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In 1952, Van Vliet launched the "Showdown Operation", which was directed against the Volunteer Army, which was the defense area of the 15th Army, in the direction of Pingkang.
The defense line of the 1st and 15th armies
The 15th Army took over the defense area of the current defensive position from the 26th Army after the end of the rest and recuperation in early April, starting from Fali Peak in the west and reaching Zhongxian Mountain in the east, with a frontal width of 32 kilometers and a depth of 21 kilometers.
The 38th Army is on the right and the 12th Army on the left. The 15th Army and the 38th Army were under the command of the 3rd Corps under which Wang Jinshan was the acting commander, while the 12th Army, which was originally part of the 3rd Corps, had been transferred to the command of Yang Chengwu's 20th Corps.
The defense area of the 15th Army, bounded by the Hantan River, is roughly divided into two parts: the western half is the Pingkang Pingchuan, which is a relatively open valley passage in the formation belt of the Pigeling Mountains, and the highway and railway from Wonsan to Seoul are inserted diagonally from northeast to southwest along this Pingchuan, making it the junction point of the communication line from the east coast to the west coast, and there are commanding heights such as the West Mountain, Fali Peak, Wang Zaifeng, and Douliu Peak to form a bird's-eye view on the side.
In the eastern half of the defense area, the front line is close to the highway from Jinhua to Tongchuan through Jincheng, and there are Wusheng Mountain as a natural barrier in the north. According to this topographical condition, the 15th Army formed two defensive areas in the defense area: one was on the right, with the West Mountain as the core, including Fali Peak, Wang Zaifeng, and Douliu Peak, to control Pingkang Pingchuan and prevent the "United Nations Army" from advancing northward along the open area of Pingchuan; The other is on the left, with Wusheng Mountain as the core, including Zhongxian Mountain, Zhugao Gaoli Mountain in the Shangling area, facing the defense line of the "United Nations Army" north of Jinhua, and extending a salient of about 12 kilometers forward, which not only protects the security of the Pingkang flank, but also poses a threat to the defense line of the "United Nations Army".
Among the armies of the Volunteer Army, the frontal width of the 15th Army Defense District was the largest. At that time, there were 7 front-line volunteer armies, and the average frontal width of the defense area was 26 kilometers, and the frontal width of the 15th Army defense area exceeded this average by 6 kilometers, and according to Deng Hua's standard, there was almost 1 more frontal regiment.
Of all the seven corps, only the 15th Army was deployed in one echelon, with eight infantry regiments serving as the front-line garrison and only one regiment as a corps reserve.
Specific configuration:
The 44th Division was attached to the 87th Regiment of the 29th Division and 5 artillery battalions, serving as the right flank (western) defense, and the main task was to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Pingkang from the line of Wang Zaifeng, Xishan, and Douliufeng; The 45th Division was attached to two artillery battalions and served as the left flank (eastern) defense, with the main task of preventing the enemy from breaking through in the direction of Shangganling and Wusheng Mountain.
After the start of the tactical counterattack in the autumn, the 29th Regiment of the 85th Division was transferred to the front line to take over the defense of the 45th Regiment of the 134th Division.
In this way, the army reserve only had one regiment of the 86th Regiment of the 29th Division, which was deployed in the area of Zhuangzi Mountain and Mabeiyan.
2. The importance of tunnel operation
Regarding the position of the 15th Army Defense Region in the entire defense line of the Volunteer Army, Qin Jiwei has an image analogy.
He said:
If the Korean Peninsula is regarded as a human figure, the 15th Military Defense District is located in the heart of the "man" navel up. Although Cheorwon and Gimhwa have been occupied by the "United Nations Army," as long as the commanding heights in the middle of the "Iron Triangle" area are in the hands of the 15th Army, the attempt of the "United Nations Army" to occupy the entire "Iron Triangle" area cannot be realized.
Qin Jiwei was 38 years old at the time and had five years of experience as a military officer in charge of the army (column). He enlisted in the army at the age of 15, served as a regiment commander, staff officer and military instructor during the Red Army, participated in the Long March, and was imprisoned after the defeat of the Western Route Army.
In the later period of the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the commander of the Taihang Military Region, and the commander of the 9th Column of the Second Field and the first commander of the 15th Army in the War of Liberation. Yang Dezhi called him a "commander who is foresightful, scheming and decisive."
After receiving the defensive mission, Qin Jiwei focused his attention on preparing to resist the attack of the enemy in front of him.
Despite the fact that there have been no major battles for nearly half a year, the troops have maintained a high level of combat readiness. During this period, the army organized some small unit activities for the purpose of squeezing out localities, but "suffered more losses and less successes," and Qin Jiwei did not speak highly of this.
Therefore, he was cautious about taking such actions, stressing that "we will not do it without 80 or 90 percent certainty," and focused the greatest energy on the construction of the city, mainly tunnels. The 15th Army Defense District was taken over from the 26th Army.
After the handover of the two armies, Qin Jiwei spent three days carefully inspecting the original positions, and found that most of the fortifications he took over were excavation and civil engineering structures, the communication trenches were opened on the mountain beams, and many of the tunnels were half-cut, which was difficult to resist the surprise attack of the enemy's powerful firepower. Therefore, the party committee of the army urgently mobilized and demanded that the troops go all out to transform and rebuild the existing positions and establish a defense system with tunnels as the backbone and support points.
In the past six months, a total of nearly 720 tunnels have been constructed, with a total length of 42,149 meters, 64,950 meters of trenches and 154095 meters of traffic trenches.
Later, the troops of the 15th Army fought with the attacking enemy in the Shangganling area, relying on such tunnels to build the city.
Qin Jiwei said: If there is no city and no tunnels, the cost of the battle will simply be unimaginable.
3. Qin Jiwei's judgment of the enemy's situation
At 22 o'clock on 28 August, Zhi Si issued a telegram of instructions, judging that the "United Nations Army" "has the possibility of concentrating about two divisions and cooperating with the sea and air to choose the Yan'an Peninsula for landing, and its attempt is to detour the flank of our western front and occupy the Yan'an and Baichuan areas, thus creating an encirclement and threatening Kaesong." In order to coordinate with its landing operations, it is possible to carry out a diversionary attack on our front, and it is possible to use the Pingkang side as the focus of its containment."
According to this judgment, the main direction of attack of the "United Nations Army" is on the western front, the target is Kaesong, and the central line is only a key point in the direction of containment.
Qin Jiwei has his own opinions on this.
Previously, he estimated that "the enemy may launch a relatively large offensive after the rainy season", and there are roughly three scenarios:
The first is to "make a big move", with a frontal attack and a flank landing, but the landing site is not on the western coast, but on Wonsan in the east;
the second is to "seize a certain point or a position of our country in the medium and local", focusing on the line of the western mountains and the Fali peak;
The third is "a small-scale surprise attack with a force of less than one regiment."
In his opinion, the first situation is the most serious, but the enemy's existing forces are insufficient, and I am afraid that it will be difficult to launch, and the second and third situations are more likely.
On August 26, Qin Jiwei spoke at the Corps Operations Conference, noting: "If the enemy launches an offensive, its focus will be on Pingkang and not on the Western Front. ”
According to Qin Jiwei's account, "everyone has no different opinions" on his judgment.
If the "UN Army" launched an offensive in front of the 15th Army, where would the main target be chosen? Qin Jiwei also made a long observation and reflection.
He believes that according to the deployment of troops and the terrain situation, there may be two directions of the enemy's attack: one is to attack the West Mountain as the main attack and the Wusheng Mountain as the assist; The second is to attack Wusheng Mountain as the main attack, but the focus is on Zhongxian Mountain, flanking Wusheng Mountain, and expanding the position of Zhuzidong Nanshan.
Compared with the two, it is more likely that the Western Mountain will be the main target, and the possibility of focusing on the Wusheng Mountain is very small, because the Western Mountain controls the Pingkang Pingchuan River, the terrain is flat, the shelter is scarce, and it is easy to attack and difficult to defend, which is convenient for mechanized troops to develop in depth, while the Wusheng Mountain has a steep terrain and is easy to defend and difficult to attack.
Qin Jiwei said:
"If the enemy focuses its offensive on the Five Holy Mountains, it will be easier for us to crush the enemy's attack."
Qin Jiwei also made a prediction about the combat intentions and possible actions of the "United Nations Army", and he wrote in his diary on August 28:
We should anticipate an attack on the position of our 44th Division with the strength of the entire 1st US Cavalry Division, two regiments of the 7th Division, and nine regiments of the 187th Airborne Regiment and the 1st Puppet Division.
The duration of the battle is twenty days long. At the same time, it is also necessary to prepare the enemy to open the gap at 472.4 from Fali Peak and Wang Zaifeng, and then put in a large number of tanks (2,300 units) to enter the courtyard along 330.5, and then carry out airborne landing to seize Huyan Mountain, forming a large division and creating an encirclement situation in the Western Mountain. In short, it must be fully estimated that if the enemy does not come this autumn, it will be enough, and if it comes, it will not be good.
Sooner or later, there will be a vicious battle to be fought in front of the face, and Qin Jiwei is mentally prepared for this, and he himself "hopes that the enemy will attack a division on the front of our defense" so that the troops can be tested and tempered; However, he also knew that things often did not go as he wanted, and if the "United Nations Army" really focused its attack on the front of the 15th Army, with at least two divisions, and it was very likely that three divisions or even more would come, it would certainly be a vicious battle.
His concern was "whether the center and west sides would be able to cope with the situation".
According to his estimate, "in the event of a large-scale enemy attack, several of our forward positions may be captured by the enemy, especially on the east side of Xishan, Douliufeng, and Hantanchuan, as well as the positions of Falifeng, Wang Zaifeng, 330.5, and 472.4 in the joint area with the 38th Army." If this is the case, "the price to be paid may be greater," but "as long as there are no mistakes in command, there will not be any major chaos."
3. Tactical counterattack of the 15th Army
Throughout the preparation of the defense, both the 15th Army, as well as the 3rd Corps and the Volunteer Army Command, which was its superior, focused on the western side of the mountain in the direction of Pyongkang. This understanding is consistent from top to bottom.
In late September, after the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a tactical counterattack on all fronts, all levels generally believed that the possibility of a large-scale attack by the enemy in front of them no longer existed, so they put the focus of operational guidance on organizing a tactical counterattack.
The "guidelines" proposed by the 15th Army at that time were:
"If the enemy launches a small attack, we are sure to inflict more damage on the enemy, and if the enemy does not attack, we will let go of the counterattack."
Based on this judgment and understanding, there was "ignorance and delusion of the following two situations" as pointed out by the 15th Army in its post-war summary:
(1) At the end of August, the enemy began to prepare for an attack in front of Wusheng Mountain, but I did not pay serious attention to it, and I regarded the enemy's long-term preparations as the norm, and I became paralyzed, believing that the enemy would not have a major attack.
(2) On 1 October, the staff officer of the 32nd Regiment of the 2nd Puppet Division surrendered to us, confessing that the 32nd Regiment would cooperate with the US attack on the 18th, and we estimated that the enemy's attack might be in the Western Mountains (at that time, the British 7th Division was in front of the Western Mountains), especially the 44th Division to strengthen combat readiness. The puppet army was acting in cooperation with the smaller, so that the 45th Division made general preparations, still believing that the enemy would not have any campaign offensive.
Before the start of Shangganling, the 15th Army, like other armies, was busy organizing a tactical counterattack by front-line troops.
The 3rd Corps set the targets for the counterattack of the 15th Army:
The 44th Division faced the unnamed heights northwest of Shangjia Mountain, the northeast mountains of the 381st Heights, and the 448 Heights of Dongshan in front of the 45th Division, with more than 2,000 enemy annihilation targets.
These small-scale battles involved most of the energy of the army leaders.
Qin Jiwei recorded in his diary that on September 30, Wang Jinshan, the acting commander of the Corps, came to inspect the 15th Army and asked him to cooperate with the actions of the 38th Army on his right side and first attack the 391 Heights on the junction of the two armies, while Qin Jiwei and Xiang Shouzhi, the commander of the 44th Division, both advocated hitting the Jiashan Mountain first, on the grounds that the terrain conditions of the 391 Heights were not good, and the preparations were not allowed to be divided, and they were not sure enough.
The two sides had a dispute over this, and Wang Jinshan was quite unhappy. After the successful counterattack on Shangjiashan, Qin Jiwei once again reviewed the attack plan against the 391 heights, and still believed that there were shortcomings in the combat deployment and could not be fought immediately.
But Wang Jinshan called again and asked to launch an attack on the 11th, and Qin Jiwei replied: "You can't enter the battle earlier than the 12th at the earliest." ”
Wang Jinshan didn't seem very happy again, and he asked Qin Jiwei to send a telegram directly to Deputy Commander Deng Hua of Zhisi for instructions. In the end, according to Qin Jiwei's opinion, he launched an attack on the 12th, and achieved the result of completely annihilating one reinforced company of the South Korean army.
Qin Jiwei talked about his feelings at that time and said:
"Combat is not a rush to catch up with the excitement, but must be decided from the conditions under which one's own preparations are ripe, and this is an indication of whether a commander is experienced in command."
Next, plan and prepare the 45th Division to counterattack Zhuzidong Namsan Mountain. The enemy here is 1 battalion of the ROK army. Qin Jiwei personally went to the 45th Division for combat mobilization, and then talked to the commanders of the four companies responsible for the assault mission to learn about their breakthrough positions, attack routes, and grasp of the enemy's situation.
In order to enhance the attack force of the 45th Division, Qin Jiwei made partial adjustments to the original defensive deployment, replacing the position of the 134th Regiment east of Lingtai with the 85th Regiment of the 29th Division, transferring the 134th Regiment to the east, and with the cooperation of the 133rd Regiment, mainly responsible for the counterattack on Nanshan in Zhuzidong.
At 23 o'clock on October 13, the 15th Army reported to the Corps and the Zhi Division the battle plan for Zhuzidong Nanshan:
"It is determined to take part in the battle with all the 134th Regiment, 1 battalion of the 133rd Regiment, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th companies of the 135th Regiment, and engineers and reconnaissance companies of the 45th Division, and to completely annihilate the defending enemy, and after seven to 10 days of repeated struggle, finally achieve control and consolidation of the place, and intend to kill and wound 2,500 to 4,000 enemy at a cost of 1,000 to 1,500 men"; The attack was launched on October 18.
On the same day, Qin Jiwei wrote in his diary:
The enemy, with the strength of one battalion, counterattacked his lost position, Heights 391, and after repeated battles with the enemy from dawn until mid-afternoon, at dusk I recaptured all positions with heavy artillery fire in support of the infantry, and captured a great deal.
As things stand, the enemy may retaliate against him. Urgent instructions have been given to all units tonight to be vigilant and ready to crush any retaliatory action of the enemy, to fight a battle of annihilation in the event of an enemy attack on us, and to inflict greater damage on the enemy and capture the enemy's weapons. It is estimated that the enemy's retaliation may be focused on the positions of the 44th Division, but it must be estimated that the enemy will look for the direction in which we have not launched the offensive and the points where the positions protrude to attack us. Because the enemy thinks that the artillery fire in the direction of our newly occupied position is strong, and he is well prepared, and chooses a direction that I do not pay attention to to suddenly attack, we must be vigilant and prepared, the water is impermanent, the troops are impermanent, and the people who use the troops are always thinking about the enemy's unexpected moves, as long as we are prepared, the enemy's attack from any direction will fail, and I always take the initiative.
A few hours later, the enemy in front of him really launched a fierce counterattack on the position of the 15th Army, but the target of the attack was not in the direction of the West Mountain, as Qin Jiwei estimated, but in the direction of the Wusheng Mountain.
4. The campaign attempt of the US army
From the main peak of Wusheng Mountain to the south to Shangganling, the mountain trend is divided into two veins: the west side extends to the south, passing through the 597.9 highland to Jixiong Mountain (603.9 meters above sea level); The eastern vein extends to the southeast, passing through the 537.7 highland Beishan to the 537.7 highland. The ends of the two veins were occupied by the U.S. 7th Division and the ROK 2nd Division, respectively, forming a close confrontation with the 45th Division of the 15th Army, which controlled the 597.9 Heights on the same mountain beam and the 537.7 Heights North Mountain.
597.9 Heights, the U.S. Army Map is 598 Heights. It has three small hills, and two ridges along the southeast and southwest trends are connected to the main peak at the southern end, forming a front triangular shape, so it was named "Triangle Mountain" ("Triangle Heights") by the U.S. military. The high ground is 400~500 meters away from the position of Jixiong Mountain occupied by the US army, and Xiaganling is located in the northeast of the foot of the mountain, and then to the east is the 537.7 high ground occupied by the South Korean army.
537.7 Heights, the U.S. Army Map is 538 Heights. To the north of the main peak of the highland, there is an unnamed highland with no elevation on the map, which is the 537.7 highland North Mountain. The main peak of the 537.7 highland was occupied by the South Korean army, and its position was only 150 meters adjacent to the position of the volunteer army on the north mountain, and each other could hear each other's voices.
From the topography point of view, Jixiong Mountain and the 537.7 Heights are relatively high, and they are the two important commanding heights of the "United Nations Army" on the defense line north of Jinhua, which can not only form a panoramic view of the forward positions of the Volunteers, but also serve as the starting point for the northward attack.
In terms of the Volunteer Army, the 597.9 Heights and the 537.7 Heights Beishan also have important tactical value. These two highlands are backed by Wusheng Mountain, forming horns on the left and right sides of Shangganling, and the defense can be used as a barrier to Wusheng Mountain, and can form a wedge into the recess of the enemy's defense line when attacking, directly threatening the highway traffic from Jinhua to Jincheng and the open area south of Jinhua. In particular, in the 537.7 Heights of Beishan, in the volunteer "cold guns and cold guns" activities, the vehicles and personnel of the "United Nations Army" passing here were repeatedly shot and killed, so it was nicknamed "Sniper Ridge".
Before the war, the 15th Army estimated that if the "United Nations Army" launched an attack in the direction of Wusheng Mountain, it was likely to first break through from the left and right flanks of the 45th Division's defensive line, that is, from Zhongxian Mountain in the east, the 419 Heights and the Yongfeng in the west, and return to the flank of the Wusheng Position in two ways, and then seize it.
However, when the actual battle began, the opponent did not make such an elaborate tactical design, but simply adopted the hard-hitting "top bull" and "wall" style of play, and directly launched a fierce attack on the two high ground from the front.
According to the history of the Korea War, the 9th Army of the US Che issued Operation Plan No. 32 on October 91 on the "Offensive North of Kimhwa", the main points of which are as follows:
(1) The corps planned to launch an attack at × on × to seize the high ground of 598 (near Shangganling) and the "sniper" ridge, and at the same time advance the main resistance line to this place and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy;
(2) The ROK 2nd Division (with the 37th Light Infantry Regiment, the 59th Danke Company, and the 1st Company of the 140th US Tank Battalion) :(1) launched an attack at × on × with no more than one infantry battalion and one support force to capture the "sniper" shuttle; (2) Establish the main line of resistance immediately after capturing the target; (3) inflict maximum damage on the enemy; (4) Maintain close coordination with the U.S. 7th Division;
(3) The U.S. 7th Division (with the 91st and 50th Artillery Battalions) :(1) captured the 598th Heights with no more than 1 battalion; (2) Establish the main line of resistance immediately after capturing the target; (3) Closely coordinate with the ROK 2nd Division to inflict maximum damage on the enemy; (4) Considering the possibility of the enemy's counterattack in the defense area of the ROK 9th Division, one company of the 73rd Tank Battalion was assigned to the division;
(4) The ROK 9th Division (attached to the 51st Light Infantry Regiment, the 1st Artillery Group, and the 53rd Tank Company) :(1) continued to carry out the original mission; (2) During the operation of the corps, conduct powerful reconnaissance of the enemy in the defense area.
The plan is also an advance order to the ministries. Four days later, at 12 o'clock on October 13, the plan came into force as an order, and it was determined at 5 o'clock on the 14th day of H on D day.
In the early morning of October 14, the 7th Division of the US Army and the 2nd Division of the ROK Army launched attacks on the 597.9 Heights and 537.7 Heights Buksan, respectively. At the same time, the 15th Army's defensive line was attacked, as well as the northwest of Shangjia Mountain, the southern mountain area of Zhilin, and the 419 heights captured in the tactical counterattack in the early stage.
The world-famous Battle of Shangganling has since begun.
(End of text)
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