Author: Nerve endings
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="4" > Chen Gongpei went to Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, to negotiate and conclude 11 anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek joint combat agreements</h1>
Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan made clear their attitude to Chen: "In order to expand the national revolutionary war and to implement the repeated declarations of the Central Government of the Soviet Union, the Red Army is willing to conclude a joint combat agreement with the 19th Route Army on the basis of anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek negotiations, first of all to overthrow the traitorous government in Nanjing, with Chiang Kai-shek as the evil leader, and to expel Japan and all imperialism from China." ”
Then, the two talked about the three conditions instructed by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Union. After hearing this, Chen Gongpei said that it was entirely possible to stop attacking the Soviet zone, release political prisoners, and lift the economic blockade. ”
Peng and Teng also pointed out that Liu Heding and Zhou Zhiqun, who had been besieged by the Red Army, were defending the land, and that the 19th Route Army should not be allowed to help each other, and that the two of them had an iron heart to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, and Chen Gongpei also expressed no objection to this.
At present, Chen Gongpei borrowed the radio station of the Eastern Army to report the negotiation situation to Jiang Guangding and Cai Tingkai, but many times they could not get in touch. Finally, Peng Dehuai wrote a letter in his own name to Jiang Guangding and Cai Tingkai, which was brought back by Chen Gongpei.
The letter reads: "Chairman Jiang Guangding and Commander-in-Chief Of Cai Tingjian, Jun Jian: Representatives of the 19th Route Army arrived at Wangtai and read the codexes of the two generals they were holding. We welcome your army's response to the declaration of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Provisional Central Government of our Chinese Soviet Republic of China on January 17, 1933, willing to cooperate with the Red Army in resisting Japan. Your army was originally a northern expeditionary division, and the Songhu War of Resistance was even more meritorious, but in the past and now, it was repeatedly driven by Chiang Kai-shek to participate in the anti-communist 'suppression of redness', which caused the history of your army to be tarnished. Now that the princes have a clear policy, Dehuai immediately reported to the Central Committee of our Party and the Chinese Soviet Government, and suggested that your army send plenipotentiaries to Ruijin to negotiate. At present, in order to avoid the loss of the anti-Japanese forces, the two sides should immediately cease military operations and implement a truce. Specific matters are agreed upon by the Joint Staff Group. Commander of the Eastern Army Peng Dehuai. ”
On September 28, the headquarters of the Eastern Army was moved from Wangtai to Yangkou, and Peng and Teng sent people to escort Chen Gongpei to the other side of Yanping and return to Fuzhou.
After Chen Gongpei returned, he met Cai Tingkai at Youxi's headquarters, and Cai was very happy to see Peng Dehuai's handwritten letter. Jiang Guangding was also happy to hear this. He then telegraphed Chen Mingshu in Hong Kong. Chen Zheng was very happy that Mei Gongbin could not get the point of contacting the CPC, and wen Jiang and Cai were very happy to get in touch with Peng Dehuai, and they sent a telegram to Jiang and Cai and decided to send another representative directly to Ruijin, Jiangxi Province, to meet with the CPC dignitaries.
Jiang and Cai discussed for a while, and then decided to send Xu Minghong, Cai's secretary general. The first is that Xu's identity is appropriate, and the second is that Xu served as the director of the political department of the 11th Army during the Northern Expedition and knew many important people in the CCP. At the moment, Xu Minghong arrived in Ruijin in September with Chen Gongpei. Ran Ruijin's provisional central dignitaries were very indifferent to the arrival of Xu and Chen, but Chairman Mao treated them as if they were guests of honor, so that Xu and Chen could eliminate their unhappiness and vigilance.
After negotiations between the two sides, the Red Army and the 19th Route Army on the front lines of Shunchang, Yanping, Jiangle, and Shaxian in western Fujian were all in a state of truce. On October 26, according to the basic spirit agreed upon by the two sides, Ruijin sent representative Zhang Yunyi and Fuzhou sent representative Chen Xiaohang. Chen Xiaohang was the secretary of the 19th Route Army, and Chen was a great translator, who later changed his name to Luo Yingnan.
The deputies of the two sides signed an 11-article anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek preliminary agreement in Longyan, the main contents of which were: The two sides should cease military operations and immediately make preparations for anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek military operations; the Fujian side should release political prisoners and allow the people to have the right to democracy and freedom; and the two sides should resume trade relations and adopt the principle of mutual assistance and cooperation. The two sides also delineated neutral zones.
Soon, Chen Gongpei went to Ruijin to negotiate, and at this time the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China said that the Third Party was worse than the Kuomintang and had more deception to the people. Although Peng Dehuai did not agree with their closed-door view, he felt that he could not come up with any reason. At this time, he had a sense of inferiority, and felt that intellectuals always had his crooked reasoning.
For example, when Chen Gongpei first came, the Central Committee reprimanded him for not receiving a good reception, criticizing him for not paying enough attention, and now saying that the Third Party is worse than the Kuomintang, what Peng Dehuai cannot understand most is that the 19th Route Army's anti-Chiang Kai-shek anti-Japanese resistance is what is so bad about the Red Army?
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="6" > In the face of the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the Central Revolutionary Military Commission insisted on attacking General Le and Shunchang, and still did not take it for a month</h1>
On April 11, 1933, Chiang Kai-shek held a public security conference in Nanchang in the seven provinces of Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Henan, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong, and deployed the fifth "encirclement and suppression" matter.
On June 8, Chiang Kai-shek held a military conference in Lushan to "suppress Chi" in the five provinces of Gansu, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan and Hubei, and on June 25 ordered the establishment of the "Lushan Officer Training Corps" in Lushan. Training of "Chi Chi" officers.
On October 10, Chiang Kai-shek's fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Central Soviet Region began. Shi Jiang used a total of 1 million troops, desperately.
At a time when Chiang Kai-shek was doing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Jiangxi Soviet region in a down-to-earth manner, Bogu and other "Left" provisional central authorities separated the main forces of the Red 1 Front army to engage in so-called "separation operations", and formed the Eastern Army with the Red 3 Corps as the main force to fight the 19th Route Army, which had serious differences with Chiang Kai-shek.
Although the Eastern Army won a series of local battles, the Red Army's own combat effectiveness was quite weakened. However, in the party, government, and army of the Soviet region, due to the fierce criticism of the "Luoming line," the criticism of political movements such as "Deng, Mao, Xie, and Gu," and the "Left" Chatian Movement, precious time was lost in preparations for the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression, and at the same time, the extent of the crisis in the Soviet region was further aggravated.
Faced with the grim enemy situation, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, who were on the front line, believed that the Eastern Army should immediately withdraw and quickly move north to prepare to meet the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang army. On September 12, the Comintern, in the name of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, sent a telegram from Shanghai, in which he asked the Eastern Army to extend the time for fighting in Fujian, and asked the Red 5th Army to transfer another division to the east to create a vast guerrilla area in the chong'an, Pucheng, and Songxi areas on the border between Fujian and Zhejiang.
On September 13, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai received a telegram immediately replying to the CPC Central Committee and transferring it to Shanghai, pointing out that if the Eastern Army continued to fight in Fujian, "the period of going north will be even more delayed... The legion transferred a division to the east, and at present it is really unnecessary to fight only the enemies of Generals (Le), Shun (Chang), and Shao (Wu)," once again emphasizing that the Eastern Army immediately ended the battle and went north. However, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission disagreed with Zhu De and Zhou Enlai's opinion, and still asked the Eastern Army to attack General Le and Shunchang, and stressed that after taking these two counties, it would go north.
The Eastern Army began to attack the cities of Jiangle and Shunchang in late August, but after a month of fighting, the two cities were still not taken. On September 25, the Kuomintang army took the opportunity of the separation of the Red 1st Front into the East and the West, and attacked Lichuan, an important town in the northern part of the Central Soviet Region, with the strength of four divisions. It was also at this time that Li De arrived at the Central Soviet Area.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="8" > the work of the Revolutionary Military Commission was decided by Li De, who copied and adopted a set of Soviet Red Army, and Li Chuan lost</h1>
Since Bogu did not understand military affairs, neither could Xiang Ying, and when Li De came, Bogu felt as if he had caught a life-saving straw and handed over military leadership to Li De. Li Deben was an international adviser, and through Bogu and other packaging, he became the "Chincha Minister" of the Comintern.
The work of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission was completely decided by Li De alone, and the principle of the party's collective leadership was completely abolished. Li De, on the other hand, knew nothing about the situation in China, let alone the special laws of China's revolutionary war, and only took the knowledge he learned in the books to the Red Army and took a seat, and copied and copied a set of copies of the Soviet Red Army.
Just a dozen days after Li De arrived in the Central Soviet Zone, the enemy Zhou Hunyuan commanded three divisions from Nancheng and Saltpeter to Lichuan, the northeast gateway of the Soviet Zone, and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission only arrived late at night on September 25. The headquarters of the Red 1st Front was ordered to "immediately end the eastern front, concentrate on Taining, go out of its northwestern region, and destroy the enemy who is advancing into Lichuan."
Zhu De and Zhou Enlai also urgently sent a telegram to the Eastern Army to concentrate on the Lichuan area in two columns, and asked Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen to lead the Central Army to Nanfeng to contain the Kuomintang army's eastward advance.
Since the troops of the Eastern Army were still scattered in the territory of Yanping, Shaxian, Shunchang, and Jiangle, and were besieging the counties of Jiangle and Shunchang, it was difficult to rush back to Lichuan for a while. On September 27, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission also ordered Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan to quickly move north from Jiangle and Shunchang to the Taining area, "first destroy the enemy who is advancing into Lichuan, and then join forces in the west of Fu (He) and go all out to fight the enemy at Fuhe."
According to the instructions of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the headquarters of the Red 1st Front ordered the main force of the Eastern Army to move north in two columns on September 28. On the same day, Li Chuan lost.
The loss of Li Chuan shocked Li De, Bogu, and Xiang Ying, who were anxious to retake Li Chuan in order to keep the "national gate" and then attack the enemy outside the "national gate", so they ordered Peng Dehuai to lead his troops to retake it.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="21" > received the telegram, Peng Dehuai was very embarrassed, and at the critical moment, he even telegraphed the Revolutionary Military Commission, and the troops withdrew from the battle</h1>
Before the enemy attacked Lichuan, Peng Dehuai had expected that when he and Teng received the telegram to retake Lichuan, they analyzed the enemy's situation and were very embarrassed, because if they directly attacked Lichuan, they would attack the enemy strongly and would be unfavorable to themselves. So it was decided to gather the troops in Taining first, and then attack Shao Wu, lure the enemy deeper, and then destroy the enemy.
On September 29, Peng Dehuai ordered the Eastern Army to divide into two columns, left and right, from Fujian to the north, and reach the northern part of Taining and the southwestern region of Shaowu by October 4, and Teng Daiyuan led his headquarters to Jinkeng, which was close to Lichuan. On October 2, xiang Ying sent two consecutive telegrams on the way of the Eastern Army, believing that the enemy "could not cause a strong fortress if it took only a few days to capture Lichuan."
Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan were very embarrassed to receive a telegram from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and they knew that if they attacked a strong enemy head-on, they would be very unfavorable to themselves, and if they did not attack, they would violate the military order. The two of them studied the enemy situation together with the combatants, thought hard about good strategies, and after some consultation, finally decided to attack the enemy north of Lichuan. The Red 19th Division, which was looking for Huaizhou, attacked from Tongbu to Nancheng to block Nancheng to aid the enemy, and Peng Dehuai led the main force to attack saltpeter through Feiying and Jiaoyang.
After the plan was decided, it was late at night on October 5, so he reported to Zhu De and Zhou Enlai on the one hand, and issued orders to the troops on the other. With the Red 19th Army of Xunhuaizhou as the right column, and Cheng Zihua's Red 13th Division and the Red 20th Division as the left column, they marched according to the predetermined plan. On October 6, the Eastern Army advanced to Feiying, and the Red 4th Division of the vanguard Zhang Xilong and Peng Xuefeng suddenly encountered three regiments led by Ge Zhongshan, commander of the 18th Brigade of the Enemy Zhou 6th Division.
After fierce fighting, Ge's 31st and 34th regiments were defeated, and the remnants retreated to Xunkou, retreating to 9 p.m. under the cover of his 27th regiment, and Xiao Zhiping's 573rd regiment and 576th regiment of the 96th Division stationed in Lichuan were ordered to rush to the aid of Xunkou in the night.
On October 7, the 27th regiment and the 34th regiment of the Kuomintang army were waiting for reinforcements from Lichuan, and the 31st regiment was ordered to escort the wounded soldiers back to Lichuan because of the heavy casualties.
At this time, Zhang Jingwu's Red 3rd Division, which was under the command of the Eastern Army, and the Newly Formed Red 13th Division, led by Chen Bojun and Song Renqian, cut off the communication between Xunkou and Lichuan, cut off the return route of the 31st Regiment of the Kuomintang Army, and blocked the 573rd and 576th Regiments led by Xie Pufu, deputy commander of the Kuomintang Army led by Li Chuanchi to aid The Xunkou Kuomintang Army.
Peng Dehuai ordered the Red 4th, Red 5th, and Red 20th Divisions to depart from Feiying, Wai, and Yangguan respectively, and on the Liantang Mountain Hill three kilometers away from Xunkou, riding on the fog, launched a fierce attack on the enemy troops at Xunkou, and after several hours of fighting, annihilated three regiments of the enemy army (owing one battalion), and captured the enemy brigade commander Ge Zhongshan alive the next morning. In this battle, more than 1,000 guns, 2 mortars, 29 machine guns, 1 radio station, more than 1,100 Kuomintang troops were captured, and more than 700 people were also killed by the Eastern Army.
The Battle of Xunkou was not completely over, and one of Zhou Hunyuan's battalions had not yet been annihilated after it was besieged, so Xiang Ying, in accordance with the saltpeter and Zixi Bridge battle plan formulated by Li De, sent an electric order of "100,000 fires" on October 7 to ask the Eastern Army to attack saltpeter in a hurry, with the aim of breaking through the outskirts of Lichuan and then capturing Lichuan. He also ordered Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen to lead their troops to the vicinity of Lichuan to cooperate in the battle.
Saltpeter is located between Lichuan, Nancheng and Nanfeng, each separated by 20 kilometers, strangling Linan Avenue, which is of an important position. On 29 September, Chen Cheng ordered his 24th Division of Huang Zixian to advance from Nancheng to Saltpeter and fortify the pillars. After Huang Zixian arrived at the saltpeter, he immediately stepped up the construction of the pillar, and by early October, the first and second lines of defense had been formed, forming a solid support point.
At the same time, Chen Cheng was equipped with four divisions in Lichuan and three divisions in Nancheng and Nanfeng.
After Peng Dehuai received the order from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, he did not dare to slacken off. On October 8, Cangshan gathered the main force for combat deployment: Zhang Xilong's Red 4th Division and Peng Shaohui's Red 5th Division were the right column, and the saltpeter attack was attacked from the north of Hanfeng Bridge (locally known as Hangong Bridge); Chen Bojun's Red 13th Division was the left column, attacking from Chen Fang to saltpeter; the Red 19th Division from Xunhuaizhou attacked Hongmen and cut off the enemy's way back; and the main force of Su Yu's Red 20th Division strangled the enemy's northern reinforcements near Tantou Village.
On 9 October, the Eastern Army launched an attack on saltpeter. Shi Chen Cheng ordered Huang Zixian to hold the saltpeter to attract the Red Army, and then dispatched reinforcements to encircle the Red Army in an attempt to annihilate the Red Army near the saltpeter.
Because the Kuomintang army built many fortresses in saltpeter, the Eastern Army fell into the fortress after entering, completely losing the room for maneuver. On October 10, Peng Dehuai reported to Zhu De and Zhou Enlai on the obstruction of the attack on saltpeter, saying: "The southeast of saltpeter is blocked by the river, and it is not easy to attack strongly, so the Eastern Army should continue to make a powerful feint with one unit, urge enemy reinforcements, and the main force will gather and maneuver to eliminate the enemy." And strive to get the first strike against the countermeasure troops."
Zhu De and Zhou Enlai thought that this proposal was feasible, and immediately forwarded the original telegram to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, asking for "immediate re-telegram so that the order can be ordered." However, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission did not return the call.
At this time, the four divisions of the Nationalist army Li Yannian's 9th Division, Huang Wei's 11th Division, Huo Yuzhang's 14th Division, and Xiao Zhiping's 14th Division came from the south to the east and reached saltpeter.
At the critical juncture, Peng Dehuai immediately made a decision, and sent a telegram to Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, stating the stakes and demanding that the order to attack saltpeter be canceled.
That night, the Eastern Army withdrew from the battle and returned to the front line of Xunkou and Liantang.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="10" > Author Profile: Nerve endings, engineering history enthusiasts, works scattered in various newspapers and magazines. </h1>