In May 1948, the Secretariat of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting. One of the topics was to discuss the strategic proposal that Su Yu's three columns would not be able to fight a major battle in the north of jiangsu for the time being. Most military fans of this period of history are more familiar with it. However, after the meeting, chen Yi did not know much about why he went to work in the Central Plains Field Army. After all, it is the commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, after all, it is to Go to Zhongye to serve as Liu Bocheng's deputy and serve as a deputy commander, which is equivalent to no "military power", at least no longer "number one". This made the military history circles inevitably have all kinds of questions and speculations: What happened to Chen Yi's being sent to Nakano? How was he feeling when he went to Nakano, and was there any loss? How did he go after he arrived in Nakano?
First, why did Liu Deng invite Chen Yi to work in Nakano?
As for Chen Yi's going to work in Nakano, many people think that Chairman Mao Zedong suddenly decided at the Chengnanzhuang Conference. In fact, there is a prelude to this. That is, before that, when the Central Committee consulted Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping on the issue of Chen Yi going to work in Zhongye, Liu Deng sent a special telegram to the Central Committee, mainly: "The situation in the Central Plains is too big and the situation is complicated. At present, the ability of the Central Plains Bureau is really incompetent." Based on this: "First, Comrade Peng Zhen was invited to serve as the first secretary, and Chen Yi and Xiao Ping were appointed as the second and third secretaries. Second, Chen Yi was also the second commander of the military region and the commander of the field army. Third, if Su Yuru stays in the Central Plains temporarily, he will also be the deputy commander of the military region and the deputy commander of the field army."
Through this telegram, it can be seen that the main reason for inviting Chen Yi to work in Nakano is that Liu Deng believes that the central plains area covers too much coverage, coupled with the complexity of the situation, and the existing leaders do not have enough energy, and it is urgent to strengthen new leadership. To this end, when they suggested Chen Yi's post, they also made a package of specific personnel arrangement suggestions for the central authorities on the chain changes brought about by this.
However, Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission adopted Some of Liu Deng's opinions and suggestions and some of them did not. For example, Peng Zhen did not take up his post at the Central Plains Bureau, and the first secretary of the Central Plains Bureau was still Deng Xiaoping. As for Chen Yi, as Liu Deng suggested, he served as the second secretary of the Central Plains Bureau, and at the same time served as the deputy commander of the Central Plains Military Region and the Central Plains Field Army.
Second, did Chen Yi have the psychological preparations to go to Nakano?
It should be said that Chen Yi was not mentally prepared to work in Nakano. Why?
As early as January 1948, the strategic decision that Su Yu led three columns to cross the river and carry out a wide mobile combat mission in Jiangnan was itself agreed upon by Chairman Mao Zedong and Chen Yi. That is to say, Chen Yi was very sympathetic to Su Yu's three columns across the river. To this end, he also wrote a poem that reads, "Five years of victory is now predictable, and the Yangtze River is steadily crossed to send Su Lang" to express his heart for the southward advance of the river. At that time, Chen Yi, who had returned from northern Shaanxi to the Huaye front, not only did not have the problem of going to Zhongye to work at all, but he also carried a warrant from Chairman Mao Zedong, that is, in the future, after Su Yu led his troops to leapfrog across the river, the Southeast Field Army would be established, and the warrant was written that Chen Yi would be appointed commander and political commissar of the Southeast Field Army.
As a result, Su Yu's suggestion that three columns should not be crossed by the river was equivalent to a major turn of one hundred and eighty degrees, and Chen Yi, who had just returned to the Huaye front, was recalled to Chengnanzhuang, the central seat at that time, together with Su Yu. Eventually, Chairman Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission agreed to Su Yu's strategic proposal. At the same time, it was also decided that Chen Yi would work in the Central Plains, and in the words of the chairman, "Huaye would be carried out by Su Yu." But although Su Yu insisted that "Huaye cannot do without Commander Chen", Chairman Mao Zedong made it clear that although Chen Yi, the commander and political commissar of Huaye, still held the post, he must go to Nakano to work.
Regarding Chairman Mao Zedong's decision to send Chen Yi to work in Nakano, there is no more introduction in the main history. Perhaps because of Liu Deng's strong invitation mentioned above, or perhaps because Chairman Mao Zedong transferred Chen Yi away, put pressure on Su Yu, and let Su Yu fight a big battle in the Central Plains. We can't speculate more about that. But in any case, this decision was definitely something that Chen Yi did not expect.
Third, did Chen Yi go to Nakano and have a lost mentality?
Although at Su Yu's request, Chen Yi's post as commander and political commissar of Huaye remained, at the same time Chairman Mao Zedong demanded that Chen Yi must go to Nakano to take up his post, and later sent a telegram to clarify the issue. From a common sense point of view, the senior officer of the ruling party is transferred to another place to serve as a deputy post, and the "military power" is lost, and the average person usually has a psychological gap. So does Chen Yi have this kind of lost psychology?
We may find some clues in a letter from Chen Yi to Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao. According to the "Biography of Chen Yi", at that time, Chen Yi entrusted Yang Lisan to bring the captured AC and DC dual-use radio to the central government to give to "Enlai and Xiaochao". In a letter attached at the same time, it is written: "This new American production, Xuchang Battle Capture, you have electric lights, use it very well to start, two couples can dance in the house." Chen Yi went on to write later: "Tomorrow I will go west, without any intention of leaving the troops, and hope that I will be able to enter Sichuan with the army in the future."
Through These few words of Chen Yi, it is not difficult for us to see that Chen Yi is still a little disappointed, and he issued a "no intention of leaving the troops at all."
Interestingly, after Zhou Enlai received this letter from Chen Yi, he specially approved it for Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Ren Bishi and other major secretaries to circulate. I don't know who is still next to the sentence "There is no intention of leaving troops" "with a brush to draw a rough bar to show that it is worthy of attention"...
Fourth, did Chen Yi's psychology of loss affect his work after he arrived in Nakano?
However, after all, Chen Yi was a revolutionary who had been tested by blood and fire, and although there were some psychological changes in the sudden change of his position, it did not affect his loyalty and love for the revolutionary cause in the slightest. After arriving at the Central Plains Field Army, Chen Yi quickly threw himself into work, cooperating with Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping and others. In particular, the large piece of "regular work of the Central Plains Military Region and the Central Plains Bureau" was mainly undertaken by Chen Yi, who invested a lot of painstaking efforts and wisdom.
On July 25, 1948, Deng Xiaoping, first secretary of the Central Plains Bureau and political commissar of the Central Plains Military Region, departed for Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei Province, to report to the Central Committee on the details and experience of the Central Plains Strategic Region, and at the same time attended the "September Meeting" of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Since then, the daily work of the entire Central Plains Bureau has been completely presided over by Chen Yi. In this way, Chen Yi's burden was undoubtedly heavier.
Main references: "Biography of Chen Yi", "Annals of Chen Yi"