On July 1, George Packer, a contributing contributor to Atlantic, wrote for former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who died on June 30, calling him the worst defense secretary in the United States and not regretting his decision until his death. Rumsfeld's deadly judgment and blind self-confidence after 9/11 dragged the United States into war and trapped it, and U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara during the Vietnam War was not even the worst compared to the unrepentant Rumsfeld during the Vietnam War because he recognized his mistakes.
Screenshot of the Atlantic Monthly website
Rumsfeld is the worst secretary of defense in U.S. history, and his "spare him this distinction" cannot be ignored just because of his death. His closest "worst defense" contender was Robert McNamara.
George Parker, author of the article, said, "McNamara's stupidity represents the stupidity of an entire generation of Cold War fighters who thought Indochina (Indochina) was an important front against communism." Later, McNamara became more and more aware that the Vietnam War was an unwinnable waste of resources, and after realizing this, he had more foresight than his peers; however, his choice not to let the American public also understand this made him an unforgivable coward. ”
However, George Parker wrote that Rumsfeld was a major advocate of all the disasters that followed 9/11. Whatever occasion the U.S. government intends to make the wrong choice, Rumsfeld will appear there with a wry smile in advance, squinting his eyes and laughing at people who are too cautious, thus pushing his country into a deeper pit.
"Only his deadly judgment can rival his absolute confidence." At the same time, he lacked the courage to self-doubt and the wisdom to change his mind. ”
Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (data map), pictured | surging image
The article satirically depicts the scene after 9/11 when Ramsfeld made a quick and decisive decision:
On the morning of 9/11, Rumsfeld was working in his office. In the first few minutes of the attack, he showed "courage and leadership." After a few hours, he was already indulging in his own disastrous thoughts. According to a shorthand written by an assistant at the time: "It is better to get intelligence quickly." Judge if you have enough ability to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time, not just Usama bin Laden. Then: "Strike out on a massive scale." Sweep it all up, whether related or unrelated. These fragments embody what Rumsfeld is all about: his decisiveness, his aggressiveness, his belief in hard power, and his contempt for procedure. So much so that in the end, what the intelligence officers said didn't matter.
George Parker counted a series of mistakes caused by rumsfeld's blind confidence after 9/11.
Within hours of the attack, Rumsfeld began to make mistakes and never stopped. He argues that the attack proved the need for a missile defense system he has long advocated. He had thought that America's entry into the war in Afghanistan would mean the end of the Taliban. He also argued that the new Afghan government did not need a U.S. presence to provide security and support. He believes the United States should ignore the United Nations, abandon its allies and go it alone. He insisted that al-Qaida could not function without a strongman like Saddam Hussein.
He believes that all intelligence about Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" is wrong, except for the terrible reports that he himself ordered to make. He also had great confidence in the information obtained through torture. He believed that the State Department and the CIA were cowardly and ignorant bureaucrats. He believes the United States can win wars with computerized weapons and an awesome display of force.
George Parker believed that Rumsfeld believed in regime change but did not believe in nation-building, and Rumsfeld thought that tens of thousands of soldiers would be enough to win the iraq war. He believes that the rapid overthrow of Saddam's regime means that the mission has been accomplished. His response to the U.S. occupation of Baghdad was simply: "Freedom's untidy." As if this chaos were just a giddy display of democracy, as if it would not destroy Iraq or become a problem for the United States.
Rumsfeld's overconfidence was particularly evident in his contempt for the fighting in Iraq, when he faxed footage of Che Guevara's biography to an American officer in the region to prove that Iraq's growing resistance did not meet the "definition" of "insurgency" and that there was no way out of the rebels' contempt. He insisted on keeping the number of U.S. troops in Iraq at a low level, so much of Iraq soon fell into rebel hands. His best efforts have focused on winning the war between the Bureaucracy in Washington.
Thus, by the time Rumsfeld was sacked in November 2006, the United States, instead of ensuring peace in one country, had lost wars in both countries (in Iraq and his own career in the United States), largely due to Rumsfeld's own actions and decisions.
The article concludes with "intelligence," "wit," "drive," and "boundless confidence in himself."
Unlike McNamara, he never showed a hint of regret. He must have died convinced that he had always been right in the secure knowledge. ”
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