Some time ago, when Ivan the Great and his friends discussed the geopolitical pattern around ancient China during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, they unexpectedly brought up a completely new topic: Has ancient China, or the ancient Chinese Empire as the core, and the Chinese civilization cluster formed by the central agrarian peoples and the surrounding nomadic peoples encountered fundamental challenges and crises? Or was there a real danger that ancient China would be "subjugated" and threatened by a completely heterogeneous civilization or nation-state, thus fundamentally changing China's political map and even the cluster of civilizations? Ivan the Great and his friends believe that this danger is real, and that at least since the sixteenth century, ancient China and modern China have encountered two major crises that may subvert civilization and political law, and these two crises can be regarded as the "darkest moments" of Chinese civilization.
Before we begin to talk about it, it is necessary to clarify ancient China, or more precisely, the geopolitical situation and political legal system faced by the classical Chinese Empire. First of all, the basic geopolitical situation faced by the classical Chinese Empire, from the geographical characteristics of the classical Chinese Empire in East Asia, almost all the regimes in ancient China directly controlled the most fertile rain-fed agricultural areas in the "two rivers and one river" (Yangtze River, Yellow River, Pearl River) basin in East Asia, and all established their rule with the above three agricultural areas as the core (that is, the so-called "Central Plains" and "Jiangnan"). On the outskirts of these three rain-fed agricultural areas, there are insurmountable geographical obstacles compared to other geopolitical regions: to the east, needless to say, it is a vast sea, only ancient Japan and some of the Austronesian peoples whose civilization development is lagging behind (including the indigenous peoples of the Taiwanese alpine tribes, Indonesian dwarf blacks and Polynesians, etc.), some Southeast Asian ethnic groups maintain immediate ties with the Chinese Empire; to the south is a miasma-filled tropical rainforest, although the Red River Delta such as Vietnam also has relatively good conditions for rain-fed agriculture. However, the insurmountable tropical rainforest and the heat of the tropical region greatly limited the pace of expansion of the classical Chinese Empire, of course, with the strength of the Southeast Asian ethnic groups, there is almost no ability to challenge the Chinese Empire, and the two sides are bounded by the hills and rainforests of the southern part of Guangdong for a long time; to the southwest is the same towering Hengduan Mountain Range, the Western Sichuan Plateau, etc. The barrier of the mountainous terrain makes it almost impossible for the army of the classical era to pass through the lofty mountains of western Yunnan and western Sichuan, appearing in the border area of the Chinese Empire. Of course, it was also quite difficult for the classical Chinese Empire to expand its influence to tibet and Yunnan, which was not first infected by the central government until the Yuan Dynasty and was first included in the central government until the Ming Dynasty.
To the north of Sichuan, the Hexi Corridor, which consists of thousands of miles of Gobi, and the more distant Turpan and Seven Rivers Valleys of Central Asia, is almost impossible for any army in the classical era to develop an attack through the Hexi Corridor to Guannei without trains. Correspondingly, ancient China wanted to send power west of the Guanzhong Plain, and judging from the han and Tang empires' operations in Central Asia, it was also a matter of extreme consumption of people's fat, serious disproportionate input and output, and finally abandoned; finally, it was the grassland and forest area in the north and northeast of the classical Chinese Empire, although the nomadic people in the classical period had always been regarded as the enemy of the central agrarian national regime, and even the nomadic people would put themselves on the grassland after entering the Central Plains and becoming the new agrarian regime." Brothers " regarded it as a vendetta (such as the Northern Wei Dynasty looked at Rouran), but the invasion of the Central Plains by the nomads could not really threaten the root of the Chinese civilization cluster for a long time from the perspective of great history, on the contrary, the nomads, due to the lack of a relatively strong culture, were constantly integrating into the farming peoples, making themselves an integral part of the Chinese civilization.
Therefore, as Professor Wang Dingjie proposed in "Review of Jia Wu", from the geographical location and national strength of ancient China or the classical Chinese Empire in East Asia, it is possible to describe the status and basic situation of ancient China in the geopolitical region of East Asia in four words: "No one is stronger than one.". The so-called "one super" refers to the fact that the volume of the classical Chinese Empire in East Asia is too large, the political, economic, and military resources are in an absolutely dominant position, and no centralized and unified regime in the eastern end of the entire old continent can compete with the ancient Chinese regime for a long time; the so-called "no strong", in the case that ancient China occupied the most elite part of the rain-fed agricultural areas in East Asia, let all the surrounding small regimes either live in the sea corner, or avoid the rain forest, or simply stay on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to become their own unity. All small regimes were politically and economically weak, and none threatened the ability of ancient China to rule the core areas.
And in this pattern of "one superpower and no strong", the formation of ancient China's very special political legal system and state construction model, we mentioned earlier, ancient China in the entire East Asian region of the state construction is a concentric circle, onion-style structure: the core part is by the "Tianzi" directly under the jurisdiction of the "household", and then the outer circle is the "Tianzi" to maintain close contact with the "Tianzi" and accept the "Tianzi" canonization, and then to maintain a relatively close connection with the "Tianzi", from time to time to accept the "Tianzi" canonization and rewards, However, the "foreign vassals" whose relations with the central government have been good and bad, and finally the "tributary" countries that have not closely related to the "Son of Heaven". However, whether it is a "household", "internal subject", "foreign domain" or "tribute" regime, in theory, it all belongs to the category of classical Chinese civilization clusters, and they do constitute the Chinese civilization from ancient times to modern times, and even the entire East Asian and Southeast Asian civilization clusters, which can be regarded as the broad scope of "classical China".
After clarifying the geopolitical pattern and political legal system of ancient China, the first "darkest moment" encountered by the classical Chinese Empire in the long river of history is self-evident: yes, it is precisely from the beginning of the 15th century to the middle of the 17th century that the Eastern Coast and the Western Frontier were confronted with the challenge of the Western colonists, Dzungar Mongols, Tsarist Russian Empires, and other civilizations that were completely heterogeneous compared to the classical Chinese state system and civilization clusters, and even had certain national state characteristics.
As we all know, Europe began in the 15th century, ushered in the era of "geographical discovery", in 1488, the Portuguese Dias led a fleet of ships to the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, proving the possibility of sailing to the East, in 1521, the Portuguese Fernando. Magellan also led a fleet to the Maluku Islands in the Philippines, and in fact completed the strategic task of "finding the shipping route to China and bringing back spices and gold" that Portugal and Spain dreamed of. In 1565, the Spanish colonists occupied cebu island in the Philippines, and actually established colonial rule in the Philippines, in fact, before this, the Portuguese colonists had begun to invade the coast of China, in 1517, a small number of Portuguese colonists and the Ming army clashed head-on, although the Ming army repelled this invasion, but in 1557 the Portuguese fraudulently seized the right to rule the Macau area.
In 1622, at the Battle of Portuguese-Dutch Macau, the Dutch were defeated and occupied Taiwan
After entering the 17th century, the expansion of Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands on the eastern coast of ancient China became increasingly arrogant, and Portugal established rule in Macau, built fortresses, fortresses and churches, and demanded monopoly on trade in Guangzhou by bribing Ming officials. In the mid-to-late 16th century, Spain seized the Penghu Archipelago and the northern part of the main island of Taiwan, using Taiwan as a base to radiate influence to the ancient Chinese mainland, and even prepared to send a colonial army of tens of thousands of people to directly open up large colonies along the coast of China. Although the Dutch moved slowly at first, they were extremely strong, and from 1622 to 1624, they first clashed with the Portuguese colonial army in Macau, failed to succeed, and then turned to Taiwan, engaged in an exchange of fire with the Spanish colonists, expelled the Spanish colonial army located in Penghu and the main island of Taiwan, established two fortresses of Zeelandia and Chikanlou on the main island of Taiwan, and the Western colonists on the eastern coast began to visit the house.
In the fourth year of the Ming Dynasty (1624), the Dutch East India Company invaded and occupied Taiwan
The sea no longer became a natural barrier for ancient China, and the western plateau and the northern steppe would also face a completely heterogeneous civilizational challenge: in the northern steppe, although the Manchurian military aristocracy that began to rise in the late 16th century and the early 17th century, the desert north and the desert south Mongolia, which were still in a state of fragmentation, were still the "foreign domains" of the ancient Chinese system, but behind them there was a powerful and approaching shadow: the Tsarist Empire. At the end of the 16th century, during the reign of the Rurik Dynasty and Tsar Boris Godanov, the Tsarist Empire had begun to expand eastward, and at war with the Siberian Khanate, after the destruction of the Siberian Khanate, the door of the Tsarist Empire to the east was opened, and the footsteps of the Russian Cossack colonial army did not stop, heading for the distant Chukotka Peninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk, and also came to the Heilongjiang River Valley and mongolian plateau of ancient China. And they encountered, there was no military or political presence of the ancient Chinese central government, only a small number of indigenous people in a state of extreme bondage and looseness, a large number of ghost-minded Mongol princes, which was the best colonial object for the Tsarist Empire, which was accustomed to pulling one faction from another to fight. In this way, the grassland and forest barriers in ancient northern China are no longer so foolproof.
Finally, at that time in the western region of ancient China, there was a "old monster" that had just been brushed out: the Dzungar Empire. As we mentioned earlier, the basic geopolitical pattern that ancient China faced in East Asia, to describe it in four words, was "superpower and no strong", and for a long time no second empire in a centralized state, equally powerful in civilization and economy, could compete with the Central Empire, and the Dzungar Empire broke this pattern. On the one hand, the Dzungar Empire, although organized with the Dzungar Department of Western Mongolia as the core, included the three homelands of Western Mongolia, and also attacked to the west and occupied a large area of land in the Kazakh Khanate; on the other hand, with the defeat of the Dzungar Great Khan Kaldantaiji in 1676, the traditional Weyrat Mongol alliance leader Öziltu Khan, the Dzungar Empire began to rapidly transform from a loose Mongol tribal alliance to a nationalization, and the territory under the jurisdiction of the Werat departments and the Southern Frontier Hui Department began the process of imperialization; third, Although the Steppe Empire has always been criticized for lacking effective ideological support, the Dzungar Empire has accurately seen the influence of Tibetan Buddhism among the Mongolian nobility, GardanTaiji himself studied under the seat of the Fifth Dalai Lama Lobsang Gyatso, and enjoyed the honorific title of Hutuktu himself, while relying on the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism (Yellow Sect), the influence of the Dzungar Empire in the entire Mongol system is so great that it has the potential to integrate all political forces in Central Asia, Tibet, and Inner and Outer Mongolia; finally, don't forget, Behind the Dzungar Empire, it is also the Tsarist Empire that came from afar, and the Tsarist Empire will certainly not sit by and watch the Dzungar Empire attack the city, and behind the expansion of the Dzungar Empire, there is also the shadow of the Tsarist Empire.
Clarify the situation of the demarcation of the two sides and the future
From the above analysis, we can already see what kind of harsh geopolitical environment ancient China faced from the 16th century to the 17th century: the eastern coastal areas were faced with western maritime colonists who were getting closer and closer and more powerful; the northern border areas were faced with Russian land colonists who had rushed to the Heilongjiang River Basin, began to demand tribute, and were ready to establish rule; the western border areas were facing the imminent completion of national integration and the integration of the entire "Great West" Regional potential for the Dzungar Empire and the Tsarist Empire behind it. Whether it is the Western colonizers, the Russian colonizers, or the Dzungar Empire, they all have the following characteristics in terms of national nature and national capabilities:
First, in terms of economic form and military technology, it is in an absolutely superior position compared to the classical Chinese Empire at that time, which has been clearly discussed in our previous series of articles on "On Ming and Qing Firearms", compared with the Western colonists who are strong and strong, and the ships are strong and strong, and the military technology of classical China has lagged behind. In the early 16th century, due to the scarcity of western colonists and only a few dozen hundred people, ancient China's military strength relied on numerical superiority and internal advantages to barely resist, but with the establishment of Western colonists' sea power, ancient China was absolutely unable to resist the attack of these emerging countries.
The shadowed part of the figure shows the lost land in the late Qing Dynasty, accounting for about 13% of the total land area.
The second is the position in the geopolitical pattern and state system, which are all completely heterogeneous regimes and civilizations relative to the "tianxia" system composed of the classical Chinese Empire as the core, "foreign domains" and "tributes". Some Western colonial powers have even completed the initial transformation from classical countries to modern nation-states, and the wars that occurred with ancient China no longer belong to the category of internal dynastic wars between ancient China's internal "editors" or "foreign domains" entering the Central Plains, but to some extent have the nature of "aggression and counter-aggression" wars of the nation-state. Correspondingly, once such a war is defeated, the consequences will be much more terrible than the internal peasant uprising or the mutual attack of the aristocratic classes, which can be called the real "death of the world", and the classical Chinese civilization will likely be profoundly influenced and even replaced by a completely heterogeneous Western civilization that has come from afar.
The oil painting "Zuo Zongtang Recovers Xinjiang" reflects the historical fact that the Western Expeditionary Army composed of officers and soldiers of the Manchu, Han, Mongolian and Hui nationalities recovered Xinjiang with the support of the Uyghur people
In the face of the "greatest crisis" in the history of classical Chinese civilization, it was a central imperial regime with relatively limited capabilities: on the one hand, the ming empire's ability to rule was close to its limit in the late 15th century, and in the late 16th century, it had already embarked on a downward spiral, and by the beginning of the 17th century, it had begun a process of total collapse, and it was completely unable to take the initiative in the face of so many threats and the financial level; on the other hand, in terms of the previous political skills of the Ming Empire, the political operations in Inner Asia were very conservative. The degree of tribal restraint in the northeast region is very weak, and the counterpart outer Mongolia has long adhered to the attitude of "closing itself off", and as for the gradual integration of the Mongol tribes in the distant northwest of Weilat, it is not within the scope of the political considerations of the Ming Empire; third, from the perspective of the operation of inner Asia in ancient China, especially in the northwest region, it has always been constrained by the Central Plains and Jiangnan Scholars, after all, these are two black holes that fill in the pits, one cannot land, the other cannot collect rent, and what is the meaning of collecting the money of our masters to fill these bottomless pits?
And these aspects, at least with the national ability and political level of the Ming Empire, are absolutely unable to survive this "crisis of the 15th to 17th centuries": the weakening of financial and military capabilities determines that the Ming Empire simply cannot come up with enough financial and military strength to support it to survive the challenges of these completely heterogeneous civilizations; the defects in the political operations in Inner Asia determine that the Ming Empire will basically be in a state of black eyes and one black eye when facing the integration of the Dzungar and Tsarist Empires, and will even emulate the story of the Southern Song Dynasty. Or in advance, the drama of "borrowing from Pingkou" at the end of the Ming Dynasty was staged in advance, and the Tsarist Empire joined forces to destroy the northern and southern Mongolian departments, and was complacent about its own genius operation; and in the face of the structural contradiction of the "Central Plains-Frontier" in ancient China, that is, the contradiction between operating the border areas and safeguarding the interests of the scholar class, judging from the political division of the Ming Empire at that time, there was almost no possibility of breaking the situation. In short, if these major crises in the frontier areas broke out in the 17th and 18th centuries, then the luck of ancient China was slightly better, and it would lose all the frontier areas except the rain-fed agricultural line, and if the luck was slightly worse, it might lead to the complete destruction of classical Chinese civilization, which was the first "darkest hour" encountered by ancient China.