Wu Bingbing: Trump's Middle East policy and US-Iran relations
Author: Bingbing Wu is a special researcher at the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, and an associate professor at the Department of Arabic Language and Culture, School of Foreign Chinese, Peking University
Source: Originally published in Wang Jisi, ed., China International Strategic Review 2020 (Part 2), World Knowledge Press, December 2021 edition; Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University
WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue
Executive Summary
Since the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been at the center of U.S. policy in the Middle East. In 2015, six parties, including the United States, reached a Nuclear Deal with Iran, and Trump believed that the agreement was unfavorable to the United States. After Trump took office in 2017, Trump's security and diplomatic team formed a Middle East policy against Iran, pro-Israel and support for Gulf Arab states, and withdrew from the Iranian nuclear agreement in May 2018. From May 2018 to June 2019, the Middle East policy team composed of National Security Adviser Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo, and White House Adviser Kushner pursued a policy of "maximum pressure" to restore unilateral sanctions against Iran and push back Iranian influence in the region; on the other hand, they designed a unilateral support for Israel's "deal of the century." On the basis of the resumption of sanctions against Iran, in May 2019, Trump tried to implement Iran's policy of zero oil exports, and Iran began to respond to the "extreme resistance" policy of reducing the implementation of its obligations under the Iranian nuclear agreement, the United States and Iran fiercely competed, and twice moved to the brink of military confrontation because Iran shot down the US drone and the US attacked General Sulaimani of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In response to Trump's 2020 election, the new Middle East policy team led by Secretary of State Pompeo, US Iran Special Representative Abrams and Kushner has further escalated US-Iran tensions and promoted Arab countries such as the UNITED Arab Emirates and Bahrain to reach a peace agreement with Israel. Trump's Middle East policy has exacerbated tensions in the Middle East, potentially triggering military conflicts in the Gulf region and forcing the United States to maintain its investment in the Middle East, which may delay and delay the strategic adjustment of the United States centered on the Indo-Pacific strategy.
keyword
- Trump
- Iran
- Middle East
- The Iranian nuclear agreement
- U.S.-Iran relations
After the 2003 Iraq War, Iran increasingly became the biggest challenge for the United States in the Middle East and the center of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Through the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Obama sought to ease relations with Iran to reduce U.S. investment in the Middle East and to promote the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy to achieve a global U.S. strategic shift. After Trump took office in 2017, the United States withdrew from the Iranian nuclear agreement and resumed sanctions on Iran, trying to force Iran to submit through "maximum pressure" and then integrate Iran into the US-led security structure in the Middle East. At the same time, Trump has also isolated Iran by unilaterally supporting Israel's Middle East peace plan and the Arab-Israeli peace agreement, supporting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf Arab countries, and trying to push back Iran's influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and other places. Since May 2019, Iran has responded through the "extreme resistance" policy, responding to the maximum pressure policy of the United States on regional issues and reducing the implementation of obligations under the Iranian nuclear agreement. Trump's Middle East policy has forced the United States to continue to invest in the Middle East and has the potential to trigger a military confrontation in the Gulf.
First, the formation of Trump's Middle East policy
January 2017 to April 2018 was the formative phase of Trump's Middle East policy. Trump's appointed national security and diplomatic corps clearly reflects the basic direction of its Middle East policy. When Trump took office as U.S. president in 2017, he initially created a national security team that handles Middle East affairs with military personnel as the main members. After Trump's victory in the November 2016 election, retired Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn was selected as his national security adviser. Flynn joined the U.S. military in 1981 and has long been engaged in intelligence work, serving in U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. He served as director of the Defense Intelligence Service from 2012 until his retirement in 2014. He then opened a private consulting firm and served the Trump election. Although Flynn resigned on February 13, 2017, shortly after taking office, his military background, especially in the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq, left a deep imprint on Trump's formation of a national security team for Middle East affairs and the formulation of Middle East policy.
Under Flynn's influence, retired U.S. Military Colonel Derek Harvey was appointed Senior Director of the NSC for Middle and North African Affairs, Colonel Joel Rayburn was appointed Director of the NSC for Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and Syria, and Retired Colonel Michael Bell was appointed Director of the NSC for Gulf Affairs. "Harvey and Rayborn were previously hand-picked by David Petraeus... to design a reinforcement strategy to suppress the Iraqi insurrection and stabilize Iraq. "In the eyes of these servicemen, their experience in the war in Iraq shows that both Sunni militants and Iranian-backed Shiite forces are a threat to the U.S. military." To maintain U.S. military security in Iraq and U.S. presence in the Middle East, both terrorism and Iran must be combated. Although Iran is also fighting the "Daesh" group [Islamic State (ISIS), arabic for short, Daesh] on the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, it is not a partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism, because it causes U.S. casualties, so it should be the target of the U.S. military. The military further argues that Sunni terrorists are a response to Iranian-backed Shiite expansion, so to truly defuse the threat of Sunni terrorists, Iran must be suppressed at the same time. H. McMaster R. McMaster, who succeeded Flynn as national security assistant, fired Drake Harvey on July 27, 2017, and he immediately appointed Michael Bell as senior director of the National Security Council in charge of the Middle East and North Africa, continuing the aforementioned policy claims on Iran.
Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson served as CEO and chairman of ExxonMobil from 2006 to 2016 and has close ties to the Gulf states. Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, who served as U.S. Central Command commander from 2010 to 2013, was appointed defense secretary and is familiar with Middle Eastern countries, especially Qatar. For them, strengthening relations with the Gulf states is a natural policy option. Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is an Orthodox Jew, Trump's daughter Ivanka also converted to Orthodox Judaism after marrying him, and the Kushner family has a personal relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Kushner was appointed by Trump as an adviser to the president in 2017. Mr. Trump's appointed envoy for the Middle East, Jason Greenblatt, is also an Orthodox Jew, and David Friedman, the U.S. ambassador to Israel who took office in March 2017, is known for his strong support for Israel. Kushner, Greenblatt, and Friedman strongly influenced U.S. Israel policy. When Kushner took office, he also forged close ties with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud and Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
Such a diplomatic and security team reflects Trump's strong anti-Iran, pro-Israel, and pro-Gulf policies in the Middle East. But there are also disagreements within Trump and his diplomatic and security teams over specific issues surrounding Middle East policy. The first disagreement is how to deal with the 2015 JCPOA. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump said the JCPOA was "one of the worst deals ever reached." John Bolton noted in his memoir, "The Room Where It Happened," "there is a general perception that he (Trump) was ready to take extreme action [against the JCPOA] after taking office." But Tillerson, Mattis and McMaster have blocked Trump's efforts to pull out of this nefarious deal, and they have been praised by their media as 'axis of adults' because they limit Trump's indulgence in wild delusions." The team also differs in its approach to the Gulf states, with Kushner having closer ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Mattis and Tillerson know More about Qatar.
In terms of the Iranian nuclear agreement, according to the regulations, the US State Department needs to confirm Iran's implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement with the US Congress every 90 days. On April 18, 2017, after Trump took office as president, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson confirmed this for the first time. Trump was reluctant to continue confirmation when a second confirmation was needed in July, but Mattis, Tillerson and McMaster all agreed that it should be confirmed. After a long argument between the two parties, the two parties finally decided to reconfirm. After that, Trump called Bolton and complained that the State Department did not give him room to choose about the Iranian nuclear deal. Bolton's idea is to create as many obstacles as possible to the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement by influencing Trump, so as to make the US-Iran relationship a substantial setback. On October 12, Trump called Bolton before needing a third confirmation, and the two sides agreed that the United States would continue to review the Iranian nuclear agreement and be ready to withdraw at any time, link Iran to North Korea, and be ready to declare Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign terrorist organization. The next day, Trump announced that he would no longer confirm Iran's implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement, although the United States remained within the framework of the Iranian nuclear agreement.
In January 2018, Trump needed to decide whether to continue his decision not to reinstate sanctions on Iran. He believes that the action in October 2017 is sufficient enough to neither confirm Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, but also to restore sanctions against Iran. On March 6, 2018, Trump and Bolton met at the White House. Trump said he had decided to withdraw from the JCPOA and said he wanted to remove Tillerson from his post as secretary of state and replace him with Bolton. But Trump feared that Bolton's appointment as secretary of state might not be approved by Congress, so he nominated Mike Pompeo as the new secretary of state and Bolton as assistant to national security affairs. On April 9, Bolton became the new national security adviser, and on April 27, Pompeo became secretary of state. Both Bolton and Pompeo advocate being tough on Iran, while the only people in the Trump administration who advocate a pragmatic stance on Iran are Defense Secretary Mattis and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.
Tillerson's removal is also related to the Qatar diplomatic severance crisis in June 2017. On May 20, 2017, Trump visited Saudi Arabia, his first foreign visit since he became president. The trip is seen as a strong U.S. support for Saudi Arabia. He met with Saudi King Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Crown Prince Heir Mohammed bin Salman, and attended the U.S.-Gulf Summit and the Arab Islamic States-U.S. Summit on the 21st. On May 24, on the website of Qatar's official news agency, emir of Qatar criticized Saudi Arabia, which Qatar said was the result of a hacking attack, but Saudi Arabia blamed Qatar. On June 5, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Qatar. The next day, Trump tweeted that Qatar supports terrorism, arguing that the diplomatic isolation of Qatar marks "the beginning of an end to terrorism." But Tillerson and Mattis took a different stance on the incident, arguing that the move by saudi arabia and other countries hampered global counterterrorism efforts. On June 9, trump reiterated his bid to stop Qatar from financing terrorism at a joint press conference with visiting Romanian presidents at the Rose Garden. On the same day, Mr. Tillerson called saudi arabia and other leaders of four countries, asking them to support Kuwait's diplomatic efforts to mediate the Qatari crisis. Tillerson argues that it was Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE's ambassador to the United States, who manipulated Trump's rose garden speech. Mr. O'Ettett had a close relationship with Kushner, who used family ties to influence Trump. Under the influence of Tillerson and Mattis, the United States has not unilaterally supported Saudi Arabia and other countries in isolating Qatar. On January 30, 2018, the two also chaired the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue at the U.S. Department of State. At the opening ceremony, Mattis said that "Qatar is a strong and valuable military ally of the United States."
The crisis of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has seriously hampered the impetus of Trump's "Middle East Strategic Alliance" (MESA) initiative. When Trump took office, the idea of building an "Arab NATO" was put forward. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017, Trump formally proposed a strategic alliance in the Middle East, with six Gulf Arab states as the core, plus Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, to create a security cooperation mechanism. The United States did not use the term "Arab NATO" because the mechanism would not have the same function of collective defense as NATO. "The Strategic Alliance in the Middle East is seen as meeting the needs of the United States: locking in Iran, reducing the U.S. regional presence while preventing China or Russia from gaining influence." The Qatar diplomatic severance crisis in June 2017 severely weakened cooperation among the Gulf states. In August 2017, at the request of Mattis and Tillerson, retired Gen. Anthony Zinni was appointed special envoy of the U.S. Department of State to mediate the Qatar severance crisis and advance the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative.
Driven by Kushner's team, Trump is determined to take unilateral measures to support Israel. On December 6, 2017, Trump announced that he recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and was preparing to relocate the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. On May 14, 2018, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, the United States officially completed the relocation of the museum.
In April 2018, the Middle East policy team structure of Bolton, Pompeo and Kushner's "troika" took shape. Correspondingly, suppressing Iran, forming a strategic alliance in the Middle East, and unilaterally supporting Israel have become the focus of Trump's Middle East policy, and the issue of counterterrorism has faded out.
Extreme pressure on Iran and the "deal of the century"
From May 2018 to June 2019, Trump's Middle East policy focused on maximum pressure on Iran and the "Deal of the Century" on the Palestinian-Israeli issue.
On April 9, 2018, bolton's first day as the president's national security adviser, he instructed the National Security Council to be ready to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement within a month. Trump asked European countries to come up with a plan to strengthen the binding force of the Iranian nuclear agreement by May 12 of the same year. On April 26, French President Emmanuel Macron visited the United States and put forward the "four pillars" proposal when meeting with Trump, that is, while retaining the framework of the Iranian nuclear agreement, continue to extend the binding force of the Iranian nuclear agreement on Iran's nuclear program after 2025, and incorporate Iran's missile program and its influence in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq into the framework of the Iranian nuclear agreement. In the eyes of France, Germany, britain and other EU countries, this has fully accommodated the concerns of the United States; but Trump is not satisfied. Bolton made it clear that in his view and Trump's view, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is the biggest problem. "This agreement is poorly conceived, poorly negotiated and drafted, and is entirely in Iran's favor: neither coercive nor verifiable, nor sufficient in terms of validity and coverage." Although the agreement supposedly addresses the threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program, this is not the case. In fact, the deal creates problems, resolves the illusion, diverts attention from danger, lifts economic sanctions that have caused substantial harm to Iran's economy, and allows Tehran to move unimpeded, thus exacerbating the threat. Furthermore, the agreement does not seriously respond to other threats posed by Iran: including its ballistic missile program (which barely conceals its activities to develop nuclear weapon delivery vehicles), which has been providing core financial support for international terrorism, through the intervention and growing of the Quds Force, a foreign operational arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere, and other evil practices in the Middle East. After escaping the sanctions, Tehran's aggressive Ayatollahs received $150 million in cash and about $150 billion in global unfreezed assets, thus reviving them in blood. Driven by this view, the United States decided to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement on May 8, 2018, thus officially opening the "maximum pressure" on Iran.
While both McMaster and Tillerson have left the administration, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Defense Secretary Mattis remain cautious about Trump's Iran policy. Mnuchin said it would take 6 months to formally restore U.S. sanctions on Iran. In November 2018, the United States began reinstating sanctions on Iran, particularly in the areas of finance and crude oil exports. Mnuchin worries that a ban on Iranian oil exports will lead to higher global oil prices. Trump agreed to waive the purchase of Iranian oil from eight economies, including China, India, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Greece, Italy and Taiwan. In order to strengthen the effect of sanctions on Iran, Trump began to consider zero exports of Iranian oil. On April 22, 2019, Trump announced that it would stop the exemption for eight economies to buy Iranian oil, thereby implementing a zero-export policy for Iranian oil. According to the OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report ( September 2020 ), Iran's oil production fell from 3.553 million barrels per day in 2018 to 2.356 million barrels per day in 2019 and to 1.95 million barrels per day in 2020. Iran's oil exports also fell from 1.85 million barrels per day in 2018 to 650,000 barrels per day in 2019. On November 2, 2018, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin demanded that the International Financial Messaging System (SWIFT) cut off services to Iranian entities and individuals. Given U.S. sanctions pressures, the entire banking system, including Iran's central bank, has been excluded from the international financial messaging service system. This is the second time since 2012-2016 that Iran has been excluded from the system.
The intention of the United States is to trigger an economic, social, and political linkage in Iran through economic warfare. Through sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors such as crude oil and finance, serious difficulties in Iran's economy have been triggered, and people have launched large-scale anti-government demonstrations due to difficulties in life, thus inducing serious differences at the top level of Iran and even civil unrest. In late 2017 and early 2018, there were demonstrations in Iran, but they were quickly quelled. In the view of the United States, if the economic pressure is increased, this situation will repeat itself. Iran's economy is indeed experiencing difficulties, especially foreign exchange shortages and soaring exchange rates. In November 2018, the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Iranian rial was about 1 US dollar to 145,000 rials. It fell to 105,000 rials in December 2018, to 156,000 rials in May 2019, to 112,000 rials in October, and to a high of 274,500 rials in September 2020. In less than two years, the dollar has nearly doubled in value against the rial, and Iran has responded with a multi-track exchange rate system. The above-mentioned fluctuating exchange rate is the Open Market Rate," in addition to iran's official exchange rate for the central bank and the Currency Exchange Unified System (NIMA). Iran's official exchange rate has always been maintained at the level of 42,000 riyals per dollar to meet the import demand for necessities such as food and medicine; In addition, Iran's central bank also publishes the "SANA Exchange Rate" (SANA) based on the average exchange rate of the officially licensed money banks. Through a complex multi-track exchange rate mechanism, Iran responds to the pressure of U.S. sanctions by both securing the supply of foreign exchange imported into necessities at official prices and regulating foreign exchange supply and demand at market prices.
In addition to imposing sanctions on Iran, the United States has also devised a "pushback" policy against Iran's regional influence, which focuses on Syria. Given that it is iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that is operating in Syria, on April 8, 2019, the United States declared Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization. In Syria, the U.S. has taken a three-track approach: the CIA has been supporting the Syrian opposition; the U.S. Department of Defense has supported the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in its fight against the "Daish" group, which it has used as its core to form the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); and the U.S. State Department has been pursuing a "Turkey first" Policy in Syria. In 2017, Russia launched the Astana Process, working with Iran and Turkey to set up "de-confliction zones" in Syria. Trump believes that the war on terror in Syria has benefited Russia and Iran, and in order to push back Iran's influence in Syria, it is necessary to stir up contradictions between Turkey and Iran and use Turkey to balance Iran. With this in mind, on August 17, 2018, the U.S. Department of State appointed former Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey, as the State Department's Special Representative for Syria, and Joel Riyborn was transferred from the NSC to the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs and Special Envoy for Syria. Jeffrey made it clear to Turkey that U.S.-Syrian kurdish democratic forces are "ad hoc, technical and transactional." On December 14, 2018, Trump spoke by phone with Erdogan and said the United States would withdraw from Syria. This means that the United States fully complies with Turkey's demands and abandons the Syrian Kurdish forces supported by the US Department of Defense. Defense Secretary Mattis and Brett Mcgurk, special envoy of the U.S. Global Coalition to Fight Islamic State, resigned to oppose it, with Jeffrey taking over the role. The United States believes that once the existence of the US military is reduced, the contradiction between Turkey and Iran in Syria will increase. But both Iran and Turkey have carefully managed bilateral relations and their differences in Syria, and the U.S. plot has not worked.
Kushner's U.S.-led Israeli policy team has been pushing for a trump version of Trump's middle east peace plan through unilateral support for Israel, dubbed the "deal of the century." On June 22, 2019, the United States released the Peace to Prosperity Plan Framework, which is considered the economic component of Trump's Middle East peace plan. The document states that the Trump administration's peace-for-prosperity program has three pillars: unlocking the potential of the Palestinian economy, empowering the Palestinian people, and improving Palestinian governance. More specific measures include a $50 billion loan over 10 years, doubling Palestinian GDP, creating 1 million jobs, reducing unemployment to single digits, and halving poverty in Palestine. On June 25-26, the United States and Bahrain co-hosted the "Peace for Prosperity" Economic Seminar to present the Framework of the Peace for Prosperity Program. Kushner attended the meeting in person, Israeli representatives and the Israeli media were invited, while there were no official representatives of the Palestinian side.
In October 2018, Saudi Arabia assassinated journalist Jamal Khashoggi at its Consulate General in Istanbul, causing an impact on Saudi-U.S. relations. The US Congress, the media and even the State Department and other government departments have expressed dissatisfaction with Saudi Arabia, but Trump himself still supports Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman under the influence of Kushner. The Khashoggi incident and the long-protracted qatar diplomatic severance crisis have made it difficult for the Middle East strategic alliance initiative to land. In January 2019, Anthony Zinni resigned as Special Envoy for Related Affairs of the State Department.
From April 2018 to June 2019, the focus of U.S. Middle East policy was on the "deal of the century" of maximum pressure on Iran and the promotion of unilateral support for Israel, and the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative and support for the Gulf Arab states are generally subordinate to the above two priorities. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made it clear that all of these policy measures are interlinked and that the center of it is Iran. In an exclusive interview with Zarif by Fox News, which aired on April 28, 2019, he noted that "Team B," including Bolton, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi, united Arab Emirates, all of whose names begin with B, are targeting the Iranian people. In a Twitter feed released on the same day, Zarif said: "When John Bolton and Team B say that the Iranian people 'deserve better,' they use this to admit that they are using 'economic terrorism' and even war against the Iranian people, and that they are arrogantly seeking 'regime change.'" But will Donald Trump let these people's dreams of fighting another endless war come true? ”
Third, the US-Iran game and Arab-Israeli peace
Since May 2019, with the United States stopping its exemption from Iran's oil exports, Iran has begun to implement a policy of "extreme resistance" to counter the extreme pressure of the United States, and the United States and Iran have launched a fierce game.
On May 12, 2019, four tankers belonging to Saudi Arabia, Norway and the United Arab Emirates were attacked and damaged by the explosion near the Emirate of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, and on May 14, two oil pumping stations of the Saudi East-West Pipeline were attacked by drones. In view of the escalating situation in the Gulf, Trump intends to downgrade tensions. On May 27, during Trump's visit to Japan, Mr. Abe informed him that he would visit Iran from June 12 to 13. Trump asked Abe to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran, and he "thinks Iran is on the dead end and has to reach a deal." He wants to meet with the Iranians right away." On 13 June, two more tankers exploded and caught fire in the Gulf of Oman. On the same day, Mr. Abe met with Iran's supreme leader, Khamenei, in Tehran. Khamenei has made it clear that Iran does not trust the United States and does not accept negotiations under pressure. Of Mr. Abe's desire to relay Trump's message, Khamenei said: "I have no doubt about your goodwill and the words of the PRESIDENT you conveyed, but I don't think Trump is a person worth exchanging information for, I won't reply to him, and I will never." On June 14, Mr. Abe briefed Trump on his meetings with Khamenei and Rouhani, noting that neither of them was willing to talk to the United States in the face of U.S. sanctions on Iran, but Abe believed that Rouhani had the will to talk to the United States.
On June 19, 2019, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air and Space Force shot down the U.S. Navy's Terryton (MQ–4C Triton), the naval version of the Global Hawk drone, with a homegrown Hoddad–3 anti-aircraft missile (Khordad 3). After the incident, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford and full-time acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan suggested retaliation by striking three military targets off The Iranian coast, National Security Adviser Bolton and Secretary of State Pompeo both advocated harsher retaliation, and Army Secretary Mark Esper remained silent. On June 20, Trump called a meeting of Dunford, Shanahan, Bolton and Pompeo to say he would cancel the decision to retaliate against Iran. Dunford and Shanahan expressed support, while Bolton and Pompeo opposed it, and eventually Trump canceled the decision to attack.
Despite the departures of McMaster, Tillerson and Mattis, there are still pragmatic and radical voices in the Trump administration around Iran. In addition to the military, Finance Minister Mnuchin also falls on the pragmatic side. French President Macron believes that only the Reduction of U.S. sanctions on Iran will be possible to start negotiations between the United States and Iran, and Mnuchin has also contacted the French finance minister to try to promote the resumption of U.S.-Iran negotiations through France. France is preparing for the G7 summit and has decided to invite Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif to visit France at the same time. Trump arrived in France on Aug. 24, and Zarif on Aug. 25, where the G7 summit was located. Macron invited Zarif to test Trump's claim that he wanted to talk to senior Iranian officials without setting any preconditions, something Mnuchin reiterated when he arrived in Biarritz, where the G7 summit is located. But in the end Trump did not meet with Zarif and made it clear that it was not yet time to meet, but he was willing to meet with Iranian President Rouhani.
From May to June 2019, it was the stage of escalating tensions between the United States and Iran; from July to August, Iran responded to the willingness of the United States to downgrade nervously, but it was regarded by Trump as a sign of weakness, judging that Iran could not hold on, so it was unwilling to further promote diplomatic actions and reduce sanctions on Iran. In the early hours of September 14, saudi Aramco's two oil facilities at the Abu Ghaeg refinery and the Khurais oil field were attacked. Against this backdrop, Macron tried to arrange for Rouhani and Trump to meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. On September 24, Macron and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson jointly tried to persuade Rouhani. Macron told Johnson: "If he (Rouhani) leaves without meeting Trump, that's a lost opportunity." Because he won't be back in a few months, and President Trump won't be going to Tehran, they should be there now. "Iran's position is very clear, only if the United States reduces sanctions against Iran can it be possible to carry out Iran-US talks, but Trump has refused this." On the evening of the 24th, Macron tried to make a last-ditch effort to arrange a phone call between Trump and Rouhani. Trump agreed to make phone calls, but refused to lift sanctions against Iraq, and the two sides were ultimately unable to talk by phone. This is the last attempt to meet or call directly with the top brass of the United States and Iran after Trump took office.
At the same time, Iran began to reduce its obligations to comply with the JCPOA from May 2019. On May 8, on the first anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that if Iran could not obtain the economic rights and interests granted by the JCPOA within 60 days, Iran would suspend part of its obligations under the JCPOA, first breaking through the enriched uranium and heavy water limits. Under the JCPOA, Iran could retain 300 kilograms of enriched uranium with a yield of 1.67 percent and 130 tons of heavy water. Earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on May 3 that iran would be banned the next day from exporting more than 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and heavy water. Iran took tit-for-tat measures, and on July 1, Zarif announced that Iran's low-enriched uranium holdings had exceeded 300 kilograms. On July 7, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi announced that Iran would take a second step to reduce its obligations under the JCPOA, enriching uranium by more than 3.67 percent. Since then, it has been reported that Iran has increased the enrichment of enriched uranium to 4.5%. Iran expects that the other parties to the JCPOA can effectively give Iran its due economic rights and interests in the next 60 days. On September 4, Rouhani announced that Iran would restart the development of a new centrifuge on September 6 as a third step to reduce the implementation of some of its obligations under the JCPOA. On November 5, Rouhani announced a fourth step, starting to inject uranium-containing gas into centrifuges. The next day, under the supervision of members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran injected uranium-containing gas into centrifuges at the Fordo underground nuclear facility. On January 5, 2020, Iran announced a fifth and final step, removing restrictions on the number of centrifuges in Iran.
Iran still has room for the JCPOA. While reducing the fulfilment of some of its obligations, Iran continues to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to allow verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2003, Iran negotiated and signed the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but parliament did not ratify it. From 2003 to 2006, Iran voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol, which was suspended until 2015, when it resumed voluntary implementation after the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement. Iran's actions to reduce the fulfilment of some of its obligations are also based on the provisions of the JCPOA. Article 26 of the JCPOA stipulates that if the United States resumes sanctions on Iran or imposes new sanctions, Iran has the right to "stop, in whole or in part, the implementation of the JCPOA commitments"; article 36 stipulates that if Iran and the Three Countries of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Eu have differences on the implementation of the JCPOA and their differences are not resolved, "the participants may use the unresolved issues as the basis for stopping the implementation of the JCPOA commitments in whole or in part."
Iran strives to deal with the extreme pressure of the United States by consolidating domestic political and social consensus and managing economic difficulties through comprehensive means, while reducing the implementation of its obligations under the Iranian nuclear agreement as the ultimate resistance against the United States. At the same time, Iran is pressuring Europe to meet its economic commitments related to the JCPOA and to work to develop cooperation with China and Russia. In the face of Iran's demands and U.S. pressure, the European side has designed a "Special Purpose Vehicle" (SPV) designed to bypass the dollar and pay for trade between Europe and Iran in other currencies, thus avoiding unilateral sanctions by the United States. But Europe has limited trade payments in the food, pharmaceutical and medical device sectors so as not to overstimulate the United States. On January 31, 2019, the Uk, France and Germany changed the "Special Purpose Vehicle" to the "Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges" (INSTEX), and on November 29, six European countries, including Finland, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, announced their participation in the payment mechanism. After the United States lifted the Iranian oil export exemption, in fact, European countries have completely stopped importing Iranian oil, so there is no cash flow in the payment instrument of trade transactions that can be used to support trade. The volume of trade between Iran and Europe has also fallen sharply. From January to September 2019, Trade between Iran and Germany was 1.248 billion euros, down 48% from 2.393 billion euros in the same period of 2018. Among them, Iran exported 155 million euros to Germany, down 58%; imports from Germany were 1.093 billion euros, down 46%.
On January 3, 2020, the United States killed General Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, in an aerial raid in Baghdad. On January 8, Iranian missiles retaliated by attacking the U.S. Ayn Al Asad Airbase in Iraq. The shooting down of a U.S. drone in June 2019 and the assassination of Soleimani in January 2020 put the U.S.-Iran relationship twice on the brink of military confrontation in six months. The Trump administration's policy of extreme pressure and Iran's policy of extreme resistance are in direct opposition, creating a risk factor for military conflict in the Gulf region. Given the lessons of George W. Bush's war on terror, Trump is reluctant to intervene in a new war. But its policy of maximum pressure on Iran threatens to trigger a military confrontation between the United States and Iran. Sanctions alone can seriously hurt Iran, but they don't achieve the intention of causing Iran to collapse or submit to the United States. Extreme pressure based on economic warfare will not achieve the desired results of the United States, so Trump can only resort to war to achieve the goal of bringing Iran to its knees. This is the biggest risk to its policy of maximum pressure.
On January 28, 2020, Kushner's "Deal of the Century" plan, which Kushner has been working hard to promote, was officially announced. According to a report titled "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli Peoples," the United States is partial to Israel on issues such as Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, security, and Palestinian statehood. On the issue of settlements, for example, Israel will retain all of its settlements in the West Bank, in total disregard of palestinian rights and demands. With the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia epidemic in the United States in 2020, Trump's idea of fighting for the economy to win the election cannot be realized. In order to attract the support of pro-Israel Christian evangelical voters at home and thus win victories in key swing states, the U.S. policy orientation of unilateral support for Israel is more pronounced. On August 13, israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a peace deal with the United States. By promoting peace between Arab States and Israel, the interests and aspirations of the Palestinians are completely set aside. On September 11, the United States pushed Bahrain to reach a peace agreement with Israel. It is estimated that the United States is also interested in further pushing for a number of Arab countries, including Oman, Morocco, Sudan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to reach a peace agreement with Israel. On September 15, under trump's auspices, Israel signed formal agreements to normalize relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The United States pushes for a peace agreement between Arab countries and Israel, and although it has a level of targeting Turkey from the perspective of the UNITED Arab Emirates, it is generally to integrate the system of regional alliances and increase the suppression of Iran.
In August 2020, Elliott Abrams succeeded Brian Hook as the U.S. Department of State's Special Representative for Iran. Brian Hooke was the main enforcer of the U.S. policy of maximum pressure on Iran, but his influence was largely limited to the level of technical operations. Elliott Abrams is tougher on issues like Iran and Iraq, and he has political influence. Robert C. O'Brien, who succeeded Bolton as national security assistant in September 2019, is no longer a relatively independent center of power and more close to Pompeo. Secretary of State Pompeo, Iran Special Representative Elliott Abrams and White House Adviser Kushner constitute the new Middle East policy "troika", which fully represents Trump's policy orientation of favoring Israel, supporting Gulf Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, suppressing Iran, and serving Trump's presidential campaign.
According to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the embargo on Conventional Arms on Iran expired on October 18, 2020. The United States tried to extend the Arms Embargo on Iran, but its proposal was rejected by a 13-2 vote in the United Nations Security Council vote on August 15, 2020. Trump then said on August 19 that the United States would initiate the restoration of United Nations sanctions on Iran. Although the resumption of sanctions is included in the JCPOA, because the United States has withdrawn from the JCPOA, other countries in the Security Council generally believe that the United States does not have this power. On September 19, Pompeo announced that he would restart UN sanctions against Iran on the same day, and on the same day, Britain, France and Germany sent a letter to the UN Security Council reiterating that they would continue to uphold the Iranian nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, on September 18, the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier battle group entered the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to make a military threat to Iran. Ignoring the positions of its European allies and the agreements of the United Nations Security Council, the United States has forcibly pushed forward unilateral sanctions against Iraq and pushed maximum pressure to a new height.
Trump's Middle East policy is centered on Iran, after withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear agreement, extreme pressure and the united States and Iran extreme pressure and extreme resistance sharp game, during which Iran shot down the US drone and the United States attacked Sulaimani and twice to the brink of military confrontation, and before the 2020 US election, Trump's election needs to be further antagonized and upgraded. At the same time, the United States unilaterally supports Israel in promoting the "deal of the century", supports Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries to form a strategic alliance in the Middle East, promotes Arab countries to reach a peace agreement with Israel, and tries to divide Turkey and Iran, both suppressing Iran to maintain the dominance of the United States in the Middle East, and helping Trump to choose. But the Gulf States and Israel are not capable of bringing Iran to its knees without U.S. involvement, nor can the U.S. maximum pressure based on economic warfare achieve this goal. This means that the United States must be deeply involved in the Affairs of the Middle East, thus delaying and blocking the pace of its strategic shift to the Indo-Pacific region, and increasing the possibility of the United States falling into a new military conflict in the Gulf region. There is a mismatch between Trump's Middle East policy and the us global strategic shift layout.
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