and punish those who committed atrocities in 2014.
This is a fairly strong argument. At that moment, many people, myself, began to think that he was about to declare war on Ukraine. And he eventually said Russia would recognize the two republics. This surprised and relieved us. Because at that particular moment, what should I say? Well, it's hard to imagine that would end up like this. So there are two things I want to say here, one of which is safety. Putin failed to get what was most important to him. He is trying to deal with things that he sees as problematic and dangerous to Russia.
Now, I believe Putin has taken a crucial step towards the so-called final solution to the Ukraine problem. Because, despite being president, it's one thing to publish an article (Note: On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, published by Putin in June 2021), it's another when addressing the nation on crucial issues as president and using stronger language. So I think Ukraine has officially entered the agenda of the President of Russia. We can feel strongly that this is no longer simply thinking about it, but has become a real agenda item.
The Russian Federation is undergoing a profound reconstruction
MILLER: Putin is seen as a brilliant tactician and strategist, why did he choose to act at this time? Because Europe is now fragmented and lacks strong leadership, U.S. presidents are weaker than ever and domestic politics are chaotic. Sino-Russian relations have been strengthened. All of these factors clearly laid the groundwork for the timing. I know you're not a prophet, but I'm sure you might try to predict the future like an analyst. Where do you think the situation is headed?
Trinin: In addition to those you mentioned, let me add a more important factor. 2024 is the year of presidential elections in Russia. I don't believe Putin will leave office in two years. However, every election, especially in Russia, is a test of the system. You have to add something new to the elections. You have to mobilize people, you have to get people out to vote. In the face of this challenge, the Kremlin did not take it lightly. I think that the current situation continues to develop, and for Russia it will lead to some form of reconstruction of the Russian federation. Whether it is geopolitical, or political, economic, cultural, ideological reconstruction. It is part of a process of transformation in the broader sense of the Russian state, the Russian system, the Russian economy, And Russian society, by shedding the last vestiges of globalization that originated in the West. Russia is being reinvented according to what is considered true Russian values, which are not imported from the United States, Germany, or anywhere else in the Western world, but are russian-owned. The Constitution adopted in 2020 is an important step in that direction.
The likely scenario in 2024 is that Russia will forge a closer alliance with Belarus, and the new Donbass Republic could join the union state with four million people. This will be seen as the main means of strengthening the Russian state.
Miller: You wrote a great book, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story, in which you argue that we need to overcome the idea that the Russian Empire can be rebuilt. If Putin is pursuing the Russian Union of States, how does this analysis reconcile with your point in the book?
Trinin: We are comparing the possibilities for the future, and what concrete actions Russia and its heads of state are most likely to take. Putin lives in the trauma of the Russian state's two-time collapse in the last century. In fact, his speech last night expressed his sharpest criticism of Vladimir Lenin. He blamed Lenin for the collapse of the Soviet Union, accusing Lenin of pandering to Ukrainians and other nationalists in order to keep Lenin himself and his party in power. He was fiercely critical of Lenin. That's why he calls Ukraine "Lenin's Ukraine" — just as some other Russians call Ukraine "Bandera" after Stepan Bandera. Of course, he means differently, he says it in the sense of the composition of the territory of Ukraine, but this is still important.
In yesterday's televised address, Putin recalled the past. He said that during former US President Clinton's visit to Moscow in 2000, he actually asked Clinton a question: What is the attitude of the United States toward Russia's entry into NATO? He said he never mentioned the old story publicly. As we all know, in the early 2000s, Putin wanted to bring Russia into NATO, he wanted to bring Russia into Europe. In 2001, before the famous Munich speech, he gave a speech at the German Bundestag, proclaiming Russia's European mission. He tried to integrate Russia into the wider Western world, but he was very disappointed with the results. He concluded that the West would never accept a strong Russia. His actions are based on this insight. So he chose to build a strong Russia, a Russia that integrated the Russian-speaking areas into the Russian Confederacy.
For Putin, Biden is the only partner
MILLER: You mentioned 2024, and I want to use that context to explore the question of the United States. How important is President Biden in President Putin's layout? If Putin wants to strike some sort of deal with the United States, he will either face Biden or another new president in 2024. So when Putin looks at the Biden administration, does he see it as a fundamental adversary or a potential partner to implement any new form of security arrangement he is trying to achieve in Ukraine or even on a European scale?
Trinin: I think he sees Biden as his only partner on all these issues. He gave up on the Europeans. I think that Prime Minister Schultz's visit to Moscow was, if not a disaster, at least a great disappointment. Schultz later commented that the claim that genocide was taking place in Udon was absurd. This passage has been repeated thousands of times on Russian television, which to me means that it is deeply offensive to Putin. You can't make fun of this, it's not a trivial matter. You can't describe "genocide" as "ridiculous," especially when talking about genocide by russians.
President Putin sees President Biden as a partner capable of dealing with these issues. Biden, a man with fond memories of the Cold War who shared Brezhnev, saw the Soviet Union as the historical name of Russia, and in a way he treated Russia as they did before, and he was a man who really didn't want to go to war in Europe. So I think the beauty of dealing with Biden for now is that Biden is not like Trump. Biden has the support of the majority on Capitol Hill, and even if there are some doubts about this or that potential deal between Biden and Putin, they are not going to call those deals "treason" as they did during Trump's presidency. Who knows who the next president will be? If it was a new generation who may have never heard of the Cold War or the Soviet Union, it would be much more difficult to deal with that person.
So I think Biden is in a lot of ways someone That Putin can negotiate with. The problem is that the main goals set by Putin and the main diplomatic demands on the United States cannot be fully met in the form set by Putin. That's the problem.
MILLER: Can you guess what is absolutely unyielding and what is discretionary for Putin? What must Putin guarantee? Will Putin favor coercion over diplomatic procedures?
Trinin: He thinks there's no other way to bring the United States to the negotiating table. And he believes that he has tried many other means in the past, but to no avail, and that the United States only knows the language of force. The United States will only take its opponents seriously when threatened. This judgment stemmed from his own personal and painful experience.
So on your question, I think what Putin needs is a Russia-friendly Ukraine, which means that Russia and Ukraine don't have to be economically integrated, that would be too expensive. Nor is it military integration. I don't think Russia needs or will not see Ukraine as a particularly loyal factor in its alliance system. But Russia needs a de facto demilitarized Ukraine. It can have an army, but it is not a problem for Russia, as long as it does not have any security alliances with other countries, has no foreign military bases and foreign troops on its borders, and sees Moscow as a major partner. It can also deal with Western countries, but Moscow will be the main partner.
But after Putin's televised remarks yesterday, that judgment may also be outdated. I stress again that this speech is of much higher importance than the article he published last June. For obvious reasons, Putin may have decided that the rest of Ukraine also needs to become similar to Donetsk and Luhansk. It would be a radical transformation of this part of Europe's geopolitical map. I probably wouldn't have made that judgment two or three days ago, but I think that's where we are today.
This article is from the Carnegie Moscow Center and compiled by the Eurasian Society for Systems Science. Welcome to share personally, media reprint please contact the copyright owner.
There is no upper limit to tipping, and cultural reconstruction is supported