Memoirs of German Field Marshal Manstein - 86

The development of the situation under the city of Stalingrad

Inaugurated as commander of Army Group "Don".

On November 21, the command of the 11th Army received an order from the General Headquarters of the Army in Vitebsk. The order stated that in order to achieve closer coordination among the various units engaged in arduous defensive operations in the west and south directions of Stalingrad, the headquarters of the 11th Army would be reorganized into the headquarters of Army Group "Don", under the jurisdiction of the 4th Panzer Army, the 6th Army and the Romanian 3rd Army.

In view of the fact that we lacked a quartermaster detachment, the quartermaster detachment that was intended to be assigned to the headquarters of Marshal Antonescu was assigned to us. Its commander was Colonel Fink of the General Staff, who was not only of excellent character, but also an excellent organizer of logistics. Later, all the logistical difficulties encountered by the army group were resolved by him one by one. But the air supply of the 6th Army was not under his jurisdiction. After I was dismissed from my post in April 1944, Colonel Fink was promoted to quartermaster of the commander-in-chief of the Western Front, and I was later told that he had organized the logistics there in such a short time that he was able to resupply them with full Soviet air supremacy. He was implicated in Hitler's murder and was executed after July 20, 1944.

Regarding the tasks of Army Group "Don", the General Command of the Army General stated in its order: "Stop the enemy's offensive and regain the starting position occupied by its own side before its offensive." ”

Initially, only one corps and one division were promised to be assigned to the reinforcements, which were to be transferred to Milerovo, to the rear of the right flank of Army Group "B".

From the wording of the task given to us by the order, and the little reinforcement promised to us, it can be concluded that the General Headquarters of the Army, when giving the order, did not clearly recognize the danger of the Stalingrad situation, and that on that day the 6th Army was encircled.

Other information came to us during a conversation with Field Marshal von Kluge and his chief of staff, General Weller, in Vitebsk, when our train stopped at the station and we met Marshal Kluge by chance. They told me that the Soviets broke through the defense line of the 3rd Romanian Army northwest of Stalingrad with a large number of forces (1~2 tank armies, a large number of cavalry units, a total of about 30 divisions). The front of the Romanian 4th Army, south of Stalingrad and part of the 4th Panzer Army, was similarly breached.

Therefore, I sent a telegram from Vitebsk to the Chief of the General Staff, making it clear that our operation in Stalingrad could not be merely aimed at recapturing a number of positions, given the strong forces thrown by the enemy.

The force used to restore the posture should be the size of an army group and, if possible, a counter-assault should be carried out only after it has been fully deployed.

General Zeitzler agreed with me (as he always has) and promised to give us 1 more armored division and 2~3 infantry divisions.

At the same time, I sent a telegram to Army Group "B", asking them to order the 6th Army to resolutely withdraw its forces from the line of defense in order to ensure that the Don River crossing, which was located near Karachi, behind it. Whether the order has reached the 6th Army or not, I cannot say for sure.

It was not until 24 November, when we arrived at Army Group "B's" base camp in Starvo Belsk, that we learned from its commander, Senior General von Weickers, and its Chief of Staff, General von Zondenstein, about the current situation.

It turned out that in the early morning of November 19, after heavy artillery preparations, the Soviets crossed the Don River from the Don bridgehead in Kremenskaya and from the west, and launched an offensive against the left flank of the 6th Army (11th Army) and the Romanian 3rd Army (Romanian 4th and 5th Armies). At the same time, the Soviets attacked the 4th Panzer Army (General Hoth), which was mixed with the Romanian 4th Army at Stalingrad South with great force. Although the 6th Army held its left flank, both Romanian lines were broken through by the Soviets. Powerful Soviet tank units quickly broke into our depth - this is what they learned from us.

In the early morning of November 21, the Soviets rendezvoused at Karachi on the Don River and seized the intact bridge, which was vital for the supply of the 6th Army. Thus, from the morning of 21 November, the 6th Army, as well as the German 4th Panzer Army, which had been driven here from the southern area of Stalingrad, and the Romanian army were encircled. The encirclement consisted of 5 German corps, a total of 20 divisions, and 2 Romanian corps, as well as a large number of artillery reserves and engineering units of the High Command.

Later, even the army group itself could not accurately count how many German troops were encircled. According to the statistics of the 6th Army, the number is about 200,000~270,000, but it should be noted that in addition to the Romanian troops, thousands of "volunteer ambulance personnel" and prisoners of war are also included among the "rations". The 300,000 people claim to be an exaggeration.

Part of the rear service personnel of the 6th Army, as well as part of the transport troops, the wounded and those on leave, were not in the encirclement. These remnants later served as the backbone of the regrouping of the divisions of the 6th Army; However, each division is about 1500~3000 people. If we take into account that the strength of the divisions of the 6th Army had been greatly weakened in November, then even with the addition of the strong artillery and engineer reserves of the High Command, the encirclement should be 20~220,000 people, this figure seems to be quite accurate.

The situation on 24 November was as follows:

The 4th Motorized Division, which was part of the 16th Panzer Army, was still a full-fledged division, scattered in the steppes on both sides of Elista, in addition to the Romanian 18th Division on the northern flank. All other Romanian units were partly thrown into Stalingrad, partly annihilated or routed. The army group tried to concentrate the remnants of the Romanian troops and the rear service units of the German army, holding a cordon in front of Kotelnikov. At first, they were not attacked.

The remnants of the Romanian 4th Army (including its headquarters) were under the command of General Hoth. General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, located on the southern front of Stalingrad, withdrew to the southern and southwestern lines of Stalingrad and the front south after the rout of the Romanian army, and placed it under the command of the 6th Army.

The 6th Army, together with its 4th, 8th, 11th, 51st and 14th Panzer Corps, was encircled around Stalingrad. The 6th Army withdrew the 11th Army and the 8th Army immediately to the east from the lines on both sides of the Don River to a newly constructed western line of defense within the encirclement, the salient of which reached the east of the Karachi Bridge. At the same time, a new southern line of defense was constructed with reserves and a section of the 4th Panzer Army fighting at Stalingrad, as well as the Romanian Army. The enclosure is about 50 kilometers from east to west and 40 kilometers from north to south.

Both flanks of the Romanian 3rd Army have been broken through. In the center, a group under the command of General Laskal, who had distinguished himself in Sevastopol, with the strength of about 3 divisions, put up a heroic and stubborn resistance. They have been encircled, and it is estimated that they have all been captured during this time.

The 48th Panzer Corps, which was originally planned to be left in reserve and behind the bridgehead positions on the Don River, launched a counter-assault, but it was too late and ultimately failed. Its two divisions had been encircled and were ordered to break through to the west. The commander of the army (Heim) had been dismissed by Hitler and recalled to the Führer's stronghold, where a military tribunal composed of Goering, which he often enjoyed, sentenced to death on charges of responsibility for the destruction of the army; But he was later pardoned: because in fact the troops under his command were too weak in force for the tasks they undertook. The corps had only the newly formed Romanian Panzer Division, which had no combat experience, and the German 22nd Panzer Division, which was clearly not up to the level it should have in terms of technology.

The Romanian 3rd Army, which actually had only about 3 divisions in strength, did not take part in the attack, but stopped on the banks of the Don River, next to the Italian army (Romanian 1st and 2nd armies).

According to Army Group "B", the 6th Army had only enough ammunition for a maximum of 2 days and food for 6 days! (This figure later turned out to be too low.) In fine weather, the use of air supplies would only cover 1/10th of the ammunition or fuel needs of the 6th Army. It was originally promised to invest 100 Junkers aircraft to resupply the group army (in addition to the inevitable losses, the actual equivalent of 200 tons of supplies), and other types of aircraft will also be put into operation.