Author: David M. Glantz
Translation: Little Xiaoice
(Above) Tanks of the Leningrad Front attacked in January 1944
The Victory of the Red Army in January 1944 in southern Leningrad and Novgorod was an ominous sign for Adolf Hitler and his troubled Wehrmacht. It is not surprising that the Red Army will once again launch a massive winter offensive, since the Red Army did "have" winter based on the experience of late 1941 to early 1942 and from late 1942 to early 1943. The Germans were deeply disturbed by the fact that the Soviet offensive was moving forward across such a wide front and was achieving such remarkable results.
Unlike the previous two winters, in the winters of late 1943 to early 1944, the headquarters of the Soviet High Command planned and organized a strategic offensive along the entire front. When the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts attacked the 18th Army of the "Northern" Army Group and broke the blockade of Leningrad, the 1st Baltic Front, the Western Front and the Belorussian Front, from west of Nevel and Vitebsk in the north to the east of Bobruisk, launched a fierce assault on the German defenses in Belarus. At the same time, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts rushed out of the strategically large landing field across the Dnieper River, forcing the Germans to withdraw through Zhytomyr and Kirovogle and back to the vicinity of Vinnytsa and Krivoroge. By 30 January, the attacking Soviet fronts had encircled and prepared to annihilate the German forces in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky salient, which were guarding the remnants of their boastful defenses of the Eastern Wall along the Dnieper. At the same time, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts repeatedly attacked the overstretched German defenses on the north and south sides of Nikopol at the top of the Great Bend of the Dnieper River.
At the end of January, the headquarters of the Soviet High Command ordered the fronts to launch a ruthless offensive, once again trying to completely crush the German defenses on the Eastern Front. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, operating in the main strategic direction, would crush the German defenses in Ukraine and advance to the Polish-Romanian border, while the 4th Ukrainian Front and the North Caucasus Front were responsible for the liberation of Crimea. To the north, the 1st Baltic And Belorussian Fronts will liberate Minsk and completely retake Belarus. Finally, unlike previous winters, the Soviets in the Leningrad region had every reason to believe that their offensive would completely liberate the Leningrad Oblast and even break through the German defenses in the Baltic region. The Germans had no confidence in whether they could stop the Red Army's offensive, and for the first time in the war. Nor did the Germans benefit from any of the battles between the catastrophic events of January and the Red Army's operations in February.
Plans for both sides
At the end of January, the Leningrad Front lined up along the Luga River and prepared to attack Narva, the gateway to the Baltic Sea region from the east, and the 67th Army from the north and northwest was already halfway through Leningrad to Luga. The 59th and 8th Armies of the Volkhov Front posed a threat to Luga from the east, and the 54th Army was rushing from the northeast to Oljezh and Luga. For both fronts, this was really an opportunity to encircle and annihilate the main forces of the German 18th Army entrenched in luga to the north and northeast (see map).
(Above) January-April 1944, soviet Leningrad-Novgorod offensive campaign
Faced with the impending disaster, Küchler, still commander of Army Group North, again rushed to the Fuehrer's headquarters in East Prussia on 30 January, and finally obtained Hitler's approval to withdraw Lindemann's 18th Army to the Luga River Line. However, Hitler, with his usual stubbornness, ordered the anxious Kuchler to hold the Luga Line, regain contact with the 16th Army, cut off by Meretskov's forces, and seal all gaps in the line. Quhiler informed his operational staff of these demands, who immediately protested to the OKH Operations Service, saying the orders could not be carried out at all. He said a gap in the group line was 50 kilometers wide and that the Russians had crossed the Luga River at Staritsa, northwest of Luga. Zeitzler later agreed to tell Hitler that the 18th Army could not hold the Luga Line.
At noon the next day, Hitler relieved Kuchler of command and replaced him with Field Marshal Walter Modell. Modell, who served as commander of the Panzer Division, Commander of the Panzer Corps, and Commander of Army Group Group, helped rescue the "Central" Army Group from the encirclement in early 1942, and for a long time served as Hitler's "firefighter", dealing with various crises again and again in seemingly irreparable situations. The strong fighter sent a telegram to his new command: "You must not take a step back without my explicit approval. I flew to the 18th Army this afternoon. Tell General Lindemann that I ask him to believe me. We've worked together before. ”
The strong Modell did not realize that the strength of the 18th Army had been severely depleted. After being forced to retreat for a considerable distance in the last days of January, the army's defensive lines were crumbling and the rate of depletion of the internal units under its jurisdiction had risen sharply. Modell's relatively complete divisions were the 12th Panzer Division, which returned to the area at the end of January, and the 58th Infantry Division, which was arriving by train from the south. Army Group Reported on January 29 that as of January 10, the 18th Army's combat infantry numbered 57,936. Since then, the army has suffered losses of 35,000 wounded and 14,000 killed, and even with the newly arrived reinforcements, the 18th Army currently has only 17,000 combat infantry.
In February 1944, submachine gunners of the Leningrad Front stormed the outskirts of Luga
The Soviet high command headquarters was not intended to give the Modell Army Group a much-needed respite. On 29 January and 1 February, respectively, the base camp ordered Govorov and Meretskov to crush the German resistance along the Luga River and completely annihilate the 18th Army.
At the same time, the base camp transferred the 1st Chibiesov Assault Army, deployed in the old Russa area on the right wing of the 2nd Front on the Baltic Sea coast, to the Meretskov Front as a way to gather forces for his attack on Luga.
On 29 January, Govorov ordered Fejuninsky to storm the 2nd Army and Maslennikov's 42nd Army to cross the Luga River, clear the enemy on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, advance to the Narva River, and seize the landing field on the west bank of the river. Sveridov's 67th Army should launch a surprise attack to the south, in coordination with the Volkhov Front to capture Luga. Thereafter, Govorov's main forces would assemble north of Lake Chude and set about invading Estonia.
However, Meretskov was slow to capture Luga, and the volkhov forces were unable to attack Pskov to the west, forcing Govorov to change the tasks of the front. On 1 February, he ordered Masrennikov's 42nd Army to rush south to Lucasi on the right side of the 67th Army to prevent the Germans from drawing reinforcements from Pskov and Luga to reinforce Narva. While covering the left flank of Fejuninsky's army, Maslennikov should also attack south to the east of Chude Lake to support the volkhov front's assault on Luga from the northeast and east. After the Volkhov Front and the 67th Army had conquered Luga and attacked Pskov to the west, Maslennikov's forces should thoroughly eliminate the enemy east of Lake Deux and be prepared to launch a surprise attack west from Lake Chud and Lake Pskov.
This article is excerpted from the Battle of Leningrad 1941-1944