This article is published with the permission of the public account "Memory Islands Isles"
"If you think that there is a risk that you may be killed by atrocities by publicly sending emissaries (to Korea), then please send me there anyway," "There is no need to send such an outstanding envoy as Vice Shima Jun (Vice Secretary of Foreign Affairs Vice Shima Shigeya), and I can deal with such a small matter as death."
When it comes to the history of Japan's foreign aggression, Saigo Takamori will become an important figure in the "Theory of Conquest of Korea". According to the general saying, Saigo Takamori did not hesitate to gamble his own life to provoke a war and "conquest" Korea that did not want to open a country, but he was opposed by Okubo Ritsu, believing that internal affairs should be taken seriously first. After a dispute between the two sides, Saigo Takamori took his supporters to the field in Meiji 6 (1873).
The "Controversy over Korea" was famous in the early years of the Meiji era. Some people believe that Saigo Takamori represents the interests of the old samurai clan and opposes the abolition of samurai privileges under the new system; in connection with the Iwakura Envoy Group (1871-1873), it happens that Saigo Takamori and Shimono are both "left-behind groups", and the winners such as Okubo Ritsuru are "out-of-town groups", so they believe that the "left-behind groups" take advantage of the absence of the "outer-travel groups" to violate the rules and carry out reforms without authorization, causing contradictions between the two sides.
Although the various statements are reasonable, through the interpretation of Japanese historians in recent years, the above statements are somewhat problematic. The theory of conquest does exist as an aggressive ideology, but Saigo Takamori is indeed not the leader of the theory of conquest, and the "Meiji Six-Year Coup" triggered by the "controversy over the conquest of Korea" is full of paradox.
Saigo Takamori's letters are sincere
We must also start with the text: why is saigo Takamori writing the first paragraph of the text.
In September of the fifth year of Meiji (1872), the Meiji government took over the "Kusayo-ōkan" in Busan under the jurisdiction of the Tsushima Domain, renamed it the "Great Japanese Mansion", and sent officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be responsible for trade with Korea. However, Lee's Joseon and the Japanese Edo shogunate only maintained "correspondence" relations for more than 200 years, and the ownership of kusa-ryō-kwan belonged to the Korean government and was only lent to Japanese businessmen, which was also considered extremely rude to Japan, and Japan-North Korea relations were strained.
On May 21 and 31, 1873, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stationed at the "Great Japanese Mansion" sent a telegram to Tokyo, mentioning that the Korean government had vigorously controlled the trade activities of the mansion because of the accusations of Mitsui group merchants posing as Tsushima merchants, and that Korea also posted a notice demanding that Trade between Japan and North Korea be restored to a "communication" system through Tsushima merchants, and that the Meiji Restoration was "sublime and flattering."
Against the backdrop of tension, the Japanese Main House (equivalent to the Cabinet) held several deliberations. Senator Itagaki (equivalent to a cabinet member) proposed sending a brigade (battalion) of soldiers to Korea to protect the Japanese diaspora and the mansion, Minister of State (equivalent to Prime Minister) Mitsumi Mitsumi proposed to send two brigades, Saigo Takamori opposed and proposed to send envoys to negotiate. On July 29, Saigo Takamori wrote a letter to Itagaki. The opening words are just after the following paragraph.
"Once troops are sent in, the other side will definitely ask for retreat, and if the withdrawal is not announced at that time, it is equivalent to starting a war." It is not in line with the original intention, it is tantamount to causing the scourge of war, and it is advisable to send envoys to go first immediately. If so, if the other side commits atrocities, then we will also have the name of requisition."
Because Saigo Takamori's "theory of envoys" mentioned that it might "send troops" in the future, it has long been considered to be a foreshadowing of the "theory of conquest of Korea", and it is expected that north Korea will have a great name after killing itself. The problem, however, is that even if North Korea resents Japan's rude behavior, it does not threaten the personal safety of Japanese officials and merchants in Kusayo, and there is no inevitability that "North Korea will kill Japanese emissaries." Judging from the context of the letter, Saigo Takamori was obviously opposed to sending troops, but only to persuade Itagaki to retreat and had to be catered to, proposing that if "first salute and then soldiers" can be reasonable and disciplined, if there is really "atrocities" and "violent killings", it can also be re-attacked.
According to Saigo Takamori's deliberations and speeches in the main house, he would wear traditional Japanese dresses such as "black hats" and "straight hangings" to go to Korea for negotiations, and at this time, "if the army and navy were sent to Korea", the Korean officials and people would have "suspicions" and "the original german intentions of the Imperial Court to the Korean state" would be contrary to the "original german intentions of the Imperial Court for the Korean State." Since Saigo Takamori's thinking was the most rational, on August 17, the main house deliberated and decided to send Saigo Takamori as an envoy to North Korea to discuss trade affairs.
Looking at Saigo's life experience, some laws can be found. During the first Choshu expedition (1864) at the end of the shogunate, Saigo Takamori twice took the initiative to enter the enemy position as an emissary and used his sincerity to persuade the Choshu Domain to surrender; during the War of Wuchen (1868), Saigo Takamori came forward to reach an agreement with the shogunate's Katsukai Boat, which promoted the bloodless opening of Edo castle, and later promoted the peaceful annexation of the Shonai Domain. Based on past performance, Saigo Takamori is inclined to settle peacefully even when he has military superiority, not to mention that Japan's military strength is not significantly stronger than that of North Korea, and internal political reform is still a mess, and it is difficult to imagine that Saigo Takamori, who has always been cautious, has become a follower of the "Korean conquest theory".
So why did such a decision, which obviously did not mean "conquest", lead to the "Meiji Six-Year Coup"? All this has to start with the return of the Iwakura Mission.
Eerie opposition
Although the Iwakura Mission is often evaluated as "opening eyes to see the world" and "the first step in Japan's Europeanization", in the eyes of the people of the time, this envoy's visit was an out-and-out diplomatic failure.
The Iwakura Mission, which departed in July of Meiji 4 (1871), was not only a trip, but was mainly aimed at seeking to revise unequal treaties with the European and American powers. As a result, as soon as it arrived in the United States, the mission found that "treaty correction" was only Japan's wishful thinking, and the United States had no intention of canceling its unequal policy toward Japan, or even to negotiate with the Japanese envoys outside of etiquette. ”
The first stop, the United States lost, the Iwakura mission fell into embarrassment, had to change the main task from "treaty correction" to examine the national conditions of various countries, and finally the mission's visit time accumulated to 20 months, almost double the original plan. Out of a loss of confidence in the mission, in addition to the fact that Iwakura Tsukihito (Right Minister) had been leading the team, the deputy envoy Okubo Toshitsuru returned directly to Japan at the end of May of Meiji 6 (1873).
It has always been believed that after the return of the "out-of-town group" Okubo Ritsuto, he found that the "left-behind group" had undergone radical reforms in the country, causing a large number of political incidents, and he believed that the "left-behind group" had violated the agreement that "major matters should be handled after the return of the foreign travel group," and then opposed Saigo Takamori on the issue of the DPRK's mission. In fact, however, during this time, Ōkubo Ritsuru did not pay attention to politics, but instead traveled to Kansai on August 16 to relax his mind—the next day, coinciding with the order of the main house, allowing Saigo Takamori to send an envoy to North Korea.
Not only Okubo Ritsu, but in fact, the deputy envoy, Kido Takayoshi, who returned to Japan in July, did not pay attention to the North Korean problem, but instead devoted his energy to solving the internal affairs of the Choshu valve; after the return of the Iwakura envoys on September 13, Iwakura was busy reorganizing the government together with Mijō Shimi. Until early October, major politicians did not consider Saigo Takamori's mission to North Korea to be a big deal, and there was no confrontation.
In fact, the main contradiction of the new government at that time was concentrated between the Saga valve and the Choshu valve. During the outinging of the Iwakura envoy group, Saga Valve's judicial secretary Eto Shinpei successively investigated and dealt with the scandals involving the Choshu Valve's Daisuke (Army Minister) Yamaga Yukin and Daisuke Daisuke Daisuke (Finance Minister) Inoue Kaoru. After the return of the Iwakura envoys, Choshu wanted to immediately activate the Okubo Ritsu, which would expel Eto Shinpei from the Senate. It was only Okubo Ritsu, who was immersed in the shadow of the failure of the mission and had been reluctant to return to politics, and the situation was deadlocked.
At this time, saigo Takamori and the North Korean issue became a good solution to this contradiction.
According to the earliest plans, Saigo Takamori was expected to leave for North Korea on September 20. However, after the return of the Iwakura envoys, they were busy dealing with the "unresolved Pepsi" and no one paid attention to them until the end of September, and Saigo Takamori went to criticize Mijo Shimi. The specific content of the accusations is not clear, but on September 28, Mitsumi Mitsumi's letter to Iwakura Tsushi mentioned that "saigo was very urgent in the North Korean incident, and what he said yesterday was very painful"; Iwakura takashi immediately visited Saigo Takamori on September 30, and was also reprimanded. Due to the hesitation of Mitsumi Sanjo's personality and the fact that Iwakura did not understand the North Korean issue, Saigo Takamori's cross-examination caused pressure on the two of them, and they did not know how to deal with it, so they had to consult with the Choshu valve.
In order to increase the importance of Okubo Ritsu's return to politics, the Choshu valve began to exaggerate the dangers of "sending an envoy to Korea" to Sanjo Shimi and Iwakura, making the two secretaries realize that no one in the current government can stop Saigo Takamori, and must return to Okubo Ritsuru and dismiss the senators who support Saigo Takamori (the main body is Eto Shinpei). In fact, the established thinking of equating "sending Korea" with "conquest" today also came from the propaganda of the Choshu valve.
On October 8, Iwakura and Mitsumi Mitsumi personally invited Ōkubo Ritsu to return to politics; on October 10, Okubo Ritsu submitted a "letter of request" stating that he "honored the imperial will of (Sanjo and Iwakura) and had to obey orders", and tried his best to postpone the mission to Korea. From this point in time, Okubo Ritsu, who had returned to check and balance the Saga Valve, was responsible for dealing with Saigo Takamori's mission.
On October 12, Okubo Ritsu entered the main house and was inaugurated as a senator, and the dispute over the "conquest of Korea" also ushered in a climax.
Back pot man Saigo Takamori
On October 14, the deliberations of the main house began. Saigo Takamori explained the plan of sending an envoy to Korea, and Okubo Ritsu put forward the famous "Seven Articles of Opposition to the Theory of Conquest of Korea" to refute it, starting from the logic of "dispatching Korea" = "conquest of Korea", believing that there was no preparation for war at present, and asked the envoy to postpone his travel. However, due to Saigo Takamori's repeated explanation that the envoy was only to "enhance friendship", Okubo Ritsu's argument was somewhat untenable.
Then Eto Shinpei spoke: If we believe that "the DPRK may brutally kill Saigo," then war is bound to be unavoidable, then fundamentally we should not propose a "postponement of dispatches," but rather "no longer take into account Saigo's opposition, stop dispatching envoys, and decide to go on a crusade against Korea. In other words, if it is believed that Japan-DPRK relations have reached the point where they are bound to be "killed by atrocities," then Okubo Ritsuto's proposal should be to prepare for war in an all-round way, not to postpone it; since the proposal of "extension" is proposed, it proves that Okubo Ritsu himself does not believe that North Korea will necessarily kill Japanese envoys.
The argument itself, though subtle, elevated the "conquest controversy" to factional level: after all, Eto Shinpei was the real target of Okubo Ritsu and Choshu, and now that he had jumped out to support Saigo Takamori, it would be even more impossible to give way to North Korea's success — but there was no reason to refute Saigo Takamori.
During the deliberations on October 15, Saigo Takamori, believing that he had finished what he wanted to say, did not attend, but instead proposed a "Letter of Beginning and End" detailing his views on the mission to North Korea:
"In the previous deliberations, it was proposed to send a brigade of escorts to (North Korea), but I proposed that sending troops was by no means a good thing, and it was very likely to trigger war, which was contrary to our original idea, so it was only proposed to send an open envoy ... Even if the other side may break off diplomatic relations and send troops to the organization, if it cannot really understand its meaning, it is still not a complete personnel matter."
Speaking of this, the whole audience could not raise objections, and Okubo Ritsu was silent, and on the same day, the main court deliberated and formally approved Saigo Takamori's envoy to North Korea.
Unlike Saigo Takamori's frank victory, Okubo Ritsuru lost face and handed in his resignation in anger. In order to keep Okubo Ritsu, Iwakura pushed full responsibility to Mitsumi Mijo and announced that he would resign as Right Minister. Mitsumi saw that the situation had suddenly changed, and she herself was unable to bear it and fell ill violently, and died soon after, and the position of Minister of Taisei was handed over to Iwakura Ascetic.
This controversy is ostensibly a "Korean conquest theory", but the internal basis is to eliminate the Saga valve, and once the "Korean conquest theory" is not suppressed, the political result is that the Saga valve continues to grow. Iwakura took advantage of the opportunity of "acting as an agent" to blatantly violate the rules of procedure by submitting to Emperor Meiji a letter of revision of the resolution (on his mission to Korea) and his "opinion" (extension of the mission), relying on the "holy judgment"; at the same time, the revision of the book Okubo Ritsuto asked him to prevent Saigo Takamori from "directly suing" emperor Meiji.
Although the Meiji Restoration was known as the "retro monarchy" and the pursuit of "emperor pro-government", in actual operation, no bill was actually decided by the emperor, but was discussed and completed by the Meiji Emperor, and the emperor recognized it in form, which also laid the foundation for the future constitutional monarchy. By turning the matter over to the Emperor, Iwakura saw it as a promise to do everything in his power to stop Saigo Takamori in order to save Okubo's political life.
On October 23, Saigo Takamori did not "directly sue", but asked to resign from all positions. At this point in time when victory and defeat were not divided, Saigo Takamori did not retreat because of defeat, but more like retreating to advance, resigning to convey a message to the emperor. However, the Emperor could not ignore the opinion of the Secretary of State, Iwakura, and had to request an extension on October 24.
Since the Emperor publicly overturned the resolution of the Main House, it was tantamount to sending a signal of distrust to all the senators. As is customary, all senators submitted their resignations, Iwakura, who held the option, approved the resignation of five senators, Saigo Takamori and Eto Shinpei, while Ōkubo Ritsuru and Kido Takayoshi remained. At the cost of driving away his old friend Saigo Takamori, Okubo Ritsu annihilated the core of the Saga Valve, Eto Shinpei, and the Choshu Valve was able to retain its strength, which laid a solid foundation for the rule of Japan by the two big men of Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi.
Clad in Meiji Yuanxun Kasumitsu, Saigo Takamori's every move is difficult to escape the political struggle, and he himself is also easy to become a "pot bearer". Later, he returned to Kagoshima to open a "private school"; he was also favored by the old scholars who opposed the reform of the new government, and he took up the pot of the "Southwest War" and finally completed his life in Seongsan.