In the final year of the war, the technical and tactical superiority enjoyed by the Japanese navy and army was exhausted by more than two years of war, and the senior Japanese commanders had few illusions about the ability to prevent the United States from landing on the Japanese coast, and in despair turned to the legendary kamikaze, which was their last hope to defend Japan. The purpose of the strategy is to inflict heavy damage on the United States and to make the United States willing to engage in political negotiations in order to end the war without unconditional surrender. While kamikaze planes are the most famous, the Navy also has a wide variety of ship-crashing, human-torpedoes, and human-guided rockets.
One: Kamikaze Origin
In 1943, some junior Japanese officers proposed a variety of suicide weapons in hopes of regaining tactical equality, but many officers opposed this extreme measure, and there were occasional incidents of planes crashing into U.S. warships, but these attacks were neither ordered nor organized by superiors. But after the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944, Japan had lost its previous advantage, the Imperial Armed Forces were in the abyss of rout, senior Japanese commanders began to secretly discuss how to use organized suicide attacks to restore Japan's superiority, and in September 1944, the 4th Air Force and the 1st Air Force conducted a series of tests at the port of Manila, concluding that only a quarter of the well-trained bomber pilots had a chance of hitting the target, and a well-trained suicide pilot could hit the target every time. In July 1944, the Japanese began recruiting for two special forces, equipped with large warhead bombers modified to sink battleships, and on September 21 and 22, 1944, two aircraft took off from Los Negros for the first kamikaze attack.
The original kamikaze was an ordinary Mitsubishi A6M5 fighter, with weapons, radios and other unnecessary weights removed and a 250-kilogram bomb. The only change was the installation of wires, pilot-activated insurance to detonate on impact, and on October 21, 1944, the Japanese launched a suicide attack that destroyed the cruiser Australia, though probably one of several sporadic attacks. However, the first large-scale kamikaze attack took place on October 25, 1944, sinking the American frigate San Lowe and destroying the usable Aircraft Carrier Santi. The success of the attack inspired the Japanese, and the Emperor received the Minister of the Navy and Natsumitsu and said, "It is really necessary to go to this extreme, they have done a good job." The Japanese began to form the first joint basic attack group in the Philippines, because japanese fighters in the Philippines had been destroyed, so a large number of reinforcements were sent to the Philippines. The initial kamikaze attack was conducted through fighter jets, but soon spread to most other aircraft, and the Army saw the Navy's tactics much more successful, which also prompted the Army to turn to kamikaze attacks.
A meeting at Air Force Headquarters in July 1944 noted that a large-scale kamikaze attack could make a decisive contribution to repelling the U.S. Navy landings and would sink one-third of the invading forces. These estimates were partly wishfully exaggerated, and by the summer of 1944 some 4,300 Japanese trainer aircraft had been converted into kamikaze aircraft, including specialized junior and senior trainers, as well as obsolete fighters, in addition to 700 dive bombers, torpedo bombers, medium bombers, and most modern fighters, all of which would eventually be spent on kamikaze attacks. The Army Aviation Program was smaller than the Navy's forces, with about 800 aircraft in place by April 1945, and the Army having only about 800 fighters and bombers, and about 2.100 specialized kamikaze aircraft. A meeting in 1945 estimated that about 60 percent of the available naval power would actually be put into combat when the U.S. landed, 2.400 people were involved, about one-sixth, the military was more optimistic that a third of the aircraft would hit the target, and the Army and Navy held several meetings concluding that kamikaze was the best air tactic the two militaries had tried so far and was the only way to stop the United States.
Two: Air Kamikaze Weapons
In addition to the simple modification of aircraft, Japan also developed a number of special kamikaze aircraft, the earliest rocket-assisted gliding bomb proposed by transport pilot Lieutenant Mitsuo Ota in 1943, this idea was ignored until June 1944 after the defeat of Mariana, the original plan was to use the kr10 liquid fuel rocket engine to power the glider, which was developed by the Mitsubishi Nagasaki plant on the basis of the Walter rocket engine of the German Me-163 fighter jet.
Due to the immaturity of rocket engines, as well as the cost and complexity, the idea was quickly rejected, and the design shifted to the use of usable solid rocket boosters. Originally designed to be brought into the combat area by a Mitsubishi G4M2e bomber bomber, the propulsion system allowed the aircraft to accelerate during the last dive, the initial propulsion structure was five solid rocket boosters, three in the rear of the fuselage, one under each wing, the test flight found the uneven combustion rate of the wing rocket and the resulting asymmetric thrust, the wing rocket was abandoned, this aircraft is made of wood and non-strategic materials, easy to assemble, cost only one-tenth of that of conventional fighters. Named cherry blossoms, production began in November 1944.
The Sakura Rocket Auxiliary Glide Bomb, carried by 16 G4M2 bombers of the 711st Attack Squadron, was escorted by about 30 A6M5 fighters and made its first sortie on March 21, 1945, targeting U.S. Task Force 58, which was operating off the coast off Kyushu, but when they were about 60 miles from the target, they were intercepted by 24 U.S. Navy warplanes, and all the aircraft were shot down in just a few minutes, forcing the Japanese to change tactics, alone or in very small teams. to avoid detection and interception by U.S. Navy Air Patrol. In addition, the design was turned to the jet-powered Type 22 Sakura Bomb, equipped with a Hitachi Tui-11 jet engine,
The new engine allowed the bomber to release cherry blossom bombs at a distance of 130 kilometers from the target, increasing the bomber's survivability aircraft, and the development of the Type 22 began on February 15. A limited production of 50 aircraft was made before the end of the war, and only one successful test flight was conducted. The more advanced Ne-20 axial turbojet engine was a smaller version of the BMW-003 used by the German Me-262 fighter, and the Type 33 with this engine was planned to be launched from a submarine catapult, the more aggressive Type 43A was intended to be launched from a submarine or aircraft carrier, and the Type 43B was designed to be launched from a land-based coastal launcher, but the design of these variants was never completed, and the war ended before the Type 43 began production.
Another kamikaze fly was the Army Special Attack Aircraft Ki-115 (Sword) experimental aircraft designed by the Japan United Aviation Agency in January 1945, the Navy's high-tech jet aircraft compared to rockets, the aircraft design is very traditional, powered by a Nakajima Ha-115-11 1,130 horsepower (843 kW) radial engine, in order to simplify production, the aircraft used a basic fixed landing gear and bomb tray, in the event that the mission had to be aborted, there was no way to discard ammunition. The first prototype was completed on March 5, 1945, and flight tests began. The original design proved too crude. Simple landing gear makes the aircraft difficult to maneuver on the ground, the cockpit visibility is low, the wings are too small to produce enough lift, and there are no flaps at takeoff, all of which exacerbate the aircraft's shortcomings. The revised design of the Ki-115 Ko was hastily put into production in June 1945 and the training program for The Ki-115 pilot began in late June 1945. But after many pilots were killed while flying the vintage aircraft, the project was abruptly canceled.
Three: Sea Kamikaze weapons
The concept of a guided torpedo that could be launched underwater from a submarine was first proposed by the small submarine force in 1942, but was rejected, but in the worsening situation of 1944, the concept was given more serious consideration. In March 1944 began the design of a human torpedo with the aim of developing a weapon that could be carried into the war zone by a mother submarine and then launched from underwater, known as the Kaiten 1. The Kaiten is essentially a variant of the Type 93 3 torpedo, with an enlarged front to accommodate a pilot and a 1550 kg warhead. In contrast to some of the earlier manned torpedoes, the pilot sat inside the pressure hull instead of sitting outside the torpedo like a frogman. The first Kaiten was completed and tested in June 1944. The main attraction of the Kaiten compared to conventional torpedoes is that the range is extended, the warhead is more powerful, and the guidance is more precise. Construction of the Kaiten 1 began in August 1944 with a total production of approximately 330 vessels, including 100 orizinal Tvpe 1s in 1944 and 230 improved Mod 1s in 1945.
Various improvements have been made to the weapons during production to compensate for deficiencies found in training and operation. The most serious problem is the damage caused by water leakage. Typically, a mother submarine sails on water for the first few days, but does dive into the water after entering the area of U.S. ship activity. It is in the underwater part of the voyage that the problem of water leakage becomes the most serious. Kaiten 1 is operated by volunteers aged 18-20, mainly reservists and non-commissioned officers from the Naval Aviation Training Group, the initial training was to allow the pilot to enter the abdominal hatch of Kaiten 1 through a special watertight tunnel through the deck, and then use periscopes and magnetic compasses to pilot the Kaiten 1 underwater to approach the target,
Kaiten can work at depths of 60 meters, and in order to use a periscope near the finish line, the height is usually controlled to about 5 meters. Its maximum underwater speed was about 30 knots, and since its basic design was not completely satisfactory, it was decided to start a more complex version, and its revolutionary Tvpe 6 powerplant was affected by the German hvdrogen-peroxide torpedo engine, this scheme was abandoned. A more traditional kerosene/oxygen torpedo engine was re-introduced. Although the expected top speed was 40 knots, the experiment showed that it could barely reach 20 knots, and a total of 5 were built before the program was abandoned.
In the spring of 1944 the Naval Technical Department planned to develop a very simple miniature version of the wooden torpedo boat, the first Shinvo boat was completed on May 27, 1944 and subjected to testing, the Shinvo model was powered by a Toyota KC 6-cylinder car engine with a speed of 23 knots, its main weapon was a 270 kg high-explosive warhead on the bow, the production of these ships was carried out in some naval shipyards, private shipyards and some automobile manufacturing plants. There were differences between the ships built in different factories, and a number of improvements were made after the initial operational deployment, the first of which was the installation of a simple rocket launcher, partly to distract the U.S. Navy gunners, partly to give the new pilot a little courage in the event of an attack, and finally to inflict some damage on the target ship before impact. In the autumn of 1944, after the initial combat deployment in the Philippines, it was suggested that a cable cutter be fitted to the bow of the ship to cut the oil fence. The Japanese planned to build about 7,000 new ships by September 1945 and about 6,200 to complete by the end of the war.
Four: Battlefield effects
During operations in the Philippines from October 1944 to January 1945, the Japanese Navy flew 421 kamikaze aircraft, supported by 239 escort fighters, of which 102 were shot down, crashed or missing. The Army sent 400 aircraft on 61 kamikaze missions, claiming to have attacked 259 ships, but the sum of the two was more than twice the actual result. The Japanese exaggerated their victory in the Battle of Okinawa, claiming to have sunk 44 warships, including two aircraft carriers and eight battleships, while in fact sinking 17 warships, including a frigate and 11 destroyers, and destroying 279 other ships. About 45 percent of the aircraft were shot down by the U.S. Navy Combat Air Patrol, and of those that successfully crossed the fighter jets, about 46 percent were shot down by Naval anti-aircraft fire. Kamikaze received 121 hits and 53 devastating close-range hits, 22 percent of which were hit. Kamikaze were the most destructive and effective force of the Japanese Air Force in the Philippine Campaign.
The largest and most successful Kamikaze Campaign to date began on March 26, 1945, during the Battle of Okinawa. Japan launched the first wave of large-scale attacks, dispatching nearly 729 kamikaze aircraft and frigates. The mission was one of Japan's largest air operations in the entire war. In the Battle of Okinawa, nearly a quarter of U.S. warships were hit by kamikazes. About 64 percent of the attacks were carried out by the Navy, and the remaining 36 percent were carried out by the Army. A total of 74 of the Sakura Rocket-Assisted Gliding Bombs sank one destroyer and damaged two others.
In the ten months of kamikaze attacks, kamikaze aircraft attacks accounted for 48.1 percent of all damaged U.S. warships, of which 21.3 percent were sunk. The missions cost about 2500 aircraft and 3860 crews, 474 hit Allied ships, and each was 18.6 percent effective. More than 7,000 U.S., Australian and British servicemen were killed in "death squad" attacks, and a U.S. Navy study of the Battle of Okinawa concluded that about 10 percent of the kamikaze aircraft that launched the assault had to return to base due to mechanical failures, weather or inability to target. About half of the kamikaze aircraft that reached the theater were hit by shells, and only about a third of the kamikaze survived naval anti-aircraft fire and hit the target.
The battle of kamikazes began in the summer of 1944, the first attack ended in disaster, many ships were missing, at dawn on January 10, 1945 the Japanese army used 45 ships to launch an attack on Lingayan Bay, sinking or seriously damaging 20-30 American ships, in fact only four U.S. transport ships were destroyed, two landing craft were sunk, guided torpedoes were originally planned to fight against the U.S. Navy anchorage, on November 8, 1944, the first operation three submarines each with four manned torpedoes attacked, As a result, the L-37 submarine was sunk by a U.S. warship on November 19, 1944, and the 1-36 and L-47 successfully released their guided torpedoes outside Ulithi Atoll. But many guided torpedoes were found and sunk, and only one hit the fleet's refueling ship, the Misissiniwa, which was loaded with aviation fuel that caused a massive fire. The mother submarine spotted a huge column of smoke over the harbor and thought several ships had been sunk.
The second operation departed from the Chepran Sea in David, all of which were scheduled for January 12, 1945, but 148 were sunk before they reached their destination, other submarines attacked and reported a large number of explosions and columns of smoke, and the Japanese assessed the sinking of 18 destroyers, in fact none of the manned torpedoes succeeded. In July 1945, during its last operation off the coast of the Philippines, the Japanese sank two U.S. warships at the cost of four fleet submarines and four transport submarines, 147 man-guided torpedoes, and possibly hit or damaged five or six. The rest was reserved for final combat operations, so none were used in combat at the end of the war.
Fifth, the conclusion
Postwar U.S. research on Japanese air force concluded: "Japan's most effective aircraft weapon was the kamikaze aircraft, and the Navy's kamikaze weapon was more of a dangerous nuisance to the U.S. fleet than a serious threat to the U.S. fleet." Between the Philippine campaign and the Okinawa campaign, kamikaze attack efficiency declined, with about 54 percent of kamikaze members approaching success in the Philippines, but only 32 percent in Okinawa getting close to the U.S. fleet. Kamikaze strikes are more effective than ordinary bomb strikes, but not as effective as torpedo strikes. Usually a 250-kilogram bomb can sink a small warship like a destroyer, but it is less effective against a large warship like a cruiser or battleship, so a bomb on a kamikaze is not the main cause of damage, more commonly a fire caused by an explosion of aircraft fuel.
The U.S. Navy's new tactics against kamikazes are that destroyers and destroyer frigates are used to create cordons around carrier task forces, to expand radar warning networks, and to establish a first line of defense against kamikazes. These patrol ships bore the brunt of kamikaze casualties, as inexperienced Japanese pilots tended to attack the first battleships they encountered. Thus, during the Battle of Okinawa, 11 of the 17 missing ships and 109 of the 198 damaged ships. These alert ships provided additional time for the Navy to intercept incoming kamikaze aircraft, and the Battle of the Philippines also led the Navy to increase the number of anti-aircraft weapons on board and to accelerate the deployment of close-range fuzes in anti-aircraft shells, new tactics and techniques that effectively weakened the effectiveness of kamikaze aircraft. In general, the Kamikaze are 10 times more efficient per sortie than conventional aircraft attacks, but the actual exchange ratio is extremely poor, but for Japan, this is the only weapon that can go to the battlefield.