Foreword: Argentina's careful thinking
In 1980, the two negotiations between Britain and Argentina on the Falklands were inconclusive, and on February 26, 1982, the Anglo-Argentine negotiations resumed in New York, in which the Arab side showed an unusually friendly attitude, but the negotiations still made no progress, at this time Argentina has been quite bad, the economy continues to decline, social unrest, almost all rely on the iron fist of high-pressure policy to maintain. For internal, diplomatic and economic reasons, President Garretta decided to take action, including military action, to end British rule over the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The Commander of the Argentine Navy, Anaya, was a strong advocate of reconquest by force, and the Commander of the Air Force, Dozo, also expressed support, and President Gary's plan was based on the fact that the islands based on the finances based on fishing and sheep breeding were of little value, the strategic situation was not good, and it was too far away from the British, and the British might accept the fact of occupation and would not launch a labor expedition. In Sun Tzu's Art of War, the victorious soldiers won first and then fought, and Argentina lost at this point
In 1982, Argentina began to actively prepare for the war, with the development of the Reconquista Initiative code-named "Rosario". In March 1982, Brigadier General Mario Menendes, 52, was appointed Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Malvinas, and graduated from the Argentine National Military Academy in 1949, with his uncles all right-wing soldiers. Menendez has been chief of staff at the Buenos Aires Army Headquarters in recent years and has had a considerable influence in the Army. His method of governing the army was to strictly restrain the troops, constantly giving tasks to subordinates, and in tactical command. There are very few improvements on it. In 1975, when he joined forces to "clear" the left-wing guerrillas in Tucumán Province, he was known for not letting soldiers rest and searching door-to-door. The commander of the South Georgia garrison, Colonel Astiz, followed the ruling committee of Argentine soldiers in the mid-seventies, specializing in tracking left-wing guerrillas and having no experience in regular combat. The commanders of the Afghan theater are good at counterinsurgency internally, lack of combat experience externally, and some of them are special agents who are not real soldiers. Early planning for the amphibious landing was the responsibility of Rear Admiral Carlos, commander of the Marine Corps
One: Argentina's battle plan
At this time, the Argentine ground force had about 60,000 soldiers, which was relatively good compared to other South American troops, and the brigade was the main combat unit, and each brigade consisted of 3 infantry battalions plus 1 artillery battalion and 1 engineer battalion. The Army also has five anti-aircraft battalions and one aviation battalion. The original plan of the Argentines was for the Marines to occupy the airfield, for small garrisons of Army personnel to later be airlifted to Stanley, to occupy the islands with no more than one brigade, but to more than 11,000 men once the British troops were deployed, and the majority of these troops, some 8,000 men, formed a reinforcement brigade of five regiments, together with anti-aircraft guns, armored vehicles and engineers, remained in and around Stanley, and deployed more than 1,000 infantry with anti-aircraft capabilities at Gusglin, Two battalions, about 800 men each, were deployed in West Falkland and occupied Port Howard and Fox Bay, supported by sappers. A large number of military installations were established within a month of the landing, and the army and naval forces on the archipelago were equipped with armored vehicles, 105 mm and 155 mm guns, 20 mm, 30 mm and 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles, adopting a long-term defensive plan to resist British efforts to reclaim the archipelago.
On 26 March, President Garretta convened a meeting of the Military Council composed of senior admirals of the Navy and Air Force, at which it was decided to immediately retake the Falklands, consisting of 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, 1 tank landing ship, 1 submarine, 1 icebreaker and 1 supply ship carrying 2 battalions of Marines to form the 40th Amphibious Task Force, departing from Bergrano to retake the Falklands, forming the 60th Amphibious Task Force with 1 frigate and 1 supply ship carrying 2 platoons of Marines. Departing from the port of Desaiado for the reconquest of the South Island, the 20th Task Force was formed with 1 aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers, 1 frigate, and 1 oil tanker to carry out the cover of the battle. The commander-in-chief of operations was Lieutenant General Oswayudo Jorge Garcia, Commander of the 5th Army and Commander of the Malvinas Theater of Operations. On 28 March, Task Force 20 and 40 anchored from Puerto Desaiado and Bergrano, respectively, and that night reached an attack position 450 nautical miles north of the Falklands. On March 29, the sea storm suddenly broke out, and the speed of the Afghan fleet was forced to be reduced from 14 knots to 6 knots, so the landing time was also forced to be extended from March 30 to April 2.
On March 31, the Afghan army intercepted the Governor of the Falklands, Rex. Hunter radioed orders to the islanders and garrisons to be put on alert, and it was clear that the Actions of the Afghan Army had been discovered. On 1 April, the 40th Amphibious Formation arrived on the Falklands. In the early hours of April 2, Marine Commandos carrying Sterling's 9mm submachine guns landed at Cape Pembroke aboard the destroyers USS Trinidad and Santa Fe, respectively, to inspect the main landing beach north of Stanley. At 4:30 a.m., more commandos landed in helicopters at Mullet Creek,
The Argentine soldier wore a padded parka, steel helmets, olive uniforms, black high boots on his feet, usually a harness of equipment made of gray-green leather, a bayonet inserted in his left hip, and a water bottle and a small backpack on his right hip. A blanket and a shovel were tied to the backpack, and a horseshoe-shaped blanket wrapped around his body. Aiming at Stanley, we headed north of Sapar Mountain. Meanwhile, Task Force 40 destroyers and frigates anchored near Stanley for support, and a landing craft (LST) approached an undefended beach in York Bay. At about 6:30 a.m., the Argentines began to arrive at Moodbrook with about 20 LVTP-7 armored vehicles, each carrying 20 Marines, from the San Antonio Olympics, arriving at MoodyBrook and then heading east to the government building on the western edge of the town. Fighting broke out with the British guarding the building, in which Colonel Giachino, the leader of the Argyle commando unit, was killed
Meanwhile, the Argentine 25th Infantry Regiment came from Stanley to the airport completely unhindered, at 8:30 a.m. Seven C-130 transport aircraft of the Afghan army brought in more than 3.000 reinforcements, bringing the total strength of the Afghan army on the island to 4,000. By this time, argentine forces had surrounded the defenders, and unable to resist such overwhelming numbers and firepower, at 09:15, the British governor of the island, Hunter, ordered 181 Marines to surrender, and the Albanian army immediately occupied the Falklands. Command of the garrison initially fell to Lieutenant General Osvaldo Garcia, but on 7 April. Brigadier General Mario Menendes assumed this responsibility as Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor of the Malvinas Islands.
Two: the plight of the Argentine army
On the same day, the United Kingdom announced that from the 12th onwards, it would demarcate a 200-nautical-mile sea exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, and after learning that Britain had begun to organize task forces, Argentina began to continue to transport troops and supplies to the Falkland Islands through merchant ships and transport aircraft. The attack in April initially sent 2,500 men from the 9th Infantry Brigade to the island, and gradually increased its strength to 13,000 men. However, the Afghan side did not sufficiently masse the supplies in advance. In the month between April and early May, a large number of supplies arrived by sea. These reserves may have been Menendez's efforts to fend off the expected siege. The natural conditions of the Falklands are harsh, the industry is limited, the 13,000-strong Afghan army insisted until the winter of July, the materials needed are 80,000 tons of clean water, rations, alcohol, tobacco, juice, tea, paper, soap, toothbrushes, face knives, towels and other daily necessities 5300 tons, ammunition 22,000 tons, accessories, medicine 3100 tons, but his distribution system is running very badly, the demand for various types of combat materials and the actual combat requirements are quite different,
After the Afghan army occupied the Falklands, the troops lived in Moody's in Port Stanley. The Brook Barracks, with only some air defense training, did not conduct any drills to resist landings and compete for high ground. The Afghan Army has only done a short period of platooning and shooting training on the mainland, except for some elite units, all of which are a mixture of conscripts and professional soldiers, with an average of 25% of new recruits, most of whom have not completed basic training courses. The Army did not conduct adaptive training for alpine island warfare. The troops deployed on the coast and airfield near Stanley, as well as artillery and Air Force personnel, had little "material enjoyment" and these troops, exposed to the harsh weather of the highlands, experienced considerable discomfort, and although less than 7 miles (11 kilometers) from Stanley, they had no means of transportation and, if ever, rarely came to the town. These troops were stationed there before the task force arrived, so they had to stay in the mountains for more than 6 weeks, and worse, the main burden of the coming British offensive would fall on the shoulders of these hungry, cold, and weak armies.
Without shelter, shower facilities and steaming food, these people live miserably in tents, trenches or makeshift shelters made of stone and turf, enduring hunger and fatigue in the face of severe cold and fierce winds, and because the soil is so thin that water can penetrate quickly, it is extremely difficult to dig holes under the soil. When it rains, it will be submerged, even submerged. It's impossible to wash clothes — and certainly not to dry them after washing them, and the socks are put on and never changed. Each person had three thin blankets, a sleeping bag and a thin mattress — not enough to keep warm, and the Falklands consisted mostly of swampy undulating wasteland and wind-blown rocks that exposed the ground with few trees. The climate is harsh. Temperatures vary between 9 degrees Celsius in February and 2 degrees Celsius in July, with July instead marking a harsh winter of winter. From the military's point of view, this unique, changeable, and seasonally harsh climate requires the military to be well protected. Troops that are improperly equipped, dressed, eaten or unaccustomed to fighting under such harsh conditions cannot function effectively
With limited sea and air transport capacity and tight time, and a serious shortage of combat materiel delivered to the Falklands, the Argentine army in Falkland resembled the Italian army in North Africa during World War II. There was no qualitative difference in food between officers and men in the German army, and this was not the case for the Italian army. Generals, school officers, lieutenants, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, all levels of food are completely different. The soldiers were cold and wet and hungry—really, very hungry and tired. Many soldiers ate all the food the army had given them for a week in a day or two, and waited five days for the food supply center to distribute the next grain. Food shortages are a serious problem, which has seriously affected morale. There was tea, but no milk, only a small amount of sugar. Troops' lunch and dinner were usually only a bowl of thin soup made from dehydrated vegetables and a small amount of meat. Bread was the most basic staple food in Argentina, but it could not be found here, and even then, troops stationed outside Stanley often found that their rations and gifts sent from home had been robbed by those who were in the logistics unit or who operated the postal service in the town, and cigarettes could also be stolen by those in Stanley and then sold for a profit.
There are a large number of sheep on the island, but some of the troops' cooking equipment is left in Argentina and cannot be processed, and on this desolate island, like roasted whole sheep, even if the food is plentiful, the distribution system is not functioning well, making it difficult for the front-line troops to obtain fresh and cooked food. Getting supplies out also presents enormous challenges, as the ground is often roadless and the rough terrain is everywhere, with a serious lack of adequate means of transport. Even necessities such as ammunition often require people to act as pack horses, exacerbating these already serious problems. Even troops who were eligible to walk weekly to Stanley often refused to travel long distances because of extreme hunger and weakness. The stresses of boredom, fatigue, cold and hunger are evident in all units, and frostbite and "trench foot" are common diseases that cause constant loss of personnel due to disease. Almost all the soldiers wanted to evacuate.
Three: The advantages and disadvantages of both sides
In the ensuing Battle for the Falklands, the British ground forces involved in the battle were: the 40th, 42nd and 45th Marine Assault Battalions (about 700 men per battalion), the 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions (650 men per battalion), the 29th Royal Artillery Assault Wing (with 2 artillery battalions, equipped with a total of 36 105 mm guns), the Scorpion Light Tank Squadron, the "Skoset" armored vehicle squadron, the 59th Royal Engineer Squadron, the "Blowpipe" anti-aircraft missile company, the "Lightsword" anti-aircraft missile company, the radar detachment, The Scottish Guard Battalion of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the Welsh Guard Battalion, the Gurkha Infantry Battalion (about 1,000 men per battalion), as well as the Marine Corps' "Special Boat Squadron" and the Army's "Special Air Force", with a total strength of about 9,000 men (actually 4,042 men on the island)
The Albanian forces on the island included 5 battalions of the Marine Corps, 1 infantry brigade, 2 motorized infantry brigades, 2 artillery battalions and 1 anti-aircraft battalion, with a total strength of about 13,000 people. The ratio of the number of British and Afghan ground troops is 1:1.440, both sides are equipped with helicopters, light tanks, armored vehicles, field artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles, etc., but the number of the above weapons of the British army is more than that of the Russian army, especially with a large number of multi-purpose helicopters, infantry equipment is complete, rifle machine guns are equipped with night sights, artillery equipped with reconnaissance radar, laser rangefinders, ballistic computers and thermal imaging equipment, so the British army has a greater advantage.
The training status of the troops determines to a large extent the combat capabilities of the troops. British Marines and Paratrooper Battalions train on the northern coast of Norway for 3 months a year. Soldiers are resistant to high temperatures, can carry heavy obstacles and march on foot, and master tactical actions such as melee night raids. The infantry battalion of the 5th Infantry Brigade has been training in the welsh mountains, and the Nepalese Langkha infantry is good at mountain warfare and close combat. Ground forces were more mobile, such as the 2nd Parachute Battalion's attack on Darwin Harbour and Gusgrain on the night of 28 May, and with the cooperation of helicopters, motor vehicles and motorboats, the entire battalion was able to cross a complex area of about tens of kilometers in the bitter cold at night to pounce on the target. : For example, during the occupation of the Zinte Hill Heights, British Marines and paratroopers were able to climb the heights with 81 mm mortars and anti-tank missiles. These units are among the best armed forces in the UK,
In short, British soldiers and Marines marched faster than Argentines, consolidated their positions more effectively, and shot more accurately, while Argentine soldiers had much lower marksmanship, field skills, and general discipline. The British army is entirely volunteer, often with years of experience, and the British military service system has been abolished for 20 years. This fact alone gave the British army a natural superiority over the vast majority of recruits serving in Argentina, even on par with those who were the backbone of Argentina's professionals. From the very beginning, the British took the initiative in ground operations, maintaining a rapid pace of action, forcing the Argentines to become passive rather than active.
Brigadier General Menendes hesitated for several days after the Landing of San Carlos, who could have extended the duration of the campaign before launching any large-scale raid, large-scale reconnaissance or appropriate counterattack, but the Afghan army was inexperienced, had low military skills and military literacy, and had poor independent combat ability and sustained combat ability of troops at all levels. Troops are not accustomed to melee and night combat. The pace between the various branches of the army was uneven, the Afghan army had many weapons but could not make full use of it, and the Gusgrainian defenders were twice as strong as the British paratrooper battalion, but only fought for 14 hours before surrendering. Afterwards, the British captured a large number of napalm oil tanks, which the Albanian army had never used. The Afghan Army was also not good at using artillery, and there were artillery positions in Port Stanley, but no forward observation posts. The commanding heights failed to hold firm, some voluntarily abandoned (such as the two sister hills), the Port Stanley defenders did not even organize the necessary night patrols and reconnaissance activities, and the city's defenses were completely passive. Menendez reported military morale to headquarters over an unencrypted wireless telephone in an unencrypted wireless phone, indicating that he lacked the minimum common sense of secrecy of a combat commander, and when the British learned of it, the siege was forced to land in one fell swoop.
Four: Conclusion
For the British, the battle had to be short, swift and decisive, to be fast-paced from beginning to end, to win with minimal casualties before the rapidly approaching Antarctic winter, while the 13,000 men deployed on the island were demoralized by the cold and hunger, succumbing to the weight of running out of water and food, and these recruits could not maneuver, could not hold on to defenses, lacked the enthusiasm to fight, and once driven out of a certain position, showed a considerable degree of passivity, Without making any effort to reorganize and fight for the lost positions, it can be said that the value is insignificant, if the Argentines reduce the number of troops by 5 times (after the reduction is not much different from the British on the island), only the elite marines on the island are retained, greatly reducing the logistical pressure,
Tactically, the british lost their sea support under the extremely harsh winds and waves, and the British army fought against a particularly long supply line — 20 times longer than their opponents — 20 times longer than their opponents, and in the face of the deteriorating winter in winter. For the British, the occupation of this territory by Argentina, no matter how unpleasant, would not pose a threat to British internal security, so the British could only retreat without a quick victory.