In 1950, Mao Zedong was 57 years old.
At 11 a.m. on October 1, 1950, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and other party and state leaders attended a rally to celebrate the first anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Tiananmen Square, inspecting the troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the mass procession. In the evening, Mao Zedong and others watched the fireworks at the Tiananmen Tower.
Teach Kim Il Sung with guerrilla tactics
On the same day, the South Korean Army crossed the 38th parallel. MacArthur issued an "ultimatum" to the DPRK, asking the Korean People's Army to unconditionally "lay down its arms and stop fighting." On the same day, Stalin sent a telegram demanding that China immediately send at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel, so that the DPRK could organize a battle to defend the area north of the 38th parallel. In the middle of the night, Kim Il Sung urgently met with Ni Zhiliang and asked the Chinese government to send troops for support.
On the morning of October 2, Mao Zedong reviewed and revised Zhou Enlai's letter to Ni Zhiliang, that is, to transfer the telegram to Jin Richeng. The full text of the telegram is as follows (the words added and rewritten by Mao Zedong are highlighted with emphasis):
On 30 September, Comrade Zhiliang telegraphed that the situation had been informed. On the one hand, since the eight divisions of the army are cut off by the enemy, please consider whether it is possible to divide these eight divisions into two parts, use four divisions to destroy the heavy weapons, divide them into many small detachments and withdraw from the enemy's gap to the north of the 38th parallel, and disperse the four divisions in South Korea into many small detachments, relying on the people to persist in guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, and contain a large force of the enemy so that it cannot advance northward. Where have the five or six divisions led by the Second Front Army been withdrawn, and can they all be withdrawn to the north of the 38th parallel within a few days? In short, your army must quickly withdraw northward, as quickly as possible, and if the enemy is obstructed, it should also destroy the bulky weapons and insert them through the enemy's gaps, and those who cannot withdraw should stay behind the enemy lines and persist in scattering the guerrillas. If the above suggestions are appropriate, please reply immediately, and look forward to seeing the specific situation.
In the evening, Mao Zedong reviewed and revised the draft of Zhou Enlai's telegram to Ni Zhiliang, and added a paragraph:
I would like to inform Comrade Kim Il Sung that in addition to withdrawing the troops cut off by the enemy as much as possible according to this morning's telegram, all troops that cannot retreat should persist in fighting guerrilla attacks in the same place and not panic and waver, so that there is hope and victory.
At two o'clock in the morning of October 2, a telegram was drafted for the Central Military Commission to Gao Gang and Deng Hua:
(1) Comrade Gao Gang was asked to come to Beijing for a meeting immediately after receiving the call; (2) Comrade Deng Hua was requested to order the border guards to end their preparations ahead of schedule, to be ready to be dispatched at any time, and to fight the new enemy according to the original plan; (3) Ask Deng to send a telegram of the readiness and whether it can be dispatched immediately.
The crowd opposed the sending of troops, and the telegram to Stalin was not sent
On October 2, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Stalin on the issue of sending volunteers into Korea to participate in the war. The telegram said:
1. We have decided to send a part of our troops to the DPRK in the name of volunteers to fight the troops of the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee to assist the Korean comrades. We believe that this is necessary. This is because if the whole of Korea is allowed to be occupied by the Americans, and the revolutionary forces in Korea suffer a fundamental defeat, the American aggressors will become even more rampant, and it will be detrimental to the whole East.
(2) We believe that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, first, we must be able to solve the problem, that is, we must be prepared to annihilate and expel the invading forces of the United States and other countries in Korea; Second, since the Chinese army is fighting the American army in Korea (although we are using the name of the Volunteer Army), we must prepare for the United States to declare a state of war with China, and we must prepare for the United States to at least use its air force to bomb many of China's large cities and industrial bases, and use its navy to attack the coastal zone.
(3) Of these two issues, the first question is whether the Chinese military can annihilate the US military in Korea and effectively resolve the Korean issue. As long as our army is able to annihilate the American army in Korea, mainly the Eighth Army (a combat-ready old army of the United States), the gravity of the second problem (the declaration of war between the United States and China) will remain, but the situation will be favorable to both the Revolutionary Front and China. That is to say, if the Korean issue is de facto over the result of a victory over the US military (it may not be over in form, and the United States may not recognize the victory of the DPRK for a considerable period of time), then even if the United States is openly at war with China, the war may not be very large in scale and will not last long. We believe that the most unfavorable scenario is that the Chinese army will not be able to annihilate the American troops in large numbers in Korea, and the two armies will become a stalemate, and the United States and China have openly entered a state of war, which will destroy the economic construction plan that China has begun now, and cause the national bourgeoisie and other parts of the people to be dissatisfied with us (they are very afraid of war).
(4) Under the present circumstances, we have decided to start dispatching 12 divisions (five or six are not enough) that had been transferred to South Manchuria in advance on 15 October, to be located in an appropriate area of North Korea (not necessarily to the 38th parallel), to fight the enemy who dared to attack north of the 38th parallel, and to fight only defensive warfare in the first period, to annihilate a small force of the enemy, and to ascertain the situation in all respects; While waiting for the arrival of Soviet weapons and equipping our troops, they will cooperate with the Korean comrades to launch a counteroffensive and annihilate the American invading army.
(5) According to the materials we know, a US corps (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division), including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, has a total of 1,500 guns of various calibres of caliber between 7 and 24 cm, while our army (three divisions) has only 36 such guns. The enemy has air supremacy, and the air force we have begun training will not have more than 300 planes ready for combat until February 1951. Therefore, our army is not yet sure that it will annihilate one US army at a time. Having decided to fight the Americans, we should be prepared to concentrate one of our armies in the presence of the US High Command on a battlefield of campaign operations to fight against our troops, so that our troops can have four times the enemy's strength (i.e., one of the enemy's armies against our four armies) and one and a half to two times the enemy's firepower (i.e., 2,200 to 3,000 guns of more than 7 centimeters against the enemy's 1,500 guns of the same caliber), and we can confidently and cleanly annihilate one of the enemy's armies.
(6) In addition to the above-mentioned 12 divisions, we are also transferring 24 divisions from the south of the Yangtze River and the Shaanxi-Gansu region to the Longhai, Jinpu, and Bac Ninh CIJ lines as the second and third batches of troops to assist the DPRK, which are expected to be gradually used in accordance with the prevailing conditions in the spring and summer of next year.
The telegram was not sent and was probably drafted before the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that day. Originally, it was planned to send it to Stalin after the decision to send troops to Korea to participate in the war was made at the conference, but the majority of the people at the conference did not approve of sending troops, so the telegram was shelved.
According to the archives of the Russian President, on October 3, 1950, the Soviet ambassador to China, Roshin, telegraphed Stalin about Mao Zedong's preliminary opinion that China should not send troops for the time being. Title:
We had originally planned to mobilize several divisions of volunteers to North Korea to help the Korean comrades when the enemy attacked north of the 38th parallel. However, after careful consideration, we now believe that this move would have extremely serious consequences. First, it is difficult to solve the Korean problem with a few divisions (our army is extremely poorly equipped, and there is no certainty of victory in the battle against the American army), and the enemy will force us to retreat. Second, and most likely, it would lead to an open conflict between the United States and China, and as a result, the Soviet Union could also be dragged into the war, which would make the problem extremely serious. Many comrades of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that caution must be exercised in this regard.
Therefore, for the time being, it is better to refrain from sending troops for the time being, and at the same time prepare forces, which will be more advantageous in seizing the opportunity to fight the enemy.
On the afternoon of October 2, Mao Zedong presided over a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee at the Juxiang Book House in Zhongnanhai to discuss the Korean war situation and China's dispatch of troops to aid Korea. Mao Zedong believed that sending troops to North Korea was extremely urgent, but most people at the meeting did not approve of sending troops. The meeting decided to convene an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on 4 October to discuss the issue of sending troops to fight in Korea. Mao Zedong asked Zhou Enlai to send a plane to Xi'an to pick up Peng Dehuai to Beijing to attend the meeting.
On the afternoon of October 4, Mao Zedong presided over an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Yi Nian Hall in Zhongnanhai to discuss the Korean war situation and the issue of China's dispatch of troops to aid Korea.
Mao Zedong first asked everyone to talk about the unfavorable situation of sending troops. Those who are not in favor of sending troops or have all kinds of misgivings about sending troops have stated that the main reasons are: we have fought so many years of war and urgently need to heal the wounds of war; It has only been a year since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and the economy is very difficult; Rural land reform and urban democratic reform in the newly liberated areas have not yet been carried out; The many bandits, spies, and counter-revolutionaries left behind by the Kuomintang have not been purged, and the people's power has not yet been fully consolidated; The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has poor weaponry and no air and sea supremacy, and so on. Their opinion is that it is better not to fight this battle unless it is absolutely necessary.
Mao Zedong said: You have a reason for what you say. But when others are in a critical moment for the country, we stand by and watch, and no matter what, we feel sad. In conclusion, he announced that the enlarged meeting of the Politburo would resume tomorrow.
Peng Dehuai supported the dispatch of troops
On the morning of October 5, Mao Zedong asked Deng Xiaoping to pick up Peng Dehuai at the Beijing Hotel to Zhongnanhai to discuss the issue of China's sending troops to aid Korea.
Mao Zedong said to Peng Dehuai: You didn't have time to speak yesterday. We do have serious difficulties, but what are our advantages? Peng Dehuai said: Last night, I thought about it repeatedly and agreed with your decision to send troops to aid the DPRK. Mao Zedong asked: You see, who is the right person to send troops to aid the DPRK? Peng Dehuai asked rhetorically: Hasn't the Central Committee decided to send Comrade Lin Biao there? After talking about Lin Biao's situation, Mao Zedong said: Our opinion, you still have to pick this burden, you don't have this preparation in your mind, right? Peng Dehuai said: I obey the decision of the central authorities. Mao Zedong said: I am relieved of this. Now that the US military has divided its route and is advancing towards the 38th parallel, we must dispatch troops as soon as possible to gain the initiative. The Politburo will continue to meet this afternoon, and I would like to ask you to present your views.
On the afternoon of the same day, he presided over an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at the Yi Nian Hall in Zhongnanhai to continue to discuss the Korean war situation and the issue of China's dispatch of troops to aid the DPRK.
There were still two views in the discussion. Zhou Enlai supported the idea of sending troops to aid Korea.
Peng Dehuai said in his speech: It is necessary to send troops to aid Korea, and if it is defeated, it will be equivalent to a few years of victory in the War of Liberation. If the US military is located on the banks of the Yalu River and Taiwan, it can find an excuse at any time if it wants to launch a war of aggression.
Mao Zedong said in response to Lin Biao's views on the high degree of modernization of the US military and the atomic bomb: It has its atomic bomb, I have my grenade, I believe that my grenade will defeat its atomic bomb, it is nothing more than a paper tiger.
After full discussion at the meeting, everyone unified their understanding, and the meeting finally made a strategic decision to "resist US aggression and aid Korea, defend the homeland and defend the country." The meeting also decided that Peng Dehuai would lead the volunteers to fight in Korea, and decided to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to the Soviet Union for talks with Stalin.
On October 7, Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai and Nie Rongzhen studied various preparations for sending troops to aid North Korea.
On 8 October, Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Revolutionary Military Committee, issued an order on the formation of the Chinese People's Volunteers, appointing Comrade Peng Dehuai as commander and political commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers.