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After the "United Nations Army" was hit hard by the second battle of the Chinese Volunteer Army, MacArthur turned from contempt for the strength of the Chinese Volunteer Army to fear the Chinese Volunteer Army, and macArthur in Tokyo to the U.S. officers and men on the battlefield were filled with pessimism and disappointment.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="21" >1, the fear of the volunteers in the United States</h1>
According to an Associated Press reporter, when the US 8th Army retreated to the 38th Line, it collapsed and desperately tried to seize the road and flee south.
"The road south from Pyongyang was crammed with an army that was massively retreating. On the dusty roads, torrents of troops, trucks, artillery and heavy equipment poured down and moved backwards. "
In early and mid-December 1950, Colonel James Polk, an intelligence officer at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, described his and his frustrations in several letters to his wife. In his letter, he said:
"The people at the General Headquarters are depressed, and I think that's the whole free world now. I've been frustrated lately, so I haven't written to you for three days. The war has changed dramatically, and a few days ago the war seemed to be about to end with a great victory, but now no one can see its end. It's terrible. "In the last two days, here... It is very unstable, everyone is so impatient, depressed, and pessimistic and disappointed about the prospects... There are so many things here —I mean many things —that need to be done, and the whole command is deeply plunged into a terrible depression. ”
"People in the country are really disappointed with all this, as you say, and they have the right to do it because things are really messy these days. As I said to you earlier, I was very disappointed by the attitude of the General Command, who appeared sick, hopeless, and had an 'idle attitude' towards things. Everything is done by feeling, do something headless and brainless, very bad. ”
After the "United Nations army" withdrew to the 38th line, it was still in a state of shock. On December 23, Walton Walker, commander of the U.S. 8th Army, drove from Seoul to the front to inspect his defeated troops when he was killed by a South Korean military truck retreating south on his way to the Uighur government. Matthew Ridgway, assistant chief of staff of the U.S. Army, took over as commander of the U.S. 8th Army and arrived in North Korea on December 26.
Ridgway was an outstanding student at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and served as the commander and commander of the U.S. Airborne Division during World War II. As soon as he took office, MacArthur put all the "United Nations Army" ground troops under his command. Ridgway had wanted to resume the offensive soon after taking over, but he spent two days inspecting the US 1st Army, the British 29th Brigade, the US 25th Division, and the South Korean 1st Division, meeting with the commanders of various armies and divisions on the front line, and understanding their views on launching an offensive.
However, the 8th Army had suffered deep physical and psychological damage over the past few weeks, and the morale of the troops was extremely low and in a state of apathy without offensive spirit. Commanders, staff officers and even soldiers at all levels of the 8th Army had lost confidence. These commanders and division commanders believed that whatever kind of attack was carried out at this time would be a failure and could pay a heavy price. Ridgway wrote in his memoirs:
I also found that the troops, mentally and mentally, could not be prepared at all for the kind of offensive action I had been planning. ... The troops are too forward-looking, and there is no sign of the enthusiasm, dynamism and vigor of an army full of confidence and determination to win.
I met some soldiers along the way, talked to them, and listened to their grievances. From them, I also deeply felt that this was an army that was at a loss of confidence in itself and its leaders, did not know what it was doing, and always looked forward to returning to China by boat as soon as possible.....
Every command post I have inspected gives me the same feeling, a loss of confidence and morale. Commanders above the sergeant major seemed to be cold and unwilling to answer my questions, even if it was not easy to hear some grumbling opinions from them. They sullenly provided information, and they could not see in them the agility of the emotionally charged troops.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="90" >2, the efforts of the US military to hold the 38th line</h1>
In view of the prevailing feeling of defeat and low morale in the American army, Ridgway had to abandon his plan to immediately turn to the offensive.
After retreating to the 38th Parallel and south, the "United Nations Army" further constructed fortifications, established a deep defensive line and reorganized its troops, and prepared to resist the attack of the volunteer army. Ridgway believed that the UN forces were too thin to establish a solid front across the entire Korean Peninsula or to stop the night offensive of the Chinese army, but the UN army had air superiority and superior artillery firepower. Therefore, he demanded that "the troops be reduced at night, so that the troops are closely linked to each other, and during the day, a strong counter-attack is launched with a coordinated detachment of step and tank." ...... Capture a series of favorable highlands ... Rely on superior artillery support and air fire support to wipe out the enemy during the day." Once forced to abandon some positions, "after careful survey and careful construction of rear positions, the retreat was carried out in an orderly manner in accordance with the adjustment line".
At the end of December, Ridgway deployed "a general front from the Imjin River to the 38th Parallel," as macArthur ordered on December 8. Two basic lines of defense were set up on this general front, which crossed the Korean Peninsula for 250 kilometers and a depth of 60 kilometers. The first line of defense (Line A) runs from the mouth of the Linjin River in the west and along the 38th Line through Wenshan in the east to Xiangyang on the east coast.
The second line of defense (Line B) runs from Gaoyang in the west to Dongdri on the east coast of The Council, Gaping, and from Yinli to Dongdri on the east coast. In order to increase the depth of defense, from the south of the second line of defense to the 37° north latitude, three mobile defense lines of C, D and E were also prepared, and a large number of migrant workers were drawn from South Korea to construct. Line C runs from Yeongdeungpo along the south bank of the Han River via Yangpyeong and Hengcheng to Gangneung; Line D runs from Suwon to Samcheok via Leecheon, Wonju and Pyeongchang; and Line E runs along the 37° line from Pyeongtaek via Chungju to Samcheok.
In order to prevent being forced to retreat to Busan, Ridgway also designated Brigadier General Garrison Davidson, a sapper-turned-Brigadier General, to set up a defensive line near Busan, the former Rodong River Line, to defend the Busan port area. Davidson used thousands of South Korean laborers to build most of the trench systems, artillery positions, and a large amount of barbed wire.
At this time, the total strength of the "United Nations Army" ground forces in Korea was 365,000 people, of which 250,000 were combat troops, and the US 10th Army was also under the command of the US 8th Army. Except for the hard-hit US 10th Army (commanding the US 1st Marine Division, us 7th Division, and US 3rd Division) located in the Daegu and Busan areas, and the main force of the US 2nd Division was located in the Dicheon River north of the 37° line, 8 South Korean divisions were deployed on the first line, and the rest of the main forces of the US and British troops were placed in a mobile position south of Seoul.
The deployment of the "United Nations Army" was characterized by placing the South Korean army on the first line, the American and British troops on the second line, and most of them were assembled on the main roads around Seoul and in the north and south of the Han River, posing a posture of being able to observe the rules and not be able to be prepared to retreat according to the plan at any time.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="91" > 3 and 1 night to break through the "United Nations Army" 38th line defense line</h1>
On The eve of New Year's Day in 1950 , December 31 , the wind near the 38th Line was bitter, heavy snow was flying, and the temperature plummeted. At 17:00 on the same day, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, in accordance with the predetermined plan and after a short period of artillery preparations, launched an attack on the 38th-line defensive position of the "United Nations Army" on a wide front of more than 200 kilometers stretching from the mouth of the Linjin River in the west to the Linhei in the east.
Prior to this, the 6 corps of the Volunteer Army in the first line were about 230,000 people, and the 3 corps of the KPA in the first line were about 75,000 people. The first line of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army totaled about 300,000 people.
By December 30, all the armies had completed the campaign, and due to the covert action, the suddenness of the battle was achieved, especially the 116th Division of the 39th Army, on the day before the start of the campaign, in front of the South Korean 1st Division, braving the cold of minus 25 °, using terrain, snow, straw, etc., to hide more than 7,500 assault troops and more than 70 artillery camouflages for a day and night, undetected.
At this time, the "United Nations Army" had become a bird of fright, fearful of the volunteer army, and after the attack of the volunteer army and the people's army, it resisted a little and then retreated and fled. Only half an hour to one hour after the Volunteers launched the attack at 17:00 on 31 December, the 38th and 39th Armies of the Right Column and the 42nd Army of the Left Column broke through the 38th Line position of the "United Nations Army". At 18:30 and 20:30, the 40th Army of the Right Column and the 66th Army of the Left Column also broke through the enemy's 38th Line positions successively, and the 50th Army crossed the Linjin River south at 22:00, and the breakthroughs of all units of the Volunteer Army were relatively smooth.
The 39th Army, supported by the 26th and 45th Artillery Regiments (32 guns in total), broke through at The New Ridge and Doi areas. With heavy artillery fire, it destroyed the forward fire point of the South Korean 1st Division, suppressed its deep artillery, and opened two roads for the infantry at the front. The 116th Division, which was tasked with breaking through, spent 5 to 11 minutes passing through the minefield, wading through waist-deep glaciers and climbing up the opposite cliff as the artillery fire extended. It then quickly broke through the front of the South Korean 1st Division's defenses. After a night of fighting, before dawn on January 1, 1951, the South Korean Army broke into the defense depth of about 10 kilometers and occupied the Daechon and Wujianli areas. After crossing the river with the right wing regiment of the 116th Division, the 117th Division, which was tasked with interspersing and relocating, quickly interspersed the area south of the Dongdou River, and its vanguard regiment crushed the enemy's five blockades along the way, and before 5 o'clock on the 1st, it broke into a depth of 15 kilometers, detoured back to the Area of Shonsui-ri and Sengan-ri south of the Dongdou River, severed the connection between the South Korean 6th Division and its left-wing South Korean 1st Division, and intercepted more than 600 people of the South Korean 6th Division that had fled south.
The 115th Division crossed the Linjin River with the 1st Regiment of the 116th Division and forcefully coordinated the crossing of the 50th Army.
After crossing the Linjin River, the 1st Army Corps of the People's Army on the western front developed in the direction of Xianyouli and Bozhouli near Mount Wen. The 4th Division of the 2nd Army and the 1st Division of the 5th Army on the Eastern Front crossed the 38th Line before the battle was launched, and infiltrated and detoured in the direction of Hongcheon, Hengcheng, and Wonju respectively. One of the divisions advanced to the area of Singan-ri, southwest of Hongcheon, on the morning of the 31st, threatening the enemy flank and forcing the South Korean 3rd Division to flee south.
On January 1, 1951, an Associated Press reporter reported on the southward flight of South Korean troops:
The mighty Chinese army repelled UN forces north and northeast of Seoul on New Year's Day morning this year. The Allied 1st Division directly north of Seoul had completely collapsed. Reporters had seen about 300 men of the division heading south on a road several miles east of their original positions. The name of the UN army could not be revealed, but the defeated division was known for its tenacity. Agence France-Presse reporters and United Press agency reporters reported that when the US 8th Army retreated, it implemented a "scorched earth" policy, and the entire area that withdrew from the 38th Parallel to the south burned out. They burned down schools, grain depots and thatched huts that had occupied since early December last year. White smoke and charred shards of straw floated on the way back, and the smoke obscured the sky and there was no light all day long.
In order to stop the attack of the volunteer army and the people's army, the US 5th Air Force rushed out and launched a fierce attack on the volunteer army advancing south along the Kaesong to Seoul and along the Road from Lyencheon to Seoul. On 1 January, 564 sorties were dispatched, and on the 2nd, 531 sorties were dispatched, with an average of one group of fighter-bombers dispatched every 10 minutes.
The Volunteer Army and the KPA continued to develop their offensive in spite of the indiscriminate bombardment of Us aircraft. At dawn on the 2nd, the main force of the 39th Army of the Right Column advanced to the designated reinforcement positions- the areas of Wu da Li and Wu Lin Da. At 11:00 on the 2nd, the 50th Army successively occupied the areas of Liguli, Wenpingli and Huangfali east of Wenshan. The South Korean 1st Division in the Wensan area, under the attack of the 39th and 50th Armies of the Volunteer Army, fled south at 12 o'clock on the 2nd. The 40th Army and the 38th Army entered the area northeast of the Hui government and south of Baochuan until 17:00 on the 2nd. The 1st Corps of the People's Army went out to the Xianyouli and Pajuli areas near Wenshan Mountain on the 2nd. At this point, the armies of the right column of the Volunteer Army had advanced to Poju-ri, Sen-gwan-ri, QifengShan, and the northeast line of the Uighur Government, and burst into the defense depth of the South Korean Army by 15 to 20 kilometers.
After the main force of the 66th Army of the Left Column and the 124th Division of the 42nd Army annihilated the enemy in the areas of Xiudeshan, Shangnanshu, and Xiananshu, the main force of the 42nd Army occupied Jiaping at 10 o'clock on the 2nd, and the enemy of Jiaping had fled south. At 15:00 on the 2nd, the 198th Division of the 66th Army, which pretended to attack in the direction of Chuncheon, occupied Chuncheon.
At this point, the defense of the existing positions of the "United Nations Army" on the 38th Line completely collapsed, and the 6 corps of the Volunteer Army and 3 corps of the People's Army continued to develop the offensive in depth by taking advantage of the victory. In view of this situation, Ridgway ordered on the morning of January 3 that the entire line be withdrawn to the south of Seoul to organize a defense.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="93" occupied Seoul > 4 or 4 days</h1>
After the third campaign of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, the "United Nations Army" retreated south from the 38th Parallel. At 7 and 8 o'clock on January 2, Deputy Commander Han Xianchu ordered the 38th and 39th Armies of the Right Column to seize the enemy of the Hui Government with 1 division each, the main force of the 38th Army advanced to the south of the Hui Government to block the enemy of the Hui Government fleeing south and the enemy who reinforced the Hui Government from the south, the main force of the 39th Army attacked the Hui Government from the northwest and southwest, and the 40th Army attacked the Hui Government from the north. The 50th Army quickly advanced towards Goyang, west of the Uighur government, and if the enemy of Goyang fled south, it pressed toward Seoul. If the enemy on the first line of the Government of Parliament and Goyang had fled south, the 50th Army pursued Seoul, seized the Han River Bridge, crossed the Han River with cameras, and the other armies attacked the Han River and managed to prepare to cross the river, with the 1st Army of the People's Army acting as a guard in Seoul.
Accordingly, the volunteer units continued to advance south on the evening of the 2nd and the morning of the 3rd.
The 50th Army pursued Goyang, and the 446th Regiment of the 149th Division defeated 1 battalion of the US 25th Division at Biheli, north of Goyang, and continued the pursuit, cutting off the retreat route of the British 29th Brigade, which was retreating from the Uighur government to Seoul via Goyang, at Fomidi, south of Goyang. After 3 hours of fierce fighting, the 1st Battalion and 1 tank squadron of the Royal Osterian Rifle Regiment of the British Army were completely annihilated. During the battle, the anti-tank teams of the 446th Regiment used cluster grenades and explosive canisters to destroy and capture 31 enemy tanks, 24 armored vehicles and vehicles in one fell swoop. In this battle, the 446th Regiment, in coordination with the 445th Regiment, killed and wounded more than 700 British prisoners. On January 11, Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua, Park Yiyu, Hong Xuezhi, and Han Xianchu praised the 446th Regiment of the 149th Division.
The 39th Army pursued in the direction of Seoul, and the main force of its vanguard, the 116th Division, was ordered to intervene in the Government of Parliament to cut off the enemy's retreat. The 346th Regiment of the 116th Division encountered the 21st Regiment of the US 24th Division at Huilong Temple, southwest of the Uighur Government, and annihilated one of them. At the same time, the 347th Regiment of the 116th Division annihilated 2 companies of the British 29th Brigade in the Valley west of the Government of Parliament, capturing more than 30 tanks and vehicles.
The 38th and 40th Armies pursued to the shuiluoshan area southeast of the Uighur government, defeated 1 regiment of the US 24th Division, and annihilated one of its units.
The main force of the 42nd Army of the Left Column of the Volunteer Army and the 1st Division of the 66th Army crossed the North Han River from Kaping and Chuncheon to pursue in the direction of Hongchuan. The 2nd and 5th Armies of the People's Army continued to intercept the fleeing enemy in the direction of Hongchuan and Hengcheng. On January 3, 1951, after Ridgway was forced to order a full-scale retreat south of Seoul, Peng Dehuai immediately decided to take advantage of the victory to pursue and expand the results of the battle, based on the situation on the battlefield.
The "United Nations Army", under the brave pursuit of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, was forced to retreat from Seoul on the afternoon of January 3. From 3 p.m. onwards, Ridgway ordered that all civilian vehicles and pedestrians should be barred from passing on Seoul bridges and main roads except for the army, and that all necessary measures should be taken to prevent refugees from passing through bridges and main roads in order to ensure that the 8th Army continued to pass through the bridges.
On the afternoon of January 3, the U.S. 8th Army retreated from Seoul, with long lines of infantry, trucks, tanks, and various means of delivery slowly passing through the pontoon bridge. While withdrawing from Seoul, the US 8th Army carried out frenzied destruction of Seoul, Incheon, Gimpo Airport, and other places with gasoline and bombs. Schools, hospitals, libraries, and museums in Seoul were severely damaged. When Reuters reporter White fled Seoul by plane, he saw "Seoul burning in thick smoke" and "the fire can still be seen 50 miles south of the city."
On the afternoon of January 4, the 116th Division of the 39th Volunteer Army and the 1st Army of the People's Army occupied Seoul. The 149th Division of the 50th Army entered Seoul that evening. The 114th Division of the 38th Army and the 117th Division of the 39th Army each had a reconnaissance detachment that entered Seoul on the 4th. When the 1st KPA Corps entered Seoul, it engaged in a fierce battle with a tank battalion of the US army, killing and wounding about 200 enemy prisoners, capturing 2 tanks and 46 cars. As a result of the frenzied destruction of seoul by the "United Nations Army" during the evacuation of Seoul, Seoul was completely unrecognizable at this time, and many buildings were reduced to rubble.
On January 5, China's People's Daily published an editorial congratulating it on the occupation of Seoul. The editorial also states:
The reason why the Chinese Volunteers were able to defeat the US invading army "armed to the teeth" in Korea was mainly because they fought for justice and humanity, for patriotism and internationalism, for the elimination of American aggressors, for the protection of the DPRK and Chinese from massacre, and for the safety of Korean and Chinese women and children. Therefore, where they went, they saved lives and helped the injured, restored towns and villages, and restored the peaceful life of the Korean people. Their great deeds have been warmly welcomed by the Korean people.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="95" > 5 or 8 days to force the three or seven lines</h1>
At 12 o'clock on the 5th, 1 company and 1 reconnaissance company of the 116th Division of the 39th Army crossed the Han River from the Han River, and learned that the "United Nations Army" 30 miles south of the Han River had no troops, and the Han River had frozen, and the personnel could pass. The 39th Army had ordered 1 regiment of the 116th Division to cross the Han River south to occupy the beachhead position. Wu Xinquan, commander of the 39th Army, and Xu Binzhou, political commissar, sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Hong Xuezhi, Xie Fang, and Han Xianchu at 15:00 on 5 July, and at the same time suggested that the 50th Army cross the river overnight, and that the other armies should not cross the river from Seoul east of the Cheongpyeong River but from Seoul to the south.
According to this situation, Peng Dehuai, Kim Hung, and Park Yiyu made some adjustments to the deployment at 24:00 on the 4th, and at 18:00 on the 5th, the 50th Army crossed the river that night and advanced towards Suwon; the 1st Army of the People's Army, in addition to leaving 1 division to guard Seoul, the main force seized Gimpo and captured Inchon.
That evening, the 50th Army of the Volunteer Army and the 1st Army of the People's Army, under the cover of a regiment of the 116th Division of the Volunteer Army, which had occupied a beachhead position on the south bank of the Han River, crossed the Han River and began to operate. At the same time, 1 regiment of the 120th Division of the 40th Army crossed the Han River northeast of Guangzhou to cooperate with the 50th Army. The 126th Division of the 42nd Army sent 1 battalion in the direction of Yang Ping for power reconnaissance, and the rest of the troops rested and stood by.
After crossing the Han River, the 50th Army continued to pursue south in two ways, with the 149th and 150th Divisions on the right pursuing in the direction of Suwon via Gwacheon and Junpu-ri, and the 148th Division on the left pursuing in the direction of Suwon via Miju-ri and Shangdi-ri. The 149th annihilated a unit of the South Korean 1st Division at Gwacheon and Junpo. After crossing the Beihan River, the 360th Regiment of the 120th Division of the 40th Army occupied Guangzhou on the 6th and advanced through Jing'anli in the direction of Jinliangchangli. By the 7th, the right column had crossed the convergence and occupied Suwon and Kim LeungChang.
After the 1st Corps of the People's Army crossed the river, by the 8th, it occupied Gimpo and Chuangang successively.
On the 7th and 8th, the powerful reconnaissance sent by the 42nd Army of the Left Column of the Volunteer Army entered and occupied Pingli, Yangping, Lizhou, and Lichuan, and annihilated the first part of the US 2nd Division at Limuting, northwest of Hengcheng; the 66th Army occupied Hongchuan on the 5th and then rested in place.
The 2nd and 5th Armies of the KPA occupied Wonju and Hengcheng on the 7th and 8th respectively, and continued to pursue in the direction of Yeongju.
At this time, in view of the fact that the Volunteer Army and the People's Army had failed to annihilate the enemy's living forces in large numbers during the offensive, the "United Nations Army" seemed to be retreating in a planned manner in an attempt to induce the Volunteer Army and the People's Army to go deeper to the south, causing the volunteer army and the People's Army to empty the defenses on the east and west coasts on the flanks and rear, and exposing their flanks so that they could take advantage of the advantages of the navy and air force, carry out a flank and rear landing, and carry out a north-south attack on the volunteer army and the people's army.
After three battles, the Volunteer Army suffered great attrition, abnormal fatigue, and extremely needed to rest and replenish, and because the front line advanced, the rear transport line of the Volunteer Army was extended, and the transportation capacity itself was weak, and it was seriously blocked and destroyed by the US Air Force, and the supply was very difficult. In order to avoid advancing too far and falling into an unfavorable situation, and also to prepare for the spring offensive, at 24:00 on the 6th, Peng Dehuai, Jin Xiong, and Park Yiyu immediately called the armies of the First Line Volunteer Army and the corps of the People's Army to end the campaign, turn to rest, prepare for the spring offensive, and pay attention to strengthening vigilance and air defense.
The battle ended on 8 January, when the third battle was won. The "United Nations Army" all withdrew to Pyeongtaek, Anseong, Dichuan, Samcheok and the first line near the thirty-seventh parallel north latitude.
The third campaign was a large-scale offensive operation between the Chinese Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army against the enemy who was prepared for defense.
In this campaign, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army fought side by side, overcame difficulties and obstacles, and after 8 days and nights of continuous attacks, broke through the defense of the "United Nations Army" on the 38th Line, occupied Seoul, pushed the front line from the 38th Line to near the 37th Parallel, advanced 80 to 110 kilometers, annihilated more than 19,000 enemy personnel, smashed the ATTEMPT of the US authorities to defend the 38th Line, bought time, reorganized the army, and prepared to re-offend, broke the attempt of the US authorities to "cease fire" along the 38th Parallel, and aggravated the US authorities' attempt to "stop fire" along the 38th Line. The defeat of the United Nations Army has deepened the internal contradictions between the US and British ruling cliques and the "United Nations Army" and further expanded the influence of the chinese and Dprk peoples and armies in the international community. The Volunteer Army and the People's Army suffered more than 8,500 casualties in this battle (including more than 2,700 people in the People's Army).
(End of text)
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