War and Strategic Issues

(November 6, 1938)

　　* This was part of mao zedong's conclusion at the enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The conclusion was made on November 5 and 6, 1938, and this part was spoken on the sixth day. In his articles "The Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" and "On Protracted War," Mao Zedong had already solved the problem of the Party's leadership of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Comrades who have made the mistake of right opportunism deny independence and autonomy in the united front, and therefore adopt an attitude of doubt and opposition to the Party's policy on war and strategic questions. In order to overcome this right-leaning opportunism in the Party, to enable the whole Party to have a clearer understanding of the primacy of the war and strategic questions on the question of the Chinese revolution, and to mobilize the whole Party to conscientiously carry out this work, Mao Zedong at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee again focused on this issue from the historical aspect of China's political struggle, and at the same time explained the process of the development of our military work and the specific changes in our strategic principles, thus achieving the unity of the whole Party in terms of leadership ideology and work.

I. Chinese characteristics and revolution

　　The central task and the highest form of war revolution is the armed seizure of power, the solution of the problem by war. This Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principle is universally correct, both in China and abroad.

　　But under the same principle, the performance of the proletarian party in carrying out this principle under various conditions is inconsistent on the basis of different conditions. In the capitalist countries, in the period of absence of fascism and without war, the condition there is that there is no feudal system within the state, there is a bourgeois democratic system; there is no external national oppression, and some are oppressed by their own nations. On the basis of these characteristics, the task of the proletarian parties in the capitalist countries is to, after a long and legitimate struggle, to educate the workers, to live in strength and to prepare for the final overthrow of capitalism. There, it was a long and legitimate struggle, the use of parliamentary pulpits, economic and political strikes, the organization of trade unions and the education of the workers. The form of organization there is legal, and the form of struggle is bloodless (non-war). On the question of war, the Communist Party there is an imperialist war against its own country; if such a war occurs, the Party's policy is to bring down the reactionary government of its own country. The war he wanted was only a civil war in preparation.[1] But such a war should not be waged until the bourgeoisie is in a real impotence, until the majority of the proletariat has the determination to launch an armed uprising and wage war, until the peasant masses have voluntarily aided the proletariat. When it comes to uprisings and wars, it is again the first occupation of the cities and then the attack on the countryside, not the opposite. All this was done by the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries and confirmed in the October Revolution in Russia.

　　China is different. China is characterized by the fact that it is not an independent democratic country, but a semi-colonial and semi-feudal state; that there is no democratic system at home, but is oppressed by the feudal system; that there is no national independence externally, but that it is oppressed by imperialism. Thus, there is no parliament to exploit, and the legal right of unorganized workers to strike. Here, the task of the Communist Party is basically not to enter into insurrection and war after a long and legal struggle, nor to occupy the cities first and then to take the countryside, but to take the opposite path.

　　As for the Communist Party of China, when imperialism is not armed, it will either wage a civil war against the warlords (the lackeys of imperialism) together with the bourgeoisie, such as the Guangdong War of 1924-1927[2] and the Northern Expedition; or unite the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie in a civil war against the landlord class and the comprador bourgeoisie (also the lackeys of imperialism), such as the agrarian revolutionary war of 1927-1936. When imperialism is launching an armed offensive, it is all classes and strata in the United Nations that oppose foreign aggressors waging foreign national wars, such as the present War of Resistance Against Japan.

　　All this shows the difference between China and capitalist countries. In China, the main form of struggle is war, while the main form of organization is the army. Everything else, such as the organization of the people and the struggle of the people, and so on, is very important, must be indispensable, must not be ignored, but is for the sake of war. All organizations and struggles before the outbreak of war were aimed at preparing for war, such as the Period from the May Fourth Movement (1919) to the May Thirtieth Movement (1925). For example, during the Northern Expedition, all organizations and struggles in the rear of the revolutionary army were directly coordinated with the war, and all organizations and struggles in the areas ruled by the Beiyang warlords were indirectly coordinated with the war. Another example is the period of the agrarian revolutionary war, when all the organizations and struggles within the red areas directly cooperated with the war, and all the organizations and struggles outside the red areas indirectly cooperated with the war. For example, in the present period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, all the organizations and struggles in the rear of the anti-Japanese army and in the areas occupied by the enemy army are also directly or indirectly coordinated with the war.

　　"In China, it is the armed revolution against the armed counter-revolution. This is one of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution. [3] Comrade Stalin's assertion is entirely correct; it is true both in terms of the Northern Expedition, in the agrarian revolutionary war, and in today's War of Resistance Against Japan. These wars are revolutionary wars, the objects of war are counter-revolution, and the main ingredients participating in the war are revolutionary people; the difference is only between civil wars or national wars; or wars waged by the Communist Party alone, or by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Of course, these distinctions are important. These indicate that there are broad and narrow distinctions between the main body of the war (the unity of workers and peasants, or the union of the workers and peasants bourgeoisie), and the distinction between the internal and external objects of war (against the enemy at home, or against the enemy abroad; the enemy at home is divided into beiyang warlords or the Kuomintang), and indicate that the Chinese revolutionary war has different contents in various periods of its historical process. However, all armed revolutions oppose armed counter-revolutions, both are revolutionary wars, and all express the characteristics and merits of the Chinese revolution. The thesis that revolutionary war "is one of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution" is fully suited to the Chinese situation. The main and almost initial task of the Chinese proletarian party is to unite as many allies as possible, to organize the armed struggle, to oppose internal or external armed counter-revolution, as the case may be, and to struggle for the emancipation of the nation and society. In China, without armed struggle, there is no proletariat and no Communist Party, and no revolutionary task can be accomplished.

　　In this regard, in the five or six years from the founding of our Party in 1921 to its participation in the Northern Expedition in 1926, there was insufficient understanding. At that time, I did not understand the extreme importance of armed struggle in China, did not seriously prepare for war and organize the army, and did not pay attention to the study of military strategy and tactics. In the course of the Northern Expedition, the army's struggle was ignored and one-sided emphasis was placed on the popular movement, and as a result, once the Kuomintang reacted, all popular movements collapsed. For a long time after 1927, many comrades continued to focus on the central task of the Party in preparing for the urban uprising and the work in the white areas. The fundamental change of some comrades on this question was after the third victory of "encirclement and suppression" against the enemy in 1931. But there has been no change in the whole Party, and some comrades still do not think as we do now.

　　Experience tells us that China's problems cannot be solved without armed forces. Understanding this is of interest to the future victorious War of Resistance Against Japan. The concrete facts of the armed resistance of the whole people in the War of Resistance Against Japan will educate the whole Party to further understand the importance of this issue, and every Party member must always be ready to be armed to the front. At this meeting, we also decided that the main aspect of the party's work was in the theater of operations and behind enemy lines, and gave a clear policy. This is still a good medicine for some Party members who are willing to do the work of the Party organization and the work of the popular movement, but are unwilling to study and participate in the war, and some schools do not pay attention to encouraging students to go to the front, and so on. Most of the work of party organization and mass movement in Chinese territory is directly linked to armed struggle, and there is no separate isolated party work or popular movement. In some rear areas that are farther away from the theater (such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan) and some areas controlled by the enemy (such as Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing, and Shanghai), the Party's organizational work and popular movements are also coordinated with the war, and can only and should only obey the demands of the front. In a word, the whole party must pay attention to war, study military affairs, and prepare for war.

Ii. The War History of the Chinese Kuomintang

　　It is useful for us to look at the history of the Kuomintang and to see how attentive it was to the war.

　　From the time Sun Yat-sen organized the small revolutionary group, he carried out several armed uprisings against the Qing Dynasty. In the league period, it was full of deeds of armed uprisings[6], until the Xinhai Revolution[7] which overthrew the Qing Dynasty by force. During the period of the Chinese Revolutionary Party, an armed anti-Yuan movement was carried out. Later navies going south[9], the Guilin Northern Expedition [10] and the founding of Huangpu [11] were all Sun Yat-sen's war causes.

　　Chiang Kai-shek replaced Sun Yat-sen and created the military era of the Kuomintang's heyday. He saw the army as life, and experienced three periods: the Northern Expedition, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek over the past decade has been counter-revolutionary. For the sake of counter-revolution, he created a huge "Central Army". If there is an army, it has the right, and war solves everything, and he grasps this base point very tightly. We should learn from him about this. In this respect, both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our gentlemen.

　　After the Xinhai Revolution, all warlords loved the soldiers as their lives, and they all valued the principle of "having an army, having the right".

　　Tan Yanmin [12] was a clever bureaucrat who made several mistakes in Hunan and never became an oligarchic governor, but an overseer and governor. He later became chairman of the Nationalist governments in Guangdong and Wuhan, and was also the commander of the Second Army. There are many such warlords in China, and they all understand the characteristics of China.

　　There are also some political parties in China that do not want the army, the main one of which is the Progressive Party,[13] but it also understands that it is necessary to rely on a warlord to have officials. Yuan Shikai[14], Duan Qirui[15], and Chiang Kai-shek (who was attached to Chiang Kai-shek, a part of the Progressive Party that transformed into the Department of Political Science[16]) became its patrons.

　　A few small parties with a short history, such as the Al-Shabaab[17], did not have an army, so they could not make a name for themselves.

　　The bourgeois parties of foreign countries do not need to directly control a part of the army. China is different, because of the feudal division, the landlord or bourgeois clique or party, whoever has a gun has the power, and whoever has more guns has the greatest power. The proletarian party in such an environment must see clearly the centre of the problem.

　　Communists do not compete for their personal military power (they must never fight for it, never learn from Zhang Guotao again), but they must fight for the party's military power and the people's military power. Now it is a national war of resistance, and it is still necessary to fight for the national military power. If you suffer from infantile disease on the issue of military power, you will not get anything. The working people, who have been deceived and intimidated by the reactionary ruling class for thousands of years, are not easily aware of the importance of their own gun. The oppression of Japanese imperialism and the war of resistance of the whole people have put the working people on the stage of war, and communists should become the most conscious leaders of this war. Every Communist Party member should understand this truth: "Power comes out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must not be allowed to command the Party. But with guns, it is indeed possible to build a party, and the Eighth Route Army has created a big party in North China. It is also possible to build cadres, schools, cultures, and popular movements. Everything in Yan'an is made by the barrel of a gun. Everything came out of the barrel of the gun. From the Marxist point of view of the doctrine of the state, the army is the main component of state power. Whoever wants to seize state power and keep it should have a strong army. Some people laugh at us as "war omnipotent", yes, we are revolutionary war omnipotents, this is not bad, it is good, it is Marxist. The guns of the Russian Communist Party created a socialism. We want to build a democratic republic. The experience of the class struggle in the epoch of imperialism tells us that the working class and the toiling masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and the landlords only with the force of a gun; in this sense we can say that the whole world can be transformed only with the barrel of a gun. We are war abolitionists, we do not want war; but we can only eliminate war through war, and we must pick up the barrel of a gun without a gun.

3. The War History of the Communist Party of China

　　Although our Party did not understand the importance of directly preparing for war and organizing the army in the three or four years from 1921 (the founding of the Communist Party of China) to 1924 (the First National Congress of the Kuomintang); from 1924 to 1927, and even for a period after that, it did not understand this; but from 1924 onwards, when it joined the Whampoa Military School, it has entered a new stage and begun to understand the importance of the military. After assisting the Kuomintang in the Guangdong War and the Northern Expedition, the Party had taken control of a part of the army. The revolution failed and learned a bitter lesson, so the Nanchang Uprising[19], the Autumn Harvest Uprising[20] and the Guangzhou Uprising [21] entered a new period of creating the Red Army. This period is an extremely critical period for our Party to thoroughly understand the importance of the army. Without the Red Army of this period and the wars waged by it, that is to say, if the Communist Party had adopted Chen Duxiu's abolitionism, the war of resistance against Japan today and its long-term support could not have been imagined.

　　The emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee on August 7, 1927[22] opposed political right opportunism and took the Party a step further. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931[23] it nominally opposed political "Left" opportunism and in fact re-offended the mistake of "Left" opportunism. The content and historical role of these two conferences are not the same, but neither conference focuses on the question of war and strategy, which is a reflection that the focus of the Party's work at that time was not yet on war. After the Party Central Committee moved to the Red Zone in 1933, the situation changed radically, but with regard to the question of war (and all the main problems), it made a mistake of principle, resulting in serious losses in the revolutionary war. The Zunyi Conference of 1935 was mainly to oppose opportunism in the war and to put the question of war first, which was a reflection of the war environment. Up to now, we can confidently say that in the course of seventeen years of struggle, the Communist Party of China has not only tempered a strong Marxist political line, but also a strong Marxist military line. We will not only use Marxism to solve political problems, but also to solve the problem of war; we have not only created a large number of powerful backbones who can govern the party and the country, but also a large number of powerful backbones who can govern the army. This is the flower of revolution watered by the blood of countless martyrs, which is not only the glory of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, but also the glory of the world Communist Party and the people of the world. In the world, there are only three armies under the leadership of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, China and Spain, which belong to the proletariat and the working people, and the parties of other countries have no military experience, so our army and military experience are particularly valuable.

　　In order to successfully carry out today's War of Resistance Against Japan, it is very important to expand and consolidate the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and all the guerrilla units under the leadership of our Party. Under this principle, the Party shall send the best and sufficient number of Party members and cadres to the front. For the sake of victory on the front line, the organizational task must be subordinated to the political task.

The transformation of the Party's military strategy in the civil and national wars

　　The question of changes in our Party's military strategy deserves to be studied. It is divided into two processes: civil war and national war.

　　The process of civil war can be roughly divided into two strategic periods. In the early stages, guerrilla warfare was mainly the main one; in the later period, it was mainly regular warfare. However, the so-called regular war is of the Chinese type, which is only manifested in the concentration of forces to fight a movement war and in a certain degree of centralization and planning in command and organization; the others are still guerrilla, low-level, cannot be generalized with foreign armies, and are somewhat different from the Kuomintang army. Thus, this kind of regular warfare is, in a sense, an enhanced guerrilla warfare.

　　In the course of the War of Resistance Against Japan, as far as the military tasks of our Party are concerned, they will also be roughly divided into two strategic periods. In the early stage (including the two stages of strategic defense and strategic stalemate), guerrilla warfare was the mainstay; in the later stage (the stage of strategic counteroffensive), the main thing would be regular warfare. However, the guerrilla war in the early stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the guerrilla war in the early stage of the Civil War have many different contents, because the regular (to some extent) Eighth Route Army is used to disperse the guerrilla tasks; the regular war in the later period of the War of Resistance Against Japan will also be different from the regular war in the later stage of the Civil War. At this time, the army will gain a high degree of centralization and organization, the operation will gain a high degree of regularity, greatly reducing its guerrilla nature, the low-level will change to the high-level, and the Chinese-type will change to the world-type. This will be the cause in the phase of the strategic counter-offensive.

　　From this point of view, between the two processes of the civil war and the War of Resistance Against Japan and the four strategic periods, there were three strategic changes. The first is the shift between civil guerrilla warfare and domestic regular warfare. Second, the shift between the regular civil war and the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. Third, the transition between the anti-Japanese guerrilla war and the anti-Japanese regular war.

　　Of the three transformations, the first one had encountered great difficulties. There are two aspects of the task here. On the one hand, it is necessary to oppose the tendency of Right-wing localism and guerrillaism to indulge in guerrillaism and unwilling to change to regularity, which arises as a result of the cadres' underestimation of the changed hostility and tasks. In this regard, in the case of the central red area, there has been arduous educational work, which has gradually transformed it. On the other hand, it is necessary to oppose the tendency to attach too much importance to the regularization of "Left" centralism and adventurism, which occurs because some leading cadres overestimate the enemy situation and tasks and mechanically apply foreign experience without looking at the facts. In this regard, in the central red area, it was once a long period of three years (before the Zunyi Conference) that great sacrifices were made before they were corrected from the lessons of blood. This correction was the result of the Zunyi Conference[25].

　　The second shift was between two different courses of war, which occurred in the autumn of 1937 (after the Lugou Bridge Incident). At this time, the enemy is new, that is, Japanese imperialism, the friendly forces are the enemies of the past, the Kuomintang (which is still hostile to us), and the battlefield is the vast territory of North China (temporarily frontal of our army, but soon it will become a long-term enemy rear). Our strategic shift is an extremely serious one in these exceptional circumstances. In these special circumstances, it is necessary to transform the regular army and mobile warfare of the past into guerrilla warfare (decentralized use, not organizational and disciplined) and guerrilla warfare in order to be compatible with the enemy's situation and tasks. But such a transformation is phenomenally manifested as a retrogressive transformation, so this transformation should be very difficult. What may occur at this time is, on the one hand, the tendency to lightly attack the enemy, and on the other hand, the disease of fear of the Sun, which all happened in the Kuomintang. When the Kuomintang changed from the battlefield of the civil war to the battlefield of the national war, it suffered many undue losses mainly due to the light enemy and the existence of a Disease of Japanese Phobia (represented by Han Fuyu and Liu Zhi [26]). Yet we carried out this transformation quite smoothly, and instead of being defeated, we were greatly victorious. This was obtained by the fact that the broad masses of cadres received the correct guidance of the Central Committee at the right time and observed the situation flexibly, although there was once a serious dispute between the Central Committee and some military cadres. This change has a bearing on the persistence, development and victory of the entire War of Resistance Against Japan and on the great future of the Communist Party of China, and one need only think of the historical significance of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the destiny of China's national liberation. China's anti-Japanese guerrilla war, in terms of its peculiar vastness and protracted nature, is unprecedented not only in the East, but also in the entire history of mankind.

　　As for the third transition from the anti-Japanese guerrilla war to the anti-Japanese regular war, it belongs to the future of the development of the war, and it is estimated that new situations and new difficulties will occur at that time, and it is possible not to say it now.

V. The Strategic Position of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War

　　In the general sense of the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular war is the main thing, and guerrilla war is auxiliary, because the final fate of the War of Resistance Against Japan can only be resolved by regular war. As far as the whole country is concerned, of the three strategic stages (defense, stalemate, and counter-offensive) of the whole process of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the first and last stages are mainly regular wars, supplemented by guerrilla warfare. In the intermediate stage, because of the situation in which the enemy is conservatively occupying the territory and when we are prepared to counterattack but are not yet able to carry out a counter-offensive, guerrilla warfare will take the form of the main form, supplemented by regular warfare; but this is only one of the three stages of the whole war, although it may be the longest. Therefore, in general, regular warfare is the principal and guerrilla warfare is auxiliary. Without understanding this situation, without understanding that regular war is the key to resolving the final fate of war, and without paying attention to the construction of the regular army and the study and guidance of regular warfare, Japan cannot be defeated. That's one thing.

　　But guerrilla warfare occupies an important strategic position in the whole war. Without guerrilla warfare, neglect of the building of guerrillas and guerrilla armies, and neglect of the study and guidance of guerrilla warfare, Japan will not be able to defeat Japan. The reason is that most of China will become the rear of the enemy, and if there is no guerrilla war of the broadest and most persistent, and if the enemy is allowed to sit in peace and occupy without any worries, then the damage to our frontal main force will be greater, the enemy's offensive will be even more rampant, it will be difficult to stand in a stalemate situation, and it may be possible to shake the continuation of the war of resistance; that is, if not, our counter-offensive forces will not be prepared enough, there will be no response at the time of the counter-offensive, and the enemy's attrition may be compensated. If these circumstances arise and a large-scale and persistent guerrilla war is not developed in time to overcome it, it will be impossible to defeat Japan. Therefore, although guerrilla warfare occupies an auxiliary position in the war as a whole, it occupies an extremely important strategic position. To resist Japan and ignore guerrilla warfare is undoubtedly very wrong. That's another aspect.

　　The possibility of guerrilla warfare exists as long as the conditions of a great power exist, so there were also guerrilla wars in ancient times. But the persistence of guerrilla warfare can only emerge under the leadership of the Communist Party. Therefore, most of the guerrilla wars in ancient times were failed guerrilla wars, and only the modern great powers with communist parties, such as the Soviet Union and China during the civil war, had victorious guerrilla wars. On the question of war, the division of labor between the two parties of the Communist Party of China in the War of Resistance Against Japan, as far as the present and general conditions are concerned, the Kuomintang is responsible for frontal regular warfare and the Communist Party for guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines is necessary, appropriate, mutually necessary, mutually cooperative, and mutually assistive.

　　From this we can understand how important and necessary it is for our Party's military strategic policy to change from a regular war in the later stages of the civil war to a guerrilla war in the early stages of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Combining its advantages, there are the following eighteen items: (i) shrinking the enemy's occupied territory; (ii) expanding our army's base area; (iii) the defensive stage, in coordination with frontal combat, dragging the enemy back; (iv) the stage of holding hands, insisting on the enemy's rear base areas, which is conducive to the frontal reorganization of the army; (v) the counter-offensive stage, in coordination with the front, to restore the lost territory; (vi) the most rapid and effective expansion of the army; (vii) the most universal development of the Communist Party, and the organization of branches in every rural area; (viii) the most universal development of the popular movement, and the entire people behind enemy lines, except for the enemy's strongholds (ix) The most universal establishment of a democratic anti-Japanese regime; (x) the most universal development of anti-Japanese culture and education; (xi) the most universal improvement of the people's livelihood; (xi) the most convenient disintegration of the enemy's army; (xiii) the most universal and lasting influence on the hearts and minds of the whole country and the invigorating the morale of the whole country; (xiv) the most universal promotion of the progress of friendly armies and friendly parties; (fifteen) suited to the conditions for the enemy's strength and our weakness, so that we can suffer less losses and win more battles; (16) conditions suitable for the enemy's small and large, so that the enemy will suffer more losses. Fight fewer battles; (xvii) create a large number of leading cadres most quickly and effectively; (xviii) the most convenient solution to the problem of subsistence.

　　In the course of protracted struggle, there is no doubt that guerrillas and guerrilla warfare should not cease in their original positions, but should develop to an advanced stage and gradually become a regular army and a regular war. We will, through guerrilla warfare, accumulate our strength and make ourselves one of the decisive factors in the crushing of Japanese imperialism.

Sixth, pay attention to the study of military issues

　　All problems of hostility between the two armies depend on war to solve, and China's survival depends on the victory or defeat of war. Therefore, the study of military theory, the study of strategy and tactics, and the study of the political work of the army cannot be postponed. Although the study of tactics is insufficient, the comrades engaged in military work in the past ten years have made many achievements and have put forward many new things in accordance with China's conditions. The study of strategic questions and war theory questions is still limited to the work of a very small number of people. The study of political work has first-class achievements, its experience is rich, and the number of new creations is so good that the whole world except the Soviet Union will count us, but the shortcoming lies in the lack of comprehensiveness and systematization. For the sake of the needs of the whole Party and the whole country, the popularization of military knowledge has become an urgent task. All this should be noted in the future, and the theory of war and strategy is the backbone of everything. From the study of military theory, it is necessary to arouse interest and arouse the attention of the whole Party to the study of military issues.

exegesis

[1] See Lenin, War and Russian Social-Democracy, The Council of Representatives of the Foreign Branches of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, On the Defeat of His Own Government in the Imperialist War (The Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 26, People's Publishing House, 1988, pp. 12-19, 163-169, 297-303) and The Defeat and Revolutionary Crisis in Russia (The Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 27, People's Publishing House, 1990, pp. 31-35). Lenin wrote these works between 1914 and 1915 in response to the imperialist wars of the time. See also Chapter VI, Section III, "Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on The Question of War, Peace and Revolution" in A Concise Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of The Communist Party of The Communist Party of Bulgaria (1975 edition, pp. 185-192).

[2] Refers to the revolutionary war in which the kuomintang-communist cooperation of the revolutionary army against the warlord comprador forces in Guangdong during the first civil revolutionary war. In October 1924, the revolutionary army annihilated the comprador gentry who colluded with British imperialism to launch a rebellion in Guangzhou, the "merchant group". From February to March 1925, the revolutionary army marched from Guangzhou to the east and defeated the main force of the warlord Chen Jiongming, who was occupying the Dongjiang River. In June, the Hui division eliminated the troops of the Yunnan and Gui warlords Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan, who were occupying Guangzhou. From October to November, the Second Crusade was held, which finally eliminated Chen Jiongming's army. At the same time, the revolutionary army divided its troops into southern expeditions to attack the warlord Deng Benyin, who was occupying southwestern Guangdong. In these battles, the members of the Communist Party of China and the communist youth league heroically stood in the forefront of the battle and mobilized the broad masses of workers and peasants to enthusiastically support the revolutionary army. The victories in these battles created the situation of unification of Guangdong at that time and established a rear base for the Northern Expedition.

[3] See Stalin, On the Future of the Chinese Revolution (Selected Works of Stalin, Vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 487).

[4] See Part IV of the Appendix to the article "Study and The Situation" in Volume III of this book, "Resolutions on Certain Historical Questions".

[5] In 1894, Sun Yat-sen organized a small revolutionary group of a bourgeois nature in Honolulu, called the Xingzhong Association. After the defeat of the Qing government in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Sun Yat-sen relied on the xingzhong association to contact the party and organized two armed uprisings against qing rule in Guangdong, namely the Battle of Guangzhou in 1895 and the Battle of Huizhou in 1900.

[6] In 1905, Xingzhong, together with other anti-Qing groups, the Huaxing Association, and other anti-Qing groups, formed the League of Chinese Bourgeois Revolutionary Groups in Tokyo, Japan, and adopted the bourgeois revolutionary program proposed by Sun Yat-sen of "expelling the Tartars, restoring China, establishing the Republic of China, and equalizing land rights." Under the leadership and influence of the League, the Revolutionary Federation Party and the New Army launched a number of armed uprisings, the main ones being: the Battle of Liling in Liuyang, Pingxiang in 1906, the Battle of Huanggang in Chaozhou, the Battle of Huizhou, the Battle of Qin (Zhou) Lian (Zhou) and the Battle of Zhennanguan (present-day Guangxi Friendship Pass) in 1908, the Battle of Shangsi and the Battle of Yunnan Hekou in 1908, the Battle of Guangzhou in 1910, the Battle of Guangzhou and the Wuchang Uprising in 1911.

[7] See Note [3] in the first volume of this book, "Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan".

[8] In 1912, the League reorganized into the Kuomintang and compromised with the rule of the Beiyang warlord Yuan Shikai. In 1913, Yuan Shikai sent an army south in an attempt to eliminate the Kuomintang forces in Jiangxi, Anhui, Guangdong and other provinces, and Sun Yat-sen once launched an armed revolt, but soon failed. In 1914, sun Yat-sen, in view of his compromise with Yuan Shikai, organized a separate Chinese Revolutionary Party in Tokyo, Japan, to distinguish himself from the Kuomintang at that time. The Chinese Revolutionary Party is a bourgeois revolutionary party, and it actively carried out armed anti-Yuan movements, the main ones being: the uprisings in Chenxian and Guiyang in Hunan in 1914, the uprisings in Huizhou, Shunde and other places in Guangdong, and the uprisings in Zhaohe warships in Shanghai in 1915. In December 1915, Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor, and Cai Yi and other anti-Yuan forces launched a war against Yuan in Yunnan. Sun Yat-sen was an active advocate and activist of the armed anti-Yuan campaign at that time, and the Chinese revolutionaries under his leadership launched armed uprisings against Yuan in Guangdong, Shandong and other places.

[9] In 1917, Sun Yat-sen and the navy under his influence went from Shanghai to Guangzhou, based in Guangdong, to unite with the southwestern warlords who opposed the Beiyang warlord Duan Qirui at that time to organize a military government against Duan.

[10] In 1921, Sun Yat-sen was in Guilin, Guangxi, preparing for the Northern Expedition. In 1922, he moved to Shaoguan, Guangdong Province, and officially went on to the Northern Expedition. Due to the collusion of his subordinate Chen Jiongming with the Beiyang warlords to stage a rebellion, the Northern Expedition did not bear fruit.

[11] In 1924, Sun Yat-sen, with the help of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union, established the Army Officer School in Huangpu, the eastern suburbs of Guangzhou, and in 1926 it was reorganized into the Central Military and Political School, commonly known as the Whampoa Military Academy. Before Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution in 1927, it was a revolutionary military academy cooperated by the Kuomintang and the Communists. Sun Yat-sen concurrently served as the premier of the military academy, Liao Zhongkai served as the school party representative, and Chiang Kai-shek served as the principal. The Chinese Communists Zhou Enlai, Yun Daiying, Xiao Chunu, Xiong Xiong, Nie Rongzhen, and other comrades successively held political and other work in this school, and trained a large number of backbone cadres for the revolutionary army at that time with the revolutionary spirit, including many communists and members of the Communist Youth League.

[12] Tan Yanmin (1880–1930), a native of Chaling, Hunan, was a Hanlin of the late Qing Dynasty. Originally advocated a constitutional monarchy, it was followed by the Xinhai Revolution. His participation in the Kuomintang camp in 1912 reflected the contradictions between the local forces in Hunan and the Beiyang warlords. From 1911 to 1920, he served as the governor of Hunan Province, the governor and the governor of Hunan Province, and the governor and commander-in-chief of the Xiang Army.

[13] The Progressive Party was a political party organized by Liang Qichao and Tang Hualong in 1913, when it was politically dependent on yuan shikai in power and had organized a cabinet. In 1916, the Progressive Party evolved into the "Research Department" and was attached to the ruling Duan Qirui, and in 1917 joined the cabinet organized by Duan Qirui.

[14] See Note [1] on tactics against Japanese imperialism, vol. 1 of this book.

[15] Duan Qirui (1865–1936), a native of Hefei, Anhui, was the leader of the Anhui clan of the Beiyang warlords. He was an old subordinate of Yuan Shikai, who held the central power of the Beiyang warlords several times after Yuan Shikai's death.

[16] The Department of Political Science was originally a generic term for the Political Science Society, a bureaucratic and political group composed of a group of right-wing kuomintang and progressive party elements in 1916. During the reign of the Beiyang warlords, it colluded with the warlords of the North and the South against Sun Yat-sen. Before and after the establishment of the Kuomintang government in Nanjing in 1927, some members of the department successively defected to Chiang Kai-shek to help Him establish and maintain counter-revolutionary rule, and became one of the factions within the Kuomintang, with its main members being Huang Hao, Yang Yongtai, Zhang Qun, and Xiong Shihui.

[17] The Al-Shabaab, the "nationalist" Chinese Youth Party. See the first volume of this book, "Analysis of the Classes of Chinese Society", note [1].

[18] This refers mainly to the Independent Regiment headed by Ye Ting, a member of the Communist Party (see Note [18] in the first volume of this book, The Struggle at Jinggangshan), the Twentieth Army headed by He Long, the Officer Education Corps of the Third Army led by Zhu De, and the Wuhan Branch of the Central Military and Political School.

[19] See Note [37] in the first volume of this book, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War".

[20] See Note [39] in the first volume of this book, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War".

[21] See Volume 1 of this book, Why Did the Red Regime in China Exist? Note [8].

[22] Refers to an emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Hankou. This meeting summed up the lessons learned from the defeat of the first domestic revolutionary war, put an end to chen Duxiu's right-leaning capitulationist rule in the central authorities, determined the general policy of agrarian revolution and armed resistance to the rule of the Kuomintang reactionaries, and made it the most important task of the party at that time to mobilize the peasants to hold an autumn harvest uprising.

[23] Refers to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Shanghai on January 7, 1931. Chen Shaoyu and others, with the support of the Comintern and its representative Mif, gained a leading position in the CENTRAL Committee of the Communist Party of China through this meeting and began the rule of "Left" adventurism in the Party for four years.

[24] See Part IV of the appendix to the article "Strategic Problems of the Chinese Revolutionary War" in Volume I of this book and "Resolutions on Certain Historical Questions" in the appendix to the article "Study and Current Situation" in Volume III of this book.

[25] See Part III, "Resolutions on Certain Historical Questions", appendix to the article "Study and the Situation" in volume III of this book.

[26] Han Fuyu, originally a Kuomintang warlord who ruled Shandong for a long time, served as deputy commander of the Fifth Theater and commander-in-chief of the Third Army after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Liu Zhi, a descendant of Chiang Kai-shek, was originally in Henan, and after the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as the deputy commander of the First Theater and the commander-in-chief of the First Army, responsible for the defense of the areas along the Pinghan Railway in Hebei Province. Both men fled without a fight when the Japanese invading forces attacked. Han Fuyu was executed by Chiang Kai-shek in January 1938 for losing land and misleading the country.