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With regard to the post-war treatment of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a tolerant attitude. On August 15, Chiang Kai-shek, in a radio speech for Japan's surrender, proposed:
"My Chinese compatriots must know that 'not remembering the old evils' and 'being kind to others' are the supreme and noble virtues of our national tradition. We have always declared that we will regard only the warlords of The Silent Force of Japan as enemies and not the japanese people, and that today the enemy army has been defeated by our allies, and of course we must strictly oblige him to faithfully carry out all the terms of surrender, but we do not attempt to retaliate, still less to insult the innocent people of the enemy country, but we can only show mercy to them for being driven by the fools of his Nazi warlords, so that they can extricate themselves from mistakes and crimes. We must know that if we reply to the former atrocities of the enemy with atrocities, and if we reply to their former erroneous sense of superiority with enslavement, then the retribution of wrongs will never end, and it will never be the purpose of our benevolent teachers. This is what each and every one of our military and civilian compatriots should pay special attention to today. ”
This is China's post-war policy toward Japan, which is called "repaying grievances with virtue," and the National Government basically implemented this policy in dealing with Japan after the war.
It should be said that compared with the brutal policy of the Japanese aggressors in burning and looting in China, China's post-war policy toward Japan, as a victorious power, is indeed quite tolerant and lenient.
The reason why Chiang Kai-shek did this, although the ostensible reasons, although they sounded grandiose, showed the actual purpose of the victors' "benevolence to others" and "teachers of benevolence and righteousness":
The first is to try to handle the issue of Japan's surrender as smoothly as possible so as not to interfere with his handling of other more pressing issues in post-war China, especially the issue of relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the second is to hope that Japan's cooperation on the issue of acceptance will become a strategy and means to reduce the resistance to acceptance, so as not to let it be thrown to the Chinese Communist side for other reasons; third, Chiang Kai-shek has realized that the attitude of the United States toward Japan is different from that of Germany due to the changes in the international situation, and thus is in line with the United States that he most hopes to support on this issue.
In order to embody the policy of "repaying grievances with virtue," at that time, the Japanese army that had laid down its arms in China was not called prisoners of war but bare-handed officers and men, and maintained the original command system of the troops, concentrated in concentration camps set up in various localities, and the prisoner of war management offices set up in various theaters were centrally monitored, educated, and managed, waiting for repatriation.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="97" >2. Repatriation of Japanese soldiers</h1>
The former General Headquarters of the Japanese Chinese Dispatch Force was renamed the General Liaison Department for the Rehabilitation of Japanese Officers and Men in the Chinese Theater, and in accordance with the orders of the General Headquarters of the Chinese Army, "handled all matters concerning the aftermath of the surrender of the Japanese army." The Japanese military headquarters in each theater were correspondingly renamed the Aftermath Liaison Department of Japanese officers and men in the theater, so that the Japanese army could basically live in the concentration camp accordingly in its original organization.
In these concentration camps, except for a small number of personnel on duty, they are not allowed to carry any weapons, they are not allowed to go out, and those who have fled should be hunted down and punished; they should be educated by the Chinese side, liquidate the poison of militarism, instill a sense of democracy and peace, and engage in a certain amount of manual labor, mainly to repair transportation and communication facilities and wartime destroyed projects.
For Japanese nationals in China, the General Command of the Army has successively issued the Measures for the Centralized Management of Japanese Overseas Chinese in China, the Measures for the Interim Handling of Japan's Private Industries in China, and the General Rules for the Interim Requisition of Japanese Employees in China, stipulating:
"All Japanese overseas Chinese scattered in China (outside the three eastern provinces) shall be concentrated in the areas designated by the surrendered chief officers of the Chinese Army in each region and handed over to the local provincial and municipal governments"; the Japanese overseas Chinese industry shall be operated in the form of a company, a strong occupier in war, and prohibited by Chinese law shall be accepted by the government; the registration and sealing of personal small-scale property; personal property, except for the necessities of life, each person shall be allowed to carry 5,000 yuan in Legal Tender, and the rest shall be deposited with the Chinese Government Bank as part of the future indemnity For those who cannot interrupt their careers in various business departments, who have no replacement skills, those who lack technology in our country, and those who need to be requisitioned as business cleaners, They can requisition Japanese employees and pay living expenses.
From October 25 to 27, 1945, China and the United States held the first meeting in Shanghai to repatriate Japanese prisoners of Japanese overseas Chinese, formulated the "Plan for the Repatriation of Japanese Officers and Soldiers and Japanese Overseas Chinese in the Chinese Theater", and decided that the repatriation of Japanese prisoners and Japanese overseas Chinese in the Chinese Theater (including northern Vietnam) should be the responsibility of the Chinese Government, the transportation of Japanese prisoners of Japanese overseas Chinese from the interior to the concentration area should be undertaken by the Chinese side, and from the concentration to Japan, the US Seventh Fleet and the Japanese Shipping Administration would provide transport vessels, with a transportation scale of 150,000 people per month.
On January 5, 1946, the Second Repatriation Conference was held in Shanghai. On February 6, a China Theater Repatriation Conference was held in Tokyo, confirming previous arrangements between China and the United States. After the establishment of the Military Investigation Department, it was given a special mission in the repatriation of Japanese prisoners and overseas Chinese in North China, and they could arrange transportation and boarding orders according to the situation, so as to ensure the supply of goods along the way of the repatriated.
From November 1945, when the Japanese army and overseas Chinese repatriated to China began, by April 20, 1946, a total of 1.24 million Japanese officers and soldiers in China had been repatriated, and 780,000 were repatriated; 660,000 were returned. There are still 580,000 officers and soldiers and expatriates waiting to be repatriated. According to the U.S. Military Headquarters in the Chinese Theater, the repatriation of northern Vietnam was completed on April 21, Taiwan on April 23, South China on April 25, Central China on July 11, and North China on August 11.
Due to Soviet factors, the repatriation of the Northeast did not become clear until late April after an unclear period of responsibility as to who would be responsible, except for the brigade area, which was still the responsibility of the Chinese government, and the United States began to be responsible for the shipment from Huludao. By the end of 1946, when the large-scale repatriation was completed, the total number of Japanese prisoners and overseas Chinese repatriated from China reached nearly 3 million.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="101" >3. Trial of Japanese war criminals</h1>
On November 6, 1945, the Ministry of Military Affairs, the Ministry of Military Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Administration and other organs jointly formed the War Criminals Handling Committee, which was responsible for the handling of Japanese war criminals, with the authority to decide on the policy of trying war criminals, investigate, arrest and extradite war criminals, and supervise the trial of military tribunals.
Later, it was presided over by the Ministry of National Defense, and the minister and chairman of the committee (in January 1947, it was changed to vice minister Qin Dechun as the chairman of the committee). In February of the following year, the Military Commission deliberated and adopted the Measures for the Trial of War Criminals and its Implementing Rules, as well as the Measures for the Handling of War Criminals, which made detailed provisions on the reporting, arrest, trial, and execution of Japanese war criminals.
Since the Allies organized trials of Class A war criminals who had committed major war crimes against Japan in Tokyo, China's trial of Japanese war criminals was limited to Class B and Class C war criminals who had committed crimes on the battlefields of China, and because a large number of Japanese prisoners of war needed to be repatriated, the trial of Japanese war criminals was carried out late until the repatriation of Japanese war criminals was basically completed, and only began in October 1946 (some trials were already under way in various places before, but at a lower level).
Because Chiang Kai-shek already had a policy of "repaying grievances with virtue" toward Japan, China's handling of Japanese war criminals was also relatively lenient.
On October 25, 1946, the War Criminals Handling Committee held a meeting on the policy for dealing with Japanese war criminals, and decided that "Japan should be far-sighted, and it is advisable to deal with war criminals from a big picture, without having to worry about minor matters, and to quickly end the business of dealing with war criminals."
The denunciation of Japanese war criminals ceased on October 15, 1947, and at the end of the year, the trials were basically completed, the military courts in various places were abolished, in July 1948, the War Criminals Handling Committee was dissolved, and in April 1949, the military court of the Ministry of National Defense ended the detention and trial of Japanese war criminals, and the Ministry of National Defense (before the establishment of the Ministry of National Defense, which was the headquarters of the Army) set up ten war criminal detention centers and military tribunals throughout the country, the most important of which was the Military Tribunal for the Trial of War Criminals of the Ministry of National Defense in Nanjing (established on February 15, 1946). President Shi Meiyu (also president of the Shanghai Military Tribunal for the Trial of War Criminals).
The basic circumstances of the trial of Japanese war criminals by these military tribunals are as follows:
In the trial of Japanese war criminals, the most concerned by the Chinese people is the trial of Japanese war criminals related to the Nanjing Massacre. Gu Shoufu, the commander of the Japanese Sixth Division, who was directly responsible for the Nanjing Massacre, was arrested in Tokyo on February 2, 1946, and extradited to China in August of the same year to stand trial at the Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defense in Nanjing.
During the prosecutor's interrogation, Gu Shoufu denied the fact that the Japanese army had massacred in Nanjing, and even said that he had not heard of the massacre at all, and did not learn about it in the newspaper until after the war. However, Gu Shoufu's denial could not hide the fact of blood, and in the face of a large number of powerful human and physical evidence, Gu Shoufu had to admit the existence of the Nanjing Massacre, but he also put the responsibility on other troops, arguing that "our division and regiment were transferred after entering the city, so there was no relationship", and repeatedly wrote to Chen Cheng, Bai Chongxi, and others, demanding "a leniency in the public trial."
However, history cannot be erased, and hundreds of Chinese and foreign people who survived the tragedy of the Nanjing Massacre provided testimony for the trial.
From February 6 to 8, 1947, the Military Court of the Ministry of National Defense held a public trial of Gu Shoufu at the Nanjing Inspirational Society, and more than 80 Chinese and foreign people testified in court, and the head of the court had the head of the victim who had just been excavated on the table, silently accusing the atrocities of the Japanese army that year. On March 10, the military tribunal alleged in its judgment that Gu Shoufu's "cruel acts, inflicted on the unarmed people and innocent women and children, are extremely vicious and incomparable, and are not only a major stain on human civilization, that is, the sinister of his mental skills, the viciousness of his means, and the fierceness of the harm, but also the immensity of the punishment, and should be sentenced to death with a death sentence" and sentenced "During the battle, Gu Shoufu jointly slaughtered prisoners and non-combatants, and raped, robbed, and destroyed property, and was sentenced to death."
Gu Shoufu's application for retrial was rejected. On the morning of April 26, Gu Shoufu was kidnapped in Nanjing and sent to the Yuhuatai Execution Ground, where he was executed at the site of his massacre under his command. On that day, the citizens of Nanjing were empty of alleys to see the final fate of Gu Shoufu. During the Nanjing Massacre, Junji Tanaka, the squadron leader of the 6th Division, who slaughtered hundreds of our compatriots, toshiaki Xiangjing, the leader of the 16th Division, who was famous for his killing competition, and The aide-de-camp Noda, were also extradited from Japan to China for trial in November 1947.
On January 28, 1948, Tanaka Junji, Toshiaki Xiangjing, and Takeshi Noda were executed in Yuhuatai, Nanjing, for "jointly and continuously slaughtering captives and non-combatants."
Matsui Ishigen, the supreme commander of the Japanese army in Nanjing during the Nanjing Massacre and commander of the Central China Dispatch Army, was tried by the Allied Military Tribunal in Tokyo and found that he "has both the duty and the power to control his own army and protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanjing." Because he neglected to fulfil these obligations, he could not but be held criminally responsible".
On November 12, 1948, Matsui Ishigen was sentenced to death by hanging. According to Judge Mei Ruxuan, who participated in the Tokyo trial in China, "Matsui Ishigen has been pretending to be a look of chagrin and remorse in the course of more than two years of trial. In the last court, when it was announced that he would be sentenced to death by hanging, he was so frightened that he was faceless, his soul was not possessed, his feet were paralyzed, he could not support himself, and he was forcefully held hostage by two strong gendarmes before he had to walk out of the courtroom in a hurry." The invincibility of its year is gone. On December 22, Matsui Ishigen was executed in Tokyo.
The fate of Matsui Ishigen, Tani Shoufu and others embodies the victory of human justice and morality, and finally enables the underground souls of hundreds of thousands of compatriots who have been killed in Nanjing to be a little comforted. As Judge Mei Rudun said: "I am not an egressist. It is not my intention to write on the japanese people the blood debt owed to us by the Japanese imperialists. However, I believe that forgetting the sufferings of the past may lead to future disasters. ”
According to incomplete statistics, the Japanese war criminals sentenced to death were: former chief of staff of the Tianjin Garrison army in Japan, former commander of the 23rd Army, and commander of the massacre of hong Kong arsonists (executed on September 13, 1946), later commander of the 23rd Army and responsible for the massacres in Guangdong (executed on March 27, 1947), the commander of the 130th Division and the person responsible for the massacres in Guangdong Shinhachi Kondo (executed on November 21, 1947); Former Japanese military attaché in China Tan Takahashi, former Japanese Governor in Hong Kong Rinsuke Isoya, and several Japanese division commanders.
In addition, Riki Ando, the former Japanese governor of Taiwan, committed suicide at Tilanqiao Prison in Shanghai on April 19, 1946, and commander of the Sixth Front, Naosaburo Okabe, died in the War Crimes Hospital on November 28. If we compare with the war crimes committed in China, there are not many Japanese war criminals who have been sentenced to death, and there are fewer high-level prisoners, the sentences are also lighter, and most of the military and above have not been prosecuted or sentenced to relatively light sentences, which is inseparable from the entire domestic and foreign situation at that time.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="102" > Connivance with Japanese war criminals</h1>
After the treatment of most Japanese war criminals has come to an end, the fate of Ninji Okamura, commander-in-chief of the Japanese-Chinese dispatch army, has attracted attention. Okamura is considered to be "the number one war criminal in the Chinese theater, that is, if he does not interrogate, he can also be sentenced to capital punishment", "for China, for the Chinese people, crushing bones and powder is not enough to pay for his crimes." However, due to his cooperative attitude in the reception, the Kuomintang had considered opening up its side from the beginning.
According to Okamura's self-remembrance, He Yingqin, Chen Cheng, Tang Enbo, and others all suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that he "made remarkable achievements after the end of the war and should be treated leniently, which would also be beneficial to Sino-Japanese relations in the future." But Chiang "had to consider political tactics" and "remained silent" about their proposals.
Fearing both the political troubles caused by Okamura's release and the inability to deal leniently with him for trial, the Kuomintang neither imprisoned nor released him, but instead made him live in Nanjing, where he was treated with dignity and courtesy, while the outside world said that he still needed his assistance in handling the outstanding matters of repatriation. Defense Minister Bai Chongxi told Okamura, "According to international circumstances, it is safe not to return to Japan for the time being."
In order to perfunctory public opinion, it may also be transferred to a military court for trial, but the trial is only a formality", under the pressure of public opinion, on August 23, 1948, the military court of the Ministry of National Defense held a trial in Shanghai, and Okamura Ninji was tried in a "walking form". The trial was held only once and was adjourned on the grounds that Okamura was ill.
On January 26, 1949, the court reopened and found that Okamura Ningji had become the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Chinese Dispatch Army on November 26, 1944, and that the massacres of the Japanese army in China "all occurred before the defendant's term of office and had nothing to do with the defendant"; "the Japanese government officially declared its surrender, and the defendant obeyed the orders of the enemy." If there is no such crime as massacre, rape and robbery, or planning a conspiracy to start a crime, or supporting a war of aggression, it cannot be linked to a war crime simply because he is the commander-in-chief of the enemy army."
Accordingly, the court found Okamura "guilty of no violation of the rules of war or other violation of public international law, and shall be acquitted in accordance with the law with a view to his or her consent". On January 30, all war criminals in custody at Okamura and Shanghai War Criminals Prison were sent to Japan.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="103" >5. Punishment of traitors</h1>
After the Kuomintang receivers arrived in the receiving areas, because they needed to use the original enemy and puppet regime organs and personnel to serve them, they did not take action against the traitors, resulting in the fact that the traitors went unpunished, the small and medium-sized traitors turned into "underground workers," and some innocent people became the targets of extortion.
The first traitors to be arrested were Chu Minyi, the pseudo-governor of Guangdong Province, and Chen Bijun, the wife of Wang Jingwei, who were arrested in Guangzhou on September 9. On September 26, He Yingqin ordered all theaters of war to arrest and await the central authorities' disposition of those who were major generals or above and civilian officials recommended by civilian officials and above, those who had not yet rehabilitated themselves and those who had committed serious crimes.
Since then, Mei Siping, Li Shengwu, Zheng Dazhang, Xiang Zhizhuang, Wen Zongyao, and Liang Hongzhi, traitors of the Wang puppet regime in Nanjing, have been arrested one after another. On the 30th, Zhou Fohai, Ding Mo Estate, Luo Junqiang and five others flew to Chongqing accompanied by Dai Kasa to listen to the disposition. On October 3, Chen Gongbo and others were escorted from Japan to Nanjing. From December 5 to 8, the Military Command Bureau conducted unified operations in Beiping and Tianjin, arresting Wang Kemin, Wang Yitang, Wang Yintai, Qi Xieyuan, Yin Rugeng, Zhou Zuoren, and other traitors in North China (in May of the following year, some of them were released to Nanjing for trial). According to statistics, the total number of traitors arrested by the military command is 4692. Puppet Manchu traitors and war criminals, led by Puyi, were successively arrested by the Soviet army and sent to the Soviet Union for detention.
After some legal processing, in March 1946, the trial of the big traitor began. Chen Gongbo, the number one traitor, was sentenced to death for collaborating with the enemy and plotting treason.
On May 21, Miao Bin, vice president of the Wang Puppet Legislative Yuan, was shot and executed, the first person to commit adultery and ambush the law. On June 3, Chen Gongbo was executed in Suzhou. Other important traitors sentenced to death and executed were: Hu Yukun (June 24, 1946), puppet Chief of staff, Ling Xiao (June 24), puppet Minister of the Navy (June 24), Pseudo Hubei Governor Yang Zhuyi (June 24), Pseudo Foreign Minister Chu Minyi (August 23), Pseudo Minister of the Interior Mei Siping (September 14), Pseudo Central Propaganda Minister Lin Baisheng (October 8), Pseudo Legislative Yuan Liang Hongzhi (November 9), Pseudo North China Public Security Inspector Qi Xieyuan (December 18), pseudo Zhejiang Governor Fu Shi said ( June 19, 1947), pseudo-Minister of War Ye Peng (September 18), Chairman of the Puppet Jidong Autonomous Government Yin Rugeng (December 1), Commander of the Puppet Anguo Army and International Spy Jin Bihui (Yoshiko Kawashima, March 25, 1948), And Wang Yitang,Chairman of the Pseudo-North China Political Affairs Committee (September 10).
According to incomplete statistics, there are less than twenty special-ranking traitors who have served as ministers of the puppet regime and governors or above, and the other traitors who have been sentenced to death include: Chen Bijun, wife of Wang Jingwei; Wen Zongyao, president of the pseudo-judicial yuan; Jiang Kanghu, president of the pseudo-examination court; Wang Yintai, chairman of the pseudo-North China Political Affairs Committee; Luo Junqiang, governor of pseudo-Anhui Province; and Yuan Ludeng, director of the pseudo-rice grain control committee, all of whom were sentenced to life imprisonment; and Zhou Zuoren, the pseudo-north China education supervisor, was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. In addition, on August 17, 1945, Chen Qun, the president of the Wang Pseudo-Examination Institute, committed suicide.
On December 25, Wang Kemin, former chairman of the North China Political Affairs Committee, was arrested and died of illness. In general, among the convicted traitors, there were more government officials than military generals, more Beiyang and Wang Paiyu dang than former Kuomintang central officials, and most of the puppet army leaders who held military power escaped trial.
Although the trial of the traitors is underway, the traitors Zhou Fohai, Ding Mo Estate, and others have been living in Chongqing under the protection of Dai Kasa, and public opinion is extremely dissatisfied with this, believing that Zhou "has the deepest collusion with Japan and the most thorough traitor to the country." In Wang Ji's puppet class, Zhou's crime of rebellion was really above Chen's rebellion against Gongbo"; and the secret service organ presided over by Ding's "Seventy-Six" "I don't know how many loyal and patriotic elements working underground died at the hands of this person"; "If the giant traitors do not surrender to the law early and cultivate the national integrity cultivated over the years, I am afraid that they will inevitably be injured."
At the request of all walks of life, after Dai Kasa was killed in a plane crash, on September 25, 1946, Zhou, Ding and others were transferred from Chongqing to Nanjing. On October 7, Zhou Fohai was indicted in Nanjing.
Unlike Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai had a deep relationship with Chiang Kai-shek, and after surrendering to the enemy, he established relations with the military command earlier, and made great contributions to the kmt's smooth acceptance of Beijing and Shanghai in the early stage of the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
On February 26, 1947, the Nationalist government issued an order that Zhou Fohai "not only ensures order in the Shanghai-Hangzhou area before and after the surrender of the enemy, so that the people will not suffer from ruin, but also contribute to the security of society... The death sentence of the convict Zhou Fohai was commuted to life imprisonment.". Zhou Fohai finally escaped the death sentence, and on February 28, 1948, he fell ill and died in Nanjing Prison.
Ding Mo Estate is not as "lucky" as Chow Fo Hai. On February 8, 1947, Ding was sentenced to death. On May 1, the Supreme Court rejudged the verdict, admitting that after he surrendered after he was wanted, and assisted in his surrender after victory, "although it is not without merit, it cannot hide his sins, so it will not be lightly reduced." Although the parties also have considerable status and momentum for their arguments, if zhou Fohai is further commuted, the public pressure on the authorities will be even greater, so Ding's commutation is not a fact, and he was executed on July 5.
According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice and Administration, as of October 1947, 45,679 cases of traitors had been closed through inspection, 30,185 people were prosecuted, 20,055 people were not prosecuted, and 13,323 other people were prosecuted. Of the 25,155 cases completed, 14,932 were sentenced, of whom 369 were executed, 979 were sentenced to life, 13,570 were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment, 14 were fined, 5,822 were acquitted and 10,654 were others.
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However, under the circumstances at that time, the Kuomintang needed to use the puppet army to control the situation, and the puppet army was willing to defect to the Kuomintang for the sake of future ways out, so the puppet army was mostly used by the Kuomintang. With the development of the situation, the Kuomintang government troops were successively transported to the retake areas, and the use of puppet troops was vulnerable to social opposition, so the Kuomintang's policy towards the puppet army turned to the main deployment.
However, the treatment of the puppet army in various localities was not uniform due to different circumstances, and in the general north, because of its role in assisting the Kuomintang in stabilizing its rule, most of them retained their original establishment; in the south, because the Kuomintang's rule was relatively stable, the puppet army was demobilized, and the troops were allocated to supplement the troops with soldiers.
For example, in the north, the pseudo-Second Front's Sun Liangcheng's department, the Third Front's Wuhua's Wenbu, the Fourth Front's Zhang Lanfeng's department, the Sixth Front's Sun Dianying's department, and the Xuzhou Sui's Hao Pengju's department were generally retained according to their original establishment and put into the front line of the anti-communist war, while Pang Bingxun's puppet army was allocated to various units. The pseudo-First Front Army in the south served as the Aid Dao Department, the Bengbu Sui Bureau Lin Baisheng Department, the Hangzhou Sui Bureau Xiang Zhizhuang Department, the Wuhan Sui Bureau Ye Peng Department, the Jiujiang Sui Bureau Huang Ziqiang Department, and the Guangzhou Sui Bureau Chen Chunpu Department, but were disbanded, and the soldiers were allocated to the various units.
According to Lin Wei's report to the CPPCC, the basic principle of the total deployment of the puppet army is regarded, while the officials are dealt with in four ways: willing to rebel, opportunistic, forced to coerce, and dispatched to rebel.
By the end of 1945, 600,000 people in 51 units of the national puppet army (except the northeast), 200,000 people south of the Yangtze River had been deployed, and 200,000 people north of the Yangtze River had not been deployed, which would be completed in the first half of 1946.
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