From 1919 to 1920, the Beijing government of the Republic of China shifted its power and center of gravity, directly doubted each other, the confrontation deepened, and Henan, which had an important political geographical location, became the focus of contention between the two sides. The origin and rise path of Governor Zhao Of Yu made him lack Olympic aid in political circles. After Yuan Shikai's death, Zhao Qianmei anhui in order to survive, actually left and right, the Anhui department prepared to replace Yu Dou, resulting in a wave of Yi Dou. Because of the different attitudes of Anhui zhi to his whereabouts, Zhao Qian went from mei anhui to gongwan until it was directly opposed to Anhui, resulting in a change of power in zhiwan, which was one of the important reasons for the outbreak of war and the defeat of Zhiwan. Zhao Qian's movement with the trend is not only based on his factional attributes, but also the profound influence of the current situation on personal choices. But whoever wins the factional race is ultimately only the faction's victory. The deeper they are involved in the center, the more it means the decline and disorder of the state and politics. The Yidu trend became one of the turning points in the decline of the Beiyang government.
In 1920, the Anhui clan manipulated the Beijing government to remove and replace Zhao Qian, the governor of Henan, which caused a wave of Yi Dou and prompted Zhao Qian to move from Meiwan to Wanwan until it was attached to The Zhi and anti-Anhui, which accelerated the formation of the anti-Anhui alliance, which led to the outbreak of the Zhiwan War. The Yidu trend became one of the turning points in the decline of the Beiyang government. At present, there has been considerable discussion in the academic circles on this incident,[1] but the focus is mostly on Zhiwan, and the discussion of the pivot of the key figure Zhao Qian in the Yi Dou trend and its series of influences is limited, and this article intends to focus on the experience and situation of Zhao Qian through archives, diaries, memories and other materials, analyze the interaction between Zhao Qian's factional identity, activity characteristics and changes in the situation in the process of Yi Dou, and thus combine the central government's loss of power, the rise of factions and their impact on the process of Social Development in China caused by the downward shift of power in modern times.
First, the Anhui clan sat on the throne and conspired with its Yi Governor
The shift in the center of power of the central government from 1919 to 1920 and the deepening of mutual suspicion and confrontation between The Two Sides of Anhui and Anhui caused by it caused the Yi Governor of the Anhui clan to move. [2]
The expansion of the Anhui dynasty and the decline of the presidential authority are one of the backgrounds of the Yidu trend. In October 1918, Xu Shichang was inaugurated as president, recognized by all factions in Beiyang, the core figures of the political situation Feng Guozhang and Duan Qirui were willing to retire, and the central government was controlled by the Beiyang clique as a whole. However, after the defeat of the North-South Peace Conference in 1919, The Premier Qian Nengxun, who was controlled by Xu Shichang, was forced to resign by the Anfu clan and replaced by Jin Yunpeng of the Anhui clan;[3] the parliament controlled by Xu Shichang was not yet subdued by Anfu because of the loss of financial resources;[4] the general representative of the Huihe Was made Wang Yitang, the chief of Anfu, who adhered to Xu Shichang's wishes. Xu Shichang's power in the central government was deeply weakened, resulting in "the control of all the powers of the Zhu'an clan". [5]
After the Anhui clan was strong in the central government, it further sought to overwhelm the direct family and unify the south, which led to the suspicion and resistance of the direct family. Fan Yuanlian once relayed to Xiong Xiling the bad feelings and plans of wu unification in early 1919 when he met Duan Qirui: "Qu Yi was quite dissatisfied with Wu Ziyu and Feng Yuxiang, saying that their mental skills were difficult to rely on, but still relied on Zhang Jingyao. In the future, he will not be spared from a war, and he will lead the three divisions to participate in the battle in The Lingnan and other languages. [6] This shows that Duan Qirui has always been deeply wary of Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang on the southern front, and his intention to wait for an opportunity to suppress them is very obvious. In the same year, after the defeat of the North-South Conference led by Xu Shichang, the Anhui clan's main war spirit was revived, and suppressing the direct clan that had always been the main peace was one of the steps to realize its military unification of the whole country. Duan Qirui planned to join forces with Cheng Qian to "surround the Zhi army on all sides" and force Wu Peifu to "hand over the entire first road division to Brigadier Zhang under his command." That is, Brigadier Zhang was promoted to division commander, and the remaining two brigade commanders of the PrimeValier Peace were transferred to the Daimyo Town Guard or the General's Mansion to join the army." [7] In the summer of 1919, Lu Hongkui, a secret envoy sent by Duan Qirui to Chenzhou to contact Cheng Qian, the leader of the Xiang Army, was detained by the Southern Army, and the plan was exposed, which further aroused Wu Peifu's dissatisfaction and resistance. [8] After that, there were also rumors in the political circles that it was easier to directly subordinate to the overseer Cao Kun and governor Cao Rui, and Wu Peifu directly called President Xu Shichang to defend the Cao Kun brothers, saying: "If there is no legitimate reason to remove and replace, how can unfairness and injustice serve the hearts of the people of the whole country?" Sincerity has thus provoked a great upsurge, which is even less beneficial to the country and to the central government",[9] his anger and readiness to resist are evident. Subsequently, the central government replied to deny it. [10] Because "the two factions of Anhui and Zhi were already in the shape of a rupture",[11] in november Wu Peifu signed a Treaty of National Salvation Alliance with representatives of the junta in an attempt to protect himself. On December 28, Feng Guozhang died, and "the direct family suddenly lost its center",[12] and the Anhui clan "should take advantage of this opportunity to quickly unify the Beiyang faction"[13] the idea arose, "the direct family is afraid of being oppressed, if they do not fight on their own, it is difficult to protect themselves, and now it seems to have this realization",[14] the direct family has stepped up its ties with the anti-Anhui forces.
In 1920, the Anhui side plotted to annex, the other side plotted to resist, and Henan became the focus of contention between the two sides because of its important political geographical location. The Longhai and Beijing-Hankou railways pass through Henan, especially the Jinghan Road, which is "connected to the political center of Beijing in the north, Henan in central China, and Wuhan in the south, with an extremely prominent geographical location, so it has become a place where soldiers and families must compete",[15] The Beijing-Hankou Railway "has a total length of 1214.5 kilometers, and 551.9 kilometers in Henan, accounting for 45.4% of the total length of the line". [16] At that time, the three provinces of Zhili, the Three Governors of the Yangtze River, and the Three Northeastern Provinces secretly formed an anti-Anhui alliance, which was divided into the north and south. Shaanxi, Henan, and Anhui are connected horizontally into a line, and Shaanxi and Anhui are controlled by the Anhui system. Henan is in the middle of several provinces, so if the Anhui clan controls Henan, it can cut off the anti-Anhui alliance, making it careless and easy to break one by one. On the other hand, if the direct family controls Henan, the anti-Anhui alliance can be connected and the Anhui shaanxi, Yangtze River and other places of the army can be blocked in Henan. Whoever occupies Henan will strangle the throat that runs through the north and south. The attribution of Henan can change the comparison of the Forces of Zhiwan to a certain extent. Therefore, for the Anhui clan, "if Zhao Qian does not go, then the chain of troops of the direct lineage cannot be destroyed." If zhao zhi is pulled out to Yi Wuzhi, and the Anhui system is in the center of the horizontal stem, the eight-province alliance cannot correspond at the beginning and end. Therefore, the key to the survival of the two families of Yu Province is the point of contention between the two clans, and no matter what, they will not let go easily." [17]
Therefore, in February 1920, while dispatching Wu Guangxin to march into southern Henan to force Zhao Qian,[18] the Anhui clan prepared to dismiss Zhao Qian by order of the cabinet under his control, with Wu Guangxin as the governor of Henan and Wang Yinchuan as the governor of Henan Province. This proposal was decided by the core figure of the Anhui clan" on the night of the thirteenth day at Duan Qirui's private residence "Meeting of Fuxue Hutong"[19]. After a period of planning, it was discussed and approved at the cabinet meeting on the 26th, and then sent to the presidential palace for stamping. [20] Because President Xu Shichang always tried to maintain the balance of power in Anhui and Anhui, prevent one side from dominating, in order to reap the effect of the central government's mediation and efforts to maintain the authority of the central government, he did not agree with Yi Dou, but only agreed that Wang Yinchuan would be the governor of the province. [21] Regardless of the persuasion of Prime Minister Jin Yunpeng, he refused to make Wu Guang's new zhao as the overseer. [22] Subsequently, under pressure from all sides, Duan Qirui temporarily abandoned the plan to make it easier for Yu to supervise.
Although the plot of the Anhui Yi Governor was not achieved, it triggered a series of major changes in the situation, of which the turn of the Yu Governor Zhao Qian played a key role.
Second, turn according to the situation: Zhao Qian's position
After Yuan Shikai's death, the center of gravity of the Beiyang faction shifted, and Zhao Qian, because of his shallow historical relationship with various factions, moved from time to time, trying to find power to rely on in the central government in order to protect himself. Yi Zhi's different attitude toward Zhao Qian's departure and retention caused a rapid change in Zhao Qian's position.
Zhao Qian's origin and rise path made him lack Olympic support in the Beiyang government. In his early years, Zhao Qian followed Ma Yukun of the Yi Army and was repeatedly promoted. [23] Ma Yukun died in 1908, and Jiang Guiti succeeded him as the president of the Wuwei Left Army. [24] In the same year, "Zhao assisted Jiang in managing military affairs, and with considerable achievements, he was promoted to wing commander of the wuwei left army." [25] In 1910, after Jiang Gui's inscription, Zhao Qian was named after the General Soldier Handed Over to the Military Aircraft Department,[26] and the following year the Qing government "named the chief soldier Zhao Qian as the chief soldier of Gaozhou Town, Guangdong Province". [27] In 1913, Jiang Gui commissioned Zhao Qian to be the wing commander of the Yi Army, which "dispatched all commanders and pipe belts stationed in Henan under moderation." [28] Zhao Qian rose up with the trend of Jiang Guiti, who was also Yuan Shikai's "elder of the world" and "Yuan Ji respected him", and "Zhao Qian was a meritorious general under Jiang' subordinates, and since the Republic of China, he has repeatedly dispatched battles, and Zhao Jun has shown obedience and obedience, compared to the orthodox Beiyang generals, so he has a good impression of Zhao Qian in Yuan Yuan's mind",[29] Yuan Shikai's appreciation is another important capital for Zhao Qian to gain a high position in the political arena of the early Ming Dynasty. In 1914, the Bailang Rebellion was suppressed, the government Xu Gong, the Inspector of Henan, Tian Wenlie, resigned as the superintendent of Henan's military affairs, and bao Zhao and Wang Ruxian[30] succeeded him, Duan Qirui favored Wang Ruxian, and Yuan Shikai "intended to reward according to merit and allow Zhao to be promoted",[31] so in August Yuan Shikai appointed Zhao Qian as a general of Hongwei, and in September he was renamed a General of Dewu to supervise the military affairs of Henan,[32] becoming the highest military commander of Henan, laying the foundation for Zhao Qian to control Henan. Due to Yuan Shikai's care and promotion, Zhao Qian "deeply felt the encounter and must repay him",[33] so Yuan Shikai and Zhao Qian had a deep master-subordinate relationship. Therefore, Yuan Shikai is still alive, the center of gravity of the northern forces is on Yuan Shikai's side, the political situation is relatively stable, and Zhao Qian takes Yuan Shikai as the center, and his position is stable and rising. However, after Yuan Shikai's death, Zhao Qian lost his dependence, and his origin made him at most a beiyang side branch, and the promotion trajectory had a shallow relationship with the various branches of the Beiyang faction, so it belonged to the local leaders who were relatively lacking in Olympic aid in the political circles.
After Yuan Shikai's death, Duan Qirui served as prime minister in charge of the cabinet, and was the center of gravity for the beiyang faction's new forces, and Zhao Qian worried that "it would be incompatible for Duan to become a country in the future",[34] and began to charm Anhui in order to maintain his position of power. In March 1917, duan Qirui resigned in a negative mood because the differences between Duan Qirui and Li Yuanhong on the German issue could not be bridged, and Zhao Qian immediately showed strong concern, saying that Duan Qirui was "one person advancing and retreating, and the relationship between the overall situation and safety was in danger", and sent a telegram to Duan Qirui to send the generals Fu Liangzuo and Xu Shuzheng to "try to retain". [35] In May, the conflict between Li Yuanhong and Duan Qirui intensified, and on the 18th, Zhao Qian listed the Overseers and demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly. [36] Duan Qirui's dismissal on the 23rd stimulated the Beiyang faction's hatred of the enemy, and the Overseers prepared for independence, but the various forces were still waiting to see who would attack first, unwilling to come out first, and Zhao Qian took the lead in independence at this time, becoming one of the vanguards,[37] and to a certain extent encouraging other Overseers to respond. [38] This move coincided with Duan Qirui's idea, duan Qirui was "extremely heartbroken, and the dissatisfaction situation in the past had melted a lot", and Zhao Qian's status was temporarily worry-free. [39] After Zhang Xun's restoration was suppressed, Duan Qirui became prime minister again, and Zhao Qian, relying on his positive performance during this period, wanted to further move closer to Duan Qirui. "Zhao Qian," the head of the office stationed in Beijing, took the door of Duan, made a humble and generous gesture, and befriended Xu Shuzheng, expressing his willingness to be Duan's tame subordinate." [40] After Feng Guozhang succeeded to the presidency, he made peace with Nan, while Duan Qirui was the main battle, and the two sides gradually moved from years of old friends and colleagues to antagonism, and Duan Qirui overpowered Feng Guozhang to become the general trend. Choosing a side in the Beiyang faction was far more complicated than choosing to attack Li Yuanhong before, and Zhao Qian looked to the wind and moved, or independently telegraphed Feng Guozhang to use troops in the south,[41] or followed the main war faction to exert pressure on the central government,[42] or actively campaigned duan Qirui to resume his post,[43] and his charm was highlighted here.
When the Anhui clan was in great power, Zhao Qian often followed the Anhui movements, but in fact he "still maintained his non-party doctrine", "vigorously contacted the two clans of Zhiwan and Anhui",[44] and "did not dare to make left and right" with the two clans. [45] In 1917, when Duan Qirui planned to recruit troops from the south to the provinces, Zhao Qian's chief of staff suggested that "I Should at least send troops into a mixed brigade to cater to Duan Yi and protect my position", and Zhao Qian "opposed it on the grounds that there were many bandits in Yu, and the army was not enough to distribute, and could not send troops", and his attitude was firm, "not a single soldier was sent", "because of this, Duan Yu was blamed, and I Yu was shaken from then on". [46] As the Anhui clan became more and more involved in the central government, their intention to suppress their direct and main warring forces became increasingly strong, and Duan Qirui planned to "first replace the dissident governors in the north and change them to their own generals." The governors of the north are unified, all under their own banners, and they will push down the direct lineage and then make a big deal of tarts to unify the southwest." [47] In August 1919, Duan Qirui summoned Zhao Qian to Beijing through Xu Shichang, intending to order Zhang Jingyao of the Anhui Dynasty to supervise Yu and Zhao Qian to adjust the River, and "Zhao used the word of opposition to Zhang Jingyao to be unresolved." Starry Night", which caused Duan Qirui to be unhappy at that time, "Duan has the tendency to go to Zhao". [48] According to the commentary, Zhao "did not practice the Anfu policy, so the Northern government regarded it as a weakness in the assertion of the Anfu faction". [49] Therefore, most of Zhao Qian's actions were verbal support, and he expressed his closeness to the Anhui clan in order to maintain his position of power and insist on safeguarding his own interests when his own interests conflicted with those of the Anhui clan. When the political tide intensified, the Anhui clan became more and more suspicious of him who occupied the important jin. Compared with the mutual solidarity of the three governors of the Yangtze River and the strong military strength of Cao Kun, Zhao Qian lacked both a reliable alliance and was "not strong enough and easy to change",[50] and the Anhui clan decided to replace it.
After the sound of Yi Dou's wind came out, Zhao Qian went around asking for help and preparing to resist, and his position changed to attaching himself to zhizhi and anti-Anhui. [51] Zhao Qian was originally "very shallow in party odor", and over the years "wanted to follow the example of Yan Xishan and follow the example of Shanxi with Henan",[52] and there was no party to help. Therefore, at first, Zhao Qian "had a negative attitude and did not want to fall in love", but in fact he was not willing, but later, at the instigation of his subordinates, he believed that he could take advantage of the contradictions between the Anhui and the central and direct families or be able to protect himself, so as to prepare for help and resistance. [53] Due to the urgency of the situation, Zhao Began to take the initiative to contact the direct and protector military government dignitaries who had no origin with him, and even once opposed it. In 1919, the government intended to appoint Cao Kun as the envoy of Zhilu Yu, but Zhao Qian did not want to have one more layer of leadership, so he instructed the Henan Provincial Council to oppose it with a resolute attitude. [54] When the general deputies of the Southern and Northern Assemblies were replaced by Wang Yitang of the Anhui dynasty, Wu Peifu resolutely opposed it, and Zhao Qian defended Wang Yitang and confronted Wu Peifu, saying that "it was because of the disagreement of Master Wu on the issue of people" and that "he first tied himself to the party to see it". [55] Today, Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and the Three Governors of the Yangtze River have all become the focus of Zhao Qian's request for help. Wang Tianzhong, the leader of the Yu Army of the Southern Jing Dynasty, was one of the targets of Zhao Qian's previous defenses and pursuits,[56] and at this time he also became the object of Zhao Qian's solicitation. [57] Zhao also contacted the military government Cen Chunxuan and expressed his wish to "follow the emperors strongly" against the Anhui clan. [58] Zhao Qian plucked up the courage to turn to illustrate that the confrontation between Zhiwan and Zhiwan was deep, and even if he lacked a relationship with his direct family, he could still use the Zhiwan contradiction to fight. With foreign aid, Zhao Qiang became more and more hardened, and he actively arranged his army and prepared to resist. At this time, Wu Guangxin's army had already marched into Henan, and Zhao Qian organized the army into three armies,[59] moving towards the border of Zhiyu, the provincial capital, and along the Jinghan Road. [60] He also imposed martial law on the provincial capital and refused the central government's order to transfer his troops back to the original defense on the grounds that "various groups petitioned to transfer troops to the town to take over the localities". [61] At the same time, he was fiercely and pointedly refusing to send troops from the central government to assist in the defense of Yu. [62] Zhao Qian's resistance strained the situation in the north, with the commentary that "if the Beijing government were to withdraw Zhao at this time, Kaifeng would become a battlefield." [63]
Third, Zhao Qian turned and changed the situation with Zhiwan
Yi Dou occurred during a sensitive period when the contradictions between Zhiwan and Anhui were becoming more and more intense and easily ignited, and the complicated situation inspired Zhao Qian to turn again. Zhao Qian's turn made him more deeply involved in the core of the political situation, stimulated the accelerated combination and resistance of anti-Anhui forces, and was an important reason for the outbreak of the Zhiwan War and even the defeat of Zhiwan.
First of all, Zhao Qian's anti-Anhui annexation contributed to the establishment of the anti-Anhui Eight Provinces Alliance within Beiyang. After the news of Yi Dou's wind came out, Henan asked for help on the grounds that "if such a specialized action is not obstructed, then the governors of each province can be replaced, and there is no need to consult the wishes of the provinces"[64], which cut through the psychology of the anti-Anhui forces at this time and received a positive response, so there is a saying that "the eight-province alliance and the eleven-regional alliance that have been rumored to be outside are all launched by Yu tide" [65]. By the end of March, the Southern Army had received confirmed news that Zhao Qian had "now resisted the section with the directly subordinate Overseers and the Three Governors of the Yangtze River." [66] Among them, Cao Kun was isolated in the north as a direct head, and had a strong sense of crisis, so while calling the central government to express his opposition to Yi Du and reconcile from the middle, he secretly contacted the relevant provinces to resist. In response to the Anhui clan's desire to take advantage of the Yi Dou trend to overthrow Jin Yunpeng and support Duan Qirui, Cao Kun called the government to "advocate that Duan should not come out again", saying that once a conflict broke out in Henan, he planned to "be unfair to Zhao Ming". [67] Jin Yunpeng also warned that "if Yi Bian Tuo Beiyang is bound to disintegrate". [68] In the decision of the Central Yi Governor, Cao Kun suggested to Zhao Qian that Wang Yinchuan be approved as governor of the province in exchange for concessions from the Anhui clan to retain his position as overseer. [69] At the local level, Cao Kun proposed that Wu Guangxin's army withdraw from Yu Province, and Zhao Qian withdraw from the original defense. [70] In early March, the direct clan met for several days to discuss that "the purpose was to maintain the current cabinet, unite the northern clan, withdraw the former army, and promote peace",[71] all of which were issued to restrain the Anhui clan. Cao Kun also united with the three provinces of Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Gansu, and Northeast China to jointly draw up the terms of the offensive and defensive alliance against the Anhui clan,[72] and the anti-Anhui alliance of the eight provinces was formally formed. The Times Review believes that the Eight Provinces Alliance, which was formed by Yi Du, is the most important development of the situation after Xu Shichang was elected president, because since then the old Beiyang faction has split into three, namely the Eight Provinces Alliance, the Anhui Clan, and the Neutral Faction, and predicts that "the President is now planning to mediate from the Central Mediation, and if it is ineffective, there will soon be a real wave." [73] As a result, Yi Dou intensified the long-simmering contradiction between Zhiwan and Anhui, leading to the establishment of the Eight Provinces Alliance, and the confrontation between Zhiwan and Anhui shifted from an undercurrent to an open confrontation. In the spring of 1920, Zhiwan was "inseparable" and the war was "on the string". [74]
Secondly, Yi Du directly stimulated Wu Peifu, who was stationed in Hunan, to resolve to withdraw from the north. This was a major event taken by the Eight Provinces Alliance to change the balance of power in Zhiwan and cause the Zhiwan War. From 1918 to 1920, Wu Peifu had several plans to withdraw his defenses, but they were not implemented because the contradictions with the Anhui clan were still shallow and not urgent,[75] because "once he returned to the north of the division, it would be like a rebellion",[76] Wu Peifu did not dare to launch it easily. However, this time Yi Du was the actual action of the Anhui clan determined to curb the direct clan, and the two clans of Henan's affiliation relationship rose and fell, so Wu Peifu made up his mind to withdraw. Wu Peifu was so emotional when he learned of Yi Dou's news that on February 23 he sent a telegram saying that "the Xinjiang officials are not the private property of one family, and the political power is not the business of a family", asking the central authorities to "not be used by An Fu, and to establish Wu Guangxin's army to return to the original area to prevent the disaster of war, and declared that zhao governors will not be easy." [77] On the 29th, Wu Peifu saw that the central authorities had nothing to say and that the Central Plains were full of war clouds, and he called again to ask, "Why should those who do not know that they are policy-oriented and resolute?" [78] The two electric words were sharp and pointed directly at the Anhui family, indicating that Yi Du had aroused Wu Peifu's strong sense of crisis. At the same time, Wu Peifu to cen Chunxuan relayed to Zhao Qian that "resist and do not surrender, our army immediately withdraws, with strength to aid, and will never let him follow the same mistakes as the governors of Ji and Lu." [79] Subsequently, Wu Peifu sent a representative to Yu for further consultations, saying that "the government is deeply saddened by the fact that the government has disregarded the overall situation for its own convenience and disregarded the overall situation, and if there is any need for help, please reach it immediately." After observing the current situation and believing that the central authorities still had the heart of Yi Dou, Wu Peifu decided to "withdraw the whole army with arms." [80] Wu Peifu's withdrawal would not only undermine the Anhui military unification plan, but also change the military strength of Zhiwan in the north, which was a direct confrontation with the Anhui. At that time, all parties had a clear understanding of this, and Duan Qirui was angry that Wu Peifu "did not listen to moderation and tried to undermine the unified policy of the central authorities", and determined to severely punish him for his behavior as "supporting the army and disobeying orders and openly slandering the central authorities". [81] The Confederate Army considered this to be "the motive for the rupture between the two clans of Zhiwan and Anhui",[82] and actively promoted it with the intention of profiting from it. Under the action of many parties, Wu Peifu's withdrawal had a major impact on the current situation, and people at the time called it "the starting point of the Zhiwan War". [83] The reason why Wu Peifu was determined to withdraw was directly promoted by yidu of the Anhui dynasty.
Third, Henan was the only way for Wu Peifu's army to withdraw, and Zhiwan was very concerned about Henan, and Zhao Qian's one-to-one refusal to meet and reject Zhiwan actually broke the balance of power in Zhiwan and was a key step for the two sides to meet each other. Although the Yi Dou trend basically ended in March under the opposition of many parties, the Zhiwan game further urged Zhao Qian to accelerate the attachment. Originally, Zhao Qian always centered on maintaining his rule in Henan, so even if he was allied with his direct family, because his position was relatively peaceful at that time, he did not want his direct family to stay in Henan to threaten his position, and was worried that he would further offend the Anhui family. [84] In May, the Anhui clan planned to march into Henan under the pretext of aiding Shaanxi to prevent Wu Peifu from returning to the north, but instead prompted Zhao Qian to accept Wu's army and station in Henan. On the 17th, Duan Qirui held a meeting on Tuanhe and mobilized troops to prepare for a military offensive against Wu Peifu, intending to garrison Himself in Zhengzhou to meet Wu Peifu.[85] The external pretext was that the Shaanxi-Gansu bandits were chaotic and Wu's division was withdrawing from The Xiangbian region was restless. [86] In fact, it was still a mutual conspiracy and restraint action caused by the deepening of mutual suspicions caused by the yi dou, and Xu Baoyun, who was involved in the secrets of the presidential office at the time, concluded that "since Wu Zitang wanted to win the governor, the provinces of Zhifeng su had been combined, and they were quite dissatisfied with Hefei... It was also heard that Hefei had made a move to fix Shaanxi, and was worried about other reasons, so it was necessary to withdraw the Wu army, and the Hefei side was also worried that the Wu army's move to the north was not conducive to itself, so it was ordered that the move of zitang to Go to Xiang was considered to be a clamp." [87] Henan was the key to the contention between the two sides, and Yan Xishan's sources said that the Anhui clan sent shaanxi and Gansu and Wu Peifu to return to the north, and the actual "target was in Henan". [88] Anhui aid to Shaanxi threatened both Zhao Qian's position and the safety of the Wu army. After Zhao Qian learned the news, he relayed to Cao Kun that after Wu Peifu received Cao Kun's telegram, "Immediately, the power of the central authorities, please withdraw and rest." Central extension is not permitted. Wu Peifu thought that things were urgent, and if there was a fate, there was also a retreat, and there was no life to withdraw, and the matter was imperative",[89] So Zhao Qian's news accelerated Wu Peifu's withdrawal. Subsequently, after contact between the two sides, Zhao Qian agreed to the wushi garrison in Henan,[90] with the occupation of the Beijing-Hankou Line as the center, and planned to garrison "Zhumadian, Qishan, Xuchang, Chencheng, Xinzheng, Zhengzhou, Yellow River Bridge, Cizhou, shunde area". [91] On June 9, Wu Peifu was electrified and stationed in Henan on the grounds of "recuperation with funds". [92] As the Wu army entered Yu, "the key point between the north and the south had first been stifled, and the direct Yu and Hubei were all in one piece",[93] Zhao Qian welcomed Wu Peifu into Yu and broke the Plan of the Anhui Clan to seize Yu and prevent Wu Peifu, so that the direct clan was united and the surrounding Anhui troops were included in surveillance, containment, and division. However, because the direct family was able to occupy the two roads of Beijing-Han and Jinpu, "the Duan (Qirui) faction was extremely panicked." [94] Cao Rulin interpreted that Wu Peifu's division of troops from Henan into had the potential to declare war against Duan Qirui,[95] and further promoted the arrangement of preparations for war in Anhui, so that the direct family had the strength to compete with Anhui in the north. This gave Wu Peifu the courage to clearly challenge the Anhui system on the 13th, and [96] pushed Zhiwan to the brink of a hot war. Zhao Not only allowed wu to enter the country, but also actively demonstrated both in the preparation for war and the outbreak of war. For example, in May, Zhao Qian contacted Cao Kun and Xu Lanzhou of the Feng army to prepare to receive Guo Jian of the Shaanxi Nationalist Army to attack Chen Shufan, the governor of Shaanxi. [97] In June, Zhao Qian and Cao Kun secretly sent a regiment of the Shangde Quan Brigade to Dezhou to monitor the factory. [100] In July, after the war began, he also mobilized troops to prevent the advance of the Anhui army. [100] These are all obvious anti-Anhui activities. During the war, Zhao Qian's turn saved the Zhi army from worries, and it actively supplied the direct army with military supplies, and cooperated with the zhi army, or prevented or contained or appeased the Anhui army, which played a major role in the victory of the direct army. [100]
conclusion
Unity and division is one of the core perspectives of the rise and fall of the Beiyang sect, and the ups and downs of Zhao Qian are actually the refraction of the rise and fall of the Beiyang faction, and the Yidu incident is deeply rooted in the context of the decline of the Beiyang faction, deepening the chaos and disorder of the situation.
Zhao Qian rode the wall to watch and move with the trend, which was based on his factional attributes, but also the choice he had to make under the increasing division of the Beiyang faction, which was a profound reflection of the current situation affecting his personal choices. Zhao Qian was born in the Yi Army, and his relationship with the Beiyang faction was shallow, and the influence of his identity on his political fate during the Chengping period was not obvious. However, after Yuan Shikai's death, Zhao Qian lost his protection, and the Beiyang faction seemed to have no master, and the difference between the various forces within it became more and more obvious. As a weak local military and political leader, Zhao Qian was unable to lead the situation, and could only change the object of dependence to protect himself with the evolution of the situation and the shift of the center of gravity of the political power. With the further weakening of the central authority, the strong factionalism in the regime, and the situation of intensifying the contradictions between Anhui and Anhui, Zhao Qian chose to attach himself to the anti-Anhui out of his self-preservation nature.
Zhao Qian's turn deepened the turmoil of the times and even promoted the outbreak of war. The Anhui clan wanted to occupy Henan to oppress the direct clan, and then march into the southwest to unify the whole country, and the Yi Dou decision was ostensibly from the central government, but it was actually controlled by the Anhui clan. This stimulated the sensitive nerves of the anti-Anhui forces and accelerated the combination and resistance of the anti-Anhui forces. Zhao Qian took the initiative to throw himself into the direct family, so that the Wu army was smoothly returned to the north and divided by Henan, so that the direct family had the strength to fight with Anhui, breaking the balance of power in the north, and its active activities in the war helped the direct family a lot. Therefore, Zhao Qian's turn led to the change of power in Zhiwan, which was one of the important reasons for the outbreak of war and the defeat of Zhiwan.
Under normal circumstances, Yi Du was the legitimate authority of the central government to dispatch local governors, but in a regime with strong factionalism and deep involvement of the Anhui clan, he was given the meaning of suppressing dissidents, and was thus opposed by the opposition alliance until the soldiers met each other. After the war, Zhifeng was deeply involved in the central government, the central authority was further weakened, and the political chaos was even worse than before. Zhao Qian was still deeply involved in the zhifeng dispute and soon went into exile. And no matter who wins in the factional competition, in the end it is only the victory of the faction, the deeper they are involved in the central government, the more it means the decline and disorder of the country and politics, so this Yidu trend is also one of the nodes of the Beiyang faction's transformation from prosperity to decline.
About author:Liu Huijun is a professor and doctoral supervisor of the Department of Chinese History in the College of Literature of Jilin University, with the research direction of modern and contemporary Chinese political history; Tian Xiaohong, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Chinese History, College of Literature, Jilin University.
[1] Zhang Bofeng: "Anhui Warlords and Japan", Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1988 edition, pp. 287-289; Luo Ying and Xu Jianghua: "Trial Analysis of Henan Yidu in 1920", Journal of Xinjiang Institute of Education, No. 1, 1998; Guo Jianlin: "The Great Biography of Wu Peifu", Unity Publishing House, 2012 edition, pp. 119-121; Yue Qianhou, Li Qinggang, Zhang Wei: "Cao Kun Family", Jincheng Publishing House, 2000 edition, pp. 116-118; Liu Yang: 1920 Henan "YiDu" Study", Master's Thesis, Henan University, 2016.
[2] The long-standing contradiction of Zhiwan is a distant cause of Yi Dou's occurrence, and the relevant treatises will basically be discussed, and I will not repeat it here. The analysis of Yi Dou from the perspective of the shift of the center of gravity of the central government also needs to be paid attention to.
[3] Qian Nengxun "can be called a figure who is purely subordinate to the East China Sea", and the commentary said that he was "actually no less than the secretary general of the Gongfu although he was in the seat" ("Beijing Special Correspondence I", "Declaration", September 5, 1918, 3rd edition; "Beijing Communication", "Declaration", May 26, 1919, 7th edition). Jin Yunpeng was Duan Qirui's protégé, "Hengyu renren: 'Yu's policy is to take Xu Duan as the center'" (Beijing Correspondence, Declaration, May 17, 1920, 6th edition), indicating that while he was administratively adhering to Xu Shichang's orders, he also obeyed Duan Qirui's opinions, so Jin Yunpeng's coming to power was a clear evidence of Xu Shichang's weakened control over the cabinet.
[4] The funds for the untied department were allocated by Qian Nengxun, and the fall of Qian Nengxun led to the severance of the funds of the department. Subsequently, Zhang Arc made himself a "branch store of Anfu" on the condition of support funds. See "Changes in the Political Group in the New Congress", "Declaration", October 24, 1919, 6th edition; "Changes in the Political Group in the New Congress", "Declaration", October 26, 1919, 6th edition.
[5] "Letter from Luo Jiaheng et al. to Wu Jinglian Chu Fucheng" (July 21, 1919), "Wu Jinglian Letter Telegram Manuscript", Edited by the Editorial Group of Modern History Materials of the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "Modern History Materials", No. 42, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1980 Edition, p. 144.
[6] Xiong Xiling, "On xiangshi and others to Chenzhou Tan Group Andian" (January 29, 1920), Zhou Qiuguang, ed., Xiong Xiling Collection, vol. 7, Hunan People's Publishing House, 2008 edition, p. 276.
[7] "Lu Hongkui was ordered by Duan Qirui to go to Chenzhou to contact Cheng Qian, the leader of the Xiang Army, was given a confession", ed. Second Historical Archives of China: Archives of the Beiyang Government, vol. 48, China Archives Publishing House, 2010 edition, p. 706.
[8] Peng Changlu, ed., Manuscript of The Chronology of General Wu Fuwei (Pei Fu), National Library Document Micro reproduction Center, 2001 edition, pp. 134-136. At that time, the direct command of the army was generally in the division, and Duan Qirui planned to replace Wu Peifu's division commander with someone else, which was tantamount to depriving Wu Peifu of his direct command, so it caused him to react strongly.
[9] "Whether it is true that The Commander of the Third Division, Wu Peifu et al., for the Central Committee to Dismiss Cao Rui, Governor of cao Kun Province, directly subordinate to the Governor of the Imperial Army, is it true to ask for a telegram to President Xu Shichang and others" (September 11, 1919), ed., Archives of the Second History of China: Archives of the Beiyang Government, vol. 58, pp. 210-211.
[10] "The State Council's Attempt to Replace the Military and Political Governors Directly Under the Direct Command of the People's Republic of China should immediately find out the telegram to Wu Peifu, commander of the Third Division, in September 13, 1919," Second Historical Archives of China, ed., Archives of the Beiyang Government, vol. 58, pp. 212-213.
[11] "Wu Jinglian and Chu Fucheng Wu Peifu's Draft Treaty to Tang Shaoyi (Draft)" (before November 15, 1919), Tianjin Municipal History Museum, ed., Beiyang Warlord Historical Materials, Wu Jinglian Volume, vol. 3, Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House, 1996 edition, p. 409.
[12] "Tang Jiyao's Reply telegram" (January 31, 1920), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: "The Series of Archives of the History of the Republic of China: The Zhiwan War", Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1980 edition, p. 5.
[13] "Yao Yiwei Secret Telegram" (January 25, 1920), ed., Second Historical Archives of China, ed., The Historical Archives of the Republic of China, Zhiwan War, p. 6.
[14] "Cen Chunxuan's Struggle for Power in Zhiwan Advocates the Rapid Realization of the Strategy of Joint direct control of Anhui in the Southwest" (January 14, 1920), ed., Second Historical Archives of China: "The Series of Archives of the History of the Republic of China: The Zhiwan War", p. 4.
[15] Liu Li, "Soldiers and Railway Crises in the Beiyang Period: A Case Study of the Beijing-Hankou Railway", Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University (Social Science Edition), No. 5, 2019, p. 73.
[16] Compiled by the Local History Compilation Committee of Henan Province: Chronicle of Railway Transportation in Henan Province, Henan People's Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 14.
[17] "The Great Battle Between the Two Dynasties of Zhiwan and Anhui", Republic of China Daily, March 2, 1920, 2nd, 6th edition.
[18] "Wu Guangxin's Army Arrives in Bian", Tianjin Ta Kung Pao, February 25, 1920, p. 7, p. 2.
[19] "The Trend of The Bureau and Zhao Qian", Republic of China Daily, February 27, 1920, 2nd, 6th edition.
[20] Xu Shichang's 26 diary, "Jin Yiqing came to talk for a long time", which coincided with Jin Yunpeng's "two hours of secret discussion after the state council meeting was reported", so the state council meeting and the invitation to india were on the 26th. See Xu Shichang: The Diary of Xu Shichang, vol. 23, Beijing People's Publishing House, 2013, p. 11072; The Problem of the Governor of Henan, Declaration, February 29, 1920, 7th edition.
[21] Grand Presidential Decree (26 February 1920), Official Gazette No. 1450, 27 February 1920, p. 1.
[22] Chen Wenyun, a general of the Anhui dynasty, recalled that Jin Yunpeng opposed Wu Guangxin's overseers (Chen Wenyun: "The Anhui GeneralS I Know", edited by the Literature and History Materials Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: Selected Manuscripts of Literature and History Materials, Late Qing Dynasty, Beiyang, China Literature and History Publishing House, 2002 edition, p. 790), but Xu Baoyun, who was a confidential member of the presidential palace at the time, recorded in his diary that "first Wu Guangxin wanted to win the Henan overseers, Jin Yunpeng rushed to xuzhi", and then Jin Yunpeng entered the presidential palace. Xu Keru, Diary of Xu Baoru (February 26, 1920), Zhonghua Bookstore, 2010 edition, pp. 711-712]. Chen Wenyun's recollection is that after Jin Yunpeng's reputation in the Anhui clan had deteriorated, there was a possibility that the facts would be distorted. And Jin Yunpeng rose up because of Duan Qirui's power, Duan Qirui supported Yi Dou, it is difficult to imagine that Jin Yunpeng would simply refuse, so Xu Baoyun's statement of the imminent matter is more reliable.
[23] See Zhao Julong, "Remembering the First Half of The Life of His Father Zhao Qian", Editorial Office of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", 1989 edition of the Cultural and Historical Materials Committee of the Henan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, pp. 21-37.
[24] Xu Ping, editor-in-chief: A Survey of the Sino-Japanese Armies in the Sino-Japanese War, PLA Publishing House, 2015, p. 60.
[25] Xing Hansan: "Zhao Qian", ed., Research Office of the History of the Republic of China, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., Manuscripts of the History of the Republic of China, Biographies of People, No. 19, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1984 edition, p. 68.
[26] Xuan Tong Zheng Ji, vol. 33, Xuan Tong 2 March Article, Qing Shi Lu, vol. 60, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1987 edition, pp. 600-601.
[27] Xuan Tong Zheng Ji, vol. 66, Article 3 October of Xuan Tong, Qing Shi Lu, vol. 60, p. 1232.
[28] "Jiang Gui proposed to appoint Zhao Qian as the wing commander of the Yi Army's marching battalion and cancel the consultation of the former enemy camp affairs office" (January 10, 1913), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (I) (I), Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 708.
[29] Zhang Xiao, "The Zhao Qian I Know", "Forty Years of Wind and Rain", China Literature and History Publishing House, 1986 edition, p. 127.
[30] Wang Ruxian, then commander of the Eighth Division of the CSKA, participated in the suppression of Bai Lang. See Bao Xingshi: Biography of Wang Ruxian, Miyun County Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference: Selected Literature and History Materials, Vol. 3, 1990 edition, p. 80.
[31] Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", p. 94.
[32] "Order on the Appointment of Zhao Qian as General of the General's Office" (August 9, 1914), "Order for Reassigning Zhao Qian's Position" (September 20, 1914), edited by Luo Baoshan and Liu Lusheng: The Complete Works of Yuan Shikai, vol. 28, Henan University Press, 2012, pp. 63, 403.
[33] Zhao Qilong: "Remembering the First Half of His Father Zhao Qian's Life", Editorial Office of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by a Strange Army", p. 39.
[34] Shi Dingcen: "Me and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", p. 105.
[35] "Zhao Qian to Fu Liangzuo et al. Telegram" (March 5, 1917), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Politics (II), p. 1201.
[36] "Beijing Governor's Army Qiaodian" (May 18, 1917), Edited by He Zhilin: Records of Yan Xishan Archives, Vol. 2, "National History Museum", 2003 edition, p. 32.
[37] On May 26, 1917, The Governor of Anhui Province, Ni Sichong, took the lead in announcing his departure from the central government, Zhang Zuolin responded on the 28th, and Zhao Qian followed up on the 29th, and was the first batch of difficult overseers. Guo Tingyi, ed., The Diary of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 1, Institute of Modern History, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1979, p. 302; Shengjing Zhang Overseer's Survey Telegram (May 28, 1917), Kaifeng Zhao Overseer and Other Yandian (May 29, 1917), He Zhilin' notes: Records of Yan Xishan Archives, vol. 2, pp. 39-40, 44-45.
[38] After Zhao Qian's independence, he informed Yan Xishan and "did as he pleased". Yan Xishan therefore communicated with Cao Kun again, and Cao Kun saw that "the provinces of Feng, Yu, and Anhui have all severed ties with the central government" and prepared to "proceed in unison", and then Yan Xishan called back to say that he would follow Cao Kun independently, which shows Zhao Kun's leading role. See "Kaifeng Zhao Governor Yandian" (May 29, 1917), "To Baoding Cao Overseer's Trap" (May 30, 1917), "Baoding Cao Governor's Trap" (May 30, 1917), "Restoring Baoding Cao Governor's Army Trap" (May 30, 1917), He Zhilin, ed., "Yan Xishan Archives and Records of Electricity", vol. 2, pp. 42, 50, 51.
[39] Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "Zhao Zhouren Suddenly Rises from a Different Army", p. 106.
[40] Zhang Xiao, "The Zhao Qian I Know," Forty Years of Wind and Rain, p. 132.
[41] "Governor Xiaodian of Henan Zhao Governor Tian Tian" (October 18, 1917), "Kaifeng Zhao Governor Zhengmi Steaming Electricity" (January 10, 1918), Gao Sulan, ed., Yan Xishan Archives, Records of The Dian, vol. 3, "National History Museum", 2003 edition, pp. 59-60, 316.
[42] "Attached to Cao Overseer, etc. to Nanchang Chen Overseer Wuchang Wang Overseer Fu Mi Yang Dian" (December 7, 1917), "Henan Zhao Overseer Zheng Mi Han Dian" (December 14, 1917), Gao Sulan, ed., ed., Records of Yan Xishan Archives, Vol. 3, pp. 203-204, 231-232.
[43] "Kaifeng Zhao Overseer Zhengmi Milling Electricity" (March 16, 1918), Gao Sulan, ed., Yan Xishan Archives, Records of Electricity, vol. 3, p. 470.
[44] "The State of Misfortune," Declaration, June 11, 1920, 7th edition.
[45] Zhang Runsan, "Wang Yinchuan's Political Career", Chinese Political Consultative Conference Xiuwu County Committee Cultural and Historical Materials Research Committee: Xiuwu Wenshi Materials, Vol. 5, 1989 Edition, p. 40.
[46] Shi Dingcen: "Me and Zhao Qian", Editorial Office of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", pp. 113-114.
[47] Shi Dingcen, "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", p. 114.
[48] "Li Tian Cai To Tang Jiyao Telegram" (March 26, 1920), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (III), p. 733.
[49] "Duan Sent Wu Guang Recruits to Force Zhao Qian", Republic of China Daily, February 23, 1920, 2nd, 6th edition.
[50] "The Great Battle Between the Two Dynasties of Zhiwan and Anhui", Republic of China Daily, March 2, 1920, 2nd, 6th edition.
[51] Many researchers believe that Zhao Qian is in an "intermediate position" or a "neutral attitude" in the Zhiwan dynasty (see Gongsun Mao, ed., Hebei Literature and History Materials, Vol. 22, "The Beginning and End of the Direct Warlords", 1987 edition of the Literature and History Data Research Committee of the Hebei Provincial Committee of the Chinese Political Consultative Conference, p. 30; Huang Zheng, Chen Changhe, and Ma Lie: Duan Qirui and the Anhui Warlords, Henan People's Publishing House, 1990, p. 182; Mo Jianlai: Draft History of the Rule of the Anhui Warlords, Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House, 2004 edition, p. 247), but looking at his activities, he focused on maintaining the Lu position, weighing the current situation and moving with the trend. So, rather than being a neutral, he is a wait-and-see.
[52] Beijing Special Correspondence, The Times, February 26, 1920, 2nd, 3rd edition.
[53] Shi Dingcen: "Me and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", pp. 114-115.
[54] "The Capital of The Province Opposes the Establishment of patrol envoys", "Declaration", August 16, 1919, 7th edition; "Yu Provincial Capital Opposes the Establishment of Patrol Envoys", "Declaration", August 20, 1919, 7th edition.
[55] "Zhao Qian is also Wang Yi Tang Daodi", Declaration, September 20, 1919, 6th edition.
[56] "Yu Governor Zhao Qian Relayed Wang Tianzhong's Summons in Sichuan and Sent to Western Henan and Other Places to Carry Out Activities in Xitu Rebellion and Other Secret Telegrams to the State Council" (November 3, 1919), ed., Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (III), pp. 724-725.
[57] "Wang Tianzhong's Secret Telegram to Tang Jiyao" (March 26, 1920), ed., Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (III), pp. 731-732.
[58] "Cen Chunxuan's Concern about the Anhui Clan's Rush to Try the Yu Clan's Secret Alliance with the Southwest to Boycott the Secret Telegram to Tang Jiyao" (February 25, 1920), ed., Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (III), pp. 729-730.
[59] Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", p. 116.
[60] "The Yu Army Is Temporarily Difficult to Defend", Morning Post, March 8, 1920, 3rd edition; "The Problem of Yu Dou Is Still Difficult to Solve", Times, March 7, 1920, 1st, 2nd Edition; "Jinghua Short", "Declaration", March 3, 1920, 7th edition.
[61] "Special Telegram", "Declaration", March 4, 1920, 4th edition; "Special Telegram", "Declaration", March 9, 1920, 4th edition; "The Problem of Yu Governor Is Still Difficult to Solve", The Times, March 7, 1920, 1st, 2nd edition.
[62] "Henan Incident Is Still Difficult to Be Optimistic," Morning Post, March 10, 1920, 2nd edition.
[63] "The Problem of the Governor and the Political Situation," Declaration, March 2, 1920, 6th ed.
[64] "The Battle Of Zhao Qian and Wu Guangxin", Declaration, February 23, 1920, 10th edition.
[65] Yuchao Yuxun, Tianjin Ta Kung Pao, March 28, 1920, p. 3, p. 1.
[66] "Wang Tianzhong's Secret Telegram to Tang Jiyao" (March 26, 1920), ed., Second Historical Archives of China: Compilation of Archives of the History of the Republic of China, Vol. 3, Military (III), p. 732.
[67] Beijing Communications, Declaration, March 2, 1920, 7th edition.
[68] "Special Telegram", Declaration, March 1, 1920, 6th edition.
[69] "The Trend of The Bureau and Zhao Qian", Republic of China Daily, February 27, 1920, 2nd, 6th edition.
[70] "Telegrams from Various News Agencies", Declaration, March 7, 1920, 6th edition.
[71] "Special Telegram I", Declaration, March 3, 1920, 4th edition.
[72] Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "The Sudden Rise of Zhao Zhouren by Different Armies", pp. 115-116.
[73] The report reported that zhang Guangjian, governor and governor of Gansu, Yang Zengxin, governor and governor of Xinjiang, and Yan Xishan, governor and governor of Shanxi, were neutral in their positions between Zhiwan and Anhui. See Pacific Reuters, Declarations, March 9, 1920, 4th edition.
[74] Jia Runquan: "The Tuanhe Conference and the Zhiwan War", ed. Of the Literature and History Materials Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, ed., Selected Manuscripts of Literature and History Materials, Late Qing Dynasty, Beiyang, p. 143; Han Shiru: "Overview of the Participating Army and the Zhiwan War", edited by the Literature, History and Study Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: "Selected Literature and History Materials" Bound Edition, Vol. 14, China Literature and History Publishing House, 2010 Edition, p. 230.
[75] See Liu Lanchang, "On the Evolution of the Relationship between Hengyang's Withdrawal and Zhiwan", Fujian Forum (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), No. 7, 2007.
[76] Tong Xiliang: "Hengyang Withdrawal", Zhao Hengti et al., eds., The Collection of Mr. Wu Peifu, edited by Shen Yunlong, Series of Historical Materials of Modern China, No. 68, Wenhai Publishing House, 1971, p. 375.
[77] "Wu Peifu's Indignation at the Yi BianDu Issue," Declaration, March 3, 1920, 7th edition.
[78] "Wu Peifu's Opposition to the Anhui Dynasty's Easier Yu Governor's Appeal to Force" (February 29, 1920), Tang Xitong et al., eds., Wu Peifu Wencun, Jilin Wenshi Publishing House, 2004, p. 251.
[79] "Cen Chunxuan Secret Telegram" (February 27, 1920), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: The Historical Archives of the Republic of China Series: The Zhiwan War, p. 71.
[80] "Yu Tide Still Has No Hope of Calming Down", Declaration, March 11, 1920, 7th edition.
[81] Jia Runquan, "The Tuanhe Conference and the Zhiwan War", ed., Selected Manuscripts of Literature and History Materials, Late Qing Dynasty, Beiyang, pp. 144, 145.
[82] "Secret Telegram of Li Tian Cai" (March 4, 1920), ed. Second Historical Archives of China: "Historical Archives of the Republic of China Series: The Zhiwan War", p. 12.
[83] Sejiang Turbid Matter, ed., Chronicle of the Beginning and End of the Zhiwan War, Edited by the Editorial Group of Modern History Materials, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Sciences: Modern History Materials, No. 27, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1962 Edition, p. 71.
[84] On March 17, 1920, the Beijing government received a secret telegram from Zhao Qian, saying, "When the troops of The Commander of the Wu Division pass through YuJing, they should send personnel to take proper care of them, but please do not get off the bus in Yu, for fear of summoning [Zhao] to misunderstand Yun" ("Wu Peifu Transports Troops North", Morning Post, March 18, 1920, 3rd Edition), indicating that Zhao Qian still wanted to stay out of the matter.
[85] Guo Tingyi, ed., Journal of the History of the Republic of China, vol. 1, p. 500.
[86] Xu Baoyu, edited by Xu Keru: The Diary of Xu Baosu (May 19, 1920), p. 725.
[87] Xu Baoyu, edited by Xu Keru: The Diary of Xu Baosu (May 21, 1920), p. 727.
[88] "Mr. Tian Ziqun of Beijing Hanmi Youdian" (May 25, 1920), Lin Qingfen, ed., Yan Xishan Archives, Records of Electricity, vol. 5, "National History Museum", 2003 edition, pp. 156-157.
[89] Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", Editorial Board of Henan Literature and History Materials: Henan Literature and History Materials, Vol. 31, "Zhao Zhouren Suddenly Rises in a Different Army", p. 118.
[90] "Pacific Reuters", "Declaration", May 29, 1920, 3rd edition; "Wu Jun's Decisive Garrison on the North Bank of the Yellow River", Declaration, June 8, 1920, 6th edition.
[91] "The Situation of Wu Shi's Arrival in Yu", Tianjin Ta Kung Pao, June 17, 1920, p. 1, p. 3; Peng Changlu, ed., Manuscript: Annals of General Wu Fuwei (Pei Fu), p. 185.
[92] "Wu Peifu led his troops to Zhengzhou and stationed at the turn of Zhiyu to rest and telegraph" (June 9, 1920), Tang Xitong et al., eds., Wu Peifu Wencun, p. 252.
[93] Sejiang Turbid Matter, ed., "The Beginning and End of the Zhiwan War", Edited by the Editorial Group of Modern History Materials, Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Sciences: Modern History Materials, No. 27, p. 79.
[94] "Beijing Qian Mengcai Zhen Secret Text" (June 12, 1920), Lin Qingfen, ed., Yan Xishan Archives, Records of Electricity, vol. 5, p. 167.
[95] Cao Rulin, Memories of a Lifetime, Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2009, p. 231.
[96] "Wu Peifu's Telegram on the Peace Talks," Declaration, June 22, 1920, 6th ed.
[97] "Beijing Tian Zi Chun Han Secret Telegram" (May 16, 1920), "National History Museum" collection of Yan Xishan Archives, file number: 116-010101-0013-183.
[98] "Beijing Li Fenpu Yimiyang Dian" (June 7, 1920), Lin Qingfen, ed., Yan Xishan Archives, Records of Electricity, vol. 5, pp. 162-163.
[99] "Jincheng Guo Company Commander To Taiyuan Yan Overseer's Cold Telegram" (July 14, 1920), "National History Museum" Collection of Yan Xishan Archives, File No. 116-010108-0016-086.
[100] Zhang Xiao: "The Zhao Qian I Know", "Forty Years of Wind and Rain", p. 132; "Military Operations in Zhengzhou", "Declaration", July 18, 1920, 7th edition; Shi Dingcen: "I and Zhao Qian", "Henan Literature and History Materials", Editorial Department: "Henan Literature and History Materials", Vol. 31, "Alien Forces Suddenly Rise Zhao Zhouren", p. 119.
Originally published in The Collected Works of History, No. 5, 2021.