Text/Mei Xingwu
Qiao Guanhua (1913-1983), a native of Yancheng, Jiangsu Province, returned to Hong Kong in 1938 after receiving a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Tübingen in Germany to devote himself to the Anti-Japanese Salvation Movement. In 1939, he was introduced by Liao Chengzhi and Lian Lian to join the Communist Party of China. After the fall of Hong Kong, he traveled to Chongqing to do foreign affairs work in the office of the Eighth Route Army, and had the honor of working under the leadership of Zhou Enlai. As the first generation of diplomats in New China, he was active in the diplomatic arena for more than 20 years. His talents were appreciated by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and he became the fourth foreign minister of New China. Let's open the annals of history and appreciate some of the highlights of his diplomatic career.
Behind the Scenes of the Korean Armistice Negotiations
As soon as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China was established, a foreign policy committee was set up, with Zhou Enlai concurrently serving as director and Qiao Guanhua as deputy director, which shows that Zhou Enlai valued him.
In June 1951, the Korean War was fought for a year. Malik, the Soviet representative to the United Nations, proposed that the belligerents in the Korean War should negotiate a ceasefire and truce and withdraw their troops from the 38th Parallel. Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Army", issued a radio statement in the face of repeated defeats, suggesting that the two sides hold negotiations. After agreement, China and the DPRK replied to Ridgway in the name of Kim Il-sung and Peng Dehuai and agreed to hold negotiations.
In early July, Zhou Enlai "pointed out" Vice Foreign Ministers Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua to participate in the Korean armistice negotiations. Mao Zedong summoned Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua to talk, and he said to Qiao Guanhua that he had just asked Hu Qiaomu to write an editorial for the People's Daily in favor of the armistice negotiations, "Striving for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Problem." The so-called editorial is a political proposition, and Mao Zedong wants Qiao to thoroughly understand the central policy.
On July 4, Zhou Enlai personally sent off Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua, instructing them: "Do what you should do, and stop at what you should do." Li and Qiao then took a train to Andong (present-day Dandong), then crossed the Yalu River by jeep and arrived in Pyongyang on the morning of July 5. Accompanied by Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Ni Zhiliang, Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua called on Kim Il-sung and the two sides discussed the composition of the Sino-DPRK negotiating delegation.
Negotiations on the Korean armistice began in Kaesong. Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel, was occupied by the Korean People's Army after the outbreak of the Korean War. Kaesong came to Fengzhuang and became the residence and office of Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua.
◆ When participating in the Korean armistice negotiations, he took a group photo in Kaesong, seated by Li Kenong, and from left, Deng Hua, Qiao Guanhua, and Xie Fang.
At 9:00 a.m. on July 8, the two sides of the armistice negotiations held a meeting of liaison officers in Laifengzhuang. After the meeting, the Chinese and North Korean sides learned that the other side's negotiating delegation would come to Kaesong by helicopter, and the Chinese and North Korean sides found a place in Kaesong where they could land helicopters, placed red "T" cloth signs, and then placed two English letters "WC" (welcome). But how can you inform the other party in a timely and polite manner without losing your identity? Qiao Guanhua suggested that a Chinese reporter writing an on-site newsletter and publishing it in the media was equivalent to notifying the other party, and the trick really worked.
The Chinese and DPRK delegations to the armistice talks are divided into three fronts. The Chinese and DPRK deputies who were in short contact with the REPRESENTATIVEs of the United States and the ROK on the front line were Deng Hua, deputy commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army, Xie Fang, chief of staff, Nam Il, chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army, Lee Sang-chao, chief of staff of the Forward Command, and Jang Pyeong-san, chief of staff of the 1st Army. The second line is the forward command led by Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua, and Li and Qiao are behind the scenes, Li is called "Captain Li" (code name 101), and Qiao is called "Qiao Instructor" (code number 102). The third line is the highest decision-making level, which is agreed between China and the DPRK, with Mao Zedong as the supreme commander and Zhou Enlai as the specific guidance.
Statements need to be carefully prepared before each negotiation. There are two types of texts: those that are long speeches that systematically refute each other's arguments, and those that are ad hoc speeches used in short-term engagements. The DPRK-China delegation first held a meeting, agreed on the content of the speeches, and wrote three or four speeches on important topics with different countermeasures, and reported to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Every time the negotiations returned, the translation secretary staff sorted out the situation of the venue and wrote a briefing note to report to Beijing.
Most of these reports and briefings were drafted by Qiao Guanhua. While drafting the document, he smoked, paced, thought, and dictated, and there were 4 secretaries present, one in charge of Chinese, one in charge of English, one in charge of Korean, and one in charge of diplomacy. Qiao Guanhua's language is concise, exported into chapters, said a sentence, and the secretary recorded a sentence. After the dictation was completed, the secretary sorted it out on the spot, compared chinese and English with The Korean language, and Qiao Guanhua approved it and distributed it to the negotiators for circulation, then sent Li Kenong for examination and approval, and then sent Kim Il Sung for comments, and finally sent back to Beijing to report to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong reviewed it on the same day, and the next morning sent a telegram of instructions, explicitly agreeing or proposing amendments, and feedback to the delegation for implementation.
Just 1 month and 9 days after the negotiations, Yao Yingxiang, a Chinese military policeman and platoon leader, led a patrol to the neutral zone, when he was suddenly attacked by Syngman Rhee's army and unfortunately died. China and the DPRK lodged a strong protest with the US and ROK. The Chinese delegation set up a spiritual hall for Yao Yingxiang, and Li Kenong felt that the content of the link was not enough to express everyone's indignation, so he said to Qiao Guanhua: "Or you write another one!" Qiao immediately chanted: "The world knows Ridgway, and the whole country is sad with Yao Yingxiang." Li Kenong shouted in unison.
In the negotiations, the US side rejected the three articles proposed by the Chinese and DPRK sides (ceasefire; the 38th Line demarcated the demilitarized zone; and released prisoners of war), saying that the 38th Line only reflected the balance of forces between the two sides and did not reflect the superiority of the US navy and air force, absurdly proposing that "the superiority of the navy and air force must be compensated on the ground", and demanding that China and the DPRK withdraw backwards by 12,000 square kilometers. Qiao Guanhua immediately reported this "strange" request to Beijing. Zhou Enlai instructed: Resolutely smash this absurd proposition. Joe actively plotted a response and returned the favor: "We recognize your superiority in sea and air. But don't forget that our first army against the three armies drove you from the Yalu River to the Third Eighth Line, and if it was the three armies against the three armies, they would have driven you out of the sea long ago. The U.S. and South Koreans have made another point, proposing that Kaesong is not far from Seoul and threatening seoul's safety, so they must hand over Kaesong to them. Joe gave another recoil: Seoul is not far from the city, threatening the safety of Kaesong, do you have to hand over Seoul to us? The US representative was so embarrassed that he slapped the table and shouted: "Then let the bombs, cannons and machine guns debate!" "Truce negotiations were interrupted.
The issue of prisoners of war in the Korean War armistice negotiations.
From mid-August to late October, the U.S. military launched a series of local offensives in summer and autumn. The Volunteers gave a strong response. The U.S. military tried to get what was not available from the negotiating table from the battlefield, but it did not take advantage of half the advantage. On October 25, the U.S. and South Koreans were forced to return to the negotiating table, and the negotiating venue was moved from Kaesong to Panmunjom. There is optimism that an armistice is possible this time. But Qiao Guanhua elaborated on a different view at the delegation meeting:
The recent statement by hamlet, chief of the military justice department at Van Vleet headquarters, was a signal that he had slandered our killing of prisoners of war... Although Ridgway supported Han Lai's statement, he did not dare to let Han Lai meet with reporters. Curiously, The day after Han lai's statement, Truman (the US president) claimed that "the killing of US prisoners of American troops in Korea by the Chinese army is the most barbaric act in more than a hundred years." The fact that the president of a great power should support the statement of the chief of military justice of a group army, which even the Ministry of National Defense denies, is not a general situation, and seems to tell what the American decision-making group is likely to do on this issue, I am not sure, but I remind comrades to study this issue.
The subsequent development of events confirmed Qiao Guanhua's analysis. Us and South Korean negotiators have made a big fuss about the so-called "prisoner of war issue" and set up major obstacles to the armistice talks. In November 1952, the representatives of the United States and South Korea asked the representatives of China and North Korea what they thought of their new plan of insisting on the "voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war." The Chinese and DPRK sides pointed out that the new plan does not change the soup and does not change the medicine, and it will not be accepted. As a result, the United States and South Korea announced an "indefinite adjournment" and left without waiting for the Chinese and North Korean sides to react, and the negotiations were once again in a stalemate.
In February 1953, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai analyzed the possibility of the United States returning to the negotiating table at Panmunjom again in light of the changes in the Korean War situation, so they telegraphed Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua whether our side had taken the initiative to propose to resume the meeting and give it another step. And named Qiao Guanhua to study and make suggestions.
Qiao Guanhua did not disappoint the expectations of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and in accordance with the policy of the central authorities and in light of the reality of the armistice negotiations, he sent a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on February 19, stating his views: "It is better to move than to be still, let the status quo drag on until the United States is willing to compromise and let it take action." Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai agreed with Qiao Guanhua.
◆ On July 28, 1953, Peng Dehuai signed the armistice agreement. Li Kenong (second from right) and Qiao Guanhua (first from right).
Sure enough, three days later, on February 22, Clark, the new commander-in-chief of the US military, sent a letter to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, suggesting that negotiations be held at Panmunjom on the exchange of prisoners of war. On April 26, armistice negotiations were interrupted for 6 months and 18 days and resumed at Panmunjom.
On June 25 of the same year, at the commemoration of the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, Qiao Guanhua gave a report on the situation of the armistice negotiations for members of the Chinese delegation, saying:
We're proactive right now, we're not in a hurry. Only if there is no hurry, stopping is reliable and stable.
What is the future? It seems like it's going to drag on for a while, but it won't be more than a year at the longest, because we have the power, it makes sense, and finally he has to come back to the negotiating table. There's still talking, it has to stop. We were able to win, and we have already won.
A month after Qiao Guanhua's speech, on July 27, 1953, the Korean armistice negotiations finally reached an agreement. At 10 a.m. that day, 18 texts were on the negotiating table. The personnel of the two sides enter the hall from the east and west doors, sign the 9 armistice agreements prepared by their own side, and then the staff of the two sides exchange texts and sign the 9 armistice agreements handed over by the other side.
The staff then brings back the text of the agreement and sends it to their respective Supreme Commanders for signature and confirmation. On July 28, accompanied by Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua, Peng Dehuai came to Kaesong to Come to Fengzhuang and solemnly signed the armistice agreement with the three characters of "Peng Dehuai".
After the signing of the armistice agreement, Qiao Guanhua continued to stay in Korea, and the two sides fought for more than a year over whether the provisions of the armistice agreement were strictly implemented, until April 1954, when Qiao Guanhua was ordered to return to China to attend the Geneva Conference.
"Joe's Laughter" "Shattering the Glass of the United Nations Chamber"
On October 26, 1971, Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua sent the US Special Envoy Kissinger back to China. The purpose of Kissinger's visit is to make basic arrangements for Nixon's visit to China and to consult on a Sino-US joint communique after his visit to China. In the car that sailed from Diaoyutai to the airport, the two chatted easily. Speaking about the restoration of China's seat at this session of the UN General Assembly, Kissinger laughed and said: "I don't think you will be able to enter the United Nations this year." Next year, after President Nixon's visit to China, you will be able to go in. Qiao Guanhua laughed on his back: "I can't see it!" ”
Qiao Guanhua was right. On this very day, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly voted to adopt Resolution 2758, to restore all the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and to immediately expel the representatives of the Kuomintang clique from all United Nations organs.
After receiving a telegram from UN Secretary-General Wu Dan inviting China to send a delegation to attend the 26th session of the UN General Assembly, at 7:30 p.m. on 28 October, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying convened a meeting of relevant responsible persons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Great Hall of the People, intending to send advance personnel to the United Nations.
◆ On November 9, 1971, Qiao Guanhua led a delegation to New York by plane to attend the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. More than 4,000 people from the capital and commanders and fighters of the troops went to the airport to send a warm farewell.
At 9 p.m., Mao Zedong suddenly summoned the participants. After listening to Zhou Enlai's report, he said: "The Secretary-General of the United Nations has called to invite us, so we will send a delegation." He said, pointing to Qiao Guanhua, "Let Old Master Qiao be the leader of the regiment." Why call him "Joe?"? It turned out that the comedy movie "Joe On the Car" released in the late 1950s was amused and poured into many audiences, and everyone gave the name of "Joe Lord" to Qiao Guanhua, and over time, it was called up and down.
Mao Zedong continued to talk to Qiao Guanhua: "In 1950, we were still in the 'Huaguoshan Era', and you and Wu Xiuquan went to the United Nations. Wu Xiuquan delivered a speech at the Security Council entitled "Accusations of Armed Aggression by the United States Against China's Territory of Taiwan." An accusation is a complaint, a complaint against the 'Jade Emperor'. At that time, the 'Jade Emperor' was full of spirit and did not take us seriously. Now it's different, the 'Jade Emperor' is also going to visit the 'Huaguo Mountain'. This time, you are not going to file a complaint, but to uphold justice, to grow the ambition of the people of the world, and to destroy the prestige of the superpower. Shout out solidarity to countries that oppose foreign interference, aggression and control. ”
Mao Zedong pointed out to Qiao that the first speech at the United Nations should be full of momentum. First of all, we must settle the account, so many years have not allowed us to enter the United Nations, Chinese people and the people of the world have a sense of anger. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to the countries that have supported us for visiting our homes; to some countries that have abstained; and to understand the situation of some countries that have difficulty in speaking. Second, we must talk about the changes in the world situation since the founding of the United Nations, the independence of the country, the liberation of the nation, and the revolution of the people, which has become an irresistible historical trend. The United States must withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan, and it is delusional for anyone to separate Taiwan from China. Third, we should talk about our basic attitude towards international issues.
In accordance with the instructions of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Qiao Guanhua prepared all kinds of documents and materials for the United Nations trip without sleeping, drove several nights in a row, and wrote the first speech of the UN General Assembly with a stroke of his pen. After Zhou Enlai reviewed and revised, it was finally submitted to Mao Zedong for approval.
At 8 p.m. on November 8 of that year, accompanied by Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong met with Qiao Guanhua and other key members of the delegation, and he was very excited, saying that in 1971 China had two major victories, one was that the Lin Biao issue was resolved, and the other was that China's legitimate seat in the United Nations was restored. He made two decisions: First, Zhou Enlai would lead all the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing to the airport to bid farewell to the members of the delegation, and also organize thousands of workers, peasants, and soldiers to send them off at the airport; second, the civil flight to Shanghai that the delegation was taking was changed to a special plane. He also sent the delegation two sentences, one called "Do not enter the tiger's den, get the tiger", which was spoken by the ancients; the other sentence was called "not humble and not profane", which was spoken by Ah Qingjie (the heroine of the modern Peking opera "Sha Jiabang").
Coming out of Mao Zedong's residence, Zhou Enlai spoke with all the members of the delegation at the Great Hall of the People. Qiao Guanhua had a concern: "We have been outside the United Nations for a long time and do not know anything about the situation in the United Nations. When I went to the Uniabyterian General Assembly this time, I had no bottom in my heart and was afraid that I would not accomplish my task well. Zhou En: "It is good to be afraid of things, but to be afraid of things will not be taken lightly." It doesn't matter if you don't understand the situation, learn! Learn from all who understand the United Nations, including from our opponents. ”
On November 9, Qiao Guanhua led a Chinese delegation to New York by special plane. According to Mao Zedong's instructions, Zhou Enlai led all the members of the Political Bureau of the CENTRAL Committee and more than 4,000 people from the capital and envoys stationed in China to the airport to send a warm farewell.
◆ Qiao Guanhua led the Chinese delegation to arrive at Kennedy Airport in the United States.
At noon on November 11, the Chinese delegation arrived at JFK International Airport in the United States. Sinan Cole, Director of the Protocol Department of the United Nations Headquarters, shook Qiao Guanhua's hand and said: "On behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I would like to extend my welcome and good wishes to Head Qiao and his party!" All members of the Chinese delegation have arranged to stay at the Roosevelt Hotel in the center of New York, and I will provide great assistance if the delegation has any requests. Qiao Guanhua smiled and said: "Thank you very much for everything you have done for the Chinese delegation, and I would like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations through you." I hope that you will arrange for the Chinese delegation to speak at the airport to express our good wishes to the people of New York. Sinan Colee said arrangements had been made. Subsequently, Qiao Guanhua delivered a brief speech, stressing that "the Chinese delegation came with the desire for friendly cooperation, the desire to seek world peace, and the willingness to develop friendly relations with the American people." ”
Before attending the Un General Assembly, relevant UN personnel came to solicit opinions on whether the sign in front of the seat of the Chinese delegation was written CHINA (China), or People's Republic of China (People's Republic of China), or PRC (abbreviation of the People's Republic of China). Qiao Guanhua replied clearly: "Just use China." The People's Republic of China represents all the Chinese people, and Taiwan is a part of China, and it is good to use China. "His claim was approved domestically. In the various international conferences in the future, the signs in front of the Chinese delegation were written with CHINA.
At 10:30 a.m. Eastern Time on November 15, a historic moment that Was called historic by President Malik of the General Assembly, Qiao Guanhua, guided by Sinan Colee, walked to the seat with the sign "China" written on it. Following the welcome speech by the President of the General Assembly, representatives of 57 countries took the stage to deliver speeches. The last speaker was George H.W. Bush, permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations, who said that the United States was opposed to the restoration of the seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, but the United States failed. No one can shy away from the fact that the results of the United Nations vote do indeed represent the aspirations of the majority of United Nations members. The historic moment of the People's Republic of China's participation in the United Nations has arrived.
The last to take the podium was Qiao Guanhua, a representative of the People's Republic of China, who officially took the podium of the UnIPO for the first time. He was slender, dressed in a dark blue Zhongshan suit, striding up to the podium, and his tone was pertinent and slightly severe, showing the weight of his speech. As he concluded his 45-minute speech, warm applause echoed long in the United Nations Lobby. His brilliant speech won praise from international diplomats and even diplomats of hostile countries. He displayed the image of the new China on the podium of the United Nations and spread it throughout the world through the podium of the United Nations.
Representatives of the 23 sponsors and many other countries who restored China's legitimate seat came to shake hands with Qiao Guanhua and express their congratulations. Reporters from all over the world also surrounded Qiao Guanhua, and some reporters asked: "Qiao, can you tell me about your current mood?" Qiao Guanhua, who was full of spring breeze, looked up and laughed, and that proud, vivid laugh infected everyone present. A moment later he said something like, "Haven't I already answered your question?" The moment he looked up and laughed, he was captured by the photojournalist. The photograph won the Pulitzer Prize for Photojournalism. The New York Times published the photo with the striking title "Joe's Laughter." Some Western journalists described Qiao Guanhua's laughter as "shattering the glass of the UNITED Nations chamber."
Since the beginning of the UN General Assembly, Qiao Guanhua has led the Chinese delegation to the United Nations General Assembly as the head of the United Nations for six consecutive years.
"Bad Deputy Foreign Minister"
Diaoyutai State Guest House is an important place for China to carry out foreign affairs activities. In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon was hosting. U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger did not have the opportunity to participate in the president's various visits, and he wanted to stay in Diaoyutai to hold final negotiations with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua on the content of the Sino-US joint communique.
An important concrete outcome of Nixon's visit to China was the issuance of the Sino-US joint communique. The general framework of the communiqué was generally agreed upon during Kissinger's visit to China in October 1971, but there were still three differences between the two sides on the Taiwan issue: First, the Chinese side stated that the Beijing Government was the sole legitimate government of all Of China, that Taiwan was a province of China, and that the Taiwan issue was China's internal affair; the United States only agreed to this statement: The Us Government recognizes that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait consider that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a province of China, and the United States does not dispute this position. Second, China wants the United States to state that the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue is the "hope" of the United States; the United States insists that this is the "concern" of the United States and insists on using the word "reaffirmation" to indicate that this is an obligation with continuity. Third, the Chinese side demands that the United States unconditionally promise to withdraw all US troops from Taiwan; the US side is only willing to describe the withdrawal as a goal, and insists on linking the withdrawal and settlement of the Taiwan issue with the tension in Asia as a whole.
In order to meet Kissinger, Qiao Guanhua did his homework, and for several nights in a row, he worked hard to study international law, study Kissinger, study the strategy of talks, and fight a prepared battle. Beginning on 22 February, Qiao Guanhua and Kissinger revised the Sino-US joint communique paragraph by paragraph, deliberating verbatim, focusing on three points of disagreement involving Taiwan. Qiao Guanhua first expounded China's position and commented on the US side's wording on the Taiwan issue: First, since the US side recognizes that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, then the method used to resolve the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, and outsiders must not interfere. The Chinese side's wording is "hope" for a peaceful negotiated settlement, and the US side's wording is "concerned" for a peaceful settlement. Second, Taiwan was originally China's territory, but the United States used it as a military base, and of course the US military should all withdraw, and the US side's wording is "with the easing of tensions in the region", gradually reducing the US military strength and facilities. Third, since the US side acknowledges that the Taiwan issue is Chinese internal issue, of course, the US military should all withdraw, so the Chinese side's wording is "gradually reduce until all withdrawn", while the US side only talks about "gradual reduction" and does not talk about the goal of complete withdrawal, and the Chinese side cannot agree.
◆ In February 1972, Qiao Guanhua (first from the right) attended the talks between Zhou Enlai and Nixon.
Qiao Guanhua went on to put forward the Chinese language: "The United States hopes to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, and will gradually reduce and eventually withdraw all U.S. armed forces and military facilities from Taiwan." Kissinger disagreed, saying, "I hope you understand our position, and we describe the withdrawal as a goal." Even so, we still insist on linking the withdrawal of troops with the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue with the easing of the situation in Asia as a whole. ”
Qiao Guanhua tit-for-tat: "However, this premise must be the unconditional withdrawal of the United States. Kissinger did not back down: "Doing so will destroy the entire relationship, and American public opinion will never agree." Its so-called "public opinion" is nothing more than rhetoric, and in essence the United States wants to continue to support the Taiwan authorities while improving relations with China.
The two sides are at odds with each other, sometimes fighting each other red-faced. In order to adjust the atmosphere, Qiao Guanhua took a sip of coffee and said "off-topic": "Doctor, you were born in Germany, and I obtained a degree in Germany." In this regard, we should have something in common. Philosophically, however, I like Hegel and you like Kant, and that may be why we can't agree. Kissinger laughed when he heard this, and the tension was swept away. Later, whenever such a situation occurred, Joe and Ji diluted the tension through one or two jokes, so as not to make the relationship between the two sides too tense.
Every time Qiao Guanhua sent Kissinger away, he buried his head in "stockpiling bullets" and prepared to play and fight with Kissinger again.
On February 25, Joe and Ki exchanged views in a rambling manner, but still disagreed. It seems that there is no deadline for negotiations between the two sides, as if there is no need to fly to Hangzhou tomorrow, and as if there is no need to sign a communiqué in Shanghai the day after tomorrow. In fact, this is all about using drag to put pressure on the other party.
On the afternoon of the same day, Qiao Guanhua reported to Zhou Enlai, and Kissinger reported to Nixon. Then the two sides met again, and both sides made concessions to each other. Qiao Guanhua proposed that as long as all US troops stationed in Taiwan are mentioned, China will no longer oppose the US side expressing "concern" for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Kissinger proposed that the United States agreed to separate the ultimate goal of the total withdrawal of troops and the willingness of the United States to gradually withdraw its troops during this period, rather than expressing it in one sentence.
Qiao Guanhua seized on the loosening of the other side's position and tried to get the other side to move closer to the expression of this position to the Chinese side, and he said astutely: "I see if we can make such changes, it is best to mention the 'prospects' of a peaceful settlement instead of 'premises', which seems to be more positive in writing and shows the will of both sides, while using 'premises' sounds like something unilaterally imposed by Washington." "Prospect" is only a wish, "premise" is a condition, and the word difference reflects Qiao Guanhua's clever use of principle and flexibility.
Kissinger, of course, understood Qiao Guanhua's intentions, pondered for a moment and said: "This implies that China is somehow obligated, and Taiwan's fate will not depend on such subtle differences in meaning." We agree with Mr. Joe. Kissinger said privately to his attaché: "Joe, this deputy foreign minister, is not easy to deal with. ”
Qiao and Ji met again at 10:30 p.m. that night, and it took only 15 minutes to resolve the wording of the Taiwan issue. At midnight, Mao Zedong approved this statement on Taiwan. Nixon also approved it.
◆ In 1974, Mao Zedong met with Qiao Guanhua.
However, things are off the table. On the afternoon of February 26, on the plane to Hangzhou, AFTER reading the text of the communiqué, US Secretary of State Rogers and US State Department experts listed to Nixon 15 points that needed to be amended, such as raising objections to "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China", saying that this statement is too absolute, and perhaps some Chinese think so? It is proposed to replace the words "all Chinese" with the words "Chinese". Nixon immediately brought Kissinger in and asked him to talk to Joe again.
At about 10 p.m., Kissinger briefed Qiao Guanhua on the situation. Qiao Guanhua immediately asked Zhou Enlai for instructions, and Zhou En: "The significance of the communiqué is not only in its words, but also in the immeasurable meaning behind it." You think, the communiqué brought together two countries that were once extremely hostile. It would also be harmless to postpone the resolution of some issues between the two countries for a period of time. How much change the communiqué will make for our country and the world is immeasurable to you and me today. Qiao Guanhua suddenly realized: "Premier, I understand." Zhou Enlai picked up the red phone again and reported to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong thought for a moment and replied in a very firm tone: "You can tell Nixon that except for the Taiwan part that we cannot agree to revise, the other parts can be discussed." Any attempt to revise the Taiwan section would affect the likelihood of a communiqué issued tomorrow. ”
Qiao Guanhua consulted with Kissinger again at the Liuzhuang Hotel in Hangzhou, and in addition to the Taiwan part, the draft communiqué absorbed some opinions of American experts. At 4 a.m. on 27 February, the text of the communiqué was finally negotiated. On February 28, the Sino-US Joint Communiqué was officially signed and published in Shanghai. This marks that after more than 20 years of confrontation, China and the United States have begun to develop in the direction of normalization of relations, laying the foundation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
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