<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="3" >, "responsibility for waging war" or "responsibility for losing a war."</h1>
On September 5, 1945, at a meeting of the Japanese Diet convened after the war, Ashida, a member of parliament who would later become prime minister, submitted an opinion on "Pursuing the Causes and Responsibilities for the Unfavorable Outcome of the Great East Asian War." He believed that the root cause of the defeat in the war was Japan's "failure of bureaucratic rule." That is to say, because "the extreme self-interest and corruption of the bureaucracy have led to the antagonism between the government and the people", and the control of speech has "blocked the way of speech of those who are loyal to the state", "the people are indifferent to everything about the state", thus isolating the government. He believed that since the war was a "war of total strength" waged by the national strength of all of Japan, in order to win the war, "every citizen must be made aware of the responsibility for the war." And if only the government and the military have a sense of responsibility, it can only be the result of failure." Ashida's claims reflected the views of some people who disapproved of the decision-making of the government and the military in the war. Following this line of thought, in December, Congressman Ichiro Hatoyama proposed the "Resolution on the War Responsibility of Parliamentarians", and Parliamentarian Jiro Ichinomiya also proposed the "Resolution on War Responsibility", and so on.
These motions to hold them accountable for the war are considered to be the pursuit of war responsibility for the "bureaucrats," "warlords," successive prime ministers, and the "followers and panders" of these people, starting within Japan. It is not difficult to see that this kind of investigation is based on the position of "total strength war", and that the responsibility for the defeat of the war is not the responsibility for launching the war of aggression. Or rather, this accountability denies the technical responsibility of the war directors, without denying their motives for starting the war. So, if Japan had won the war, wouldn't there have been such an investigation? Obviously, this way of thinking is completely different from the external accountability of Japan's "anti-peace" and "anti-humane" crimes introduced earlier. And following this position of investigation may also touch on the decadence of Japanese politics during the war, the problem of the prevalence of militarism and the fascist political tendencies of some people, but it is not the same level as thoroughly investigating the responsibility of militarism for launching a war of aggression.
From a technical point of view, there are also some Japanese politicians and soldiers who actively or passively admit their responsibilities, and some people choose suicide and self-determination after the war, but in fact, they also express the intention of taking responsibility. But as one scholar pointed out sharply: "The responsibility that these people consciously assume is at best the responsibility for bringing Japan into a defeated situation, not the responsibility for initiating and carrying out unjust wars." The responsibility they perceive is basically a responsibility to the emperor, not to a citizen who has suffered miserably and unspeakably under his own leadership. Of course, it is not the responsibility for the 10 million dead killed by the Japanese army in China and Southeast Asia. However, the practices of these people have actually won the approval of some people in Japanese society, and even believe that these people have maintained Japan's "self-esteem.".
Judging from the understanding of the issue of war responsibility by some Japanese leaders after the defeat in the war, even if they admit defeat, they cannot admit the objective fact that the war has caused great harm to other nationalities; on the contrary, on the contrary, they must do their utmost to safeguard the legitimacy of the so-called Greater East Asia War and the significance of the so-called liberation of Asia, and on the other hand, they must also drag the Japanese people into the ranks of shouldering the responsibility for the war. They believe that although from a legal point of view, the state controlled by politicians should be responsible for Japan's defeat, but from a moral point of view, the people should also be responsible.
The reason for this situation has a lot to do with the identity of the person who proposes to hold the war accountable. In many countries, post-war campaigns for accountability were waged by politicians or intellectuals who were persecuted during the war or even forced to flee to foreign countries, and their experiences of persecution and forced abroad gave them the opportunity to absorb new ideological and linguistic systems. In Japan, the people who proposed the above bill were basically pre-war rulers and intellectuals. In the case of Ashida Jun, who first raised the issue of responsibility for the war, Ashida did not oppose Japan's foreign expansion policy during the war, but he agreed with the anti-military ideology of the Western humanitarian position, so in 1940, when the Japanese House of Representatives was forced to expel Takao Saito under pressure from the military department, Ashida Expressed his opinion as one of the seven opposing members. After that, he also expressed dissatisfaction with the great political wing praise system. Because of this background, it was possible to put forward the idea of holding the war accountable after the war. But fundamentally speaking, his historical understanding is still limited to the "imperial view of history" and has no understanding of the nature of the war of aggression.
Some Japanese politicians and intellectuals put forward their theory of war responsibility out of a critical stand on the decadent and authoritarian fascist politics of Japan during the war, and although it contained the demand that Japan take the road of democratization after the war, fundamentally speaking, they did not have a sober understanding and reflection on the aggressive nature of the war, and they still pursued "the responsibility for the defeat of the war" rather than "the responsibility for launching the war of aggression." Although they also passionately attacked wartime politics, it was, as some have criticized, merely a psychological defense that naturally arises in the face of the onslaught of defeat, which manifests itself in the form of nationalism. To put it bluntly, they still look forward to victory in the war, and only in the helplessness of not achieving victory are they forced to think about the responsibility for defeat.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="7" > second, the war responsibility that has been led astray is pursued</h1>
Taking "responsibility for the defeat of the war" as the starting point, the internal pursuit of responsibility for the war in Japanese society in the early post-war period was led astray, and a very peculiar phenomenon appeared: many fanatical militarists also actively participated in the investigation of responsibility for the defeat of the war.
Ishihara Guan'er, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army who advocated the "theory of the final war in the world" and advocated an unprecedented decisive battle between the East represented by Japan and the West represented by the United States, was not only an active planner and participant in the September 18 Incident, but also a culprit in supporting the puppet regime of "Manchukuo" . After the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo, he also served as deputy chief of staff in the Kwantung Army. Later, due to differences in political views with Hideki Tojo, he resigned in 1938 and became a reserve officer in 1941 as a lieutenant general division commander. After that, Ishihara organized the Association of East Asian Leagues and continued to adhere to his so-called "Greater East Asia" fantasy. Because in his view, only Japan can assume the responsibility of leading East Asia. After Japan's defeat, Ishihara not only did not disappear, but on the contrary became active. On August 28, 1945, in an interview with reporters, he proposed: "Overthrowing bureaucratic despotism is the first task at present, and on this basis Japan should be built into the world's first democratic country." He also proposed abolishing the special high school and restoring the free activities of political parties. In his view, the reason for the defeat of the war was that the shackles and obliteration of freedom of expression and association by bureaucrats and warlords "hindered the exertion of national power." It can be seen that Ishihara did not reflect on the superiority of "Japan in the divine country" in his bones, and the reason why he criticized the bureaucracy and warlords was that they did not realize their ideal of "East Asian alliance".
Many politicians who supported the war also responded positively after the war to the above-mentioned proposal by parliamentarians to hold them accountable for their defeat. Ichikawa Fangeda (1893-1981), a prominent Japanese women activist who had been committed to women's political participation since the pre-war period, became a very active nationalist during the war, and served as a director of the "Great Japan Speech Newspaper Diet" and actively expressed statements in support of the war. For this reason, she was stripped of her public office for more than 3 years after the war. Ichikawa admits that this is the biggest stain on her life. After her dismissal, she was elected to the Senate and made an important contribution to the advancement of women's political status in Japan. However, in the early post-war period, she did not have any self-consciousness about her responsibility for the war, but actively responded to the claims of some parliamentarians to hold them accountable for the defeat. She stressed that "due to the control of the military and bureaucrats, although women's associations were formed in the Great East Asian War, women still did not act autonomously", in fact, by calling for women's rights and exonerating their responsibilities.
Whether it was Ishihara Origami or Ichikawa Fumiede, the bureaucratic issues and women's participation in politics raised by them after the war did exist, and their demands for the democratization of Japanese society were justified, but this could not replace the pursuit of responsibility for waging a war of aggression. Moreover, long before Japan's defeat in the war, there were people who put forward the demand for democratization from this perspective. For example, the writer Tatsuzo Ishikawa published an article in the Mainichi Shimbun as early as July 1944, calling for "criticism and repression cannot boost the morale of the battle" and "how to fight a total battle without the trust of the people"? To call for democracy in order to build a more effective basis for a more effective general war is to advocate war. Even if the democracy they expect takes place and the bureaucracy changes, Japan will not be able to shake off the trend of continuing on the road of war. Moreover, even such democratic demands cannot be endorsed by the government until they have failed utterly.
During the war, the members of the Japanese Diet supported the war policy of the Military Ministry almost without exception and rushed to express their support for the war; if these people did not conduct a deep reflection on their responsibilities after the war and did not deny their determination to show their performance in the war, the proposal to hold the so-called war responsible would only be a superficial action. Such a superficial accountability, of course, cannot involve the responsibility for the perpetrators of harm to Asian countries, war crimes in violation of international law, and still less the responsibility of the Emperor and his general citizens. Until December 1945, only 11 members of the House of Representatives, including Masamichi Ashyama, voluntarily resigned out of "remorse" for accepting the recommendation of the Great Political Wing During the War to become a member of parliament, while many of the militarists who launched the war of aggression remained behind the scenes.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="11" >3, "One Hundred Million People Always Repent" – A Deceptive Theory of War Responsibility</h1>
The reason for this situation in the post-war Japanese Diet's "investigation" of responsibility for the war was actually the inevitable result of Japan's political development after the war. Because the war had just ended, the upper echelons headed by the Japanese Imperial Family began to deliberately cover up the responsibility for the war of aggression.
On August 28, 1945, minoru Higashihisa Miya (1887-1990), who was the first post-war prime minister, issued a "policy on the reconstruction of Japan" in a meeting with reporters, and at the same time put forward the so-called "general confession of 100 million people" theory of war responsibility.
Like the proposal in the Diet mentioned above, Higashihisa, in his "Japan Reconstruction Policy," blamed the defeat of the war on the fact that the Japanese people's fighting enthusiasm was restricted by restrictions on freedom of expression and was not fully utilized. He believed that "the people are bound and cannot do anything is a major reason for the defeat of the war", so he proposed to active speech and develop associations in the future. The above-mentioned proposals of Senator Ashida Ezeki at least criticized the "bureaucrats", "warlords", and "followers", while Higashi completely evaded the responsibilities of those people, directly pointing the criticism at the people, believing that the reason for the failure of the war was that the people did not pay loyalty to the country. He even believes that the social phenomenon represented by the black market economy marks the "inferiority of national morality" and advocates that "the general repentance of 100 million people should be regarded as the first step in the reconstruction of our country."
The reason why the Imperial Family-led Japanese Government emphasizes "repentance" is to transfer the sense of humiliation of defeat to the "self-examination" of the people rather than to reflect on itself, and to avoid the situation of criticizing "bureaucrats" and "warlords" and leading the spearhead of the war of aggression to itself. The "total repentance of 100 million people" is aimed at the so-called "national decadence" and does not touch on the reasons for the emergence of decadence. According to this theory, it is not the initiators of the war who are the first to be investigated, but the pacifists in the war, those who are skeptical of the war or have a negative attitude toward the war, and who do not actively cooperate with the government's war policy; as for the anti-war people, they are even more regarded as the sinners of Japan who are "rebellious" who led to the defeat of the war, and the active war advocates have become The "heroes" of Japan.
In December 1945, the most heated discussion in the House of Representatives was the criticism of the "war bystanders." Some people have pointed out: "At a time when the war situation is very tense and the country is in a state of life and death, those people are still standing by and watching, which is really very ruthless," and "if such people are tolerated, or even let people with this attitude be the responsible for building a new Japan, it will cause misunderstanding in society, so it is absolutely impossible." Even some post-war pacifists were fiercely critical of the attitude of "war bystanders" at the time.
The so-called "confession" advocated by the "total repentance of 100 million people" refers to the repentance of the people to the country and the emperor, not to the citizens of the victimized countries in Asia and to the allies, not to reflect on the responsibility for the war of aggression. As a result, it shielded the war instructors who launched the war of aggression, dealt a blow to anti-war figures and anti-war ideologies, fundamentally reversed the general direction of pursuing responsibility for the war, reversed the direction of the Japanese people's thinking about war responsibility, and was also a major challenge to post-war values.
If the proposals of the Satomi Ashida and other legislators criticizing the bureaucracy can still be recognized by some people in Japanese society, the reaction in Japanese society after the argument of "100 million people always repent" is more critical. The first reaction of ordinary Japanese to this argument is that the so-called "one hundred million people" refers to all the Japanese who have suffered greatly in the war, and "those who are originally the most responsible call on those with the least responsibility to carry out general repentance, ignoring the major difference in the degree of responsibility between the two." They instinctively realized that those who held power under the old system were the culprits who had caused the loss of 3 million of their compatriots and the suffering of their citizens, and that according to the principle of "one hundred million people always repent", these people were relieved of their responsibilities. Because all people are responsible, it actually means that no one is responsible.
So, on September 8, 1945, someone submitted an article to the Daily News, opposing the principle of "one hundred million people always repenting":
Let one person reflect without any left, let one person repent without any left, is this not a knife to the whole nation? Until the emperor announced the armistice, weren't we all trying desperately? Aren't those bureaucrats who are unjustly distributed, who are negative and mistaken in various undertakings, who are unclear about all windows, who lead to low combat effectiveness? And now which of those high-ranking officials and nobles says that "we should reflect" and "we should repent"? Don't you ask yourself: Can you ask yourself the survivors of the special attack teams and other war dead, and the families of those who died in the factory, together with the guilty bureaucrats, to repent and reflect together?
This opinion immediately caused a great response in the whole society, and major newspapers published supporting articles written by many people. Some people in the National Assembly also criticized the theory of "total repentance of 100 million people", arguing that the responsibility cannot be traced to the general public.
In fact, the theory of "100 million people always repenting" is not the invention of Dong Jiuxuan. During the war, the Japanese government and the military department particularly emphasized the construction of so-called national morality, and the slogans at that time included "Without morality, we cannot win" and "'people' can build a bright greater East Asia." The so-called "total repentance of 100 million people" is only a continuation of the slogan of emphasizing the construction of national morality during the war, and it is in line with the theory of advocating war. In addition, before Japan's surrender, the Police And Security Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for Japan's internal security at the time, made a proposal to the Minister of Police in view of the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people with the war, saying that "all kinds of discussions about those responsible for the war and the remarks that undermine military-civilian relations may increase in the future, and that while suppressing it, it is necessary to propagate the view that the current situation should be jointly borne by the military, officials, and the people." Obviously, this proposal is the same as Higashi's "Total Confession of 100 Million People", which aims to tie all Japanese people firmly to the chariot of militarism. This also further proves from the negative side that the "total repentance of 100 million people" proposed by Dong Jiuxuan is actually a continuation of the values of the war, which is contrary to the reflection of denying the war of aggression.
Although the theory of "one hundred million people's total repentance" soon exposed the purpose of those in power to cover up their war responsibilities, just as everything has two sides, there are two sides to the proposition of "one hundred million people always repenting" and the opposition to this proposition.
On the one hand, the theory of "total repentance of one hundred million people" is a nationalistic position in which the government demands the whole people to repent of the reasons for the defeat of the war from the nationalist standpoint of "total strength war", and does not require any repentance for the responsibility of launching a war of aggression, thus covering up the responsibility of the war guide to launch and lead the war of aggression. However, the accusations of the "moral decadence" of the Japanese in the war, which is involved in the theory of "100 million people always repenting", are not unfounded. The "moral decadence" caused by the war is a problem that has a huge destructive impact on Japanese society, and it is impossible to achieve moral reconstruction in post-war Japan without facing up to the "moral decadence" of the Japanese people. In this sense, "moral reconstruction" is indeed an important issue that the entire Japanese nation must seriously face together.
On the other hand, the theory of "total repentance of 100 million people" has the fundamental error of covering up the war responsibility of the war guides, but does not the Japanese people who fully support the war need to think holistically and proactively about the issue of war responsibility? Is it possible to simply shift all responsibility for the war to militarism? This is also a question that the Japanese as a whole need to reflect on.
Demanding that 100 million people confess to the emperor and the government the defeat of the war is certainly a theory that affirms the war, but ignoring the people's war responsibility by criticizing the "100 million people always repenting" will also bias the pursuit of war responsibility in japanese society after the war.