The Afghan Taliban has officially established a state and published a list of members of the government, and everything seems to be on the right track. But everyone knows that the Taliban regime has not weathered a dangerous period. The reason is simple – the Taliban have no money, much less food.
In 2020, Afghanistan's total food production was 5.535 million tons. Divided by an average population of 39 million people, the per capita food production was 141.9 kg – and for reference, China's lowest per capita grain production was a little more than 200 kg during the three-year natural disaster period from 1959 to 1961.
When these two data are released at the same time, everyone should know what the Taliban are about to face. And this 141.9 kg is still ideal. This year is a global food famine year, and Afghanistan is no exception – especially given that Afghanistan has just experienced war and regime change, so this year's food production is certainly lower. The previous Afghan government relied on the Americans to provide food to maintain the situation. Now the Americans will certainly not give food, which means that Afghanistan is likely to face famine in the future.
Of course, I don't have any grain, and I can buy it in the international market. Not to mention that global food prices are now soaring, it is the Taliban themselves, and there is no money – in 2020, the Afghan government's fiscal revenue is 5.5 billion US dollars, of which 4.2 billion are Western donations, accounting for about 80%, and their own tax revenue is only 1.3 billion. Now the Taliban not only can no longer receive Western donations, but also the state treasury that the Afghan government once had in the U.S. bank account has also been frozen by the U.S. government.
There is no money, no food, and now is the time when the Taliban desperately need money for food – if not, soon there will be civil war and famine in Afghanistan, and the Taliban regime will immediately fall apart.
So we have seen that the Taliban regime has recently made frequent overtures to the Chinese government – not to mention, just earlier this month, the Taliban spokesman said that he hopes to rebuild Afghanistan's economy with China's help, and clearly expresses a strong interest in participating in China's "Belt and Road" and seeks to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.
The Taliban are clever - China has money, grain and infrastructure construction capabilities, and it is not the same as the United States, so as long as it intervenes, it can not only help the Taliban regime tide over the existential crisis, but also help it solve the development problems in the future; and Afghanistan's so-called $3 trillion mineral deposits, as well as the geopolitical location of the eurasian continent, determine the stability of an Afghanistan, which is of great economic and strategic value to China, as the world's largest industrial power and a fierce game with the United States.
But China's response is very interesting, compared with the Taliban's frequent or even impatient overtures, China's response is not so positive, but repeatedly stressed that it hopes that the Taliban can be open and inclusive, completely cut off with terrorist organizations, and establish good relations with neighboring countries.
Why is China not so active? Of course, Yun Shijun's relevant articles have said many times that he is afraid that the Taliban will not be able to hold the situation, resulting in his own investment drifting - after all, the investment in mineral development is high and the return cycle is long, so the risks contained are very large. Now the Taliban is not only facing a shortage of food and money, but also a large number of warlord tribes outside the system, and even the Taliban is also full of factions, so this variable is too big. If the Taliban can't hold on to the situation and a civil war breaks out, Then Chinese investment will be lost.
This is the root cause. But if it is only related to this, it is not enough to explain the deep meaning of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's reply. It is true that the Taliban's foundations are very unstable and the risks are not small. But as we said earlier, if the Taliban stabilize the situation, China's gains will also be very large. So while we can't ignore the risks, we must not give up this potentially huge benefit.
Now, if China does not intervene, the Taliban will obviously not be able to continue, which is equivalent to avoiding risks and watching a major strategic opportunity be lost.
This is clearly unreasonable. Therefore, for China, the key to the problem is not whether to shoot, but how to do it, in order to try to ensure the benefits at the same time, reduce their own risk coefficient.
And this answer is in the Reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This set of replies seems to be a bit of diplomatic rhetoric. But in fact, the conditions for China's intervention have been pointed out, that is, the Taliban must eliminate terrorism – to put it bluntly, it must completely eliminate ETIM.
It is well known that the Taliban has a deep connection with extreme terrorist forces – and even for a long time it was itself one of the synonyms of terrorism. Although the Taliban have actively whitewashed in recent years, especially after the victory, the desire to whitewash is particularly strong, but after all, the dung pit of terrorism has been lying in the pit for so many years, and it is somewhat unrealistic to go ashore at once. In fact, after this period of in-depth media coverage of the Taliban's internal situation, everyone knows that there is also a struggle between extremists and moderates within the Taliban - and the former is, to put it bluntly, a terrorist force.
Of course, it is now the moderates who have the upper hand, so the Taliban are relatively enlightened. But the advantages of moderates are not solid – extremists still have a strong presence within the Taliban system. If the moderates are not able to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan through their own enlightened style, it is likely that they will be seized by the extremists; even those extremist forces that have rebelled against the Taliban moderates, such as the IS Khorasan branch that created terrorist attacks at Kabul airport some time ago, and East Turkistan, will be re-strengthened, and even reunited with the extremists in the Taliban system.
It is reasonable to say that under this pattern, if China wants to make a move in Afghanistan, it should immediately support the moderate government in power and give money and food - after all, only by getting money and grain can the moderates stabilize the situation and continue to maintain it. And if China doesn't give, the downfall of the moderates is almost inevitable. But why is China less active and wants to root out terrorism from the Taliban as a precondition for aid? Isn't that embarrassing the moderates? If they really can't do it, won't Afghanistan go back to the days of terrorism?
On the face of it, it is indeed this logic. Given the presence of powerful extremist forces within the Taliban, it is now very difficult for moderates to strike immediately at terror – even if it is simply to eliminate east turkistan, a terrorist organization outside the Chinese system, and it is likely to cause chaos. But from China's point of view, this is actually an inevitable choice for maximizing its own interests.
From the Taliban's point of view, it is indeed difficult to deal with terrorism now - after all, their own foundations are not stable, and it is easy to stir up chaos inside and outside. Therefore, their ideal state is to stabilize their positions in the back and then clear them step by step.
But the optimal solution for the moderate Taliban is not the optimal solution for China. For this situation is based on the premise that the moderates can always control the situation. And this premise, from the current situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban, is actually not particularly certain. It is very likely that the extremists in the future, in conjunction with external terror, will inevitably force the palace to gain control of the Taliban regime – if this happens, then Today's Chinese assistance to the Taliban regime will become the cultivation of terrorist forces – especially the cultivation of East Turkistan.
Taking a step back, even if the moderates have not been ousted from power, as long as the extremists within the Taliban still exist, this is still a great threat to China and even the world - a regime that has retained a large number of remnants of extreme terrorist forces, relying on China's assistance to stabilize its position, and even relying on Chinese investment to greatly increase its strength, so that it will not only pose a huge threat to the world, but China's investment in Afghanistan and even China's border security will be highly coerced:
After all, if the Taliban are fattened by China, the internal terrorist forces will also benefit. If they start doing things next, will China allow it or not? Allowing, this is equivalent to condoning adultery, not only increasing its own potential risks, but also facing huge criticism in the international community; not allowed, these fattened terrorists say that they will turn their faces, the Taliban regime cannot be acted because of high infiltration, and China cannot directly send troops into the imperial cemetery, so are we not pit into the grandmother's house?
This is a matter of major right and wrong, and it cannot be vaguely sloppy. Now vague, it may be good for Taliban moderates – this will avoid premature escalation of tensions with extremists; but for China, that is a huge potential risk. Therefore, the eradication of terrorist forces is the prerequisite for China's assistance and investment.
Of course, it is too difficult for the Taliban to eliminate all the terrorist forces at once - if it were to do so now, it is estimated that the Taliban would immediately split and fight a civil war.
But at least, east turkistan, a terrorist force directly aimed at China, must be eradicated immediately.
This feasibility is much greater. After all, East Turkistan is only a small branch of Afghanistan's various terrorist forces – not even within the Taliban system, but an external terrorist force. While internal extremists will certainly be dissatisfied with it (they are inextricably linked), the sacrifice should not be too great compared to getting Chinese aid to solve the immediate need.
After all, even the extremists of the Taliban want to eat and drink Lhasa. Moving from dark caves to palatial kabul office buildings and luxury villas, they themselves are unwilling to return to the countryside to live a precarious guerrilla life – even if they do, neither do the centrists outside the moderates and extremists. And Chinese aid is the next key to ensuring that the Taliban can stay in Kabul, so logically speaking, this matter also has a good chance of success.
For the moderates, this is actually helping them sit firmly. Not to mention the strategic importance of obtaining Chinese aid and seizing the right to distribute aid (which is certainly given to the moderate government) for the moderates to continue to mix and even establish authority; the weakening of any terrorist force, whether within or outside the system, will itself enhance the relative advantage of the moderates within the Taliban.
However, as things stand now, moderates fear a backlash from the extremists that will lead to infighting, as well as a rebellion by terrorist forces outside the system – which is why they have so far hesitated to eradicate East Turkistan – although they will definitely prohibit it, they are hesitant to eradicate it. But the situation is stronger than people, and with Afghanistan's stock depleted and the Taliban's finances depleted, it is believed that the moderate government has no choice but to act.
Of course, some people will ask whether it will be a bit risky to do so - after all, if the Taliban are still moderate in power, if they are forced to do something, they lose again, they are replaced by extremists, or Afghanistan directly re-enters the civil war, then China is not self-defeating?
We must admit that this possibility cannot be ruled out. But even if it does, it is not self-defeating. The logic is simple: as we said earlier, China must not cultivate an Afghan government that retains a lot of terror elements – so the absolute advantage of moderates is a prerequisite for China to invest in Afghanistan. And since it is necessary to gain absolute superiority, it is necessary to act on terrorism, and China will never allow it to be vague.
At the same time, if moderates cannot absolutely suppress extremists and terrorist forces, then such a Taliban regime will have no meaning for China – if it wants to fall, let it fall. Even if the extremists come forward, they will still fall without aid – no one can feed the 3,900 Afghans on their own anyway – and these Afghans lack everything, but guns and bullets; and then you continue to fight the civil war, and there is nothing to lose for China. In the end, a certain force wins and comes to power - even if it is extreme before, if it wants to sit in the country and even get rid of poverty and get rich, it will finally have to learn from the current Taliban and whitewash and seek Chinese assistance - and then it will still have to face these conditions in China.
This is China's logic toward the Taliban. China is actually willing to support the current Taliban government, but what it supports must be a government that is determined and capable of eliminating terrorist forces. Determination and ability, both of which the Taliban must really show to China, are indispensable; if they are afraid of their heads and tails and want to pass the pass in confusion, then China is not so good at fooling! And eliminating East Turkistan is the first step for the Taliban to wash their whites and go ashore - to get Chinese assistance to solve the urgent needs!
So, what will the Taliban make in the end in the face of China's demands? If the Taliban eliminate ETIM, what kind of aid will China give to the Taliban next? Will the door of Sino-Arab cooperation be opened after that? If the Taliban don't do it in the end, is there any other means for China? Or to watch from the sidelines from now on? Pay attention to the WeChat public account: Yun Shi, Yun Shi Jun The next section continues to interpret for you.
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