Brief introduction
The Battle of Wu Chubaiju was a war in which long-distance strategic maneuvering and far-reaching strategic pursuit were outstanding in the war of the late Spring and Autumn Period. Its characteristics are: (1) The Wu army adopted a strategy of fatigue and mistakes, and after exhausting the Chu army, it carried out a surprise attack from the weak part of the northeastern border defense of the Chu state and penetrated deep into the hinterland of the Chu state in one fell swoop; after the victory of the decisive battle of Baiju, it was followed by a far-reaching strategic pursuit and broke chu into The Chu. (2) Due to the passive strategic defense of the Chu State, the border defense was not strict, and the security was lax, so it was attacked by the Wu army, and the war was at a disadvantage at the beginning of the war.
Section 1: The Formation of the Wu-Chu Contradiction
In the fourteenth year of King Jing of Zhou (506 BC), King Wu launched a major attack on Chu, breaking through the capital of the State of Chu (郢, in present-day northern Jiangling, Hubei). This was the largest war between Wu and Chu in the late Spring and Autumn Period.
Chu was originally a big country, but due to the long-term struggle to dominate the Central Plains, the people were exhausted and exhausted, and the national strength gradually weakened. When King Chu Ping was king, he was absurd and cruel, and overhauled the palace room indefinitely. Heavy servitude exhausted the people, and the class contradictions were very acute. The ruling clique also fell in love with each other, successively forcing Wu Yuan (i.e., Wu Zixu) and Bo Yao to run to Wu to help Wu rebel against Chu.
After King Zhao of Chu ascended the throne (516 BC), politics became even more corrupt. The lives of the people are very painful. Since the Jin Dynasty united with Wu and Chu, the contradictions between Wu and Chu have been developing. Chu's relations with the vassal states Cai (in present-day Runan, Henan) and Tang (in present-day northwestern SuiXian, Hubei) also deteriorated as Yin Zi often demanded bribes and detained Cai Hou and Tang Gong. Although the territory of the Chu State is large, due to the contradictions at home and abroad, the national strength has declined even more.
Wu was still a vassal state of Chu in the early Spring and Autumn Period, and by the time of King Wu's shoumeng, he accepted the advanced production technology of the Central Plains, and the economy gradually developed, and the country began to grow stronger. In order to get rid of his subordinate relationship with Chu, Shou Meng adopted the advice of the Jin envoy Shen Gong Wuchen, joined forces with the Jin Dynasty to control Chu, and learned from wuchen the Central Plains shooting method, imperial law, and car warfare method. For more than forty years from Shou Meng to Wu Wangfu, Wu and Chu continued to fight wars, and the State of Wu successively seized the cities of Lailai (present-day Fengtai, Anhui), Juchao (present-day Chao County, Anhui), and ZhongLi (present-day Linhuaiguan, Fengyang, Anhui), in the northeast of the Chu State. After King Wu ascended the throne, in order to consolidate and expand his rule, he did some work to win the hearts and minds of the people. He lived a relatively simple life, encountered natural disasters and diseases, often personally visited the people to visit the widows and widows, to relieve the poor; he was also able to sympathize with the people and work with them, so he eased the class contradictions, won a certain degree of support from the people, and strengthened the country. He also reused Wu Yuan, Bo Yao, and Sun Wu, and actively plotted a large-scale attack on Chu.
Section 2: The Strategic Application of Wu Wang's Attack on Chu (See Attached Figure I)
A tired and confused Chu army, preparing conditions for a large-scale attack on Chu
In the eighth year of King Jing of Zhou (512 BC), king Lu of Wu prepared a major attack on Chu, and Sun Wu believed that "the people's labor is not enough, wait for it". The wu personnel learned about the situation in the Chu state and proposed to Lu Lu the strategy of fatigue and mistake. He believes that "if the three divisions are to be a servant, and one division is to the end, all will come out." If he goes out, he will return, and if he returns, he will return, and Chu will be in the Way (tired of the Tao). It is urgent to (repeatedly) strike (tired), many sides to make mistakes, to stop, and then to follow them with three armies, and will be greatly overcome." He adopted this suggestion, and in the following year successively sent troops to harass the Chu state of Yi (i.e., Chengfu, near present-day Woyang, Anhui), Qian (northeast of present-day Huoshan, Anhui), and Liu (present-day north of Lu'an, Anhui), and then surrounded the string (southwest of present-day Huangchuan, Henan), and drove everywhere for six years, causing the Chu army to be tired and demoralized, creating conditions for a large-scale attack on Chu.
2. Unite Cai and Tang and take advantage of the false attack on Chu
In the fourteenth year of King Jing of Zhou (506 BC), the Chu army besieged the state of Cai, and Cai Zhaohou asked for help from Wu. Tang Chenggong heard that Cai Guo wanted to join forces with Wu to attack Chu, and in order to take revenge, he also volunteered to act with Cai and Wu. Although Cai and Tang's national strength was small, they were on the flank of Chu, and the strategic points of Zhou lai, Juchao, and Zhong Li had long been captured by the Wu army, which provided favorable conditions for the Wu army to avoid the front of the Chu army and make a far-reaching strategic detour from its flank. Seizing this favorable opportunity and situation, Wu Guo allied with Cai and Tang to jointly attack Chu.
In the winter of the same year, King Wu personally led his brother King Chai and Wu Yuan, Sun Wu, and Bo Yao to attack Chu. The large army marched west along the Huai River by boat, and after passing through the prefecture, it left the boat in Huaiwei, and the troops landed in boats, continued to advance south of the Huai River, took advantage of the gap where the Chu army had been extremely tired from fighting for many years and the northern border defense was weak, used Cai and Tang as guides, carried out a far-reaching strategic surprise attack, and quickly passed through the three passes of the Great Tunnel (Jiuli Pass, also known as Huangdan Pass, southeast of present-day Xinyang, Henan), Zhiyuan (Wusheng Pass, present-day Xinyang South, Henan), and Hao'e (Pingjing Pass, southwest of present-day Xinyang, Henan), and marched straight towards the Han River. The Chu state sent Yin Zichang and Sima Shen Yinshu (沈尹戍), Wucheng Dafu Hei, and Dafu Shi Huang to lead an army west of Xia Wei (present-day Hankou, Hubei) to defend along the right bank of the Han River, and to fight with the Wu army against the Han River. This far-reaching and roundabout strategic surprise attack of the Wu army, when it implemented the strategic maneuver, was completely unexpected by the Chu state, and the soldiers did not have bloodshed, and drove deep into the Chu territory for more than a thousand miles. Under the conditions of the time, it was a resolute and bold move. The success of this operation was not only due to the high degree of subjective effort exerted by the commander of the Wu Army, but also met the objective conditions: First, the northeast border of the Chu State was empty and there were gaps to take advantage of; second, with the assistance of Cai and Tang, it was conducive to making a major detour from the northeast of the Chu State. Although the surprise attack of the Wu army did not achieve the goal of annihilating the Chu army, the strategic maneuver was successful, which can be said to be rare in the Spring and Autumn Period.
III. The Decisive Battle of Baiju (see Figure II)
When the two armies of Wu and Chu were facing each other across the Han River, Shen Yinshu, the left Sima of the Chu Army, suggested to the commander Ling Yin Zichang: "Zi (you) go up and down with Han (referring to Han Shui) and go up and down with it (the meaning of circumvention), I melt (exhaust) The outside of Fang City with Yin Qizhou, and also plug (back to the division to block) the big tunnel, the straight line, and the dark end." If the Son destroys the Han, I will strike it from behind, and I will be defeated. Zi Chang agreed to this knowledge. After that, Takejo Daifu Hei often said, "Oku uses Muya, I use Geye, not for a long time, it is better to fight quickly." The Doctor Shi Huang also thought that the Chu people hated Zi Chang and liked Shen Yinshu. If Shen Yincheng destroyed the Wu army ships on the Huai River, the Hui army blocked the Sanguan Pass, and cut off the Wu army's retreat route, he would gain the battle merits alone. If the sub-often does not fight quickly, it is inevitable to miss the accusations of the fighter. Therefore, he also advised his son to attack often. Ling Yin Zi often wanted to achieve battle merits for his own personal interests, but changed the original battle plan with Shen Yincheng and decided to cross the Han River alone to attack the Wu army. From xiao bei to da bei fought three battles, there was no result, and the sub often had an unfavorable situation and wanted to escape. The doctor Shi Huang accused him of wanting to be an official when the country was at peace, but when he was in danger, he wanted to escape, where he could escape. Zi Chang had no choice but to reluctantly continue to fight.
On November 19, the fourteenth year of King Jing of Zhou (506 BC), wu and Chu armies lined up at Baiju. The morale of the Wu army was high, and Zi Chang led the army to barely cope with the battle. The Wu general Fu Le Wang advocated an attack first. He knew that Chu Ling Yin Zi had always been unpopular, and his subordinates would not fight for him to the death, and if the Wu army attacked first, the Chu army would inevitably collapse, and then enter the battle with the main force, and it would be able to win a complete victory, but the King of Wu did not agree. The King of Fuyu believed that his subordinates should act in righteousness and did not have to wait for orders; if they fought to the death, they would certainly be able to break through the Chu and enter the country. Therefore, he led his five thousand men to attack Zi Chang's pawns first, and they collapsed at the first touch, and the main force of the Chu army was in chaos. King Wu took the opportunity to throw himself into battle with all his might, expand his achievements, and defeat the Chu army. Chu ling Yin Zi often fled to zhengguo, and Emperor Shi and his subordinates were all killed. The decisive battle of Baiju ended with the defeat of Wu Shengchu.
IV. Far-reaching strategic pursuit
After the defeat of Baiju, the Chu army retreated to the west. Taking advantage of the fact that the Chu army had no commander and the troops were chaotic, the Wu army carried out a strategic pursuit and caught up with the Chu army at QingfaShui (河名, in modern Hubei Anlu and Yunmeng between Qinshui). King Wu was about to give the order to attack, but the King of Fuyu tried to dissuade him, saying that the trapped beasts were fighting, let alone people. If the Chu army felt that it was not spared and turned back to fight hard, it might defeat the Wu army; if the attack was postponed, so that those who crossed the river first would be spared, and those who crossed the river later would be envious and fight for the crossing, there would be no fighting spirit. Therefore, he put forward a proposal of "half a economy and then attack", and King Lu of Wu agreed, and only when the Chu army was halfway through, he launched an attack and defeated the Chu army. The Wu army continued to pursue, defeating the Chu army at Yongli (雍澨, in present-day southwest of Beijing Mountain, Hubei), and finally capturing chu's capital Yingcheng on November 29, and King Zhao of Chu fled to Suiguo (in present-day Sui County, Hubei).
After the Wu army occupied the capital of the Chu state, it plundered on a large scale, causing dissatisfaction among the Chu people. In the fifteenth year of King Jing of Zhou (505 BC), Shen Baoxu, the Grand Master of Chu, borrowed the Qin army to cooperate in the battle, and repeatedly defeated the Wu army. In an attempt to seize the throne of Fu Que, infighting ensued, and Wu Du Gu Su was attacked by the Vietnamese army. Under such circumstances, King Wu had no choice but to withdraw his troops and return to China in September of the same year.
Review
Political gains and losses were the main reason for Wu Shengchu's defeat
In the Battle of Baiju, the smaller State of Wu defeated the large State of Chu, mainly because the politics of the State of Wu were relatively clear. In terms of internal affairs, Wu Wanglu united internally, won the hearts and minds of the people, and won a certain degree of support from the people; in foreign affairs, he obtained the support of the Jin state and the assistance of Cai and Tang, thus laying the foundation for victory in the war. Although the Chu state is large, it is politically corrupt. In the life of King Ping and King Zhao, the people's lives were even more miserable, there was a sharp contradiction between the ruling class and the broad masses of the people, and they could not get the support of the people in the war, such as when King Chu Zhao fled to Yun Mengze, he was attacked by the people. At the same time, the ruling clique was vying for power and profits, and there were different intentions from top to bottom, so that the morale of the army was demoralized and the pace of command was inconsistent, resulting in a situation in which the attack could not be overcome and the defense could not be solidified, and eventually the army collapsed, the general fled, and the country was almost destroyed.
Second, Wu Guo's strategic and operational guidance is correct
Wu's victory over Chu was strategically and operationally guided.
There are mainly the following four points: First, the pre-war fatigue and mistakes made the Chu army tired of running for its life and neglecting to take precautions. This strategy was correct in terms of the situation of the struggle between the two countries at that time. Chu Yuan was a big country in the south, and although due to the long-term struggle for hegemony, the people were poor and exhausted, and the national strength was weak, but the population was large, the territory was vast, there was still a certain material basis, and the overall balance of forces was still not weaker than Wu. If we do not use the strategy of exhaustion and mistakes and surprise attacks by taking advantage of the gap, it will be very difficult to achieve the goal of breaking through Chu and entering The Chu. Second, the strategic offensive direction was correctly selected, and the main force was used to carry out long-distance strategic maneuvers from the weak border defenses in the northeast of the Chu state. This surprised the Chu state, disrupted the strategic deployment of the Chu army, and in one fell swoop penetrated deep into the hinterland of the Chu state, directly approaching the Han River, and created favorable conditions for the war that broke chu into The Chu Dynasty. Third, the timing of the decisive battle was correctly chosen. During the decisive battle of Baiju, the Wu general Fu Liang correctly judged the enemy's situation, seized the weakness of Zi Chang's unpopularity, poor unity, and his subordinates refusing to fight for him, and launched an offensive first to break Zi Chang's pawn. Wu Wang Lu was also able to seize the fighter and throw the main force into a decisive battle with the Chu army, thus winning a great victory. The fourth is a far-reaching strategic pursuit. After the decisive battle of Baiju, the Wu army was able to take advantage of the chaotic retreat of the Chu army to carry out a far-reaching pursuit, and did not give the Chu army the opportunity to reorganize and counterattack, so it smoothly entered the capital of Yingdu and won the war. This kind of surprise attack and long-distance pursuit of the Wu army gave full play to the mobility of the army, which can be said to be a pioneering move under the conditions at that time.
The strategic and operational guidance of the Three Chu States was wrong
Before the battle, due to the implementation of passive strategic defense, the state of Chu did not have active combat preparations and actions, the border defense was not strict, and the vigilance was lax, so that it was attacked by the strategic surprise attack of the Wu army. At the beginning of the war, the Chu army fell into the disadvantageous position of passive combat, which was a serious strategic mistake of the Chu state. When the two armies were facing each other in Hanshui, Shen Yinshu's suggestion was positive and beneficial to the Chu army. Because the Wu army attacked thousands of miles, it was conducive to rapid combat. According to Shen Yinshu's suggestion, the frontal confrontation to contain the Wu army, at the same time, a part of the troops, detoured behind the enemy, blocked their way back, and attacked back and forth, as long as the front can withstand, it may make the Chu army change from passive to active, from unfavorable to advantageous. However, Zi Chang lacked strategic cultivation, miscalculated the situation between the enemy and us, and thought that the strength of the Chu army was superior to that of the Wu army, and he tried to win a quick victory and win the battle merits alone, so he abandoned Shen Yinshu's steady policy of lasting victory, crossed the Han River, fought a decisive battle with the Wu army alone, destroyed the strategic arrangements planned in advance, and then broke away from the favorable Hanshui position, sending the Chu army into a dangerous situation, causing an unfavorable situation of final defeat, which was a major strategic mistake of Zi Chang. In particular, when Zi Chang was once frustrated in battle, he did not try to save the crisis, but abandoned his troops and fled to Zheng Guo, so that the whole army was destroyed and the country was in danger. "Liutao Longtao, Strange Soldier" says: "If the general is not benevolent, the three armies will not be close; if the general is not brave, the three armies will not be sharp; if the general is not wise, the three armies will be suspicious; if it is unclear, the three armies will fall sharply." This passage can be used to evaluate Zi Chang. Although the defeat of the Chu state was mainly due to political corruption and strategic mistakes, it was also an important reason for the poor moral character of the general.
Attached figure 1 Schematic diagram of the strategic attempts of the Wu and Chu armies
Attached figure 2 Schematic diagram of the battle of Wu Chubaiju