As one of the leading real estate enterprises, Kaisa has entered the ranks of "thunderstorms". Today, the news that Kaisa's 300 million yuan wealth management product failed to be paid on schedule at the end of October swept the real estate circle, exposing Kaisa's liquidity problems.
For mainland real estate enterprises that generally have high debt under the high turnover model formed in a specific development environment, relying on financing to achieve new repayment to maintain corporate liquidity has become a necessity for the normal operation of enterprises, so financing issues and sales issues are equally important, and both are indispensable. In the state of high debt, it is difficult to maintain the survival of the company only by relying on sales revenue, and without financing security, the company's liquidity will dry up, not to mention that sales revenue will be included in the capital supervision to a large extent and become a restricted fund, which cannot be used to solve the company's liquidity problem. Therefore, this forces the liquidity problem of housing enterprises to a large extent also need to rely on new financing methods to maintain. If the company falls into a state of liquidity depletion, the company will fall into a state of frequent death, and the limited sales revenue will not be able to save the company's liquidity needs, and there is no guarantee that the company will not die, let alone support the development of the company.
In fantasia and contemporary real estate thunderstorms, the cash balance displayed on the company's books is far greater than the unpaid debt due. One of the important reasons why the thunderstorm problem still occurs in this situation is that the large cash balance displayed on the company's books may belong to restricted funds, either funds that have been prioritized as financing guarantees, or funds belonging to the condominium account funds agreed in the cooperation agreement, or funds included in the supervision of local government pre-sale revenue, which are funds that can only be seen and cannot be used to save the company's liquidity. The explanation used by Li Yingcheng, the actual controller of Kaisa after the thunderstorm, to comfort the market, is also to say that the company has liquidity problems, which is naturally either that the money on the account cannot be used, or the financing and sales are not smooth, resulting in cash flow pressure. Therefore, the liquidity crisis of housing enterprises still returns to a financing and a sales problem.
At present, the biggest pressure on the liquidity of housing enterprises comes from the strong regulation from the financing end to the sales end that has been increasing since last year. This strong regulation and control that lasted for a long time and the continuous "checking and filling in the gaps" in the regulatory measures of local governments have greatly compressed the two most important sources of maintaining liquidity for housing enterprises, and since the beginning of this year, especially in the second half of the year, the rapid weakening of the property market and the disappearance of the traditional sales season "Golden Nine Silver Ten" have made the housing enterprises that have already suffered from heavy liquidity pressure even worse, and the frequent thunderstorms of many top 100 housing enterprises have become one of the most important events in the real estate industry this year. The emergence of Kaisa Thunderstorm is just another top 100 housing enterprises and industry head enterprises added to the list of thunderstorm housing enterprises.
The high leverage and high debt under the high turnover model have indeed accumulated high housing-related risks and must be eliminated and reduced, so greater industry regulation is necessary. On the one hand, this is to ensure that real estate will not evolve into "black swans" and "gray rhinos" in the operation of the national economy, on the other hand, it is also for the sustainable and healthy development and transformation of the real estate industry and housing enterprises, not to mention that the current industry fundamentals and market situation have undergone fundamental changes. However, just like driving safety can not turn sharp corners, otherwise it is easy to overturn, industry regulation and enterprise transformation can not be turned too quickly, otherwise it is not only the real estate industry and housing enterprises themselves that may overturn, but also the land finance that cannot achieve transformation in the short term will also overturn.
The influence of the governance culture and the rush to achieve results on the effect of the policy make the introduction and implementation of counter-cyclical and counter-market adjustment policies that are based on good intentions and hopes to iron out market fluctuations and industry cycles often lead to overcorrection and excessive force to hurt industries and enterprises, which in turn may also affect the government's own problems. For many housing enterprises in this round of regulation and control, because they do not involve state-owned enterprises that are integrated with the government, the policy aspect can naturally be relatively detached or even hold a wait-and-see attitude. However, the frequent thunderstorms and the private housing enterprises and their survivors under the pressure of cash flow and flow have all withdrawn from the soil auction market in order to defend cash flow, reduce the increase in soil reserves and even collectively "lie flat" in order to survive, so that land finance falls into a one-man show between state-owned enterprises and local governments.
In this scene, who is the most uncomfortable knows who knows.
Therefore, industry regulation is not only a policy job, but also a combination of science and art. Otherwise, the repeated simple cycle of adding more water and more noodles and adding water to the noodles will be played by the old lady and the little daughter-in-law, and there will not be so many ministries and financial regulatory departments to bother. The lack of systematic and comprehensive consideration of industry regulation is even more a headache and a quack doctor, in addition to curing more patients, may also hurt themselves, and the land finance in the real estate tax far from the water to quench the near thirst of the current dilemma, is this round of regulation can not avoid the problem.
In any case, it is still hoped that Kaisa, which has already "died" once, can live to the death in this liquidity crisis and become an "undead bird" in the mainland real estate industry.