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今天小編為大家帶來“越覽（31）：精讀博士論文
《競争環境下技術供應鍊專利營運及供應管理政策研究》
的第四章（1）”。
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Today, the editor brings you
"Yue Lan (31)：the chapter 4（1） of the doctoral dissertation
'Research on Patent Operation and Supply Management Strategies of Technology Supply Chain in a Competitive Environment'".
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一、内容摘要（Summary of content）
本期推文将從思維導圖、精讀内容、知識補充三個方面介紹博士論文《競争環境下技術供應鍊專利營運及供應管理政策研究》的的第三章：供應商競争環境下基于縱向和交叉許可的供應商開發政策（1）：模型描述、建構及求解。
This tweet will introduce the third chapter of the doctoral dissertation "Research on Patent Operation and Supply Management Strategies of Technology Supply Chain in a Competitive Environment" from three aspects: mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplementation: Vertical and cross-license based supplier development strategies in a supplier competitive environment (1): Model description, construction and solution.
二、思維導圖（Mind mapping）
三、精讀内容（Intensive reading content）
（一）研究内容（Research content）
本章探讨了制造商在現有供應商無法滿足其成本和品質要求時采取的部分替代政策，包括依賴現有供應商以確定産品品質和技術水準，以及通過供應商開發來培養替代供應商并提升其技術能力。同時提出了幾個核心問題，包括在特定條件下制造商是否應開發供應商、競争與交叉許可如何影響創新及供應鍊成員的績效，以及技術供應商的交叉許可如何影響制造商和其他供應鍊參與者。
This chapter explores some of the substitution strategies manufacturers adopt when existing suppliers cannot meet their cost and quality requirements, including relying on existing suppliers to ensure product quality and technical level, and cultivating alternative suppliers and enhancing their technical capabilities through supplier development. It also raises several core questions, including whether manufacturers should develop suppliers under certain conditions, how competition and cross-licensing affect innovation and supply chain member performance, and how cross-licensing by technology suppliers affects manufacturers and other supply chain participants.
（二）模型描述（Model description）
本節描述了一個由技術供應商、代工制造商和裝置制造商組成的三級供應鍊模型，并探讨了裝置制造商針對技術供應商的不同管理政策。考察了裝置制造商的三種供應管理政策：單一供應商政策、基于縱向許可的供應商開發政策和存在交叉許可的供應商開發政策。
This section describes a three-tier supply chain model consisting of technology suppliers, contract manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers, and explores the different management strategies of equipment manufacturers for technology suppliers. Three supply management strategies of equipment manufacturers are examined: single supplier strategy, vertical licensing-based supplier development strategy, and cross-licensing supplier development strategy.
單一供應商政策是指裝置制造商僅從一個原始供應商處擷取縱向設計許可，不涉及替代供應商的開發。
The single-vendor strategy refers to the equipment manufacturer obtaining vertical design licenses from only one original supplier, and does not involve the development of alternative suppliers.
基于縱向許可的供應商開發政策是指裝置制造商選擇開發替代供應商，但從原始供應商和替代供應商處分别獨立擷取縱向設計許可，這些供應商之間不進行交叉許可。
A vertical licensing-based vendor development strategy means that device manufacturers choose to develop alternative suppliers, but independently obtain vertical design licenses from original suppliers and alternative suppliers, without cross-licensing between these suppliers.
存在交叉許可的供應商開發政策是指裝置制造商同樣選擇開發替代供應商，并從原始供應商和替代供應商處分别獲得縱向設計許可，但這兩個供應商之間存在交叉許可協定。
A vendor development strategy with cross-licensing means that the device manufacturer also chooses to develop alternative suppliers and obtains vertical design licenses from the original supplier and the alternative supplier respectively, but there is a cross-licensing agreement between the two suppliers.
（三）模型的建構與求解（Model construction and solution）
考慮裝置制造商采取不同政策時，市場的不同逆需求函數如下圖所示。
When considering the different strategies adopted by equipment manufacturers, the different inverse demand functions of the market are depicted in the figure below.
1.單一供應商政策模式（Single vendor strategy model）
技術供應商選擇單一供應商政策模式時，通過求解各參與方利潤函數的一階導數得出裝置制造商的數量決策、代工制造商的價格決策、裝置制造商與原始供應商的談判以及原始供應商的技術創新水準決策。
When the technology supplier chooses the single supplier strategy model, the quantity decision of the equipment manufacturer, the price decision of the foundry manufacturer, the negotiation between the equipment manufacturer and the original supplier, and the technical innovation level decision of the original supplier are obtained by solving the first derivative of the profit function of each participant.
最後得到原始供應商、代工制造商和裝置制造商的均衡利潤。
In the end, we get a balanced profit for the original supplier, the OEM and the equipment manufacturer.
2.基于縱向許可的供應商開發政策模式（Vertical License-Based Supplier Development Strategy Model）
裝置制造商選擇供應商開發政策時，通過數學推導，得到了各個參與者的均衡技術創新水準、提成許可費、固定許可費、創新投資支援比例系數、元件價格、産品零售價格和銷量等。
The mathematical derivation of the equilibrium level of technological innovation, commission licensing fees, fixed licensing fees, innovation investment support ratio coefficients, component prices, product retail prices, and sales volumes of each participant are obtained by the equipment manufacturer when choosing a supplier development strategy.
最終給出了原始供應商、替代供應商、代工制造商和裝置制造商的均衡利潤表達式。
Finally, the equilibrium profit expressions of original supplier, substitute supplier, foundry and equipment manufacturer are given.
3.存在交叉許可的供應商開發政策模式（Vendor development strategy model with cross-licensing）
當裝置制造商選擇供應商開發政策，并且原始供應商、替代供應商進行交叉許可時，模型考慮了技術創新水準、許可費用、元件價格和産品零售價格等因素，以及各參與者的利潤最大化目标。通過這些決策過程，得出了供應鍊上各成員的最優政策和相應的經濟績效。最後給出了原始供應商、替代供應商、代工制造商和裝置制造商的均衡利潤表達式。
When the equipment manufacturer selects the supplier development strategy, and the original supplier and the alternative supplier cross-license, the model takes into account factors such as the level of technological innovation, licensing fees, component prices and product retail prices, as well as the profit maximization goals of each participant. Through these decision-making processes, the optimal strategies and corresponding economic performance of each member of the supply chain are obtained. Finally, the equilibrium profit expressions of the original supplier, the alternative supplier, the foundry and the equipment manufacturer are given.
（四）研究結論（Research conclusion）
裝置制造商選擇開發替代供應商的條件是其相對于原始供應商的議價能力較弱，同時替代供應商具有較強的創新能力，而原始供應商的創新能力相對較弱。
Equipment manufacturers choose to develop alternative suppliers on the condition that their bargaining power is relatively weak compared to the original supplier, and the alternative supplier has strong innovation ability, while the original supplier's innovation ability is relatively weak.
當裝置制造商選擇開發替代供應商時，供應商間的交叉許可對創新的影響較為複雜。一方面，交叉許可可能導緻原始供應商的創新激勵減弱，因為存在搭便車效應。另一方面，如果兩個供應商的技術創新能力差異明顯，交叉許可反而會促使替代供應商加大創新投資力度。
When equipment manufacturers choose to develop alternative suppliers, the impact of cross-licensing between suppliers on innovation is more complex. On the one hand, cross-licensing may lead to a weakening of the original supplier's innovation incentives because of the free-rider effect. On the other hand, if the technological innovation capabilities of the two suppliers are significantly different, cross-licensing will instead prompt the alternative supplier to increase investment in innovation.
四、知識補充——逆向歸納法（Knowledge Supplement—reverse induction）
逆向歸納法是求解動态博弈均衡的方法。所謂動态博弈是指博弈參與人的行動存在着先後次序，并且後行動的參與人能夠觀察到前面的行動。逆向歸納法在邏輯上是嚴密的，然而它存在着“困境”。所謂逆向歸納法是從動态博弈的最後一步往回推，以求解動态博弈的均衡結果。逆向歸納法又稱逆推法。它是 完全歸納推理，其推理是演繹的，即結論是必然的。
Reverse induction is a method to solve the equilibrium of dynamic games. The so-called dynamic game refers to the fact that there is a sequence of actions of the players in the game, and the participants who act later can observe the previous actions. Reverse induction is logically strict, but it has "dilemmas". The so-called reverse induction is to push back from the last step of the dynamic game to solve the equilibrium result of the dynamic game. Reverse induction is also known as inverse method. It is completely inductive reasoning, and its reasoning is deductive, that is, the conclusion is necessary.
在完全且完美的動态博弈中，先行為的理性博弈人，在前面階段選擇政策時，必然會考慮後行博弈人在後面階段中将會怎樣選擇政策。因而，隻有在博弈的最後一個階段，不再有後續階段牽制的情況下，博弈人才能作出明智的選擇。在後面階段博弈人選擇的政策确定後，前一階段的博弈人在選擇政策時也就相對容易。
In a complete and perfect dynamic game, the rational player who acts first will necessarily consider how the later player will choose the strategy in the later stage when choosing the strategy in the previous stage. Therefore, only in the last stage of the game can the player make an informed choice if there is no longer any restriction in the subsequent stages. After the strategy chosen by the player in the later stage is determined, the player in the previous stage can choose the strategy relatively easily.
逆向歸納法就是從動态博弈的最後一個階段開始分析，逐漸向前歸納出各階段博弈人的選擇政策。
Reverse induction is to analyze from the last stage of the dynamic game and gradually summarize the selection strategies of the players in each stage.
逆向歸納法的邏輯基礎：動态博弈中先行動的參與人，在前面階段選擇行為時必然會考慮後行動的參與人在後面階段中的行為選擇，隻有在最後一階段的參與人才能不受其他參與人的制約而直接做出選擇。而當後面階段的參與人的選擇确定後，前一階段的參與人的行為也就容易确定了。逆向歸納法排除了不可信的威脅或承諾。
The logical basis of reverse induction: In a dynamic game, the participants who act first in the previous stage will necessarily consider the behavior choices of the participants who act later in the later stage when choosing their behavior. Only the participants in the last stage can directly make choices without the constraints of other participants. And when the choices of the participants in the later stage are determined, the behavior of the participants in the previous stage is easy to determine. Reverse induction excludes uncredible threats or promises.
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參考資料：百度百科、Chat GPT
參考文獻：何浩嘉. 競争環境下技術供應鍊專利營運及供應管理政策研究 [D]. 電子科技大學, 2023.
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