When talking about the world's famous players in World War II, it is not difficult to think of Zhukov, Nimitz, Rommel, Montgomery, Patton and other such thunderous names. Each of these famous generals has been written and passed down by later generations, and their high achievements have been talked about by military experts.
But when it comes to the opponents that once made them feel difficult, in the Pacific Theater, there was a Japanese who once frightened the giant of the United States. He was the commander of the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet, Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.
When it comes to the famous Japanese generals of World War II, Yamamoto fifty-six ranks second, and no one dares to rank first. The silent man, who was only 1.6 meters tall, had a strong body and a dark complexion, and looked less like a soldier and more like an ordinary farmer. But he was the initiator of the Pacific War, with the combined fleet almost destroyed the US Pacific Fleet, is the "first dangerous person in the Pacific" in the eyes of the US military, nicknamed "war gambler".
During Yamamoto's lifetime, the war between Japan and the United States had not yet taken a one-sided situation, and after his death in early 1943, the Combined Japanese Fleet had no hope of overturning. But what is full of drama is that the fall of the famous general Isoroku Yamamoto is actually related to a battle he carefully planned, which is the famous "I-no-no- Battle".
"Operation I" is the masterpiece of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, containing his ambition to "turn decay into magic" in the Pacific. But in this battle, Yamamoto was dramatically "deceived" by the soldiers who respected him, and the navy's recruit egg blew a defeat into a victory. And Yamamoto, who credulously believed in not actual combat reports, was careless and light on the enemy, and eventually cried out for his life in the Pacific.
The execution process of operation I was foggy, what was its specific plan? Whether the Japanese Navy lost or won, why did it kill its own naval commander?
<h1 class = "pgc-h-center-line" >, Decisive Battle Madman: Yamamoto Isoroku</h1>
After the beginning of the Pacific War, Yamamoto Fifty-Six resolutely implemented the "decisive battle" policy, from Hawaii to the Coral Sea, Midway, solomon islands, the Japanese Navy is taking the initiative to attack, looking for the main US aircraft carrier fleet to compete. Yamamoto Isoroku's war mentality of advocating offense is the only way since ancient times for soldiers to "defeat the strong with the weak", and because of this strategic thinking, he is also known as the "decisive battle madman".
Yamamoto's idea of "winning the first world war" looks extreme and naïve on the surface, but behind it contains a keen vision of war and a big picture beyond ordinary people. When mankind entered the 20th century, the form of war has changed greatly from the past, the "human" factor has been continuously reduced, and the two elements of "industry" and "resources" have been continuously enlarged.
Yamamoto believes that the so-called war is no longer the blood and fighting spirit of the soldiers who can determine victory or defeat, but the competition in national politics, science and technology, resources and other aspects, that is, the so-called "confrontation of national strength.".
Yamamoto was posted in the United States in 1925 as a Japanese naval attaché to the United States. While in the United States, he was impressed by the strength of the United States. Yamamoto had long believed that there would be a war between Japan and Britain and the United States, and that "blitzkrieg" and "decisive battle" were the only way to defeat these powers. With this in mind, he planned the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941 and was a great success, making him a national hero of the Japanese at that time.
However, after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific Fleet completed the reversal with the Battle of Midway, the Japanese Combined Fleet was damaged, four aircraft carriers were destroyed, and strategically became a defensive position. In early 1943, Japan was defeated at Guadalcanal, and the Solomon Islands became a graveyard for the Japanese Navy. The Japanese army and navy all paid a heavy price on Guadalcanal, with more than 20 warships destroyed, more than 20,000 Japanese troops killed, and the combined fleet seriously injured.
Under these circumstances, Yamamoto still did not accept any conservative strategy, or insisted on attacking. He believes that the US military is also scarred, and as long as it continues to work hard, it will certainly be able to turn things around. Therefore, Yamamoto wanted to use an "air raid" to strike at the living forces of the US Navy and complete the reversal.
The plan was "Operation I".
<h1 class = "pgc-h-center-line" > ii, I-no-nos: Yamamoto wants us to die! </h1>
Battle of I-no. is Yamamoto's last song and an embodiment of his life values.
At that time, the Battle of Guadalcanal was lost, and the Japanese army in the Solomon Islands had basically no drama, let alone organizing an attack, and even defense was a problem. The Japanese Navy lost control of the sea in the Solomon Sea, and the large islands here became isolated islands for the Japanese, and the army soldiers on the islands were helpless and even in danger of starvation.
At that time, the air base of the Japanese combined fleet was in Rabaul in the Bismarck Islands, and the Solomon Islands were lost, and the Bismarck Islands would also become the mouth of the US military. Determined by this time, Yamamoto was determined to pull up an aviation force at Rabaul Airport and rush to attack U.S. military bases in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea to defeat U.S. offensive attempts.
The plan was bold, but no one dared to refute the "Navy's idol." In the end, Yamamoto's plan was also approved by the Naval Staff, and he pulled out all the belongings of the Japanese Navy at that time: General Jinzaburo Ozawa's Naval Third Fleet, and all the two aircraft carriers that could still be moved, "Mizuzuru" and "Mizuho", all of which participated in the battle, and the Eleventh Air Force of Any General Kusaka took off and stopped at Rabaul Airport. This air force includes 200 Zero fighters, 70 Ninety-Nine ship explosions, as well as hundreds of comet ship explosions, land attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, etc., and the number of aircraft is close to 400.
The number of aircraft is very shabby compared to the Japanese Navy two years ago, but this is already the last chip that Yamamoto Isoroku, a "gambler", can come up with. In order to protect the Navy's "golden" aircraft carriers, Yamamoto assured his superiors that they would not damage them, and he actually let the aircraft carriers stay in the harbor and let the carrier-based aircraft take off from the island to attack thousands of miles like the land aviation units.
But the plan for a surprise attack on the Solomon Islands reached the Japanese Navy's Third Fleet, and the Japanese soldiers wailed, and the just-concluded Battle of the Solomon Islands left the unit bleeding, and most of the slightly experienced pilots were killed, and the remaining pilots were "an old bird with a flock of rookies." The pilots who came from the rear were all inexperienced recruits, and even if they graduated after training take-off and landing aircraft at the aviation school, let them go on combat missions was basically to die.
At that time, there was a news spread within the Navy: ordinary cadets of the Japanese Aviation School could only go to the Army, and only the elite could get on the aircraft carrier. Because at that time, ordinary cadets could only take off and land, and they didn't even have the ability to park their planes on narrow aircraft carriers! The weakness of the Japanese naval aviation is evident.
Yamamoto divided the 400-aircraft operation into two parts, targeting Solomon and New Guinea, code-named "X" and "Y." Operation X was in the lead, planning to bomb U.S. military bases in the Solomon Islands on April 5 and 10, followed by Plan Y, which turned around and attacked U.S. forces in eastern New Guinea on the 11th and 20th.
The admirals were confident, but the Japanese pilots were worried. The flight from Rabaul to Solomon was long, taking two hours to arrive, with no aircraft carriers and no islands docked. Taking into account the fuel for the return journey, if the aircraft encounters the enemy over the war zone, the combat time can only be compressed to the limit, calculated in minutes.
In this state, the pilot is tired, and the aircraft can basically only complete the bombing, once caught in a bitter battle, the aircraft's fuel is definitely not enough to support the return journey, the pilot must be prepared for "jade crushing".
The old naval pilots at that time complained: Yamamoto is letting us die!
<h1 class = "pgc-h-center-line" > third, the death pit of war: lying about military information</h1>
Although the lower soldiers and officers complained a lot, the military orders were like mountains. In March 1941, the Third Fleet of the Japanese Combined Fleet began pre-war preparations, and the pilots uniformly ended their vacations and conducted combat readiness training. In Rabaul on the front line, Army soldiers worked overtime to renovate the airfield, carry oil and build air defense facilities. A steady stream of ground crews from the rear came to Rabaul, and hundreds of aircraft were newly maintained, waiting to go to the front line to make a contribution.
The Navy pilot joked: "When we arrive in Rabaul, we will have ten days left." ”
On April 1, 1941, in order to create conditions for Operation I and to test the combat status of the army, more than 50 Zero fighters of the Eleventh Air Force took off from Rabaul and went to the skies over Guadalcanal to conduct a surprise attack. The U.S. army detected the Japanese movement early and intercepted the Japanese aircraft in the Russell Islands outside Guadalcanal. The two sides retreated at the same time after a fierce battle, and the Japanese gave up the raid on Guadalcanal.
On 3 April, Commander Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, personally visited the Rabaul front to oversee the Battle Plan of the I. The naval recruits in Rabaul were very excited to hear that Yamamoto, these young people were radicals who had grown up with a militarist education, regarded Yamamoto Fifty-Six as an idol, and they were most proud to serve the idol.
On April 5, Project X was supposed to begin, but the Solomon Islands were hit by a thunderstorm, and the battle plan had to be postponed to April 7. Early in the morning of April 7, Rabaul's runway was lined with planes, and The Japanese Navy pilots held a swearing-in ceremony, and after drinking a glass of sake, they were bound to march on Solomon. Yamamoto personally watched the fighters leave outside the airport, and the novice pilots saluted their idols before flying to the Solomon Islands with tears in their eyes.
According to the memoirs of surviving postwar pilots, Isoroku Yamamoto's appearance of waving his military hat at the airport is the deepest memory of their lives.
The Japanese arrived in Solomon at 10 a.m. and took off for Guadalcanal after a short supply. The U.S. army received information about the Japanese air raids, and the "Ainsworth Fleet" quickly left the harbor and lined up a loose formation at sea. The U.S. Naval Aviation and the Japanese fought fiercely in the Russell Islands, and the U.S. military waited for work, and hundreds of aircraft fought in the sky. Japanese Zero fighters blocked the American fighters, and the 99-9 ship explosion and land attack aircraft rushed into Guadalcanal, sinking and injuring some of the American ships.
The backbone of this air raid is the carrier-based aircraft pilots of the Third Fleet, and the recruits who participated in the first battle can only help, they are either crazy to evade the action, or they are shot down early, or even escape from the team. In the end, the Japanese lost more than 20 aircraft and took the initiative to withdraw from the battlefield. Because the air raid was guarded by the US military in advance, the results of the battle were very small: only three US ships were sunk, or frigates and transport ships, and the other ships were injured.
The Japanese flying formation returned to Rabaul in disgrace, and Yamamoto Wasoroku was still at the airport to greet them.
The pilots had mixed feelings, and the recruits had experienced the baptism of blood and fire, and by this time their enthusiasm had faded, and only fear remained in their hearts. In order to boost morale and not be scolded by their superiors, the captains of the formation actually told lies to the commander of the combined fleet.
"The U.S. military is unprepared for this operation! We sank more than 20 American ships and more than a dozen American planes were shot down! The Imperial Navy has won a great victory! Yamamoto was overjoyed when he heard the news, and he could not have imagined that this so-called "battle result" was completely illusory, and that "Operation X" was a failed raid, and that the U.S. troops had almost no losses.
In view of the success of Project X, Yamamoto immediately ordered Plan Y to be carried out in advance, allowing the pilots to recuperate and raid New Guinea two days later.
<h1 class = "pgc-h-center-line" > iv, the end of the "war gambler"</h1>
On 10 April, Plan Y of Operation I began, with 200 Japanese aircraft heading toward New Guinea. However, due to weather conditions, the Japanese were unable to attack New Guinea and were forced to withdraw.
On April 12, after the weather improved, the Japanese attacked New Guinea again, and near the island of Guinea, 50 American and Japanese aircraft began air combat, and more than 30 Japanese attack aircraft flew to Port Moresby, blowing up an oil depot in the harbor and destroying more than 20 American aircraft. The surprise attack was fairly effective, but it was customary for Japanese pilots to brag, and they once again boasted of the results, claiming that the Americans had lost 30 ships and more than 100 aircraft.
On 14 April, the Japanese discovered a U.S. convoy of American convoys on the island of Papua, and 180 aircraft were ordered to destroy the fleet. However, the US military once again took precautions in advance, the convoy and fighters took off to intercept, the Japanese shot down 3 US aircraft, lost 7 of their own, and the US ships were only damaged, no losses.
On 16 April, the Japanese attacked again, only to be forced to return home after a thunderstorm.
At this point, Yamamoto Believed that the purpose of attacking the living forces of the US military had been completed, and the entire "I-I-War" was successfully concluded. According to the so-called "war report", the Combined Fleet Command reported that the Tokyo base camp: the U.S. army lost a cruiser, a destroyer, more than twenty transport ships and frigates in operation I, hundreds of aircraft were destroyed, and an oil depot was bombed. The Japanese lost more than 20 aircraft, which can be described as a complete victory.
In fact, the U.S. army was only sunk 4 ships, 30 aircraft, and the Japanese lost 59 aircraft themselves, and the Japanese lost more in this battle.
Operation I was over, and the pilots were happy, but some officers were worried. They learned about the "lying about military information" on the front line through some channels, but because the results of the battle had been reported to Tokyo, they chose to rot this secret in their stomachs. Overwhelmed by the victory, Yamamoto thought that Japan had the upper hand in the South Pacific and decided to personally inspect solomon's front to cheer up the army.
Although the staff officers and officers around him expressed their opposition, Yamamoto Wasoroku was determined to go to the front line to encourage the soldiers who had just "won".
At this time, the Japanese army's coded telegram had been cracked by the US military as early as a year ago, and the US military was surprised by the content of the telegram and immediately reported it to the naval commander Nimitz. After much deliberation, Nimitz decided to carry out a "decapitation operation" against Yamamoto Isoroku. The U.S. military did not start to defend as Yamamoto expected, but instead actively prepared for the attack, the U.S. army organized 12 P38 fighters as a commando team, flew at a low altitude in the early morning of April 18, and finally encountered Yamamoto Fifty-six's landplane at dawn.
After a brawl, the Zero fighters responsible for escorting the Navy commander were diverted away, and Yamamoto's plane was besieged by four American planes. The plane was completely sifted, and Isoroku Yamamoto died on the spot, crashing on the island. This "war gambler" did not expect that the "I plan" he planned not only failed to make the Japanese army overturn, but instead sent himself to the ghost gate, he loved to gamble all his life, and just forgot the truth that "long gambling must lose".
After the end of the "I-I Operation", the Japanese Navy's lying about military information has become a good play, and after that, whenever there is a firefight with the US army, the Japanese army will certainly be able to "win", but it is the difference between a big victory and a small victory.
The combined fleet was so "singing all the way" that it was hit by the US military. I don't know what it's like to have knowledge under Yamamoto's fifty-six springs.
Text/Shogakuno
Resources:
1. "The Restlessness of Fifty-Six Yamamoto", James W. M. Scott
2. "Assassination of Yamamoto Fifty-Six- The Fall of Japan's "Naval Flower"", Shi Yun
3. "The Final Naval and Air Showdown - Rabaul 1943", Zhang Yawei