<h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > evolving from "Future Strike Cruiser" (FSC) to DD-21</h1>
General McCaff's concept of a "Future Strike Crusier" resonates widely within the U.S. Navy. The main reason is that with the continuous improvement of the Soviet Military Capability, the U.S. Navy believes that there is a relative decline in the strike capability of the aircraft carrier battle group with the Nimitz class as the core. Theoretically, a "Nimitz" class can dispatch 120 sorties in the first half day of the first day of the war, and maintain a daily attendance rate of 230 sorties in the four days before the start of the war, which is based on the interval of 90 minutes between the two waves of aircraft and the combat radius of less than 200 nautical miles, which is equivalent to the number of sorties that the air forces of many small and medium-sized countries can dispatch every day; however, if long-distance attacks or combat patrols are to be carried out, due to the increase in the amount of ammunition and fuel, the operation time is prolonged, so the actual number of sorties will be lower than this number. What's more, in the computer wargaming exercise conducted by the US Navy in 1985, it was expected that by 1989, if the United States and the Soviet Union went to war, the carrier-based aircraft wing of an American aircraft carrier could attack 162 targets a day, but at the same time, the lower limit of the targets that a "Nimitz" aircraft carrier battle group needed to deal with was 437... Clearly, there is a considerable difference between capacity and demand. In this case, as an effective supplement to the super-nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the "Future Strike Crusier" (Future Strike Crusier) dedicated to pouring Tomahawk cruise missiles into the Soviet Union in high-risk waters and performing super-saturated attack missions is naturally very popular. Soon after, the Gulf War gave the U.S. Navy a vivid practical lesson.
Revolutionary military technological achievements can often only be seen in retrospect, as is the case with the DDG-1000 destroyer
Although it has been said that Americans generally did not stand out in the early days of every war, only the Gulf War broke this pattern. In this war, the United States won the shortest, most successful and least costly military battle in modern history. Even so, the war was not perfect for the United States, at least for the U.S. Navy. In this battle, the U.S. Navy gathered a huge force of 6 aircraft carrier battle groups, but only 2 battleships, 9 cruisers, and 5 destroyers were able to launch the first wave of Tomahawk cruise missiles to hit ground targets, and only 112 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired in total, and other surface ships were basically idle. Throughout the war, the Navy's limelight was stolen by the Air Force. In the key land attack, except for the carrier-based aircraft on the aircraft carrier, which only dropped a few bombs and a small number of Tomahawk missiles, the 406 mm main gun on the old battleship played an important role. Considering that Iraq is only a regional adversary with extremely limited comprehensive national and military strength, this makes the Gulf War more enlightening to the U.S. Navy. Because of this, although the pattern of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union has undergone fundamental changes at this time, and the debauchery of the sickle and axe flag over the Moscow Kremlin two years later has announced the end of an era, and many targeted military projects have been dismissed, the concept of "Future Strike Crusier" has taken root in the depths of the US Navy. After the Cold War, tremendous changes have taken place in the world strategic pattern. In order to permanently maintain its status of "one superpower and hegemony," the United States began to frequently adjust its national security strategy and national military strategy to "maintain the leading position of the United States in the international community," promote its global interests and ensure its security, and finally establish a unipolar world dominated by the United States. In the field of maritime security, the maritime security environment is unprecedentedly favorable to the United States, and there will be no strategic adversaries who will challenge the United States' maritime power for at least 20 years. The U.S. Navy should adapt to the shift in the focus of national security strategy and military strategy to regional defense, focus on the coastal areas of the world, and maintain the ultimate goal of U.S. world hegemony by controlling coastal areas, projecting power and influence to land, controlling and influencing land affairs from the sea.
During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy gathered a huge force of 6 aircraft carrier battle groups, but only 2 battleships, 9 cruisers, and 5 destroyers were able to launch the first wave of Tomahawk cruise missiles to hit ground targets, and only 112 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired in total, and other surface ships were basically idle. Instead, the 406 mm main gun on the old battleship played an important role
In 1992, represented by the white paper on the strategic program "From the Sea" issued in September of that year, the US Navy successively promulgated a series of "sea-to-land" strategic documents, which is the most direct reflection of the US national security strategy and military strategy in maritime security after the Cold War, and is also an important part of the US maritime security policy. Began the transformation and development of the Navy after the Cold War. One of the outstanding features of this is that the U.S. Navy placed an important position in near-shore operations and ground support rather than sea-controlling capabilities, and new terms such as forward presence, forward deployment, and forward operations appeared in that era. Its core content is mainly the following two. First, the strategic focus has been shifted. The U.S. Navy shifted its operational focus from ocean operations to land operations launched from the sea in coastal areas. In terms of operational objectives, the control of the sea is no longer regarded as its operational objective, but emphasis is placed on interfering with and influencing land affairs from the sea; in terms of combat objects, the Soviet Union is no longer the main combat object, but is locked in small and medium-sized countries in the third world that do not have strong naval strength; in terms of operational areas, the high seas are no longer the main combat area, but the enemy's coastal coastal areas are the main combat areas. The second is to highlight the importance of the presence of the frontier and the necessity of power projection. Frontier existence and power projection are presuppositions and conditions for each other and interact with each other, and both are indispensable. Without the existence of the frontier, there is no pre-deployment of power from sea to land; without force projection, the existence of the frontier lacks follow-up strong support. It is required that the Navy and marine corps must be able to ensure unimpeded passage in the coastal waters under all circumstances, and can send combat forces to the shore to support joint mobile operations on the shore; emphasize the establishment of maritime expeditionary forces to ensure joint operations with the army and air force; and emphasize that the US Navy and the Marine Corps work closely together to form joint army, sea and air task forces to adapt to coastal operations and maritime maneuvering operations. It is worth pointing out that, while there are always complaints that the U.S. military has always had a preference for not always being prepared for the misfortunes of the next war, American politics has always been extremely slow to respond to the challenges of dangerous enemies. But judging by the reaction of the U.S. Navy in the early days of the End of the Cold War, this was not the case.
One of the sc-21 projects of the ARTIST's SC-21 project "Research on Destroyer Technology in the 21st Century"
After the end of the Cold War, the THINKING of the US Navy's strategic adjustment was very clear and the implementation was also very powerful. In October 1992, a month after the U.S. Navy proposed the "From the Sea" strategy, the U.S. Navy launched a series of basic research on new future surface ships, including the "21st Century Destroyer Technology Research" that partially absorbed the concept of "Future Strike Crusier", and was immediately incorporated into the framework of the U.S. Navy's new generation of surface combat ships, that is, "Surface Combatant in the 21st Century" of 21th Centry，SC-21）。 Within the framework of the program, the U.S. Navy conducted a series of studies on various types of hulls, weapon systems, radar systems, and command and control systems, covering all surface ships from frigates, destroyers, cruisers to aircraft carriers, laying a solid foundation for the development and construction of a series of new surface ships today, including Ford-class aircraft carriers, Littoral Combat Ships, and DDG-1000s. However, it should be pointed out that in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, at this time, "Surface Combatant of 21st Centry" (SC-21) is only a loose technical pre-research framework, as part of the "21st Century Destroyer Technology Research" with a great deal of Cold War inertia, its original plan has many versions, most of which are still in a state of secrecy, and only COEA is currently disclosed The general situation of the 3B1 program: with perfect shipboard equipment, 128 VLS vertical launch units, mission capabilities still focus on traditional sea power capabilities, and the ability to attack land is only relatively enhanced, which is contrary to the concept of the "From the Sea" white paper, and in the eyes of some senior executives of the US Navy, it is also conservative and unable to keep up with the times. It was in this context that the concept of a "high-capacity guided-missile ship," which was demonstrated at the same time as the "21st Century Destroyer Technology Study," was sought after by some people, including Jeremy Boorda, then Chief of Naval Operations, and was later formally incorporated into the SC-21 framework, which became the most famous arsenal ship. The original concept of a "high-capacity guided-missile ship" consisted of two configurations, COEA 3A6 and COEA 3B5, and after being incorporated into the SC-21 framework, the configuration of the arsenal ship was adjusted to a certain extent, but it was essentially a simplified version of the Future Strike Crusier, that is, a rather extreme missile ship. There are no expensive phased array radars, nor independent long-range air defense and anti-submarine capabilities in exchange for enhanced stealth, armor, and anti-sinkability; most critically, it can free up space to load at least 500 units of missile vertical launch systems (VLS), that is, it can carry 500 land attack cruise missiles — a arsenal of missiles is worth half a fleet, which is a terrifying fire density. In short, the only task of the arsenal ship is to deliver ammunition to the ground – all types of surface missiles, including Tomahawk missiles – to provide sufficient land-fired firepower to the theater.
The artist's SC-21 project "Research on Destroyer Technology in the 21st Century" project is the second project
In fact, the world's first practical quasi-arsenal ship should be the "Kirov" class nuclear-powered cruiser of the soviet Red Navy's most brilliant period, and the fourth "Peter the Great" carries 500 missiles of various types. However, unlike the Kirov class, which has a mission of regional air defense and anti-ship operations, the core combat mission of the US arsenal ship is to strike land cruise missiles. Prior to the "high-capacity guided-missile ship" program, the U.S. Navy had also envisioned three options, such as changing the ICBM launcher on the Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarine to a cluster-type Tomahawk cruise missile launcher; improving the "Allie Burke" class guided-missile destroyer; and changing the ready-made supertanker to a Tomahawk missile launcher. However, these improvised plans were generally not in line with the dual intentions of the U.S. Navy at that time to compete for a share of the defense budget and to carry out the overall technology migration of the fleet, so as the highlight of the SC-21 framework, the arsenal ship received great attention from the US Navy, and the original "21st century destroyer technology research" came to a standstill under the pressure of Burda. In September 1994, the U.S. Navy officially approved the 21st Century Surface Combat Ship (SC-21) Mission Requirements Program. The program was approved by the U.S. Department of Defense on January 23, 1995. Since then, the SC-21 development program has been officially launched. The SC-21 was launched, and the adjustment of the arsenal ship concept began. In March 1995, the U.S. Navy officially put forward the budget requirements for the development of arsenal ships, in the invitation, the U.S. Navy required arsenal ships to be equipped with 500 missile vertical silos (VLS), empty ship displacement of more than 12,000 tons, but the crew should be controlled below 50 people, the hull is double-layered shell, the total length is at least 244 meters, the maximum speed is 25 knots, and the ship is not equipped with any sensing devices, command control and self-defense weapons. The target information required for ground attack is completely provided by friendly units through the CEC joint engagement capability network, and relies on the cover of friendly fleets, even if the U.S. Navy includes standard missiles and sea sparrows in the missile list of arsenal ships, it also relies entirely on friendly ships to engage through CCC guidance, and all tactical intelligence and attack target information required for combat are provided by the Coordinated Operations Network (CEC), which is a network-centered warfare mode of operation. In order to save costs, the arsenal ship also reduced the speed requirement, with a maximum speed of only 25 knots. Due to the simple system architecture, the arsenal ship adopts an extremely low superstructure, the surface is smooth and concise, the radar cross-section area is low, the hull structure is also very strong and durable, the overall survival design absorbs the experience of large merchant ships and cruise ships, with a double-layer hull, a large number of watertight compartments and extremely thick armor, the arsenal ship itself has no self-defense ability at all, and completely relies on the above-mentioned reduction of detection, the probability of being hit, the loss of pipe equipment and heavy armor to survive.
Schematic diagram of the artist's arsenal ship combat imagination
As soon as the invitation was issued, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Bath Steel, Newport News Shipyard, etc. responded, and a large number of bidding plans were thrown out one after another. Lockheed Martin's arsenal ship scheme, for example, clearly shows that its hull line is almost the same as that of World War II battleships, and the bridge and port are very low. The most special thing is that the bow and stern are also equipped with 2 sets of shipboard versions of the MLRS multiple rocket launchers, which can fire long-range large-caliber rockets. Here, the designers of The Lo Ma Company also played a "trick", that is, the model of the plan was painted with the hull number "72"—the number of the last battleship of the U.S. Navy that was cancelled in 1943. It seems that the understanding of the designers of the Los Ma company for the arsenal ship is the "missile battleship" of the 21st century; the Arsenal ship scheme of Northrop Grumman uses a semi-submersible hull to reduce the dry port height, and can also change the draft depth with a ballast water tank. Keep the outcrop hull at 1.5 meters; Bath Steel's arsenal ship scheme is quite sci-fi, using a radical inverted wave-piercing hull design, all inverted above the waterline, the sharp bow inclination angle is extremely large, the bridge is very low and flat, and the radar reflection area of the whole ship is expected to be equivalent to a mini fishing boat; the arsenal ship plan of the Newport News Shipyard is the simplest, the split-wave bow + inverted hull design, it looks like a stealth version of the oil tanker equipped with a bunch of VLS... Of course, no matter how varied these schemes may be, the design intent is clear: it is a very simple "land attack missile ship". But that's where the problem is, and this positioning has been in controversy from the start. On paper arsenal ships have strong attack capabilities and anti-strike capabilities, but rely too much on coordinated combat systems, which carries a very large risk in the rapidly changing battlefield. Although 1 arsenal ship can carry the number of missiles carried by 6 "Ali Burke" class guided-missile destroyers, it seems that the combat efficiency is high and the cost is low, but because the arsenal ship cannot complete the combat task on its own, it needs other ships to cooperate, and the air defense, anti-submarine and other capabilities are weak, the task elasticity is too poor, and it cannot be used in a slightly higher risk battlefield environment, and this environment is often an unexpected situation. In short, such a simple weapon, the equivalent of a "missile barge," ignores not only the uncertainty inherent in warfare, but also the military victories or defeats that humanity already understood in this era. Coupled with the fact that arsenal ships were once touted by the media as star ships that can replace aircraft carriers, this has aroused the disgust of many people in the industry, so the opposition within the US Navy is also endless.
The Los Ma Company Arsenal Ship Program, the hull follows the Montana-class battleships, and in addition to the densely packed missiles, there are external 227 mm MLRS "Steel Rain" rockets that can fire tactical ballistic missiles (above and below)
Northrop Grumman's arsenal ship scheme uses a semi-submersible hull
It is lamentable that although the arsenal ship was once rapidly promoted by the then Chief of Naval Operations, Bourda, and planned to budget for the first production ship in 1998 and build at least four ships around 2000, its fate took a sharp turn for the worse under the influence of an "unexpected" event. The arsenal was actually the only supporter at the top of the U.S. Navy, but it was this crucial figure who went wrong at a crucial point in time. The cause of the matter seems trivial. In a routine interview in early 1996, the military editor of Newsweek found Burda wearing two V-shaped medals on his chest, which seemed to be a problem. So I immediately checked the U.S. military award file and found that Burda had two medals, one was awarded to him for the military operation to rescue the shot-down pilot in 1973, which was no problem; the other was awarded in 1965, in the early days of the Vietnam War, and the V medal was awarded to those who directly participated in the battle. Newsweek immediately began to speculate: Burda's participation in the shelling of the Vietnamese army was "far away from firing", and it did not tear up with the enemy face to face, so it was not directly into battle! After Newsweek started, the Internet was not so lively at the time, but a large number of American media began to hype up, and even his date of birth (he became a soldier at the age of 17) was turned over. Burda felt stressed. On the morning of 16 May 1996, Burda received a notice from the director of the Pentagon's information department that two reporters had made an appointment in the afternoon and that he had to meet. Feeling unable to talk to reporters, Burda committed suicide by raising a gun in his office after lunch. In fact, according to the normal script, as long as Burda said, "I concede, I resign," the news media will immediately let him go. However, the admiral, who had risen from an ordinary sailor, was too fierce and chose the path of suicide. But whether it is suicide or resignation, as long as his biggest supporter of the arsenal ship is not in the position of chief of naval operations, the arsenal ship will be taken down by the opposition.
Bath Steel's arsenal ship scheme uses a large inclination through the bow of the wave
Newport News Shipyard's arsenal ship scheme is more like an improved tanker (above and below)
And it is. Before June 1996, just as the Arsenal Ship Program was about to enter Phase I (each providing millions of dollars to each major manufacturer to perfect their respective concepts), due to the sudden suicide of its most important supporter, the 25th Chief of Operations of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Burda, the Arsenal Ship was quickly reduced to a "child without a wife" – the new Chief of Operations, Jay Johnson, who succeeded Burda, apparently did not want to pick up the hot potato left by his predecessor (Burda's death, ostensibly "wearing the wrong medal", But it's hard to say it has nothing to do with arsenal ships). But it is worth pondering that while Jay Johnson acknowledges that the criticism of arsenal ships is pertinent, he blames it on defense contractors' one-sided understanding of the 21st Century Surface Combat Ship (SC-21) Mission Requirements Plan. Because of this, although in April 1997, the arsenal ship in the SC-21 framework was renamed the "Maritime Fire Support Verification Ship" by the U.S. Navy, and completely cancelled in December (along with the "sea-making ship" in the SC-21 framework), but in June of that year, the idea of a land-attack destroyer was proposed, and it was approved in October of that year, and the arsenal ship in the SC-21 immediately became DD-21, and the strict sense of dismounting is actually impossible to talk about. Of course, as an evolution of General McCaff's "Future Strike Crusier" concept, if the "arsenal ship" is an overly extreme version, then the DD-21 begins to return to rationality, which is actually a continuation of the "21st century destroyer technology research". In studies of DD-21 capability requirements, cost-to-efficiency ratio studies are highly valued. The development of the new warship noted the rational relationship between land attack, anti-submarine, reduced cost, reduced personnel and improved automation, emphasized the fire support and coastal combat capabilities of destroyers, and adopted a large number of new technologies in the design, hoping to lay a good technical foundation for the CG(X) cruiser program in the SC-21 and future surface ships. In a further clarification of the requirements, the DD-21 is described as having stealthy functions, fully electric propulsion, far more firepower on land than the Arleigh Burke destroyers, and staffing only 1/3 of the active destroyers, but significantly superior to the original arsenal ship program in terms of independent mission capabilities and adaptability to high-risk battlefield environments. These features were praised by the U.S. Department of Defense as an ideal replacement for the Spruance-class destroyers. In Jay L. At the behest of Jay L. Johnson, the Joint Needs Review Board (JROC) completed the restarted Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment (COEA) of the DD-21 in July 1997. The evaluation report analyzed the benefits of the DD-21's new design or modifications from the Arleigh Burke class, and three options were selected: the first was the previously newly designed DD-21 (still based on COEA 3B1) and the derived CG-21 anti-aircraft cruiser, the second was a simplified version of the "Arleigh Burke" class (slightly simplified with the original design of the class to enhance ground capabilities), and the third was the overhauled "Arleigh Burke" class ground attack version (based on the development of specialized ground-to-ground ships based on this class). Change the design, eliminate the "Aegis" system, and carry more VLS). The evaluation results showed that the basic design of the "Arleigh Burke" class could not meet the needs of stealth and manpower reduction, so COEA finally recommended a new design, common hull DD-21/CG-21 scheme.
Burda's death was ostensibly "wearing the wrong medal", but it is difficult to say that it has nothing to do with the arsenal ship behind it
After the arsenal ship was cancelled, one of the earlier DD-21 programs was revived
In February 2000, the U.S. Navy replaced Elmo R. Jr. Military funeral by Admiral Admirl Elmo R. "Bud" Zumwalt
In November 1997, Jay L. Jay L. Johnson signed the DD-21 Operational Requirements (ORD), based on the previous SC-21 "21st Century Destroyer Technology Study," and on November 7, the PMS-500 management unit dedicated to the DD-21 was established at the Maritime Systems Command (NAVSEA). Immediately after that, in December 1997, the National Defense Procurement Commission (DAB) approved DD-21 to enter a milestone phase, beginning to refine the project and conduct a risk assessment; on December 11, the DD-21 program signed a memorandum of understanding for follow-up development. Subsequently, the U.S. Naval Ship Character Improvement Committee also agreed to choose the newly developed DD-21 instead of the improved Burke class, and set the requirements details of the DD-21 in January 1998, at which point, after experiencing the extreme of the arsenal ship, the land attack destroyer project, which was born from the 21st century destroyer technology research, was officially established. Initially, only one competing team competed for the DD-21, led by Huntington Ingles Newport News Shipbuilding and Dockyards (which was acquired by Northrop Grumman in April 2001) and GM's Bath Iron Works (BIW) shipyard, with other players including Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and NewPort News) shipyards with National Steal. Considering that the DD-21 is a revolutionary new ship from the inside out, in order to reduce risk, the U.S. Navy announced on June 18, 1998 that the participating manufacturers must form two Shipbuilder Alliances to compete, each led by a shipyard and a system contractor, and the two teams are the Huntington Ingles Shipyard, Raytheon, Boeing and general BIW. A blue team of Lo Ma, gold and blue are one of the colors of the U.S. Navy uniform. On July 4, 2000, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that the first DD-21 would be designed to adopt Elmo R. R. Jr., a former Chief of Naval Operations who died on January 20, 2000. Admiral Admirl Elmo R. "Bud" Zumwalt was named after him. Admiral Zumwalt is well-known in the U.S. Navy, serving as commander of naval forces that invaded Vietnam in 1969, chief of naval operations in 1970, promoted to admiral, and retiring in 1974, credited with leading the U.S. Navy through one of the most difficult periods of the Cold War. It is worth noting that after the retirement of Admiral Zumwalt, Admiral Zumwalt still constantly criticized Richard Nixon and Kissinger's policy of détente with the Soviet Union, supported President Ronald Reagan's defense policy, and was an enthusiastic supporter of the "Future Strike Crusier" of the year, so naming the first DD-21 destroyer after Admiral Zumwalt not only highlighted the importance the US government attached to it. It also indicates that the bidding competition around DD-21 will tend to be white-hot.
(Continue to be updated tomorrow...) [Dog Head])