Tan Zheng (1906.6.14~1988.11.6), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan. He joined the National Revolutionary Army in February 1927. In the same year, he participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising on the border of Xianggan and Gansu, and joined the Communist Party of China in October. During the agrarian revolutionary war, he successively served as secretary general of the 4th Military Commission of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, director of the Political Department of the 12th Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and political commissar of the 1st Division of the 1st Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and participated in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" and long marches in the Central Soviet Region.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he served as deputy director of the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Jinsui United Defense Force.
During the Liberation War, he served as the director of the Political Department of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army, the director of the Political Department of the Fourth Field Army, and the deputy political commissar. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he served as the first deputy director and director of the General Political Department and the vice minister of national defense. He was awarded the rank of Grand General in 1955.
The main contents of General Tan Zheng's military thought are:
I. The political work of establishing a revolution is a characteristic of the people's army.
Revolutionary political work is peculiar to the people's army and is an important factor in uniting itself and defeating the enemy. He endorsed the proposition that political work is the lifeline of the people's army, and explained the meaning of the "lifeline," that is, the political work of the people's army is to educate the army with the party's revolutionary program and the spirit of the people's revolution, to make the army consistent with the people and the government, to make the army obey the party's political leadership, to enhance the combat effectiveness of the army, and to carry out the work of disintegrating the enemy army and assisting friendly forces, so as to achieve the goal of uniting itself, defeating the enemy, and liberating the nation and the people. This is also the basic principle of the political work of the revolutionary army. It is wrong to belittle and lower the status of political work and to overemphasize and exalt political work, and political work should have its proper status.
Second, the core of political work is to ensure the party's absolute leadership over the army
The people's army must be placed under the absolute leadership of the Party, overcome all kinds of non-proletarian ideas, and establish proletarian ideas. The Party's work is the foundation of political work, and political work should be carried out through the Party's organizations, so that the political work guidance system and the military work guidance system can be integrated, so as to realize the Party's leadership over the army. The political work of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army is to make the revolutionary army completely subordinate to the political leadership of the revolutionary party; no matter how the Red Army changes its organizational form in the new situation, it must ensure the party's absolute ideological leadership in organization. Without the leadership of the Communist Party, the army cannot have military and political work that thoroughly supports the interests of the people, and it will be impossible to become an army that thoroughly supports the interests of the people.
Third, the military's political work must be subordinated to and serve the central tasks of the Party and the army
The army's political work must adapt to the new situation and supplement new contents in accordance with the new tasks carried out by the army. The military's political work arises from the military practice under the leadership of the Party, and political work that is divorced from military practice must be divorced from reality. The direction of the entire army is the direction of political work, so the tasks of political work can only be stipulated in accordance with the basic tasks of the army and the specific tasks at present, and there can be no independent tasks of so-called political work in addition to the basic tasks of the army and the specific tasks at present. Political work is to educate the troops in a revolutionary spirit and to ensure the fulfillment of these tasks ideologically, politically and organizationally. In the tasks carried out by the army, combat is placed first, and everything else is subordinate to war. Political work should focus on enhancing the combat effectiveness of the troops and ensuring that the troops will win the war. To this end, in political work, it is necessary to continuously enhance the political consciousness of officers and men, cultivate a fine work style, strictly enforce discipline, and enhance the organizational and command ability of cadres and the combat technology level of the troops.
Fourth, the army's political work must implement the general policy of uniting itself and defeating the enemy
The army's political work must unswervingly implement the general policy of uniting itself and defeating the enemy. In the relations between the army and the Party, it is necessary to completely obey the party's leadership politically, ideologically, and organizationally. In the relationship between the army and local governments and between the army and the masses of the people, it is necessary to respect local governments and the masses of the people, practice supporting the government and loving the people, and strive to lighten the people's burdens. In terms of relations within the armed forces, it is necessary to carry out criticism and self-criticism through democratic means, close the relations between officers and soldiers, and enhance the unity of officers and men. In the relationship between military work, logistics work, and political work, we must persist in close coordination and mutual cooperation.
Fifth, in the military's political work, priority should be given to ideological education
On a certain material basis, thought controls everything, and thought changes everything. Only by making progress in thought can we achieve progress in action, and the process of progress in thinking is the process of progress in work and the progress of the mood of the masses. Therefore, we must pay attention to the political education of the troops, so as to enhance the political mood, political understanding, and political quality of the officers and men of the troops, cultivate a high degree of hatred for the enemy and the morale of heroic killing of the enemy, and correct all kinds of erroneous ideological tendencies. The ideological progress of cadres is the pivot of the progress of the work of the troops. In every task, it is necessary to make sure that the principal cadres at all levels who make up the core of leadership first understand it, and then adopt the mass line so that the general cadres and the broad masses can also understand it. In propaganda, agitation, and ideological cultivation, the task of leaders lies in uniting the activists, absorbing the middle elements, encouraging the backward elements, and adopting different policies and methods for different personnel.
Sixth, in the army's political work, it is necessary to overcome formalism and carry forward the work style of seeking truth from facts and maintaining close ties with the masses
The formalism, egalitarianism, egalitarianism, and empty slogan-shouting of work in political work are inconsistent with the nature of the people's army, and it will weaken the revolutionary nature of political work; if these styles of work do not change, even if the line taken and the direction of political work are correct, they will still not be able to play the role of political work. Political work must be done well in accordance with the principle that the chiefs are responsible, do their own work, combine the backbone of the leading cadres with the broad masses, and combine general appeals with specific guidance, and carry forward the work style of seeking truth from facts and maintaining close ties with the masses. Political work cadres should rely on their own knowledge, experience, and ability to solve problems, consult with the masses, and not rely on their positions and administrative means to suppress people.
Luo Ronghuan (first from left), Tan Zheng (second from left), and Xiao Jinguang (third from left) visit a certain military academy in Hankou to study sand tables
Seventh, the military's political work must correctly implement the Party's policy on cadres
The policy of military cadres under the leadership of the Communist Party of China should be: No matter how cadres are treated, united, trained, or promoted, there is no private line or narrow sectarian ideology. On the question of cadres, we must not discuss kinship and alienation, divide factions, and do not treat those who are personally good, and those who are evil are evil, and they are not honorable and upright. Party members and cadres are treated equally with non-party members and cadres. Revolutionary intellectuals are the fresh blood in the ranks of the ranks of the people's army, and should be absorbed in large quantities, promoted at an appropriate time, and earnestly cultivated so that they can become popular intellectual cadres. Cadres from the old military background must have correct policies, and those who have the ability, experience, and ability to command operations can be assigned as commanders after being tested. Cadres who are close to the peasants should be the main source of the contingent of cadres in the people's army, but we must also pay attention to strengthening training and raising the level of culture.
Viii. Strengthen political work in the modernization of the armed forces
The people's army should carry forward the fine traditions, overcome the pragmatism and formalism that are divorced from reality, and generally carry out cultural education and Marxist-Leninist theory education for the troops. In the political work of the People's Liberation Army, we should correctly understand the relationship between politics and military technology. In modern warfare, the importance of technical conditions has greatly increased. Without modern technological equipment and without the highly technical level of contract operations of various arms, the bravery of man alone cannot win the war. However, emphasizing the importance of technology does not advocate that the role of human beings and political factors can be reduced; on the contrary, the human factor is always the decisive factor in war and a factor that often plays a role. Under the conditions of increasingly complex technical conditions, an increase in the number of arms, and a more brutal war, it is all the more necessary to give play to the role of human beings. It is necessary to pay attention to correcting the tradition of ignoring the unity of officers and men and the unity of the top and the bottom in the transformation of the work of the troops, neglecting the role of democracy, emphasizing administrative orders in leadership methods, neglecting ideological work, and not following the mass line.
General Tan Zheng's military thinking played a certain role in the formation and development of Mao Zedong's military thought, in winning victory in China's revolutionary war, in guiding the people's army and national defense construction; in the construction and development of the troops mainly under his leadership and in the victory of combat, especially in the political work of the Chinese People's Liberation Army