Improving Sino-Soviet relations was another major task that Deng Xiaoping accomplished in the diplomatic field after readjusting relations with Japan and United States. The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations is of great significance and far-reaching impact. It has not only laid a good foundation for the long-term development of relations between the two parties and two countries of China and the Soviet Union, created a favorable international environment for the mainland's reform, opening up, and modernization, but also made important contributions to safeguarding international peace.
1. Start negotiations on the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations
Deng Xiaoping had deep ties with the Soviet Union. In his early years, he studied abroad in this country. From 1956 to 1963, he led Chinese Communist Party delegations to Moscow to negotiate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and "played a non-insignificant role" in the 10-year Sino-Soviet polemic. From the mid-60s of the 20th century, the relations between the two countries deteriorated and were basically cut off because the Soviet Union practiced great-power chauvinism against China and turned the dispute of principle between the two parties into a state dispute, exerting tremendous political, economic, and military pressure on China. This state of affairs continued until the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Party of China adjusted its domestic and foreign policies and devoted itself to creating a peaceful international environment, especially the surrounding environment, so as to facilitate the smooth progress of reform and opening up. At the same time, the Soviet Union, faced with domestic and foreign difficulties, also began to adjust its foreign strategy and reconsider its relations with China. Against this background, China and the Soviet Union began negotiations on the normalization of relations.
The Sino-Soviet talks were initiated by China in its note. On August 22, 1979, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China the "Request for Instructions on the Negotiation Plan for Sino-Soviet State Relations". On August 25, Deng Xiaoping gave instructions: "It is better to discuss it in the Politburo." "On August 29, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to discuss the plan for negotiations with the Soviet Union and determined the guidelines and tactics for our negotiations.
When Deng Xiaoping guided the negotiations on the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, he first considered and always adhered to China's national interests, that is, it could not improve relations with the Soviet Union under the pressure of large troops. On September 18, 1979, when meeting with former United States President Richard Nixon, he pointed out that it is necessary to remove obstacles to Sino-Soviet relations, which is the premise of negotiations. The obstacle was Soviet expansionism and hegemonism, not just the Sino-Soviet border issue. Can the Soviet Union's 1 million troops on the Sino-Soviet border, which is a real threat to China, continue? The USSR had to reduce the number of troops on the Sino-Soviet border, at least to the number of troops in the Khrushchev era. Will the Soviet garrison in Mongolia be able to continue? Of course, we should raise this issue and get the USSR to withdraw its troops from Mongolia. Moreover, neither China nor the Soviet Union built military bases in each other's neighboring countries. The USSR should abandon its support for expansion and hegemonism.
On March 25, 1980, Deng Xiaoping met with Zairean President Seko, and when talking about the negotiations between China and the Soviet Union to seek the normalization of relations, he once again pointed out: If the Soviet Union wants to improve its relations with us, it must reduce the number of troops stationed on the Sino-Soviet border to the level of the Khrushchev era. At that time, there were only a dozen divisions on the Sino-Soviet border. This is a prerequisite for removing obstacles to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations.
Deng Xiaoping had a full estimate of the protracted nature and complexity of the Sino-Soviet negotiations. On September 25, 1979, when meeting with former Canada Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, he pointed out: Sino-Soviet negotiations should be discussed as "marathon" negotiations. Sure enough. Shortly after the negotiations began, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place at the end of December 1979. China strongly condemned the hegemonic acts of the Soviet Union and resolutely suspended the negotiations with the Soviet Union on state-to-state relations.
The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
On April 20, 1980, Deng Xiaoping met with a delegation of the United States Press Women's Club led by Moon to visit China, and when talking about the Afghanistan issue, he pointed out: On the Afghanistan issue, our position is very clear, and we firmly condemn this aggression of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan is our close neighbor, and the Soviet Union's aggression against Afghanistan poses a threat to the world, including, of course, to China. We condemn this action and support all actions in the world against Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. On October 17 of the same year, when Deng Xiaoping met with France President d'Estaing, he clearly pointed out: We abolished the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and later conducted new negotiations. When the events in Afghanistan came out, we broke off this negotiation, and this was considered from a global strategic point of view.
Deng Xiaoping took a cautious attitude toward the resumption of negotiations on Sino-Soviet relations. On April 11, 1980, Deng Xiaoping met with Roderick, a correspondent of the Associated Press in Beijing, and in response to a question about whether China could resume Sino-Soviet negotiations that had been interrupted by the Afghanistan issue, he said: It depends on the situation in Afghanistan and how the Viet Nam issue develops. Sino-Soviet negotiations could not resolve only the problems between the two countries, because the factors for the deterioration of relations between the two countries were not isolated. We propose that to improve Sino-Soviet relations, we must first remove obstacles, which are the 1 million troops stationed by the Soviet Union on the Sino-Soviet border and the Soviet garrison in the Mongolia People's Republic, as well as Viet Nam's support for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the establishment of the Indochinese Federation, and the invasion of Cambodia and Laos.
On February 11, 1981, Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee that our strategic policy is to establish an international anti-hegemony united front. Our slogan is to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace. Don't change this pattern. Trade with the Soviet Union could be maintained for a certain amount, and there could be some contact on the border issue, but negotiations involving the restoration of relations between the two countries should be cautious. Negotiations on relations between the two countries cannot resume without a new major situation (such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This is a big gesture, otherwise it would damage our diplomatic landscape.
With the constant changes in the international situation and the strategic adjustment of the mainland's foreign policy, Deng Xiaoping gradually put forward the issue of removing the "three major obstacles" to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations as the principle and condition for improving Sino-Soviet relations.
On March 24, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, delivered a speech in Tashkent, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. In his speech, he explicitly recognized China as a socialist country, stressed that China has sovereignty over Taiwan, and expressed his willingness to improve relations with China. The speech was accompanied by a number of attacks on China's policies.
This speech attracted the attention of Deng Xiaoping. He immediately called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instructed him to respond immediately to Brezhnev's speech of 24 March. On April 16, Deng Xiaoping said at a meeting with Ceausescu, general secretary of the Communist Party of Romania: In Brezhnev's speech in Tashkent, we have taken note of other remarks except for his rebuke to us. Our position was stated in the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's statement. We value action.
At the same time, Deng Xiaoping asked Ceausescu to meet Brezhnev with words: tell him to do one or two things first, starting with Cambodia and Afghanistan, and withdrawing his troops from the Sino-Soviet border or Mongolia. Start with one or two things. Without such actions, we do not approve of it, and no one in the world will approve of it.
On 27 April, he expressed his views on Sino-Soviet relations during talks with Kim Il Sung, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and state president of the Democratic People's Party of Korea, in Pyongyang. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: It should be said that Sino-Soviet relations will improve one day, but it seems that the conditions for returning to normalcy do not exist at present. The so-called condition is that the Soviet Union must take practical action on the Afghanistan issue, the Cambodia issue, the Sino-Soviet border garrison, and the Mongolia garrison.
In July and August 1982, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and others convened a meeting of principal officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study the issue of Sino-Soviet relations. At the meeting, Deng Xiaoping proposed that we should take a big action to send a message to the Soviet Union and strive for a great improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, but it must be principled, and the condition is that the Soviet Union should take the initiative to resolve the "three major obstacles" and eliminate the threat to China's security. Commenting on the way of transmitting information, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the director of the Soviet and European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could go to Moscow in the name of inspecting the work of the embassy, and at the same time go to Warsaw, Poland. On August 10, Yu Hongliang, director of the Department of Soviet and European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went to Moscow and conveyed to the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister a message from the Chinese side suggesting that the two sides should work together to improve Sino-Soviet relations. On 20 July, the Soviet Union made an official reply, expressing its willingness to discuss the issue of Soviet-Chinese bilateral relations with the Chinese side at any time, at any place, and at any level, in order to remove obstacles to the normalization of relations. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping listened to the reports of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Yu Hongliang at his residence, and decided to agree to reopen Sino-Soviet talks.
In October, the first round of consultations between the special envoys of China and the Soviet Union at the level of deputy foreign ministers was held in Beijing, and the process of improving Sino-Soviet relations was officially launched.
2. Promote the process of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations
Deng Xiaoping had been following the progress of the Sino-Soviet negotiations and the attitude of the Soviet leadership on the issue of normalization of relations between the two sides. On 27 August 1983, when meeting with Senator Jackson of the Democratic Party of United States, he said: Yesterday Andropov made a foreign policy speech, and at the end of the speech he said that the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations should not involve third countries. This overturned all the talk of improving Sino-Soviet relations. We pointed out that in order to improve Sino-Soviet relations, we must remove three major obstacles. Its invasion of Afghanistan, its support for Viet Nam's invasion of Cambodia, its placement of 1 million troops and one-third of its missiles on the Sino-Soviet border, and its stationing troops in Mongolia pose a serious threat to China. Is this a third country? Therefore, throughout the speech, this sentence alone rejected the basis for Sino-Soviet negotiations. I don't see the prospects for Sino-Soviet relations. On 24 September of the same year, Deng Xiaoping said during his talks with Kim Il Sung: Recently, there has been a change in Andropov's speech: In the past, he said that the improvement of relations between the two countries should not involve a third country, but now he said that he should not harm the interests of a third country. After all, there are still three obstacles to resolving the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, and the negotiations must continue.
While guiding and paying attention to the progress of the Sino-Soviet talks, Deng Xiaoping continued to send a signal to the international community that China was willing to break the deadlock and increase contacts with the Soviet Union on the premise of adhering to principles, so as to win the understanding and support of the international community. On September 18, 1982, when talking with Kim Il Sung about Sino-Soviet relations, he said: In my opinion, Sino-Soviet negotiations will be long-term. Of course, we are still willing to maintain contacts with the Soviet Union. Before the 12th Party Congress, we replied to the Soviet Union and agreed to upgrade contacts between the two countries to the level of deputy foreign ministers. This is a loosening, and of course when it comes to substantive issues, it is not so simple.
On 24 October, Deng Xiaoping said at a meeting with Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of the Komeito Party of Japan: To improve and normalize Sino-Soviet relations, first of all, we must remove obstacles to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and eliminate threats to China. However, the Sino-Soviet dialogue must continue, and it cannot be assumed that the two countries will remain in such a stalemate forever. On 15 December, at a meeting with Turkey President Efren, he further pointed out: Since we and the Soviet Union are neighbors, we still have to do things to try to improve our relations, but there must be principles. On December 19, when Deng Xiaoping met with United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, he said more clearly that with regard to Sino-Soviet relations, we are very much in favor of breaking the deadlock and increasing contacts, and we are also working hard to increase contacts. Stalemate is not always the answer.
In view of the slow progress of political negotiations, Deng Xiaoping agreed to increase contacts with the Soviet Union in the fields of science and technology, culture, and education on the premise of adhering to principles, so as to promote the development of Sino-Soviet relations. On February 22, 1984, when meeting with a delegation of the United States Center for Strategic and International Studies led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, he pointed out that as long as the Soviet Union did not take a step forward in removing the three obstacles, there could be no dramatic changes in Sino-Soviet relations. But since it is a neighbouring country, some relations can be improved and developed in other areas. This would be beneficial to stabilizing the international situation. On 14 March, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in a conversation with Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun: Politically, we should persist in removing the three major obstacles, not letting go, and economically thawing and doing more business.
In May 1984, Deng Xiaoping met with Sri Lankan President Jayawardena
On 23 May, when meeting with Sri Lankan President Jayawardena, he pointed out: Our relations with the Soviet Union have been interrupted for more than 10 years, but we still want to improve and develop relations with it. Trade between China and the Soviet Union has developed in recent years and will continue to develop in the future. Other areas, such as cultural and sports exchanges, will increase. Nevertheless, the normalization of relations between the two countries still requires the removal of three major obstacles. On 11 October, Deng Xiaoping further pointed out when meeting with a delegation of the Japan Komeito Party headed by Yoshikatsu Takeiri: We proposed that the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations should remove three major obstacles, and even if they cannot be resolved for the time being, we can strengthen and develop exchanges between us in other fields, including the economic and cultural fields.
Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping's thinking, Sino-Soviet relations in the fields of trade and cultural exchanges have improved. Deng Xiaoping affirmed this. On April 29, 1983, at a meeting with the Central Delegation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led by South Budiribad, he said: Our contacts with the Soviet Union have now been elevated to the level of foreign ministers. But now it is the contact between the countries, not the party relationship. This is not to say that there should be no contact between the parties, but first of all, it is necessary to resolve state relations, and for this purpose it is necessary to remove obstacles to the normalization of state relations. These obstacles are no small matter. Of course, during this time, contacts between China and the Soviet Union increased, and trade grew.
On July 21, 1985, Deng Xiaoping pointed out at a meeting with Japan Senate President Mutsuo Kimura: We are now improving our relations with the Soviet Union in the fields of trade and cultural exchanges, and there is no sign of normalization in the political field, and we hope that there will be some signs of improvement in this regard. On 1 August of the same year, when meeting with the 13 th Komeito delegation of Japan led by Yoshikatsu Takeiri, he pointed out: China and the Soviet Union are now developing in economic and trade relations and personnel exchanges, while political relations are still the same as in the past. As for party relations, they are not yet on the agenda.
In the process of promoting the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping always stressed the need to grasp the rhythm and grasp the right balance. On October 1, 1982, when reviewing the report of the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, he gave instructions on the "Instructions on Sending a Delegation to Participate in the Activities Marking the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Association": "The negotiations have not yet begun, and it is not appropriate to send a delegation at present, but the ambassador can participate. On December 19 of the same year, Deng Xiaoping made instructions when reviewing the report of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the "Request for Instructions on Sino-Soviet Science and Technology Cooperation and Exchange Projects": "To exchange science and technology with the Soviet Union, do not rush to the top, do one or two things first, and do not have too many. A state of hunger must be avoided. ”
The consultations between the special envoys of China and the Soviet Union, which began in October 1982 at the level of deputy foreign ministers, were suspended due to considerable differences in the discussion of the removal of obstacles to bilateral relations, and no substantive progress has been made in the past two years. In March 1985, after Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, he showed a positive attitude towards improving Sino-Soviet relations. Deng Xiaoping also struggled to find a way to get the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations out of the impasse. Against this background, Deng Xiaoping decided to take advantage of the visit of Ceausescu, general secretary of the Communist Party of Romania, to China and ask him to send a message to Gorbachev.
On October 9, 1985, when Deng Xiaoping met with Ceausescu, he said: Please send a message to Gorbachev that if the Soviet Union reaches an understanding with us and Viet Nam withdraws its troops from Cambodia, and this can be done, I or Comrade Hu Yaobang are willing to meet with Gorbachev. The historical task of my visit abroad has been accomplished, and my comrades will not let me go abroad, but if such an understanding can be reached with the Soviet Union, I can make an exception. For such a good deed, I am willing to go. After you convey it to him, we await a reply.
In the message he asked Ceausescu to carry with him, Deng Xiaoping unequivocally declared that the solution to the issue of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and the removal of the three major obstacles should first start with the withdrawal of Viet Nam from Cambodia. Deng Xiaoping mentioned this many times before.
On April 17, 1985, before meeting with Belgium Prime Minister Martens, Deng Xiaoping answered a question raised by a Belgian journalist about Sino-Soviet relations. The Belgium journalist asked: So far, among the three issues that have hindered the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, which one do you think is the most difficult to solve? In other words, on which issue do you stand out on the most? Deng Xiaoping said that these three issues are equally important. For Sino-Soviet relations to truly normalize, these three obstacles must be gradually removed, as they pose a threat to China. If it is said that it was difficult for the Soviet Union to remove these three obstacles at the same time, we believe that it can be eliminated gradually, and we can start by solving one of the problems. It seems that the easier thing for the Soviet Union to do was to withdraw Viet Nam from Cambodia. This did no harm to the Soviet Union, which was still able to maintain relations with Viet Nam. If the Soviet side has a sensible attitude, it can start with this matter.
The next day, when meeting with former United Kingdom Prime Minister Heath and talking about Sino-Soviet relations, he said: To normalize Sino-Soviet relations, we insist on removing three obstacles. It is difficult to remove all three obstacles at once, but the first step should always be taken. All three obstacles are important. What the Soviets could easily do without losing anything was to get the Viet Nam out of Cambodia. The entire strategic posture of the USSR was a great threat to us. To persist in removing the three major obstacles is to remove the threat to us. On October 5, Deng Xiaoping met with Strauss, the governor of Bavaria in the Federal Republic of Germany, and further pointed out that if the Soviet Union really took a step forward in removing the three major obstacles, it would have contributed to peace. No matter which step is taken, the issue of border withdrawal, Cambodia or Afghanistan will not harm the world.
In October 1985, Deng Xiaoping met with Strauss, the governor of Bavaria in the Federal Republic of Germany
On October 22, 1985, Ceausescu conveyed Deng Xiaoping's message to Gorbachev during a meeting in Bulgaria. Gorbachev immediately said that he would give serious consideration to it. In late November, Gorbachev took the initiative to meet with Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng, who was on his way back from a visit to Eastern Europe for a short stay in Moscow. In his speech, Gorbachev stressed the need for the complete normalization of relations between the two countries and the restoration and establishment of a positive one, while also putting forward concrete proposals for a meeting between the two countries at the highest level as a reply to Deng Xiaoping's message. In his reply, Gorbachev avoided the issue of prompting Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, and it was obviously unrealistic to hold a summit meeting between China and the Soviet Union. No substantial progress has been made in Sino-Soviet relations.
On July 28, 1986, Gorbachev delivered a speech in Vladivostok, expressing the Soviet Union's willingness to improve relations with China. In his speech, Gorbachev said: The Soviet Union is ready to discuss with China in the most serious way at any time and at all levels additional measures for creating a good-neighborly atmosphere, hoping that in the near future the Soviet-Chinese border will become a zone of peace and friendship; The Soviet Union was willing to demarcate the formal direction of the Soviet-Chinese border with the main channel of the Heilongjiang River as the boundary; The Soviet Union, together with the Mongolia leadership, was studying the question of the withdrawal of a significant part of the Soviet troops from Mongolia; By the end of 1989, the Soviet Union would withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan; Understand and respect China's modernization goals.
On September 2, Deng Xiaoping responded to Gorbachev's speech in a television interview with Wallace, a reporter for the United States Colombia Broadcasting Corporation's "60 Minutes" program. "Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok was a bit new, so we cautiously welcomed his new positive stuff," he noted. But Gorbachev's speech also showed that he did not take a big step. ”
When asked whether he was willing to hold a supreme meeting with Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping said: If Gorbachev takes a solid step in removing the three major obstacles between China and the Soviet Union, especially on the issue of prompting Viet Nam to stop its aggression against Cambodia and withdraw its troops from Cambodia, I am willing to meet with him. The issue of Viet Nam's invasion of Cambodia was a major obstacle to Sino-Soviet relations. Viet Nam's presence in Cambodia is also an issue that is actually a hot issue in Sino-Soviet relations. As long as this problem is eliminated, I am willing to make an exception to meet with Gorbachev anywhere in the Soviet Union.
In September 1986, Deng Xiaoping was interviewed by Wallace, a United States television reporter
Although Gorbachev "had something new" in his Vladivostok speech, he did not touch on the issue of Viet Nam's invasion of Cambodia, and the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was still difficult. On March 3, 1987, Deng Xiaoping met with United States Secretary of State Shultz and said in response to whether he planned to visit Moscow: The condition of the visit is to solve the Cambodian issue. If I do go to Moscow, that's a good thing, it means that the Cambodian problem is solved. It seems that there is little hope. I won't be able to walk in another two or three years. On 16 November, Deng Xiaoping met with the third delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan led by Tagako Doi and said: My mission to visit abroad has long been completed, and I am not ready to go abroad again. But I promised one thing, and that was that two years ago I wrote to Gorbachev that if he pulled Viet Nam from Cambodia and Cambodia became a truly independent, self-reliant, peaceful country, I could go anywhere in the Soviet Union to meet with him. If I am healthy in two years, I will be able to fulfill this promise. The conversation once again expressed Deng Xiaoping's sincere desire to promote the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
In response to Deng Xiaoping's remarks, Gorbachev said at a meeting with Zambian President Kaunda on 27 November: The Soviet leadership took note of Deng Xiaoping's desire to meet with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee expressed in his conversation with Takako Doi, chairman of the Socialist Party of Japan. Such a meeting would also be in line with our wishes, and it could be held in Moscow, Beijing or any other convenient place, but against any preconditions.
In response to Gorbachev's conversation with Kaunda on November 27, Deng Xiaoping stressed at a meeting with Yoshio Sakurauchi, president of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, on December 4 that there were prerequisites for meeting with Soviet leaders. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: The last time I met with Takako Doi, chairman of the Socialist Party of Japan, I only reiterated what I had said in the past, that if the Soviet Union asked Viet Nam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, I would be willing to go to Moscow or other parts of the Soviet Union to meet with Gorbachev. In fact, however, Gorbachev refused, and although he said that he was willing to meet with me and even said that he was willing to come to China, he opposed any preconditions. My statement is premised on the Soviet Union's withdrawal of Viet Nam from Cambodia.
In March 1987, Deng Xiaoping met with United States Secretary of State Shultz
For some time after that, in order to push the Soviet Union forward on the basis of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, the Chinese side seized the opportunity to do some fruitful work, and the Soviet side also made earnest efforts to remove the three major obstacles to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations out of the needs of domestic and foreign affairs, and Sino-Soviet relations took a new turn for the better. By the end of 1988, the conditions for the high-level meeting between China and the Soviet Union were basically ripe. On 17 October this year, Deng Xiaoping said at a meeting with Ceausescu, general secretary of the Communist Party of Romania: The message I brought to you three years ago seems to have yielded results, and China and the Soviet Union will be able to achieve a high-level meeting next year.
3. Normalize Sino-Soviet relations
In preparation for the Sino-Soviet summit, the foreign ministers of the two countries exchanged visits at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989.
On February 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping met with visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and received a letter from Gorbachev that he had forwarded. In his speech, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: The task of the leaders of China and the Soviet Union is to put an end to the past and open up the future. This task is quite arduous, and there are too many problems between the two countries, and the scope of involvement is too wide, and none of them is a trivial problem. In order to open up the future, it is also necessary to understand the past. However, there is a limit, just understand, do not entangle, the focus is to open up the future. The development of Sino-Soviet relations has had twists and turns, and it has been interrupted for more than 20 years. The exchange of visits between the foreign ministers of China and the Soviet Union means that the process of normalization of relations between the two countries has begun. Of course, the official beginning of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was the high-level meeting between China and the Soviet Union, that is, my meeting with Gorbachev. To normalize Sino-Soviet relations, we must remove three major obstacles, first of all, we must solve the Cambodian issue, and Viet Nam must truly withdraw all its troops from Cambodia. The Soviet Union could do much on this issue.
On China's foreign policy, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: As far as I am concerned, I hope that China will make its due contribution to safeguarding world peace. Only by creating an environment of international peace for a longer period of time can we develop ourselves and shake off backwardness. To that end, we must change our relations with a number of important countries. We have normalized Sino-US relations with United States on the basis of the three principles of "abrogating treaties, withdrawing troops, and severing diplomatic relations"; We have restored diplomatic relations with Japan and signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. We issued a joint statement with the United Kingdom to resolve the Hong Kong issue in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems". The major remaining issue is the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, and I hope to see a solution to this issue in my lifetime. At the end of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping signed the Russian edition of "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" at the request of the guests. On the same day, Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei and Shevardnadze held separate news conferences. Tian Zengpei said: Substantial progress has been made in removing the three major obstacles to Sino-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze announced: Gorbachev will visit China in May.
Deng Xiaoping spoke highly of the imminent normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. On 26 February 1989, when he met with United States President Bush, who was visiting China, he pointed out: Just as United States and the Soviet Union have improved their relations, China is also improving its relations with the Soviet Union. This is a matter of great merit for the maintenance of world peace.
On May 16, 1989, Deng Xiaoping met with Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. This was the first meeting between the top leaders of China and the Soviet Union in 30 years since 1959, and it attracted great attention from all over the world. Deng Xiaoping shook Gorbachev's hand and said: "The Chinese people sincerely hope that Sino-Soviet relations can be improved. I propose to use this opportunity to declare the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations henceforth. Gorbachev agreed. Immediately, Deng Xiaoping proposed, and we also announced the normalization of relations between the two parties. The two leaders shook hands again. For the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, Deng Xiaoping made efforts for many years.
On May 16, 1989, Deng Xiaoping met with Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
After the talks began, Deng Xiaoping mentioned bringing a letter to Gorbachev. He said: For a long time, the international situation we are facing is very grim, and the situation of the Cold War and confrontation has not been eased. The overall situation is one of an arms race, and rising tides lift all boats. However, three years ago, we saw that there may be a turning point in the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and there may be a way to resolve it, and that the United States and the Soviet Union may shift from confrontation to dialogue. This raises a question before the Chinese people: Can Sino-Soviet relations be improved? It was for this motive that I brought you a letter, and it took more than three years for us to meet.
Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out that the purpose of our meeting is eight words: to end the past and open up the future. By wrapping up the past, you can stop talking about the past and focus on things that open up the future. The key to state-to-state relations is equality.
During the talks, Deng Xiaoping solemnly expounded on two issues: one was the historical situation in which China suffered damage under the oppression of foreign powers; One is where the threat to China has come from in the past 30 years. On the first question, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that in history, China has suffered damage under the oppression of foreign powers. The two countries that benefited the most from China were Japan and Tsarist Russia, including the Soviet Union on certain issues at a certain time. The Chinese land seized by Tsarist Russia through unequal treaties exceeded 1.5 million square kilometers. After the October Revolution, there were also violations of China, such as the Black Blind Island, which was occupied by the Soviet Union from China in 1929. The main thing is that when the Second World War was close to victory, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union signed a secret agreement in Yalta to divide spheres of influence, which greatly damaged China's interests.
On the second question, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "In the 60s, the Soviet Union strengthened its military facilities along the entire Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, and the number of missiles continued to increase, equivalent to 1/3 of all Soviet missiles, and the number of troops increased, including sending troops to Mongolia, the total number reached 1 million. Where does the threat to China come from? Naturally, China came to a conclusion. In 1963 I led a delegation to Moscow, and the talks broke down. It should be said that since the mid-60s, our relations have deteriorated and have been largely cut off. This does not refer to the ideological debates, and we do not think that we are right in that regard. The real real problem is inequality, and the Chinese feel humiliated. Speaking of this, Deng Xiaoping said: The historical account has been explained, and the past will be over as soon as the wind blows, and this is also a result of this meeting. In terms of developing exchanges in the future, I have an important suggestion: do more practical things and less empty talk.
On the issue of Marxism and socialism, Deng Xiaoping mentioned the issue of the Sino-Soviet polemic in the 60s of the 20 th century. He pointed out that for many years, there has been a problem of understanding Marxism and socialism. From the first Moscow talks in 1957 to the first half of the 60s, the Chinese and Soviet parties engaged in fierce debates. After more than 20 years of practice, looking back, both sides have spoken a lot of empty words. In the more than 100 years since Marx's death, it has not been clear what has changed and how to understand and develop Marxism under the changing conditions. Marx must not be asked to provide ready-made answers to the problems that arose hundreds or centuries after his death. Nor could Lenin undertake the task of providing ready-made answers to the questions that arose 50 or 100 years after his death. Genuine Marxist-Leninists must understand, inherit, and develop Marxism-Leninism in the light of the present situation.
The world situation is changing with each passing day, especially the rapid development of modern science and technology. A year now is worth decades, hundreds of years, or even more than the time of an ancient society in the past. If one does not inherit and develop Marxism with new ideas and viewpoints, he is not a true Marxist. After the success of the revolution, the countries had to build socialism on their own terms. There is no fixed pattern, and there can be. Sticking to the rules can only lead to backwardness and even failure.
This high-level meeting between China and the Soviet Union marked the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union, and the normalization of relations between the two parties. After 30 years of long-term estrangement, Sino-Soviet relations have reached a new starting point through this historic meeting, ending the past, opening up the future. Deng Xiaoping made a historic contribution to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
Source: "Centennial Tide" Issue 4, 2024
Zhang Jincai is a researcher at the Research Center for the History of Contemporary Chinese Politics and Administrative System at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Editor: Hu Liang
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