The account is frozen, and the company will be reorganized...... Since July 22, Pan Tea Holdings (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Pan Tea") has issued a series of announcements, causing an uproar and is on the verge of "thunder".
In the past few days, a large number of dealers and retail investors have gathered at the Pan Tea R&D Center in Nanhai District, Foshan City, to discuss the explanation.
Previously, Fancha proposed a plan of "paying 5% first, and replacing the remaining 95% with new products", which was unacceptable to all parties involved. Videos leaked online also show multiple clashes at the scene, and bloodshed at one point.
Although the Pan Tea R&D Center has been cordoned off by the police, a large number of people still gathered at the scene and were reluctant to leave. And Pan Tea has repeatedly said that "the company will solve it to the end and accompany everyone to the end", but many people think that "it is just delaying time".
The "Big Mac" tea company announced its restructuring
According to public information, Pan Tea sprouted in 2015 and launched its first product "Yiqi" on December 1, 2021. On September 27, 2022, Fancha Holdings (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. was formally established with a registered capital of 10 million yuan. Zheng Chaogen is the company's legal person, executive director and largest shareholder, holding 62% of the shares.
Fancha can be said to be a "brother" enterprise. Born in 1989, Zheng Chaogen is a native of Xiping, Anxi, Fujian Province, and his half-brother Zheng Haihua is the general manager of Pan Tea (holding 38% of the shares), and Zheng Huadong is the deputy general manager.
In addition to Pan Tea Holdings (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., Zheng Haihua and Zheng Chaogen are cooperating with other companies including Guangdong Pan Fu Industrial Holdings Co., Ltd. and Pan Sauce Liquor (Guangdong) Co., Ltd.
At the beginning of 2022, Fancha proposed the "100 cities and 1000 stores" plan, and began the national layout with the channel model of "opening more stores in big cities and opening big stores in small cities". Carry out large-scale investment promotion activities, land the first multinational image store in Korea, appear on the NASDAQ screen in New York Times Square in United States, and appear in the pedestrian street of Paris Spring Department Store...... Synchronized with the overwhelming marketing, is the expansion speed of pan tea.
On December 2, 2022, 116 Pan Tea offline physical stores opened across the country at the same time; By the end of 2022, that number had grown to 460. As of June this year, the number of offline physical stores of Pan Tea has exceeded 600.
On July 22, Fancha suddenly issued an announcement, saying that the bank accounts of the company and some dealers were frozen and are expected to be unsealed in early August 2024. On August 3, Fancha issued a restructuring announcement, stating that it would carry out debt or equity restructuring of the company.
Focusing on pan-tea, Zheng Chaogen has established his own "pan" business empire, and 20 related companies are involved in the tea industry, wine industry, brand management, industrial investment and other fields. However, all this collapsed after the announcement of the restructuring of Pan Tea.
Pursue short-term high returns
From the official launch of the first tea product on December 1, 2021, to the announcement of restructuring on August 3 this year. In the past 980 days, why has Pan Tea been able to absorb tens of billions of funds? Some industry insiders pointed out that as soon as pan tea entered the public eye, it was a "financial tea" that was alive and well.
It is reported that the purchase of "2021 Yiqi" was limited when it was first listed, and the purchase qualification can only be determined by lottery, and a user is limited to one purchase, and failure to pay within 2 hours is deemed to have given up the qualification. "This kind of operation is common in popular products with high collection value, and people who are familiar with the 'financial tea' gameplay have entered the game early on." A person familiar with the matter said.
"Except for retail investors, the rest have to pay a deposit to Pan Tea before they can enter the game." Li Jun (pseudonym), a tea merchant in Fangcun, said that pan-tea entrants can be divided into 5 categories, specifically channel dealers, experience halls, distributors, franchise stores, and retail investors.
Fancha has set a corresponding threshold for these entrants. Among them, the channel provider pays the most deposit, and the distribution is also the most, and someone has paid 500,000 yuan in 2022 to get the status of the channel provider. The deposit and distribution of experience halls, dealers, and franchise stores will be reduced in order. In addition, retail investors can buy tea from either grade.
How to make a profit by buying pan tea products? The first mode of trading is "spot" trading. This model is similar to collection investment, after buying the spot (or holding the circulation code), when it appreciates to the psychological expected price, you can find a buyer for offline transactions. After reaching the intention of trading, it is necessary to pay a certain fee to Fancha to replace the holder of the circulation code.
The second is "futures" trading. Buyers can choose from different redemption times, ranging from 15 to 90 days. "It's like depositing a sum of money in the bank, saving it for a month and agreeing on how much interest it is, and then paying the principal and interest together when it matures. The short storage time, the low interest; The longer the storage time, the higher the interest. Li Jun said that during the hottest period of the market, the profit margin of pan tea products was as high as 120%.
"Why do you make sure you don't lose money? Because Fancha has been attracting new investors into the game, using the principal they have invested to pay the interest of the previous batch. Li Jun said, "In fact, anyone who has done 'financial tea' knows that Pan Tea is another scam, but everyone is betting that they will not be the last to take over." ”
Retail investor Wang Ling (pseudonym) also confirmed this model to reporters. Her "upper family" promised her that if she bought a cake of Pu'er tea worth 14,000 yuan, she would return 17,200 yuan after 40 days, and she could earn 3,200 yuan when it expired. As a result, Wang Ling bought 2 cakes of tea on June 24 this year, which was originally scheduled to expire on August 4. Now after discovering that there was a problem with Fancha, she contacted the "Shangjia" again, and the other party also said that the dealer could not be contacted.
Before the collapse, many of Fancha's products were speculated to "sky-high prices". It is reported that the price of "2021 Yiqi" was 12,000 yuan per mention when it was first listed, and the product will rise to 500,000 yuan in 2022. In 2023, the price of the product will be 600,000 yuan, and it once soared to 700,000 yuan at the beginning of this year.
Circulation code and "shorting"
In many WeChat groups, retail investors believe that the transfer records and circulation codes with dealers are "the only way to get money back".
According to the original transaction model of Pan Tea, customers who buy tea will get a "circulation code" and cash out the goods with the code. According to public reports, Pan Tea has a built-in high-tech chip in each tea leaf, which can be sensed through the NFC of the mobile phone without unpacking the box to check the authenticity.
However, the follow-up transaction model began to gradually "change", and the circulation code was not handed over to the corresponding customers. It may be that retail investors trust the "upper home" very much, and often only want to pay on time, and do not care whether there is a physical object. Perhaps, the "Shangjia" did not take the initiative to inform the existence of the circulation code, that is, deliberately "shorted".
Shorting, originally an investment term, is a mode of operation of financial assets. "If the scan code shows that it has been scanned more than 2 times, it proves that the code may have been sent to multiple people, and there is a suspicion of making a short order." Some retail investors say so.
Li Jun said that the "shorting" in the process of "financial tea" trading refers to the fact that after retail investors buy tea at any level, the "Shangjia" does not buy the corresponding goods with Fancha (that is, does not obtain the corresponding circulation code), but lets the money circulate in their own hands and then redeem it to retail investors after maturity. During this period, if retail investors need a circulation code, the "upper house" of "shorting" may "issue multiple codes", resulting in the same circulation code being scanned multiple times.
Li Jun also pointed out that this kind of play is that the dealer is betting on when the pan tea will collapse. Once it crashes, they can recycle the goods in the hands of customers at a discount of 1 or 2 under the banner of low-price recycling. "For example, the dealer received 1 million yuan from retail investors, but did not call the company. After the crash, they bought it for 100,000 yuan, and they were able to make a profit of 900,000 yuan. He said.
When will the tea hype stop
The "thunder" of pan tea is not an isolated case.
According to public reports, since 2021, there have been a number of "financial tea" crashes in the Fangcun tea market, and a number of entities have been placed on file for investigation for the crime of illegally absorbing public deposits, but the "thunder" incident continues. Among them, in the "Changshi Tea" case in December last year, more than 500 people were involved, with a cumulative amount of more than 500 million yuan.
Now, the large-scale "financial tea" incident has broken out again, why do you know that it is a trap, and why do "tea roasters" still follow one another?
"I want to make money for my children's milk powder", "We just want to make money, it's too difficult to sell tea honestly," many interviewees said during the interview. A tea merchant in Fangcun bluntly said that there are many reasons for "fried tea", but in the final analysis, it is the word "greed", and the game-maker is also good at grasping the weaknesses of human nature and has succeeded again and again. "It's all a bad job. When I make money, it's 'family members rushing to rush', and now when the thunder is blowing, I will go to make trouble, go to ask for explanations, and hope that the government will help deal with it, which is too 'double standard'. The tea merchant said.
"At least 70% of the people in Fangcun Tea Market participated, especially in June and July, there were still many loans into the market." Many people estimate that the amount involved in this pan-tea incident is at least tens of billions, and many of them are likely to not even get tea in the end due to being "commissioned" and "shorted" by layers of "commissions" and "shorting".
In view of the fact that the previous plan could not be accepted, on August 6, Fancha issued another plan, proposing three plans: restarting within 30 days, completing the extraction of goods and products within 7 days, and applying for bankruptcy liquidation to the competent authorities. According to the latest plan, the previously announced "cash out 5%" has disappeared. As of press time, many entrants have expressed their disagreement with any of the above plans and "just want to get back the principal".
Myths such as "frying pan tea earns a small goal in a year" that were once widely spread ushered in a concrete collapse when the chaotic scenes of the pan tea R&D center broke out. No one knows what the final event will be, but as long as the greed of human nature and the pursuit of interests still exist, whether it is Changshi tea or pan tea, it will not be the last one to "explode".
Written by: Southern Rural Daily reporter Ou Xiaochang Yan Qiufan