Author: Wu does not understand
Hello, I am Wu Do not understand (LEO), with you to adhere to the lifelong learning of the entrepreneur!
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At the beginning of September, during the period of joint delivery of internal training for a group enterprise with Mr. Chen Song, they chatted deeply until late at night for two consecutive nights, and discussed issues such as strategic planning and decision-making, organizational cohesion, and team execution.
Teacher Chen Song recommended to me three TV series" "The Age of Awakening", "Yongzheng Dynasty" and "Armageddon", which are worth watching and thinking deeply about by every business manager.
Recently, I quickly watched "Armageddon", combined with my practice of serving Party A and Party B for many years, some insights and thoughts to share with you.
An organization, as small as a team of a dozen people to a country of more than a billion people, must have its own inevitability in winning the confrontation with its opponents; and the experience of being overwhelmed by the torrent of history is equally precious.
On the road out of the Liberated Areas and the liberation of all of China, our Party has three major battles that play a decisive role. Why the victory? It has a deep meaning for the development of our enterprise management work:
01
Battle of Liaoshen
Those who want the same thing win, and those who are in the same boat win
The Liaoshen Campaign was the first large-scale battle between the Communists and the Kuomintang, and our Party was inferior in terms of numbers, equipment, terrain, and layout, and normal people with a little common sense could "calculate" the outcome of this battle.
However, the war did not rely on the comparison of explicit indicators to distinguish between victory and defeat, and history could not be assumed, and the result was that the Kuomintang army was defeated for the first time.
The Kuomintang army exposed the following problems in the Liaoshen Campaign:
(1) Light enemies. Think that they will be able to win in a situation where the size of the number, weapons and equipment, and defensive formation are superior;
(2) Hilltop doctrine. There are many hills within the army, responsibilities are blamed on each other, and they all want to protect themselves and their troops, and they cannot form a joint force to fight;
(3) Lack of will to fight. Wei Lihuang, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Northeast Suppression Communist Party, had no determination and preparation for battle from the beginning, and ideologically resisted sending troops to support Jinzhou, and only wanted to defend his own acre and three points of land, so Chiang Kai-shek could not reach an agreement with the northeast generals and missed the fighter;
(4) Greed and aggressiveness. During the Tashan Blockade Battle, before the assembled troops were completed, Que Hanqian, commander of the Kuomintang 54th Army, preemptively launched an attack, in a vain attempt to take Tashan through his own strength, seize the merits and seize the fame, but encountered the stubborn resistance of the People's Liberation Army and had no choice but to retreat;
(5) Peer command. It was difficult to coordinate, and during the Tashan Blockade Battle, Chiang Kai-shek ignored Chen Tie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General" sent by Wei Lihuang to Huludao, and directly arranged for Que Hanqian to take command, but he was unable to mobilize Lin Weili, commander of the 62nd Army at his level, let alone mobilize the coordination of naval and air forces.
In the Liaoshen Campaign, the People's Liberation Army showed strong combat effectiveness and popular centripetal force, which was manifested as:
(1) Implement land reform to win the hearts and minds of the people. In the local area, it can replenish the living force on the spot, obtain the support and assistance of the people on the battlefield, and form a strong logistical support corps;
(2) The soldiers of the People's Liberation Army know what they are fighting for and for whom they are fighting, and the popular slogans of "fighting the local tyrants, dividing up the land" and "overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and liberating all of China" have stimulated the will to fight and the determination to fight of the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army;
(3) The team decision-making mechanism should be superior to the individual arbitrariness. The information and intelligence collected by Chiang Kai-shek in the rear areas were often erroneous, resulting in his lack of understanding of the real situation on the battlefield, and the decisions he made often ran counter to the actual situation, and in sharp contrast, the decision-making team of the supreme leaders composed of comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, and other comrades jointly discussed strategic arrangements and consulted with Lin Biao, Su Yu, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and others on the front line to jointly achieve strategic goals;
(4) Prepare for the worst and make the greatest determination. Some people believe that Lin Biao's hesitation almost missed the fighter, but under the circumstances at that time, it was really difficult to decide, before the big decision, it was not only courage to consider, but to consider how to take the next step after the worst situation occurred, not just a desperate bet. But after making up your mind, you will resolutely achieve the goal, regardless of casualties, and achieve the goal at all costs.
( Source: Douban @ Armageddon )
02
Battle of Huaihai
Only by strategizing can we win a decisive victory
The Battle of Huaihai was a turning point in the liberation of the whole country, and the Kuomintang army had the following problems:
(1) The general is incompetent and exhausts the three armies. Chiang Kai-shek appointed Liu Zhi as the commander-in-chief of the Xuzhou Suppression Of the Communists, known as "General Pig", who coveted enjoyment, indulged in the sound of silence, failed to lay out the battlefield in time, and made his war situation passive;
(2) People who can't hear the gunfire are making decisions. Chiang Kai-shek's order to du Yuming's handwritten letter on the battlefield of Huaihai directly led to the arrest and annihilation of Du Yuming and his subordinates, and the few talents who could be used were also turned into prisoners;
(3) Nepotism. Chiang Kai-shek always arranged for his own generals to serve as "number one" in the ranks of generals, and he was well aware of Liu Zhi's ability, but in the face of ability, Chiang Kai-shek attached more importance to the loyalty of his concubines, and from the side, he also reported that for so many years, the Kuomintang had not regained the hearts of the people, nor did it have a mature talent training mechanism.
In the Battle of Huaihai, the Plaster demonstrated good teamwork and execution:
(1) The rapid march is one of the magic weapons for the PLA to win in various battlefields. Running through four wheels with two legs is a multiple test of the warrior's ability, quality, and will, and is also the best embodiment of execution, not afraid of difficulties, dare to rush first;
(2) Su Yu, in coordination with Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, and Chen Yi's troops, played a very beautiful combination of punches, was able to move still, dared to rush, coordinated with each other for the same strategic goal, suppressed all kinds of breakthroughs of the Kuomintang army with absolute execution and coordination, formed multiple encirclements, and laid the foundation for victory in the campaign;
(3) Logistics support, the people's desire. In this huge number of participants in the battle, the Kuomintang army ran out of ammunition, but the People's Liberation Army relied on the continuous delivery of materials to the front line, and even reached the role of recruiting and demoting a part of the Kuomintang army, and in the third stage of the campaign, the ratio of the number of troops participating in the battle to the civilian workers in the front was as high as 1:9, and this unprecedented and vast manpower mobilization ability guaranteed the material supply of the frontline soldiers and encouraged the determination of the combat soldiers to win victory;
(4) The Battle of Huaihai is also a campaign in which the achievements of the underground workers of our Party are concentrated, and through organized counter-offensive work, it has effectively attacked the combat confidence of the Kuomintang army, and has also effectively replenished the effective strength and weapons and equipment of the People's Liberation Army;
(5) Knowing oneself and knowing the other can never be defeated. Su Yu accurately judged Du Yuming's operational policy and retreat route, deployed heavy troops on his retreat route, and completely annihilated the main force of the Kuomintang army in East China, so that the troops of the Kuomintang army could only retreat to the area south of the Yangtze River, and the PLA gained greater strategic space and strategic resources.
03
Battle of Pingjin
Tactical success does not reverse strategic blunders
Fu Zuoyi could have fought for greater initiative, but the following points made him pay more:
(1) For the form of misjudgment, want to promote the talk with defense, and get greater political gains, did not expect that the combat strength of the People's Liberation Army was already so strong, quickly took Zhangjiakou and Tianjin, and also lured the snake out of the hole, eliminating the 35th Army of Fu Zuoyi's main force, making it a toothless tiger;
(2) With the collapse of the 35th Army, Guo Jingyun, as the commander of the army, made a mistake that killed him. When Fu Zuoyi ordered Guo Jingyun to retreat to Beiping, Guo Jingyun did not immediately carry out Fu Zuoyi's orders, and the cars that were originally prepared to transport the officers and men of the 258th Division of the 104th Army were used by Guo to load the machines and flour of the Zhangjiakou Machine Repair Institute, as well as the families of dignitaries and big businessmen. It was not until the afternoon of the 6th that Guo Bu began to set off, and the departure time was more than 7 hours later than the time ordered by Fu Zuoyi, and it was these precious few hours that allowed the People's Liberation Army that came to pursue to take the opportunity to take it, which was really due to small mistakes;
(3) Chen Changjie, who insisted on Tianjin, overestimated the stability of the city defense, underestimated the strength of the People's Liberation Army," and finally misjudged the direction of the PEOPLE's Liberation Army's attack, which led to the rapid fall of Tianjin, and because he valued brotherhood, the eldest brother Fu Zuoyi did not speak, and resolutely did not give up resistance, resulting in The loss of some industrial and commercial infrastructure in Tianjin.
In the Battle of Pingjin, because Cheng Zihua, commander of the Northeast Advance Corps, misjudged the number of Miyun guards because of intelligence errors, and wanted to take Miyun by hand, this fight not only woke Fu Zuoyi, urgently let the 35th Army retreat, and delayed the failure to occupy Huailai to cut off the Pingzhang Line, if it were not for Guo Jingyun's own reasons for a delay of several hours, I am afraid that the battle situation would be a different situation.
Fortunately, after the fall of Tianjin, Fu Zuoyi in Beiping was able to proceed from the overall situation, did not stubbornly resist, protected Beijing's cultural monuments, and also avoided the erosion of the people of Beiping from war.
History cannot be changed, but in the process of moving forward, we can constantly sum up the experience of our predecessors to take the road of the future.
Shopping malls are like battlefields, strategy is the direction, management is the layout, and execution is the world.
The failures and victories in each battle, the problems or achievements in them, can be mapped to the daily team management, project operation, enterprise operation and management work, and are closely related. Chiang Kai-shek's 10 mistakes in the decision-making of personnel in the three major battles illustrate this point.
Let us draw experience from the war situation, sum up the lessons, and take the road of "managing people and directors" together.
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