In order to build momentum for this agreement, several high-ranking officials of the Indian government specially took a "special plane" of the Indian Air Force and rushed to Iran overnight to sign the 10-year agreement, which is also the first time that India has obtained the right to manage overseas ports.
In the report, the Indian media hyped up the importance of the "10-year agreement", and specifically mentioned the landmark project of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Gwadar port, saying that this agreement will overshadow the "Gwadar port", and did not hide its ambitions at all.
But India's euphoria did not last long before it was hit head-on by the United States. After learning that India was going to cooperate with Iran, U.S. State Department spokesman Waitant Patel threatened to impose sanctions on Tehran if it chose to do business with Tehran. As for the reasons for the US threat to India, everyone must be clear.
For a long time, the United States has imposed a series of severe economic sanctions on Iran, aimed at limiting Iran's nuclear program and its influence in the Middle East. India's investment in the Chabahar port project means that it is helping Iran circumvent sanctions.
As we all know, after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, India did not stand with the United States to sanction Russia, but frantically imported Russian energy, tearing a big hole in the sanctions imposed by the United States and the West. Now, India has stepped up its efforts to help Iran circumvent sanctions, and the combination of old and new hatreds makes it difficult for India to get past the United States.
(Chabahar Port, Iran)
There are several reasons why India wants to cooperate with Iran at the risk of offending the United States:
First, it helps India bypass Pakistan.
There are tensions between India and Pakistan due to a variety of historical and political factors. By developing the Chabahar port, India can reduce its economic dependence on Pakistan by becoming less dependent on ports such as the port of Karachi in Pakistan and can bypass Pakistan for direct cargo exchange with Afghanistan and further Central Asian countries.
Second, enhance regional influence.
By participating in the development of the Chabahar port, India can not only strengthen its relations with Iran, but also expand its economic and strategic influence in the Central Asian region. This is an important step for India to achieve its "Look East Policy" and "Neighborhood First" policies.
Finally, to address China's strategic challenges.
China's investment and operations at Pakistan's Gwadar port are part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to increase China's influence in the Indian Ocean region. India's development of the Chabahar port can be seen as a balancing act against China's expansion of influence in the region. According to the words of the Indian media, India is counting on this project to fight with China for ten years.
(Gwadar Port)
But even without the United States' obstruction, India's 10-year plan may not work.
First, the port of Chabahar is located in southeastern Iran, near the country's border with Pakistan. India's goal is to develop the port into a major trading hub, allowing goods to be shipped out of India to Chabahar and then continue through Afghanistan to Central Asia. This would allow Indian goods to avoid Pakistan and "create an independent trade artery to the main markets of Central Asia."
But objectively speaking, India does not have so many goods to support this independent port, and the demand in Central Asia is not very large, and it is very inconvenient to transship multiple times, which leads to many customers who prefer to buy goods that can be transported from China by land and Pakistan.
In addition, Gwadar Port is connected to Western China via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and this deep infrastructure integration enhances the strategic value and commercial attractiveness of Gwadar Port. By contrast, the challenge is whether the Chabahar port can achieve a similar degree of connectivity with India and Central Asian countries.
Therefore, even if the project is completed, it may not be comparable to the Gwadar port in the short term, and it will not make much economic sense.
[The United States does not want India to sign an agreement with Iran]
What's more, while India has also pledged investment in the Chabahar port, it has taken the project far less seriously than China. In fact, since 2004, India has led a number of consortiums to sign memorandums of cooperation with Iran, but in the decade since, India seems to have forgotten about the project.
It wasn't until 2013 that India finally came up with $100 million to support the port's project, but only $25 million was spent on the project. As a result, Iran was angry and directly proposed the Farzad B gas field project from India.
The development of the Gwadar port has benefited from the strong support of the Chinese and Pakistani governments and huge investments, especially as part of the CPEC project, which has been largely ensured by the funding, technology and construction experience provided by China. If India wants to use the Chabahar port to counter China, it needs real money.
So in general, India's expectations for the project are more on a geopolitical level than for economic purposes. But because of the U.S. obstruction, the project may eventually come to an end. It will take time to see whether India wants to hype up its own face-saving project, or whether it really has the strategic patience to discuss and promote this with the United States.