On the occasion of the Spring Festival of the Year of the Tiger, Zhixin launched a special plan "New Year Observation", interviewing a number of well-known international relations scholars to spend the Year of Knowledge with you. At a time when the century-old changes and the world epidemic are superimposed on each other, and the world has entered a new period of turbulent change, what kind of new year will we usher in? And how should we face the new year? The third issue of "New Year Observation" brings an interview with Professor Jin Canrong of Chinese Min University. The interview was written by Zhu Endi, a reporter of the Beijing Correspondent Station of Zhixin News.
【Reporter's Note】
In 2021, the Biden administration came to power, and there were new changes in Sino-US relations. On the one hand, the interaction between China and the United States has become more frequent, and there have been several high-level meetings in Alaska and Tianjin, and the Chinese and US heads of state have also had two phone calls and one video meeting. On the other hand, on the Taiwan issue, the intensity with which the United States has played the "Taiwan card" has not weakened, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait was once tense. In May 2021, The Economist magazine even listed the Taiwan Strait as "the most dangerous place in the world", reflecting deep concerns from the outside world. The Taiwan issue has always been regarded as the most core and sensitive issue in Sino-US relations. How will the situation in the Taiwan Strait develop in the future? As a "sensitive point" in Sino-US relations, how will the Taiwan issue affect bilateral relations? These are the things that the outside world cares about the most.
At the end of the year and the beginning of the year, we came to consult Professor Jin Canrong of the School of International Relations of Chinese Min University with these questions. Professor Jin Canrong is not only a veteran scholar of Long-term Research on Sino-US relations, but also a KOL on social media. Under the multiple identities, he also saw many different dimensions in the Taiwan issue. Looking at the Taiwan issue from the macro perspective of Sino-US relations and jumping out of the "two sides of the strait" to see the "two sides of the strait" are the most intuitive feelings I had in the nearly one-hour dialogue with Professor Jin Canrong.
Professor Jin Canrong likened the Taiwan issue to a "three-way game between two countries," "two countries" china and the United States, and the three sides referring to the mainland, Taiwan, and the United States. At the same time, he also compared Taiwan and the mainland to "small cross-straits" and China and the United States to "larger straits." In the interview, Professor Jin Canrong said many times that whether it is a "small cross-strait" or a "large two-strait", 2022 will be shrouded in a high degree of "uncertainty", which will also lead to the "two countries and three-way game" or will go to the edge of danger. Although Professor Jin Canrong did not give an optimistic prediction about the situation itself, he was still full of confidence in the Chinese government's ability to cope. Therefore, he also gave a solution - first of all, to do their own thing, but also to see the tricks.
Will the events in Lithuania trigger a group to follow suit?
Zhu Endi: Let's first review the situation in the Taiwan Strait in 2021. We know that in 2021, we have experienced the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Nepal, as well as the downgrading of diplomatic relations between neutral countries, but in fact, there is a Taiwan issue behind it. What do you think? Do you think these things will happen more frequently in the future?
Jin Canrong: It should be that there should be a higher frequency of events like Lithuania than before. One is that the nature of Sino-US relations has changed, originally active cooperation, and now competition is the mainstay. Since the United States wants to compete with us strategically, it will use any "card." In the past 4 years, it has played a lot of "cards" since 2018 - trade, military deterrence, public opinion war, ideological war, judicial war, etc., but the effect is not obvious. So this forces it to play the "Taiwan card." Although the United States knows that the "Taiwan card" is quite sensitive, it wants to play the "Taiwan card" out of the need for strategic competition.
The current situation on the Taiwan side is not very good, one is that Taiwan society as a whole is "turning from blue to green." As can be seen in the recent elections, the DPP's basic disk is very large. Because the DPP's ruling team has a strong ideology, cross-strait relations are now becoming more and more favorable to the mainland, so they are anxious in their hearts. It (the DPP) also wants to highlight the big issues.
In this context, for many countries, the United States and the Taiwan authorities have to use and do work, and Lithuania is only one. I reckon they're also doing work in other directions, so it's not excluded that there will be another incident like Lithuania's. This side (Chinese mainland) has to react, there has to be some preparation.
Junedale: On the subject of Lithuania, do you think lithuania itself will go further and further?
Jin Canrong: Lithuania is still in the debate. Because his president has already said that he didn't discuss it with me, he now feels that it is inappropriate to change his name, right? Of course, later, when everyone saw that the foreign minister immediately came out and said, "The whole process is reported to the president." In addition, the president's recent statement seems to be criticized by his parliament. Lithuania is now divided internally.
Of course the Lithuanian business community is now clearly opposed to the government's policies. Because the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce said that although China accounts for a small proportion of Lithuania's entire trade, it is now very influential in China as a whole. According to foreign media, like China's major trading partners, such as Germany, have made demands that Lithuanian products cannot be used or the Chinese market will be lost. There are now voices in the German business community demanding that the Lithuanian government manage its relations with the Chinese mainland, and there is still pressure on them. I think the chairman of the Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce estimates that Lithuania could lose $5 billion, which is still a big impact on its small country.
So all I can say is that we Chinese mainland have some reactions to this issue, and it seems that [the reactions] are working. As a result, its political circles began to diverge, right? At least their presidents already clearly felt regret. Lithuania has done something wrong, and then we Chinese mainland to react appropriately, and the reaction has begun to bear fruit, but what will eventually lead to it, we will have to see. Because now the European Union and the United States have stepped forward to support Lithuania, in fact, the two factions, both internationally and domestically, are wrestling on two levels. I think at least today when we speak we can't see this result, we have to wait a little longer.
Junedale: You just mentioned that the European Union and the United States are supporting Lithuania, and then Taiwan is also doing some work, and things like Lithuania may happen frequently. Let other countries also waver in the "one China" principle?
Jin Canrong: My intuition is that the United States and the European Union support Lithuania, and it is actually a test, and it starts with a small country test. If the bad things done by this small country are not punished, it will push this red line one step forward, and then the larger Western countries will follow.
If you look at it the other way around, you see someone has already done this, right? It is creating new precedents, so that is why our central government has reacted relatively strongly, including the downgrading of the ambassadorial level to the chargé d'affaires level, that is, diplomatic demotion, and then there are certain economic punishment measures and so on. It should be said that our action has a certain effect. So I have a hunch that other countries are still watching, and if we end up with a clear effect and Lithuania retreats, then the follow-up effect is gone. But if Lithuania "breaks through" with the support of the European Union and the United States, it may form a demonstration effect. So for this matter, we must pay attention to it, and we must come up with effective measures.
At present, the game is underway, and I think we have not exhausted our means. In addition to diplomatic de-escalation, in addition to certain economic penalties, it is possible to make a little fuss about geopolitics. Because Lithuania actually has quite bad relations with Belarus and Russia. In the struggle between these two factions, we can more clearly support the opposition. There are also some "cards" that can be used. Including in the future, in multilateral international organizations, for some bills and plans that are more favorable to Lithuania, we in China can stop it, right?
In short, it is now in the process of the game. If we do it well, it should be a separate case, there is no follow-up, and if we do not do it well, it will trigger a demonstration effect of the group.
The Taiwan Authorities "Rely on the United States to Seek Independence" The situation in the Taiwan Strait is somewhat dangerous
Zhu Endi: In her speech on New Year's Day, Tsai Ing-wen mentioned that she wants to further promote Taiwan to the international market, and the United States is also operating the matter of internationalization of the Taiwan Strait issue.
Jin Canrong: I remember that Tsai Ing-wen did not speak well in her "Double Ten" speech last year, and she did not speak well in her Speech on New Year's Day this year. It can be seen that there is a general situation -- the Tsai Ing-wen authorities want to take advantage of Sino-US strategic competition and want to "rely on the United States for independence." This determination is quite large.
Now on the US side, I think we also have this line of thinking, that is, to internationalize the Taiwan issue. I remember that on October 26 last year, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken published an article on the official website of the U.S. Department of State, he was in the name of an individual, but on the official website, it should represent the position of the State Department. In the article, he called on UN member states to work together to make Taiwan's participation in the UN meaningful.
This is quite dangerous, that is, to internationalize the Taiwan issue and to change the Taiwan issue from an internal and internal affairs of our Country to a problem between two UN Member States. This is a new policy for the United States.
So the Taiwan authorities are now seeing that the forces between the two sides of the strait are unbalanced, right? Like the 2021 we just had, we probably have a GDP of 110 trillion yuan, about 17 trillion US dollars. Taiwan's GDP last year should be around $700 billion, which is different from before, in the early 90s, Taiwan's GDP accounted for 45% of the mainland's GDP, and now 4% is not there, right? So this power gap is widening day by day. At present, the size of the entire economy and the military strength are definitely becoming more and more favorable to the mainland.
Although the people's will in Taiwan is becoming "pan-green" under the manipulation of the DPP, so the DPP authorities are politically stable, the general situation across the strait is particularly unfavorable to them, and I think they are very anxious. Now that the United States wants to compete with China in an all-round strategy, it (the DPP authorities) feels an opportunity. So my intuition is that both the current US authorities and the ruling team in Taiwan want to further internationalize the Taiwan issue. The fact that these two forces are in cahoots and collude makes the situation more dangerous, and they seem to have no bottom line.
Although Tsai Ing-wen constantly says that "we maintain the status quo", and the United States constantly tells us that "my one-China policy has not changed", they talk about one set and do one set. The mouth has not changed, the action has changed, and this is very dangerous.
Because we have always said that the Taiwan issue is a "two-country three-way game." Of these three parties, one side is calm. We Chinese mainland we are still quite calm, and we are still striving for the peaceful reunification of "one country, two systems" with the greatest patience and sincerity. However, it is a "three-way game", especially if the result is not decided by this party, and the two parties also have a role. But now you can see that the two sides are jointly pushing the internationalization of the Taiwan issue and breaking through the red line. So I think the situation is getting worse and a little bit dangerous.
If the Attitude of the US and Taiwan Authorities Remains Unchanged at present, the cross-strait trend toward conflict is a high probability event
Zhu Endi: Actually, I think the US officials are frequently saying that they "do not support Taiwan independence," but they have different interpretations of the "one China" policy. Do you agree with the view that the "one China" policy has been hollowed out by them, and that the foundation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States has also been hollowed out?
Jin Canrong: I agree, this is a new danger around Taiwan. Although the US side has repeatedly stated that the one-China policy has not changed, including the video summit between President Xi jinping and President Biden last year. But it's about saying one thing and doing one thing. You see after the last China-U.S. dollar video summit, the U.S. State Department had a press release about the meeting between the two heads of state, and its definition of the one-China policy is different.
The US side said that the one-China policy is the so-called "Taiwan Relations Act," three joint communiques, and a so-called "six guarantees." The "six guarantees" were previously said in private, and were not put into official documents, but now the "six guarantees" are openly put into it. The "six guarantees" are the third Sino-US joint statement, that is, the "817 Communiqué," the Reagan administration's verbal promise to Taiwan, which was written down to you today and put in the official documents of the State Council, which is actually a very important change. It contradicts the three communiques, especially the third communiqué, the 817 communiqué.
So I agree with this judgment, the United States pays lip service to saying that the one-China policy has not changed, but in fact it is changing the definition according to its ideas, or what you just said is to "hollow it out." Of course, sino-US relations in the future and cross-strait relations in the future will be unfavorable.
Junedale: At what level do they mean by "strategic ambiguity"?
Kim Chan-rong: Frankly, now I guess President Biden himself doesn't know which degree. Because I am now observing that both parties in the United States now regard China as their main strategic opponent and want to play the "Taiwan card." Although they also know that there can be no direct military collision between Taiwan and Chinese mainland, I guess most of them agree. But under the premise of avoiding Chinese mainland direct troops, it is constantly changing the content of this policy. Some people say that China will not "turn its face" when it comes to this step, and some people say that they will do a little more. So they are actually tempted, and they don't know where the red line is.
So it is arching forward little by little, which is equivalent to a process of temptation. So I guess it's not very clear subjectively where this red line is. And I myself feel that the final red line is drawn Chinese mainland. Once there is a fundamental change in our policies, then the red line will soon arrive.
Zhu Endi: So to solve the Taiwan Strait issue, the initiative lies in the hands of Chinese mainland.
Jin Canrong: Because the United States has contacts with both sides of the strait, it is a little more proactive at the moment. In the long run, of course, the final settlement of the Taiwan issue will be decided by the mainland, and in the long run, the initiative lies in the hands of the Chinese mainland and the central government in China.
Zhu Endi: You just mentioned that the US policy toward Taiwan has always been in the process of testing, is its China policy not so clear?
Jin Canrong: Yes. I noticed that Singapore's original ambassador to the United Nations was named Mahbubani Mahbubani, and he said that neither Trump nor the Biden administration has a consistent, unified, and coordinated China policy. I think his judgment is right, I agree, I think the actual situation is like this now, first of all, the entire elite level of the United States, the entire strategic circle, how to deal with China now it is chaotic, right?
So smaller, even now Biden's ruling team is not unified, because they represent different interest groups. Some interest groups want to be good with China, such as Wall Street, such as american importers, for example, the United States has some globalists, especially those who are concerned about climate change. Because globalists know that solving global problems, such as poverty, counterterrorism, migration, nuclear proliferation, climate change, all have to go to China, right? So some of its interest groups still have to cooperate with China.
But there are indeed a large number of other interest groups that want to confront China, including the military, including the relevant military industrial interest groups, including a considerable number of members of Congress, members of anti-China NGOs, and so on, so this is the reality that we are facing, that is, the entire US strategic elite circle is divided, and the current ruling team has different factions.
Then President Biden himself does not have enough political authority, his team is not strong enough, he can't coordinate, which is troublesome, so the US policy toward China now has a very big contradiction, or let's put it more simply, it is two-sided, there are constructive aspects of cooperation, there are also very negative aspects of confrontation, and there are also very negative aspects of confrontation.
Because U.S. policy has two sides, and relatively speaking, the U.S. is still a little more powerful than China, so the dominance in Sino-US relations is a little stronger. The policy of the strong side has two sides, so Sino-US relations must be very volatile, there is no way, and it is useless for us to react to it in a hurry.
My personal observation is that Biden should belong to the front faction, that is, if there is a little bit of cooperation and wants to establish a more constructive and stable predictable Sino-US relationship, he should belong to the construction faction. The problem is that Biden's authority is not enough, and many people do not listen to what he says, so the entire Sino-US relationship is in a state of contradiction and swing is very large.
Zhu Endi: This kind of vacillation and duplicity, especially the inconsistency of different US officials in dealing with the Taiwan issue, will eventually lead to the Taiwan Strait issue to what extent it has come to?
Jin Canrong: Frankly speaking, we don't have an answer now. One of the final outcomes of the Taiwan issue depends on the development of our strength, right? If we encounter great problems in our domestic development, the United States and Taiwan will be energetic. It will seize the opportunity to find a way to break the bottom line and create new paradigms, but they both have this problem - constantly changing the status quo, and then once we have to fight back and say that you are destroying the status quo, put the blame on us. It (beauty) is equivalent to doing bad things, and then saying "we must be calm, we must jointly maintain the new status quo", which is quite bad.
We are generally okay with the momentum now, so it is still a little jealous, but if we have a big problem internally, then it is unscrupulous, which is a possibility. There is also a possibility that we can develop ok, and the policy is relatively clear, but there are some problems within it (the United States), and then from the internal policy needs to "break through", it wants to take risks, which also brings uncertainty.
The other is the strategic misjudgment, that is, it knows that your development is OK, and then subjectively does not want to go to the conflict, but it has a strategic misjudgment, it feels that I do this thing you do not respond, and then I try to do another step, that is, "cut sausage". Now it's actually "cutting sausages". "Cutting sausages" always has a physical limit, no matter how good the technology, in the end, it is still necessary to cut to the meat, or even cut to the bone, then we will react. Therefore, as long as the current attitude of the US and Taiwan authorities remains unchanged, then the final confrontation between the two sides of the strait will be a high probability event.
Japan has great ambitions on the Taiwan issue but lacks sufficient strength
Zhu Endi: You just mentioned that the Taiwan issue is a game of "two countries and three parties", but Japan often wants to join in, including the recent US-Japan 2+2 also mentioned the Taiwan Strait issue.
Jin Canrong: As we just said, whether it is the US ruling authorities or the Taiwan ruling authorities, they are now a little bit trying to internationalize the Taiwan issue, and it is the big goal that Taiwan "meaningfully participates in the United Nations." This is certainly impossible to do, it will certainly not be possible in the short term, and I think it will be even more impossible to do in the future. But it would get somewhere else, a Western ally, to step in. So you see That Japan and Australia are speaking more positively now, and in a sense, There is also some intervention in European countries, including Lithuania. Therefore, [the United States] can't get the United Nations, it can get a small circle of friends.
Now the first thing is this, the United States let these "little friends" participate. Of course, these "little friends" are not completely passive, they listen to the call of the United States, and they have their own interests. So now we see that among the US allies, they are now more active on the Taiwan issue, first of all, Japan, and Australia is also a little positive, but Japan seems to be the most prominent.
Therefore, former Japanese Prime Minister Abe recently made a very irresponsible statement on the Taiwan issue, and I think our Foreign Ministry has directly criticized him.
It's complicated. Abe's recent statements have a bit of an element of intra-party struggle. Because now, like Kishida and Abe are not on the same side, Kishida now wants to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Japan's economy is actually not very good, the impact of the epidemic on Japan is greater than china, and he hopes that Sino-Japanese relations will be more stable. In particular, this year (2022) is the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and Kishida wants to use this to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations a little, which is good for the Japanese economy and the response to the epidemic. But now Abe is not doing it, and Abe is now always making trouble for him on various issues, including the Taiwan issue.
The bigger reason, of course, is indeed that Abe's conservatives represent a concern in the United States and Japan. That is, on the Taiwan issue, Japan's interests are more related than those of the United States. The interests of the United States on the Taiwan issue are mainly as follows, one is geopolitical interests, Taiwan is the core of the "first island chain", and Taiwan controls the aircraft carrier that is unsinkable to the United States, right? Blocking China in the "first island chain" is the greatest interest of the United States.
Second, Taiwan has been a "little friend" of the United States for many years, and if they are taken back by the Chinese mainland, it will be a little hit on the status of the United States as a leader of the alliance system.
The third is that Taiwan has some economic significance, including chip processing Taiwan is very good.
The fourth is the interest of some values, that is, the United States has always praised Taiwan, saying that Taiwan, the so-called "model of Asian democracy," hopes to use Taiwan to influence the political development of the mainland.
None of these interests involve "life or death," right? It's important to the United States, but it's not a matter of life and death, you can feel it. Right?
But it's not the same for Japan. Because everyone knows that Japan is very small, relatively speaking, it is very small compared with China and the United States, about 1/26 of the Chinese mainland, which is very small, and then the resources are not very rich, so Japan is highly dependent on the supply of external resources. In particular, it now has a per capita GDP of more than 40,000 US dollars, and without foreign goods, its living standards will immediately decline, which is a basic fact. Japan is an island nation that is highly dependent on foreign trade and external supplies.
Of Japan's supply of foreign materials, 80 percent have to go through the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, from the perspective of the Japanese, if the Taiwan Strait is controlled by the Chinese mainland, the Taiwan issue will be solved, although most of the Taiwan Strait itself still belongs to the international shipping lanes, not China's inland sea, but in fact we can control it. Civilian ships are fine, if you want the warship to go, it will not be convenient. So as far as Japan is concerned, after the Taiwan issue is resolved, we can really jam it with a card in the neck.
There is also another historical factor, after all, we lost the Sino-Japanese War, signed a "Maguan Treaty" after losing, and then Japan occupied Taiwan for 50 years. The last Japanese governor of Taiwan was named Fujino Shinpei, who consciously organized a considerable number of Japanese to immigrate to Taiwan, and this group of people was naturalized in Taiwan. It is true that there are many Japanese descendants on the Internet, and the editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times is a descendant of Japanese, so his philosophy of life is called "Taiwan bone and soul", right? I am Taiwanese bone grown eatIng Taiwanese rice, the identity is Taiwanese, but the soul is the Yamato nation, that is, "Taiwan bone and soul". There are still a lot of people with such a philosophy of life, and some people estimate that it has reached 2 million. This Japanese "bastard", you know?
Therefore, the kind of attention that Japan pays to Taiwan, Americans cannot understand.
You are right just now, that is, in addition to the Taiwan authorities and the United States, there are some other third parties. Finally, I would like to answer this, those third parties are actually relatively small, and the combined role is limited, including Japan.
From a purely military point of view, Japan alone is incapable of intervening. Now war needs to have that kind of reconnaissance, command, and communication system, and Japan itself does not have this system, it relies entirely on the US military. Japan everyone knows that there are now 8 Aegis ships, and the United States has built a technology for Japan, which is good. Before the modernization of our PLA Navy, the Japanese fleet was the most powerful fleet in Asia, right? For a while, it either built a "88th Fleet" or the strongest in Asia. Now it is not as good as Chinese the People's Liberation Army Navy, we have surpassed it. But it was pretty powerful at one point.
But please pay attention to Japan's 8 Aegis ships, the Japanese government can not command, where is it usually placed? Placed in the U.S. naval base in Yokohama, it was managed by the Americans. It's your stuff, yes, but it's in my hands, and you can use it when I want to use it.
So what is the conclusion? Japan has a big heart and wants to intervene in Taiwan, but in fact it is not capable enough, and it has no independent qualifications to intervene in the Taiwan issue. If the United States wants to intervene in Japan, it will participate very actively, become a "vanguard", become a vanguard officer, but if the United States decides not to intervene, then Japan will not be able to do anything. So basically, the Japanese factor can be put into the option of the American factor, rather than a separate factor.
In 2022, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is further severe The most important thing is to do one's own thing well
Zhu Endi: You just mentioned that a very large number of international members have begun to participate in the game of The Taiwan issue. Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, previously said that the situation in the Taiwan Strait will be further severe in 2022.
Jin Canrong: I agree with Mr. Ma Xiaoguang's judgment. Several factors will lead to a more serious cross-strait relationship, one of which is the Taiwan election. There was a county mayoral election in Taiwan in the second half of this year, and I saw the media call it a "nine-in-one election." Taiwan is like this; as soon as it is elected, it will hype up the topic of "reunification and independence," so this will be detrimental to cross-strait relations.
In addition, I estimate that Sino-US relations this year are not good, because it is also related to elections, and our country will hold the twentieth national congress of the party in the second half of this year, and the twentieth national congress is actually an election, a high-level election. The United States is going to have midterm elections this year, congress is going to be elected, and both elections will highlight their values. The United States stresses democratic values, and we talk about socialism with Chinese characteristics. This is a situation.
Another factor may be added. I look at a few international economic institutions, such as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, and the OECD, and they have recently issued forecast reports, and the results are similar, that is, the growth rate of our country may be lower than that of the United States in 2022. The World Bank estimates that China will reach 4.3 percent this year, while the United States can reach 4.7 percent. Of course, predictions are very unreliable, and sometimes they are not correct. But how to say, this kind of multi-economic agency's forecast will still help the confidence of the United States.
So what is the result of these things coming together? Sometimes when we talk about the Taiwan issue, we call the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan around the Taiwan Strait "small two sides," and China and the United States are separated by the Pacific Ocean, and we call them "the great two sides of the strait." The "big two sides of the strait" and the "small two sides of the strait" influence each other. In any case, this year's "small cross-strait" is not good because of Taiwan's "nine-in-one election," and neither is the "big two sides of the strait." In any case, cross-strait relations this year are not optimistic, and in addition, both the United States and Taiwan are engaged in internationalization, and the result of internationalization is that many third parties have little to do with the Taiwan issue but are now eager to try and participate in the Taiwan issue. That complicates the situation a little more, doesn't it? Mr. Ma Xiaoguang's prediction is a realistic prediction, and there will be many difficulties between the two sides of the strait this year.
Zhu Endi: You also agree that the cross-strait situation this year is not so optimistic, so what kind of suggestions do you have?
Jin Canrong: For the mainland, the first thing is to maintain concentration, because in these three-party games, we should talk about the development momentum or our best. Moreover, after years of hard work, our current comprehensive national strength has been able to counter "Taiwan independence." If the Taiwan authorities go too far, and the United States goes too far, we can take "drastic measures." Everyone has noticed that at the meeting between China and the US dollar, President Xi Jinping made it very clear that on the one hand, we strive for the peaceful reunification of "one country, two systems" with the greatest sincerity and patience, but on the other hand, if there is still Taiwan in the world who has gone too far and crossed the red line, we will take drastic measures.
President Xi's words are assured. Our national modernization, industrial modernization, scientific modernization, and national defense modernization have reached this level. If there is a conflict, we can win today, and we have the confidence. Therefore, our dominance is relatively good, and we should have confidence and determination. This is one, we first have to calm down, don't dance with the wind, dance with their baton, can't do that. We do it at our pace, we can't be led by it, and we set the whole policy rhythm.
The second, of course, is to do a good job at home. This year, the first twenty national congresses must be opened well, the economy must be well carried out, of course, the epidemic must also be well dealt with. There is an economic cost to responding to the pandemic now, and this cost is becoming more and more apparent. How to balance and do a good job in epidemic prevention without affecting the economy is now very demanding for cadres at all levels, but it must be done well. Therefore, opening the 20th National Congress, responding to the epidemic well, and recovering the economy, I think this is a basic skill. Other long-term, such as national capacity building, rule of law, and technological upgrading, are also well done. This is strategic to maintain concentration and do a good job at home.
Of course, some moves by the United States and Taiwan must also be seen and dismantled, and it is not possible to be indifferent. We don't dance with its drums, that's one thing, but we can't be indifferent, so we have to see the tricks. Probably to do what we can do on our own, and that should be our way of coping.
Author | Zhu Endi is a reporter of Shenzhen Satellite TV in Beijing
Edit | Liu Liping, the chief writer of Shenzhen Satellite TV
Thematic co-ordination | Zeng Zijin is the editor-in-chief of Shenzhen Satellite TV