First, what is the "resource curse"? This concept was first developed by the American economist Richard M. Thompson. M. Oti proposed. In the early days of Agro-Economics, abundant natural resources contributed to economic growth. However, with the advent of the era of industrialization, natural resource asset rights have not played their due role. In areas with better natural endowments, the growth rate of poverty is higher, resulting in the "curse" of resources on local economic development. This phenomenon is more typical in some parts of southwest China; for example, Guizhou Province is in a critical period of poverty alleviation before the implementation of single carbon sink poverty alleviation, although the relationship between the two is not necessary, but the development of forestry carbon sinks has a role in stimulating the economy under China's system. The intrinsic core driving force of forestry carbon sinks lies in the optimal allocation of resources through transactions, the realization of the goal of ecological revitalization, and then the breaking of the dilemma caused by the "resource curse". One of the biggest challenges is how to guarantee the benefits of forestry carbon sinks, before the "double carbon" goal has not been proposed, as the end of the forestry carbon sink industry carbon trading market still has great defects, after 2017, both CDM and CCER forestry carbon sink projects are suspended registration, which directly leads to a large number of forestry carbon sink projects in China can not be developed, farmers' income will be threatened. After the "double carbon" goal was proposed, the country's reconstruction and optimization of the carbon trading market was obvious, and the previous paper had concluded; only when a government department in a certain place issued a mandatory emission reduction signal and most market participants could feel certain market expectations, the demand for forestry carbon sinks in the region would be greatly improved. The more certain development trend brought about by China's institutional mechanism for forestry carbon sinks is obviously reflected in china's institutional advantages compared with the unstable attitude towards carbon neutrality produced by the rotation of political parties in other countries.