Ten years of hunting
U.S. intelligence knew from the outset that bin Laden was behind the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks; Intelligence agents identified Al-Qaida members while verifying the passenger lists of the crashed aircraft. The day after the attack, U.S. President George W. Bush W. Bush told the American public, "The most important thing for us is to find bin Laden ... That's our top priority and we won't stop until we find him. ”
Abundant intelligence resources have made the president, who is known for his mental retardation, finally appear less mentally retarded.
In less than a month, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan was ostensibly intended to destroy al-Qaida and overthrow the Taliban regime that sheltered the jihadists. However, the actual goal was the same as Operation Poseidon's Spear in 2011: to hunt down bin Laden.
In fact, since the mid-1990s, the Americans have been engaged in intensive intelligence work to find al-Qaida's leaders.
By December 2001, bin Laden was exposed in the remote Safed Koh of eastern Afghanistan. The U.S. military immediately launched a large-scale joint offensive in an attempt to besiege Al Qaeda's stronghold of Torabora. Hundreds of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters were killed or arrested, but in a very dramatic way, bin Laden retreated after the Americans dropped hundreds of tons of bombs.
In the decade after 9/11, bin Laden's hiding place remained the world's top secret. News media around the world are speculating about his whereabouts, speculating about his death, his deteriorating health and whether he is planning the next 9/11.
During this time, bin Laden regularly released video and audio to the media, always claiming responsibility for the current terrorist attacks and claiming that he was leading al-Qaida in jihad against the United States. Bin Laden managed to keep a low profile, but he didn't give up fighting. Of course, his enemies did not give up the pursuit.
(The SEALs who didn't chase bin Laden's door until a decade later)
Many people think that bin Laden came to the stage of history after 9/11, but in fact, he was not, and he relied on a series of attacks from 1995 to 2000, which is also a major problem for the US intelligence organization.
On October 21, 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton launched a cross-sectoral campaign to track bin Laden's financial transactions and resource flows.
In January 1996, the CIA and FBI established bin Laden's Special Agency (code-named Alec Station) to track down bin Laden and al-Qaida associates.
In April 1996, President Clinton signed a top-secret order authorizing the CIA to use all means to destroy bin Laden's organization.
In July 1997, it was reported that the CIA had hired mercenaries to find, kidnap or kill bin Laden in Afghanistan.
In 1998, the head of Alec Station prepared to arrange an operation to kill or capture bin Laden; However, the operation was vetoed by riyadh's CIA chief, who said, "The Americans should trust the Saudis to take care of bin Laden."
Between July and August 1998, U.S. intelligence intercepted cellphone calls from bin Laden's men, pinpointed their location, and determined that bin Laden was linked to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy.
In August 1998, President Clinton signed a document authorizing the CIA to use force to capture bin Laden. A follow-up memorandum authorized the assassination of more than a dozen al-Qaida and the shooting down of any plane carrying bin Laden.
On August 20, 1998, the "Infinite Extension" attempt to assassinate bin Laden began. Using intercepted cellphone intelligence, the U.S. Navy fired 66 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a suspected Al-Qaida training camp in Khost, Afghanistan, and a factory in Sudan suspected of producing chemical weapons for bin Laden. Although 30 people were reportedly killed, bin Laden survived. From then on, he stopped communicating by phone (the courier system came into being, setting the stage for bin Laden's final outcome).
On December 24, 1998, President Clinton authorized the CIA to assassinate bin Laden in Afghanistan, a group that monitored bin Laden. The authorization was not communicated within the CIA, or even to Michael Schuyer, the head of the Alec intelligence station.
In February 1999, President Clinton allowed the CIA to use the Northern Alliance to assassinate bin Laden. The president himself deleted the record of authorizing CIA operations to kill bin Laden.
On June 7, 1999, bin Laden first appeared on the FBI's Top 10 Wanted List.
On October 12, 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the joint U.S. and Pakistani operations to capture bin Laden were terminated.
In March 2000, mercenaries hired by the CIA used RPGs to ambush os-jain Bin Laden's convoy in the mountains of Afghanistan. But it didn't hit bin Laden's car.
After 9/11, the United States quickly saved up a large number of "detainees" arrested in Afghanistan. With the support of allies, the Americans also hunted down all those known to have links to bin Laden or al-Qaida around the globe.
By early 2002, the CIA and the U.S. military had begun processing and interrogating captured Al-Qaida suspects at a detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other secret facilities or "black spots" outside the United States. The CIA carefully collected data on all suspicious high-ranking officials, couriers, financiers, and subordinates. While the overall goal is to defeat and destroy al-Qaida and its associated terrorists, finding bin Laden is the ultimate goal that keeps Americans up at night.
In 1998, bin Laden used the telephone to attract dozens of ballistic missiles fired by the United States at his bases in Sudan and Afghanistan. As a result, he stopped using the phone and made it difficult for subordinates to find him.
(Torabora, known locally as Spion Ghar, is a cave complex in the Safed Koh mountains of eastern Afghanistan.) Since the 1980s, it has been used as a base for jihadists. ）
He carefully concealed his whereabouts and location from anyone, including his subordinates. He communicated only with his Al-Qaida members, the organization's top brass and the media through reliable and experienced messengers. Therefore, for the United States and its allies, tracking with electronic surveillance is a difficult task. The CIA's intelligence officers (who rarely called themselves agents) had little way of finding him. According to reports, the way to achieve this goal was to determine the identity and location of the messenger, follow the vine and find bin Laden.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="29" > the clues are continuous, but they recognize the messenger wrong</h1>
The hunt for bin Laden's first key clue, the "Courier," did not get the attention it deserved at first. In early 2002, a few months after Operation Enduring Freedom began, the CIA gathered intelligence on a man named Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, a member of al-Qaeda who may have links to bin Laden.
(Bounty of Bin Laden's poster)
This information later proved crucial, but the importance of this intelligence was not yet understood; As a result, this information was hidden in the snow and did not resurface until 2010.
Later in 2002, the CIA began gathering intelligence about a person in al-Qaida under the pseudonym Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. The man initially used the pseudonym to demonstrate the action; the Americans translated it as Sheikh Abu Ahmed from Kuwait, which, combined with a spelling variation, added to the confusion of intelligence analysts. Americans suspect he is a mid-level al-Qaida member responsible for facilitating senior al-Qaida members and their families and organizing safe havens.
In 2002, Mohamedou Ould Salahi, a prisoner at Guantanamo Prison, swore a convincing oath that he had witnessed the wounding and death of a middle-level Al-Qaida operative named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti during the Battle of Torabora in December 2001.
According to Sarahi, the person is responsible for the activities and safe havens of senior Al-Qaida members and their families. All the clues to "al-Kuwaiti" seem to have really become worthless, after all, people are dead.
(In fact, many intelligence officers in the CIA sit in the office and read documents, no different from accountants in logistics companies.)
However, this clue was later revived by the testimony of Mohammed Mana Ahmed Al-Kahtani, a Saudi citizen who has been held as a prisoner at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002.
Al-Qahtani had tried to enter the United States in 2001 and was supposed to be involved in the 9/11 attacks as the 20th hijacker. Unfortunately, he was denied entry and was subsequently captured in Afghanistan after the Battle of Torabora in 2001. According to the interrogation of Katani from November 2002 to January 2003, the messenger, named Abu Ahmed Kowiti, did not die but was active as a member of the al-Qaida caucus. However, the man's whereabouts or true identity were not further confirmed, and the pursuit of bin Laden through messengers stalled two years later.
(CIA covert operations)
On 1 February 2003, Al-Qaida commander khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the so-called mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was arrested in the Pakistani city of Karachi. During interrogations in October-December 2004, he denied knowing any messenger named al-Kuwaiti. Then, shortly after, he admitted that he did know the Messenger. However, he said Covity was not active in al-Qaida.
It was not until 2005 that Al-Qaida messenger and intelligence officer Hassan Gul (formerly known as Mustafa Haji Mohammed Khan) revealed that Koviti had close ties with bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and was also friendly with Abu Faraj Libi, the head of Al-Qaida operations. He also noted that al-kuwait had not appeared for some time. All of this raises doubts that Covitti may have been close to bin Laden.
Hassan Gough also revealed in 2005 that Abu Ahmed Kowiti was a pseudonym and that Koviti was "vital to Al Qaeda."
(The SEALs have been operating in Afghanistan since the beginning of the Enduring Freedom Movement.) In 2002, a special operator observes the destruction of an enemy arsenal. ）
On 2 May 2005, Abu Faraj Al-Libi (khalid Sheikh Mohammed's successor) was arrested in the northern Pakistani city of Mardan.
During the 2006 trial, he denied knowing anyone named al-Kuwaiti. He claimed that bin Laden's messenger was named Maurawi Abd Al-Khalik Jen — apparently a pseudonym. Both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj Libi have tried to downplay the importance of this person, from which it can be inferred that Kovitti may indeed be a member of bin Laden's inner circle.
Abu Ahmed Kovitti was a mysterious figure until 2007, when the CIA discovered his real name through his family background in Kuwait. By 2008, the man's phone calls and emails between Kuwait and Pakistan were intercepted, eventually leading to his identity being exposed. Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti is Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed. He also used pseudonyms Mohammed Arshad, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed and Al Shaid Khan.
In addition, by the end of 2010, Pakistan's Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) had been working with the CIA to provide the CIA with al-Kuwaiti's cell phone number, a number that Pakistanis had tracked in Abbottabad, and the Americans reviewed his cellphone usage in Pakistan for months.
In August 2010, after years of telephone tracking, americans observed Keviti driving from Peshawar to Abbottabad and then into a majestic fortress-like structure.
The CIA has identified a "high-value target", bin Laden is the world's most wanted man, and americans are willing to pay whatever it takes to catch the slightest clue about him.
Abu Ahmed Kewiti was the perfect candidate for the Messenger. He is a Pakistani-born Pakistani who speaks Arabic and the local Pashto language. Good communication with Al Qaeda as well as cities and Pakistani tribes. He was able to use forged national identity cards to operate publicly in Pakistan and used them to purchase items and establish bin Laden's residence.
(In January 2002, a member of the U.S. Navy SEALs provided cover for his teammates as they advanced toward a suspected al-Qaida and Taliban location in eastern Afghanistan.) ）
Together with his brother (or cousin) abar al-Kuwaiti (aka Saeed Ahmed and Tareq Khan), he managed the residence, which housed 3 families and up to 22 men, women and children, for more than 6 years. Although Abu Ahmed Kovitti allowed bin Laden to live in peace and secrecy in Pakistan for so many years, he was also the one who directly led Americans to bin Laden.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="53" > go or not, this is a question worth thinking about</h1>
In mid-August 2010, Pakistan's ISI provided the CIA with the cell phone number of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, the last time at Abbottabad.
U.S. intelligence then discovered and identified Bin Laden's most trusted messenger and followed him to the compound in Abbottabad. Shortly thereafter, the CIA provided President Barack Obama with a comprehensive briefing on what bin Laden might have found and the relevant intelligence. Then, the political forces on all sides began a tug-of-war at the operational, strategic and political levels.
The game is portrayed in the film as a difficult and lengthy decision.
The CIA's intelligence officers rejoiced that years of hard work had finally borne fruit, after all, they had endured so long. At the strategic and political levels, however, the caution and fear of politicians overwhelmed any factor.
(On December 18, 2001, soldiers from the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs Division in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, distributed leaflets announcing a reward for the arrest of os-laden.) ）
The politicians' first reaction was not to immediately rush to attack this highly suspicious target, but to scratch their heads in fear. They have repeatedly asked for confirmation and verification of bin Laden's true situation. From God's point of view, we can naturally know that Operation Poseidon's Spear will be carried out in nine months. But in fact, at the time, the only decision politicians made was "not to make a decision."
If the suspect had not been bin Laden, every commando who had descended into the compound could have been quickly arrested and detained within 48 hours.
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Americans conceived and successfully carried out hundreds of such speculative raids, relying on intelligence that fell far short of reliable standards. The United States and Pakistan have cooperated in identifying and arresting al-Qaida terrorists in the region, in the form of tactical security in exchange for rapid response.
(Abbottabad is a garrison city near the capital Islamabad with 1.5 million inhabitants.) It is home to the pakistan army corps and the Pakistan Army's prestigious Kakul Pakistan Military Academy. ）
If it is replaced by other actions, even if there is a lack of understanding of the details of all the residents in the compound, the action will not have serious consequences, at least not in Pakistan, after all, the Americans are used to walking sideways here. In this region, the more common and effective operational procedure is "shoot first, ask question later".
Americans believe that whether this mysterious compound is inhabited by terrorists, drug lords or Pakistani officials, they will always get the corresponding intelligence when they enter it and ask them one by one. Moreover, Kovitti itself is a high-value target and a pinned member of al-Qaida. Even in bin Laden's absence, Kovitti will be a trophy for U.S. or Pakistani intelligence agencies. However, Abu Ahmed Kowiti is not an ordinary Al-Qaida messenger.
It's not an ordinary compound at all, and bin Laden is not an ordinary target.
Be careful to sail the ship of ten thousand years, at this time all the choices are uncertain and can have serious political consequences.
(CIA's Combat Force)
The three main problems are:
(1) Bin Laden's existence is not 100% certain and is not easily confirmed;
(2) Suspected target sites are deep within the sovereign borders of U.S. ally Pakistan;
(3) The target himself is the world's most famous terrorist, bin Laden, the most wanted man in history, and has been awarded a record $50 million bounty by the Americans.
Fast forward to November 2010, the CIA, with the support of the U.S. Department of Defense and several other agencies, began intelligence gathering to verify bin Laden's presence. However, confirming whether he lives in the compound will take a lot of resources and time, and ultimately will not be possible.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="73" > Abbottabad's yard</h1>
Such a large, intensive, multi-platform surveillance operation had only one purpose: to gather intelligence about the Abbottabad compound to confirm the existence of bin Laden. All procedures must be carried out in secret without disclosure.
With this in mind, the CIA decided to prevent Pakistan from participating; CIA Director Leon Panetta told Time magazine's Massimo Carrabresi on May 3, 2011, "We believe that any attempt to cooperate with Pakistan could jeopardize the mission." ”
It is worth noting that although the Pakistani authorities cooperated with the United States before, during, and after the Spear of poseidon, they were unaware of bin Laden's existence and no one was officially involved in the raid on bin Laden.
(An MH-47E Chinook helicopter hovers over Afghanistan, ready to pick up military personnel during night operations.) ）
Pakistan's Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) has worked with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the region and has conducted joint counterterrorism operations for many years. During this time, ISI provided local intelligence to the CIA, unaware that bin Laden might be hiding in it.
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hired former Pakistani military personnel and ISI special agents as private security contractors, letting them serve as perimeter reconnaissance personnel to obtain photos and details of the target building and its occupants.
None of the above efforts were able to identify os-bin Laden, but the intelligence proved to be accurate enough.
As of the end of November 2010, data collected confirmed that bin Laden's messenger, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, his brother (or cousin) Saeed Ahmed, and their families were living in the target building in Abbottabad and were responsible for the maintenance of the target building.
CIA agents (reportedly assisted by Pakistani security contractors) rented a house near the base and began observations that lasted several months. The CIA team used state-of-the-art telephoto lenses, thermal and infrared imaging, and high-tech audio equipment for eavesdropping, while also relying on old-fashioned informants and agents to gather intelligence.
(These operations are basically veterans of elite units such as Delta and SEAL Six.)
The National Security Agency (NSA) has been blocking any telephone communication related to it. The Mission of the National Geographic and Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) also included drawing detailed images and recording the daily life patterns of those targeted people in the yard, drawing three-dimensional images of each building, recording local traffic patterns, and collecting visual height and gender data for each resident.
By December 2010, surveillance missions had dragged on so long that the CIA had to obtain authorization from the U.S. Congress to "reallocate tens of millions of dollars in various agency budgets" in order to continue funding these ongoing surveillance operations. Despite such meticulousness, all attempts to obtain images or audio recordings and confirm bin Laden's identity failed.
(Aerial photo of the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was killed.) (Left) Before the start of construction in 2004, (right) After the start of construction in 2011. ）
In February 2011, the CIA hired a Pakistani doctor, Shakil Afridi, to try to confirm that the compound's occupants were bin Laden's children or relatives. Afridi runs a vaccination programme in the Abbottabad community and attempts to obtain DNA samples from suspected bin Laden's family members in the compound. But the people in the compound refused to allow Afridi and his assistants to approach. Despite the continued failures, intelligence-gathering operations did rule out most other identities and confirmed past conclusions.
The CIA later reported: "Before the raid, none of the U.S. spy agencies could capture photographs of bin Laden's activities in the compound, nor did they record the voice of the mysterious man whose family had settled in seclusion on the top two floors of the building." ”
The CIA also hired an independent team to study all the evidence gathered during the investigation. The conclusion was that "no one else fit the filter as much as bin Laden." ”
This large courtyard must have been built specifically to hide an important figure in bin Laden's kind. In February 2011, the CIA reported that it had a "reliable intelligence base" to use as a basis for a plan of action to hunt down bin Laden at the Abbottabad base.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="91" > complex factor</h1>
Bin Laden's residence is located in abbottabad, an inland city in Pakistan.
He lives less than a few hundred feet from a military base and the Pakistan Military Academy. The property is effectively under the jurisdiction of the military camp community.
The United States has limited options in Pakistan, compared to those at more remote borders or in less regulated tribal areas, where joint operations have been under way for some time. Pakistanis tolerate but do not encourage the United States to use drones to launch missiles in pakistan's Waziristan tribal areas. While these attacks killed many of al-Qaida's key leaders, they also affected a large number of Pakistani civilians. Carrying out such a drone attack in a residential area is very troublesome.
Although Pakistan is an ally of the United States in the region, as a sovereign state, there is no doubt that Pakistan will insist on controlling or being aware of any potential special operations.
By January 2011, the CIA had sent a letter to The Commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Vice Admiral William H. Thompson. William H. McRaven gave a comprehensive briefing on the feasibility of a special operation to capture bin Laden. McRaven responded that using a commando raid would be a fairly straightforward approach. He also spoke of the risk that an invasion of Pakistani airspace could trigger a response from the Pakistani military.
For the mission, McRaven assigned a U.S. Navy Navy Captain "Brian" and six other JSOC officers from his JSOC J3 program group, as well as a CIA team from Langley, Virginia, to develop plans and contingency measures that ruled out pakistan.
(Raids are closely related to the team that executes them, and SEAL Six has practiced repeatedly in similar simulated buildings.)
The CIA team had all of their own contingency plans in place — plans that were in place from the time they began to monitor the compound: to carry out drone strikes or attacks as soon as their surveillance systems were compromised, or if bin Laden was spotted trying to move or flee the area.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="100" > choice</h1>
After weeks of research and evaluation, McRaven offered three courses of action:
(1) American B-2 bombers carry out high-altitude precision bombing of target buildings
(2) Launch multiple cruise missiles for direct strike
(3) The United States sent commandos to carry out the attack by helicopter.
Even if you have only a cursory understanding of the situation, you will understand that options one and two are once and for all. McRaven is an experienced Navy SEALs tactical commander who is an expert in the special operations industry. Despite the risks and dangers, he advocated raids with ground forces. At the time, however, few agreed with this high-risk plan that required the dispatch of SEALs.
(SEAL Team Six's personal equipment)
In January 2011, Valerie Jarrett, a senior white house adviser, reportedly persuaded Oba President Ma against the commando raid and informed the JSOC planning team. Later, the CIA again reported that there was a need to rely on a reliable intelligence base to develop a course of action for the raid on bin Laden in Abbottabad.
At this point, Congress reconsidered the commando attack plan. Then, at the end of February, Obama again canceled all raid options (a decision also reportedly made at Jarrett's urging). Nonetheless, the JSOC staff continued to prepare, plan, and develop the process for the raid.
On March 11, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama held the first of five National Security Council (NSC) meetings to review McRaven's course of action and strategies. Once again, he decided to wait for more precise information about bin Laden. Defense Secretary Gates and others believed bin Laden was present and lobbied Obama to risk a surprise attack.
(Major Keith Butler, May 10, 2014, was killed in action at the age of 57 when he was a CIA paramilitary contractor in Afghanistan.) ）
At a March 22 meeting of the National Security Council, Gates was skeptical of the commando program, calling it "too risky." The task of the U.S. Air Force experts was to report on the bombing program.
At the March 29 meeting of the National Security Council, the staff officers relayed back what McRaven knew.
Because the CIA could not rule out the possibility of an underground bunker beneath the building, 32 bombs (each weighing up to 2,000 pounds) were needed to cut the grass and root, the report said. Bombing or missile attacks will inevitably destroy all buildings, leaving only a huge crater behind after the bombing.
(Large-scale model of the target building)
The bombs are estimated to have caused collateral casualties among more than a dozen civilians, and it is almost impossible to leave any bodies or evidence to prove bin Laden's presence or death. So the bombing plan was put on hold, and McRaven was ordered to continue planning the raid.
By the end of March 2010, McRaven had assembled a red squadron from SEAL Six, and commandos began raiding drills at two locations in the United States.
Meanwhile, surveillance operations in Abbottabad continued until April 2011, when Pakistani intelligence groups had spotted traces of Americans, submitting reports that "indicate foreigners operating around Abbottabad."
In April 2011, selected Navy SEALs assembled at a defense testing activity base in Cape Harvey, North Carolina, for rehearsals at a full-scale mock base.
They also rehearsed at a high altitude in Nevada to test the altitude effects of the new MH-X stealth helicopter, also known as the Stealth Black Hawk, to test the helicopter's maneuverability in extreme environments.
(The invisible Black Hawk model used in Hollywood movies)
At the April 19 national security council meeting, Obama gave "provisional approval" to the raid, while Vice Admiral McRaven was tasked with ensuring the team "has sufficient reserve forces to withdraw from Pakistan if necessary." McRaven stepped up emergency measures for the "evacuation" mission, including the early deployment of Amnooka helicopters and rapid reaction forces to Pakistan.
On April 25, McRaven and the Poseidon Spear team left the U.S. Naval Air Station in Oceana, Virginia, in a C-17 aircraft. They refueled at Ramstein Air Base in Germany before landing at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. The group began making final preparations and exercises in one-to-one replicas of the target buildings in the Alpha Camp of Afghanistan's Bagram Air Base before moving on to the front-line combat base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
CIA Director Leon Panetta met with aides and concluded:
(a) They have important "circumstantial evidence" of bin Laden's existence,
(b) They have 60-80 per cent confidence in this,
(c) The evidence is strong enough to risk a surprise attack.
On April 28, 2011, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), presented the President and the NSC with the final plan for Operation Poseidon Spear. Most of the advisers supported the attack. The plan was opposed by Vice President Joe Biden (then-in-office) and Defense Secretary Gates (Gates reportedly changed his mind the next day).
Obama told Lt. Gen. McRaven: "I'm not going to tell you about my decision now. I'm going to go back and think about it again. ”
He later spoke directly with McRaven, who reported that his team was ready and that the current low moonlight conditions were most favorable for the raid.
On the morning of April 29, CIA Director Leon Panetta received a call from a White House aid who verbally approved the launch of Operation Poseidon's Spear. He recorded the orders he received in a handwritten memo that read:
April 29, 2011 at 10:35 a.m
Received a call from Tom Donilon saying that the president had made a decision on AC1 [Abbottabad Target 1]. Our decision was to continue the offensive. Timing, operational decisions and control are all in the hands of Lieutenant General McRaven. This approval was included in the risk profile submitted to the President. Any additional risks will be considered by the President. The target direction is to go inside and grab bin Laden and evacuate if he's not there.
These instructions were conveyed to Lieutenant General McRaven at approximately 10.45 a.m.
Panetta DCIA
After carefully recording the details of the operation within ten minutes of receiving the call, Panetta passed the instructions to Lieutenant General McRaven and instructed him to "keep attacking." Operation Poseidon's Spear was finally approved. w