The Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, also known as the Battle of Jinnan, was known by the Japanese army as the Battle of the Central Plains, which was a major battle fought by the Nationalist government against the Invading Japanese army on the frontal battlefield after the War of Resistance entered a stalemate stage, and it was also the last large-scale battle in the North China Battlefield. Since then, there was no more nationalist army north of the Yellow River, and there was no rear area for the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in Central China, and the Japanese army was able to draw out troops to carry out a key "sweep" of China's anti-Japanese base areas, and the aggressors swept through most of China with iron hooves, and the War of Resistance Against Japan entered the most arduous period.
The battle ended in the defeat of the Kuomintang army, but the defeat was unprecedented. It can be said that all the battles on the frontal battlefield since the all-out War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression have not been defeated this time. In just 3 weeks, more than 100,000 Japanese troops crushed and severely damaged nearly 200,000 Nationalist troops, seized all the positions of The Zhongtiao Mountain that the Nationalist army had held for three years, and wiped out the main force of the Nationalist army north of the Yellow River. According to the Japanese war report, the Kuomintang army killed 42,000 people and captured 35,000 people in this battle, while the Japanese side only killed 673 people and wounded 2,292 (the Kuomintang side said that more than 30,000 Japanese troops were killed and wounded). The casualty ratio between the two sides was as high as 26:1. Although the Japanese army's war report may be exaggerated, on the whole, it can be said that it has won a complete victory, achieved the purpose of the campaign, and achieved the campaign goal of encircling and annihilating the main force of the first theater of the Nationalist Army.
After the victory, the Japanese army was overwhelmed and claimed to have achieved "rare results since the incident" Chiang Kai-shek lamented in his review of the campaign that this was "the greatest mistake and the greatest shame in the War of Resistance." Chairman Mao also believed that this was "the biggest loss since the Battle of Shanghai (the Battle of Songhu)."
< h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the background of the Battle of Nakajō Mountain</h1>
Since the July 7 Incident, the Kuomintang has persisted in the War of Resistance on the frontal battlefield for four years, but most of North China, East China, and Central China have still fallen one after another. On the other hand, due to the excessive length of the front line, the Japanese army invading China failed to realize its operational attempt to resolve the China incident in a short period of time, and a strategic stalemate was formed between Japan and China.
During this period, Japan adjusted the focus of its policy of invading China, no longer taking the elimination of the effective forces of the Kuomintang army as the main consideration, but instead consolidating the occupied territories and stabilizing the situation in the occupied areas. Correspondingly, the Japanese army focused on adopting a policy of abduction against the Nationalist Government, in an attempt to force the Nationalist Government to completely abandon resistance through a decisive blow, so as to draw out its forces to focus on the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines led by the Communist Party.
Internationally, as the German fascists provoked the Second World War and succeeded in a short period of time, the aggressive and adventurous policy of Japanese militarism was greatly encouraged. At the end of 1940, Japan adjusted its operational policy toward China and decided to "quickly resolve the Chinese incident" and seek rapid stability on the Chinese battlefield. However, after the Japanese army occupied a large area in east and central China, the resistance movement in the occupied areas did not stop, especially the anti-Japanese movement behind enemy lines led by the Communist Party was in full swing, which gave the Japanese army a strong containment.
In order to delay the Japanese attack and ensure the stability of the rear, the Kuomintang relied on the Zhongtiao Mountains to redeploy the troops of the First Theater after the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance, forming a greater containment of the Japanese army in North China. The Zhongtiao Mountain base area also played an important strategic coordination role in the national anti-Japanese resistance. The Japanese North China Front believed that the southern Jin dynasty was the only area north of the Yellow River that was still under the control of the main Kuomintang forces, and was a major hidden danger affecting the stability of North China and the Japanese-occupied areas in Central China. Beginning in 1938, the Japanese launched 13 tentative attacks on Mount Nakajō, but all were repulsed.
At the end of 1940, the Japanese North China Front made a new judgment on the situation, holding that after the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the Eighth Route Army was attacked by the Japanese army and was unable to pose a serious threat to the Japanese army, while the Jin Sui Army had low combat effectiveness and was in harmony with the Kuomintang Central Army, and only the Wei Lihuang Department, the main force of the Kuomintang First Theater of Operations, which was entrenched in Zhongtiao Mountain, became the biggest destabilizing factor in the occupied areas of North China, and also pinned down several elite divisions of the Japanese army, which also greatly hindered the free movement of the Japanese army in China. The campaign attempt of the Japanese North China Front was quickly approved by the base camp, and in January 1941, the battle plan for the Jinnan Campaign, the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, was formally formed.
< h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > second, the two sides of the battle sequence</h1>
In April 1941, a month before the Battle of Nakajō-san, the Japanese army began massaging forces near Mt. Nakajō. In addition to the 3 divisions and 1 brigade originally deployed around Zhongtiao Mountain, 2 divisions and 3 brigades were drawn from North China and Central China. In addition, the Japanese army also transferred 2 flying regiments from the Kwantung Army to deploy in Yuncheng and Xinxiang to undertake air support tasks during the campaign. The total strength of the Japanese army was nearly 120,000 people, and the commander of the North China Front, Tada Jun, served as the commander-in-chief of the campaign.
The operational guidance and operational sequence established by the Japanese army are as follows: "With the purpose of completely destroying the Chinese Army west of the line of Zhangma and Yuanqu, and giving the Chinese Army east of the line a major blow, the main force of the 1st Army is on the northwest side of Zhongtiao Mountain, from left to right, the 41st Division, the 9th Independent Brigade, the 36th Brigade, the 36th Division, the 37th Division, and the 16th Independent Brigade, from Sangchi to Zhangdian, and directly to the north bank of the Yellow River west of Yuanqu and Qi, first dividing the Chinese Army, and then sweeping and destroying." In addition, the 33rd Division attacked from Yangcheng to the south; the 35th Division and the 21st Division attacked from Qinyang and Wenxian to Shaoyuan; the main force of the coordinated army destroyed the Chinese army. The 3rd Flying Regiment supported the battle. In addition, the Japanese army also received the cooperation of the puppet army Zhang Lanfeng, Liu Yanfeng's troops, and the 24th Han traitor pseudo-division.
In terms of the Nationalist army, the Zhongtiao Mountain garrison was under the unified command of Wei Lihuang, commander of the First Theater, and the total strength of the troops involved in the battle was about 180,000 people. Before the war, He Yingqin, chief of staff of the Kuomintang army, convened a military conference in Luoyang to deploy the zhongtiao mountain combat defense. He Yingqin made a basic factual judgment on the Japanese army's campaign attempts, believing that it was intended to seize the Zhongtiao Mountain stronghold and completely eliminate the Nationalist army on the north bank of the Yellow River, but at the same time, he also believed that the Japanese army intended to advance luoyang and Tongguan, so he did not estimate enough the Japanese army's determination to encircle and annihilate the Zhongtiao Mountain nationalist army.
Wei Lihuang
To this end, He Yingqin proposed the operational essentials of the Nationalist army as follows: "The first step should be to take the camera from one unit, the 93rd Army from north to south, the 27th Army from east to west, and join forces with the right wing of Zhongtiao Mountain to capture the areas of Gaoping, Jincheng, Yangcheng, and Qinshuijian to restore the situation before April 1939; the second step, in cooperation with the Jinxi Army and the 2nd and 8th Theaters of Operations, must also be able to secure the Zhongtiao Mountains at the very least, and the corps placed in the north and east of the Zhongtiao Mountains with our control will attack the enemy flank on the left side in coordination to suppress the enemy army." ”
To tell the truth, this operational outline is very bold and is entirely an offensive defensive deployment with the nature of an active attack. Unfortunately, however, due to the kuomintang's passive anti-war ideology on its roots, coupled with the failure of the command system after the campaign began, these campaign ideas could not be implemented, but even the minimum campaign objectives, the guarantee of Zhongtiao Mountain, could not be achieved.
According to the spirit of the Luoyang Conference, the operational sequence of the Nationalist army was as follows: the 80th Army (under the jurisdiction of 2 divisions) garrisoned the western side of Zhongtiao Mountain; the 5th Army (with jurisdiction over 2 armies, a total of 5 divisions) garrisoned the area west of the Line of Yuanqu and Sangchi from west to east in accordance with the 3rd Army and the 17th Army; the 14th Group Army (with jurisdiction over 6 divisions) garrisoned the north side of Zhongtiao Mountain in accordance with the sequence of the 43rd Army, the 98th Army, and the 15th Army; and the 9th Army (with jurisdiction over 3 divisions) garrisoned the east side of Zhongtiao Mountain.
On April 28, He Yingqin further judged from intelligence that the Japanese army had an attempt to invade Yuanqu from Jiyuan and Henggao Avenues, so he decided to strengthen the defense of fortifications along the river and implement a strategic plan for the periphery. At the same time, he also adjusted the defense system of Zhongtiao Mountain: the Pei Changhui Department of the 9th Army guarded Jiyuan; the 43rd Army Zhao Shiling guarded Yuanqu; the 17th Army Gao Guizi guarded Dai County; the 3rd Army Tang Huaiyuan And the 80th Army Kong Ling gong department guarded the Wenxi and Xia County areas; the 98th Army's Wushi Minbu guarded Dong Feng; and the 15th Army's Wuting Linbu guarded Gaoping. In addition, 4 armies were deployed in the Taihang and Taiyue areas as peripheral countermeasures.
< h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > iii, the Battle of Nakajō Mountain</h1>
On the evening of May 7, 1941, the meticulously prepared Japanese army, with the support of special forces and air forces that had been airdropped in the hinterland of Mt. Nakajō in advance, launched a sudden and fierce attack on the Kōjō Kokugun army from the east, west, north, and northeast in accordance with the operational principle of "two-wing roll attack, central breakthrough, division and encirclement, and annihilation of each side". The campaign was roughly divided into two phases.
The first stage: two wings roll, central breakthrough.
There were about 25,000 Japanese troops on the East Road, the main force of the Japanese 35th Division and the 21st Division, as well as the 4th Independent Brigade of the Cavalry, supplemented by the puppet troops Zhang Lanfeng and Liu Yanfeng, and attacked Jiyuan and Mengxian in three ways along the western section of Daoqing Road. Pei Changhui of the Nationalist 9th Army stubbornly resisted, but gradually lost its strength under the attack of the enemy's superior forces, and abandoned its position after only one night of resistance, and retreated in its entirety. The main force of the newly formed 24th Division of the 9th Army, the 54th Division, defended the first line of the gate, but it was also unable to withstand the rampant attack of the Japanese army and eventually lost. At the same time, the Japanese army attacking in the middle of the road captured the important town of Yuanqu, and then divided its troops to attack Shaoyuan, and the 9th Army was ordered to cross the river and retreat. The Japanese fiercely bombarded Guanyang Dongxidu, and the 9th Army suffered heavy casualties, most of which withdrew to Henan, and a small part retreated to the area north of Fengmen to Shaoyuan. By the 12th of the battle, the Japanese army on the western road had occupied the crossings along the Yellow River, and its main force had marched west along the Fengmen Gate to Shaoyuan, completed the rendezvous with the Japanese army advancing from the east of Yuanqu, and completed the encirclement of the Nationalist 14th Group Army.
The Japanese army on the western road, with about 25,000 men, was formed by the main force of the 37th Division and the first regiment of the 36th Division, as well as the independent mixed 16th Brigade, from wenxi and Xia County southeast to Zhangdian Town. The Western Front was the main direction of japanese attack. In the early morning of the 8th, the Japanese army broke through the defensive line east of Zhangdian and cut off the connection between the Kong Ling gong department of the Nationalist 80th Army and the Tang Huaiyuan department of the 3rd Army. At the critical moment, the headquarters of the 80th Army was attacked by Japanese special forces that had been ambushed nearby beforehand. Commander Kong Lingkei abandoned his troops and fled to the south bank of the Yellow River, and the troops who had lost their command were in disarray and fled, suffering heavy casualties in the Japanese bombardment. The 7,000 Japanese troops who invaded Xia County attacked the positions defended by the Tang Huaiyuan Department of the 3rd Army. After the Japanese army won the battle on the western front, the troops divided into multiple routes, and attacked Tang Hui, the garrison of the 3rd Army Headquarters, and Wangjiahe, the headquarters of the 7th Division, respectively, and won successively. Tang Huaiyuan led the remnants to retreat east to Wenyu, where they were intercepted by the Japanese and suffered serious casualties. On the 12th, Tang Huaiyuan fell into the siege of the Japanese army in the Jianshan area, and finally committed suicide and martyrdom. The commander of the 12th Division, Zhi Zhiqi, was intercepted by the Japanese after breaking through to Hujiayu, and after being seriously wounded, he committed suicide by drinking bullets. The 34th Division's Gongbing Clan fought fiercely with the Japanese at the Tangwangshan position, and the position changed hands several times.
There were about 30,000 Japanese troops on the North Road, organized by the Japanese 41st Division and the independent mixed 9th Brigade Regiment, implementing the tactical principles of the central breakthrough, and attacking from Hengling Pass to the west side of Yokogaki Avenue. The Japanese army intended to capture the Hengling Pass (Hengling Pass) Yuanqu (垣曲) Avenue, capture the important town of Yuanqu, cut off the southern retreat route of the Nationalist army, and divide and encircle the Eastern and Western Nationalist armies. The line was the junction of the Zeng Wanzhong Division of the Nationalist 5th Army and the Liu Mao'en Division of the 14th Group Army, while the defenders were the Zhao Shiling Division of the 43rd Army and the Gao Guizi Division of the 17th Army, which were weaker in combat effectiveness. Both armies were attacked by the Japanese at the same time, and in only one day and one night, their positions were lost. After the Japanese army won the battle, the soldiers divided into two roads, one along the Sangchi, Jiajiashan, Ducun River south, and all the way to the Yuanqu. With the cooperation of parachute troops, the Japanese army occupied Yuanqu at dusk on the 8th. The Japanese army then divided into two routes, one to the east to attack Shaoyuan and meet the Japanese army in the west, and all the way to the west, to meet the Japanese army that had entered Wufujian. At this point, the Japanese army divided the Nakajō Mountain Nationalist Army in two and completed the encirclement, and the southern retreat channel of the Nationalist army was completely blocked.
There were about 10,000 Japanese troops on the Northeast Road, organized by the first part of the Japanese 33rd Division and the first part of the independent mixed 4th Brigade Regiment, and attacked Dongfeng Town from Yangcheng. In this direction were the headquarters of the 14th Army, the Samurai Toshibu of the 98th Army, and the 15th and 93rd Armies. The Nationalist army has a great numerical superiority. The 98th Army resisted to the death, repeatedly repelling Japanese attacks, killing hundreds of Japanese troops, including Ōsa Hamada, and accounting for almost all the Japanese casualties at the Battle of Nakajo Mountain. However, with the arrival of Japanese reinforcements, the 14th Army was attacked on three sides and had to withdraw completely north.
The second stage: heavy troops encircle and suppress, comb and sweep
Beginning on May 14, while blocking the crossings along the Yellow River, the Japanese army carried out several dragnet clearances against the Nationalist forces in the encirclement, with the intention of completely eliminating the Nationalist forces at Zhongtiao Mountain. The Nationalist forces in the encirclement were isolated and helpless, and fell into a bitter battle.
After that, the remnants of the scattered troops began to break through tragically. Zeng Wanzhong, commander-in-chief of the 5th Army, was separated from his troops during the breakout and became the commander of the light pole, and finally fled to the south bank of the Yellow River with the help of the local people.
The remnants of the 15th Army, the 3rd Army, and the 14th Army broke through the Japanese blockade line, crossed the Fenhe River and the Yellow River in the west, and finally retreated to Luoyang and Xin'an. The 93rd Army and the 15th Army on the north side of Mount Nakajo fought and retreated, and finally withdrew to the Taiyue Mountains. The 8th Army was intercepted by the Japanese during the breakout and had to carry out a scattered guerrilla attack. The 47th and 24th Divisions of the defenders on the east side of Zhongtiao Mountain were scattered and carried out guerrilla attacks in the western section of Daoqing Road and the Jiyuan Mountains, and finally crossed the Yellow River south while the Japanese army was not prepared. The remnants of the 98th Army withdrew to the Taiyue Mountains to carry out guerrilla attacks. After the remnants of the 14th Army broke through, they did not cross the Yellow River until early September.
<h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the reason for the fiasco of the Nationalist army</h1>
The fiasco in Zhongtiao Mountain of the Nationalist Army not only had objective factors such as the general environment of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the gap in strength between the Chinese and Japanese armies, but also had many obvious subjective factors.
First, passive defense, there is the idea of fearing war and light enemies.
After the Battle of Xinkou and the Battle of Taiyuan, the Kuomintang lost successive battles and lost the city and land. With most of Northern China already fallen, Zhongtiao Mountain had become a strategic barrier to prevent the Japanese from further advancing west into Shaanxi and henan to the south. Because the Zhongtiao Mountains stretched from east to west to the south of Shanxi and north of the Yellow River, it was like a high wall straddling the way forward of the Japanese army to the south. As far as the Nationalist government is concerned, as long as it ensures the Zhongtiao Mountain base area, it can breathe a sigh of relief and buy time to readjust the deployment of the War of Resistance. However, since Chiang Kai-shek has long pursued a passive policy of resistance in accordance with the principle of "foreign countries must first be at home" since the September 18 Incident, every campaign has been forced to be helpless and has become an expedient measure to steal peace.
Commander of the 3rd Army, Tang Huaiyuan
It is said that the Kuomintang had been operating in Zhongtiao Mountain for several years, and if it continued to reorganize the defenders, conscientiously studied the operational laws of the Japanese army, and carried out targeted defensive exercises, it would not be completely defeated. While organizing defense, the Nationalist army did not fully rely on the defensive positions and cooperate with other theaters to launch a strategic counterattack in a timely manner, but blindly passively defended, and finally collapsed in the face of the Japanese army's fierce offensive. This is the same as the passive defense of the French army on the Maginot Line during the First World War. Imagine if the Nationalist army had adopted early experience, relied on existing positions, supplemented by active guerrilla warfare, or launched offensive operations against the Japanese army before launching a general offensive, or even adopted external operations or roundabout encirclement, the outcome might have been very different.
It was precisely from the standpoint of passive resistance against Japan and active anti-communism that Chiang Kai-shek did not attach sufficient importance to the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain from the very beginning. Under the circumstance that the Japanese army's campaign attempts were already very obvious, Chiang Kai-shek neither increased his troops to resolutely resist nor withdrew his troops to preserve the flames of the war of resistance, which eventually led to the painstaking management of the base area falling into the hands of the enemy.
Moreover, the defenders of Mount Nakajō generally had the idea of a light enemy. The Nationalist army operated in Zhongtiao Mountain for three years, believing that its defense system was impregnable, and some even touted it as an insurmountable "Chinese Maginot Line". Coupled with the fact that it repelled many small-scale attacks by the Japanese army in the early stage, the Nationalist army thus generated a certain light enemy sentiment, especially for the frequent activities of the Japanese army near The Nakajō Mountain in the months before the outbreak of the battle, and even the high-frequency espionage activities on the Japanese side were not given due attention. Before the war, the Japanese army sent a large number of spies disguised as merchants to the Nakajō-san area to inquire about intelligence. It is also said that the local villagers reported to the Nationalist army before the war that they had found a small group of airborne Japanese troops, but the defenders did not think so.
Commander of the 98th Army, Samurai Min
Second, the command was improper, and the attempt to judge the Japanese army's campaign was wrong.
It will be the backbone of the main heart, and the war will be fought first. One general is incompetent, exhausted and deadly. The fiasco of the Nationalist army was first defeated at the command level. The change of the front will be a taboo for the bing family since ancient times. Chiang Kai-shek left Sun Weiru's 4th Army alone, and because Wei Lihuang was too close to the Eighth Route Army, he became suspicious and therefore selected and employed generals in accordance with the principle of "political correctness." When the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain was imminent, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Wei Lihuang to Chongqing to report for duty, and then put him under house arrest (it is also said that he returned to Luoyang after the war to command the battle). In this way, the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain was actually commanded by He Yingqin, the chief of staff, and He Yingqin was not very clear about the defensive deployment of Zhongtiao Mountain, and even the strength of each department was not clear. Wouldn't it be a child's play to have such a person commanding an army of 200,000 to fight the Japanese army?
Therefore, from the perspective of campaign command, it is not so much that Wei Lihuang is exercising nominal command power, but rather that He Yingqin is engaged in actual blind command. However, both Wei Lihuang and He Yingqin left the front line after the battle began, which was very different from the Japanese commander Tada Jun personally commanding the front line. In addition, after the start of the campaign, the Japanese army carried out special operations, which basically paralyzed the command system of the Nationalist army, resulting in the inability to implement the orders of the superiors, and the various departments could only rush to the battle, and defeat was inevitable.
At the tactical level, the Kuomintang carried out the idea of defensive operations in key areas, and lined up the 3rd, 13th, 17th, 80th, and 98th Armies in a "long snake array" along the wide front of more than 100 kilometers east and west of the Zhongtiao Mountains, lacking in-depth configuration and not mastering a strong reserve force. After the Japanese army launched an attack in accordance with the tactics of "two wings rolling and central breakthrough", the Nationalist army was completely unable to adjust its defenses, and could only be passively beaten and tired of coping, and there was no cooperation between the various departments due to the failure of the command system. After the Japanese army captured the important town of Yuanqu, the Nationalist army was cut off by the east and west, and the defense system was already in danger.
According to the diary of Xu Yongchang, the commander-in-chief of the Jin Sui Army, chongqing had already grasped the situation of the Japanese army increasing troops at Zhongtiao Mountain as early as April, however, He Yingqin judged that the Japanese army attacked Zhongtiao Mountain was only one of the attempts, and the greater attempt was to invade Luoyang (the Japanese army did capture Luoyang later, but that was 3 years later) and Tongguan, and spy on Xi'an. Based on this judgment, some of the defenders of Zhongtiao Mountain (including Sun Weiru's troops and artillery regiments) were transferred to defend the south bank of the Yellow River before the battle, and the defense of Zhongtiao Mountain was greatly weakened. He Yingqin's serious error of judgment eventually led to tragic consequences. Perhaps completely unforeseen such a fiasco, He Yingqin's campaign attempt consisted only of combat determination, not a plan for transfer and retreat, and the Yellow River crossing did not even send a capable force to control it.
Third, the preparation for war is not effective, and the ability to continue to fight is too weak.
Although the Nationalist army operated in Nakajō Mountain for three years and boasted that it was comparable to the "Maginot Line", it was actually poorly prepared for war. Most of them are field fortifications, and there are few strong fortresses. There were no strong containment measures in the joints, passes, passages, etc. between the defenders. After the Japanese attacked, they first carried out a sweeping attack along the combined parts of the various armies and the mountain passage.
After the general offensive was launched, the special forces of the Japanese army, which were lurking before the war, struck hard and directly attacked the Yellow Dragon, which not only paralyzed the command center of the Nationalist army, but also cooperated with the main attack troops to blow up the ammunition depots of the Nationalist army and burn hospitals and material warehouses, resulting in the nationalist army falling into a tragic situation of lack of ammunition and no food soon after the start of the war. Since ancient times, fighting wars has been fighting logistics. If one side has enough soldiers and is short of food and ammunition on the other side, how can this battle still be fought? According to some sources, before the war, the Japanese army sent spies dressed as merchants to mix into the Zhongtiao Mountain Bazaar and bought a large amount of grain at a high price, resulting in a serious shortage of grain reserves for the Nationalist army. Whether it is true or not, let's leave it alone, but if you go to war hungry, the national army may not be able to do it.
In terms of weapons and equipment, the national army is also very different from Japan. Not to mention the lack of air support, the heavy weapons of the Nationalist army are also very small, and the artillery is extremely scarce. The Japanese army has more than 500 guns of caliber above 75 mm, and the Nationalist army has only a few dozen, and it is scattered among various units. The headquarters of Zeng Wanzhong's 5th Army was located in Macun, and its periphery was only defended by two heavy machine guns, and after the battle began, the Japanese army used special forces to quickly solve the machine gun position, and the headquarters could not be saved.
Sun Weiru, commander-in-chief of the 4th Army
More importantly, the Kuomintang mobilized the defenders on the eve of the great war, which can be described as self-destructing the Great Wall. The most effective 4th Army Group Sun Weiru was transferred, which was the old foundation of the Northwest Army, with strong combat effectiveness, and was called "the iron pillar of Zhongtiao Mountain" by Wei Lihuang. Zeng Wanzhong's 5th Army and Liu Mao'en's 14th Army were both units with average combat capability. According to the combat effectiveness of the nationalist army at that time and with reference to past experience, the number of troops alone must exceed three times that of the Japanese army to have the possibility of victory, and there are still many miscellaneous troops in the defenders, which are inseparable from the central army, and it is difficult to coordinate when fighting. Also, the only artillery regiment of the Nakajō-san garrison was also transferred.
Fourth, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China have lost peace, and the two parties have almost no strategic cooperation.
The Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain took place after Chiang Kai-shek created friction between the Kuomintang and the Communists, especially the two anti-communist upsurges, and the incident in southern Anhui had just passed, and the old hatred between the two parties could be said to have not gone away, and a new hatred had been added, and the anti-Japanese united front was in danger of rupture. As early as 1940, Chiang Kai-shek expelled the CCP anti-Japanese forces in Zhongtiao Mountain and disbanded mass anti-Japanese groups. However, the great battle was imminent, and Chiang Kai-shek realized that the situation was dangerous, and first appealed and then ordered the Eighth Route Army to send troops to cooperate in the battle. Mao Zedong believed that this was nothing more than Chiang Kai-shek's "radical method", which was intended to take advantage of the opportunity to deplete the strength of the Eighth Route Army and weaken our anti-Japanese armed forces.
On the other hand, proceeding from the overall situation of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, our Party still gives some form of strategic cooperation to the Kuomintang with the interests of the nation as the most important. On May 10, the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army launched a sabotage campaign against the railway lines south of Pingyao on Tongpu Road, the section south of Changzhi on Baijin Road, and the section south of Shijiazhuang on Pinghan Road, which played a retardant role in reinforcing the Japanese troops at Zhongtiao Mountain and bought time for the Nationalist army to break through. The Eighth Route Army also launched conventional combat operations in other directions, which was also a response to the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain.
However, judging from the entire situation of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression at that time, the balance of forces between Japan and China was still in the overall situation of the enemy being strong and we were weak, and in the face of the Japanese army's meticulous combat readiness, even if the Eighth Route Army fully supported it, it might not be able to rewrite the outcome of the campaign. Of course, in the long run, the fiasco of the Nationalist army at Zhongtiao Mountain also brought some negative consequences to the base areas of the War of Resistance behind enemy lines. After the battle, several divisions and regiments of the Japanese army originally used to blockade Zhongtiao Mountain were able to turn around and conduct concentrated sweeps of the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy in North China, and the War of Resistance Against Japan entered the most difficult period.
Fifth, the Japanese were fierce and fierce, and strived to complete their merits in one battle.
Because the Japanese army was determined to completely eliminate the anti-Japanese forces in Zhongtiao Mountain, its combat determination, combat deployment, and tactical application were unprecedented. The commander of the Japanese North China Front, Tada Jun, mobilized most of the Japanese army in north China, and mobilized 2 flying regiments from the Kwantung Army, a total of about 6 divisions and 4 brigades, totaling about 120,000 troops. Launching a battle with such a large number of troops was also rare for the Japanese army on the Battlefield in China at that time.
The incompetence and fiasco of the Nationalist army reflected the innovation of the Japanese army's tactics, which can be described as a vivid tactical lesson for the Nationalist army. In addition to the full preparation and strong combat effectiveness of the Japanese army' great victory, it was not unrelated to the tactical application of commander Tada Jun. The Japanese army changed the traditional tactics of "one-line flat pushing" and rarely adopted two-wing roll attack, central breakthrough, and then supplemented by tactics such as roundabout encirclement, division and annihilation, and deep parachute landing. Moreover, the Japanese army was far superior to the Kuomintang army in terms of combat command, weapons and equipment, individual quality, air coordination, or logistical supply.
Leaving aside the gap in strength, the two sides of the campaign are not at the same level in terms of strategy alone. Tada Jun was well versed in Sun Tzu's art of war, such as "soldiers stand by deception", "strange and positive cooperation", "surprise and attack", and other strategic thinking, and the battle he planned can be called a textbook war of annihilation. Before the war, he dispatched a large number of spies and intelligence personnel, disguised as traders, into the Zhongtiao Mountain Nationalist Military Defense Zone, not only found a landing area suitable for parachuting in the mountains, but also directly attacked the command center of the Nationalist Army after the campaign was launched, and most of the group army, army, and division command posts of the Nationalist Army were paralyzed by it, resulting in the Nationalist Army being in a chaotic state of fighting for each other at the beginning of the campaign. From the perspective of modern warfare, this is exactly the "decapitation war" used by the US military.
On the other hand, Tada Jun also dispatched special forces disguised as Kuomintang soldiers to mix into the ranks of the Nationalist Army, and grasped in detail the location of all the troop allocations and command posts of the Nationalist Army, and even the commanders at all levels of the Nationalist Army, from the commanders and division commanders to the company commanders and platoon commanders, had their names clearly understood. After the battle began, these special soldiers, who could speak Chinese, shouted to the Nationalist army to surrender, causing great confusion among the Nationalists. What is even more insidious is that before the war, Tada Jun deliberately spread false news through the radio to stir up relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In order to achieve the suddenness of the battle, the Japanese army also created an information fog and created the illusion of attacking Luoyang through frequent military exercises, causing He Yingqin to focus his defense on river defense rather than land defense.
It is worth mentioning that after Tada Jun was transferred back to Japan, he was promoted to army general because of his meritorious service in battle. Wei Lihuang assumed responsibility for the defeat in the Battle of Zhongtiao Mountain, and was relieved of his military power by Chiang Kai-shek and stripped of the rank of general of the army.
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About the author of the public account: Wang Zhengxing, a former officer of a field unit of the People's Liberation Army, has served in infantry detachments, headquarters, logistics departments and other units, is committed to the study of war history and tactics, and has a unique understanding of military tactics and non-war operations. His book "This is War" was recommended in two issues in May and June 2014 by Phoenix TV's "Eight Minutes of Open Volume" column. His public account name is also "This is war", welcome to pay attention