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What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

author:There is a way to research value
What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times
What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

Public Offering China Research Group | Jamie

Editing, co-ordinating| Jamie

制作 | Jessica

The operation was as fierce as a tiger, and the net value increased by 0.5. In the fast-moving A-share market, some fund managers try to make gains through frequent buy-and-sell rebalancing, but the results often backfire.

According to Wind data, among the 4,264 active equity funds in 2023 (statistics of common equity, partial stock hybrid, balanced hybrid, flexible allocation, and stock long and short), 339 funds have an annual position turnover rate of more than 10 times, and some funds even exceed 300 times, while their average return that year was -11.57%, lower than the overall -11.51%.

The most unlucky fund, with a turnover rate of 50 times a year, has a return of -44.90%, which has become a model of doing long and making mistakes.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

339 funds have a turnover rate of more than 10 times

The turnover rate of the fund is the turnover rate of the holdings, which reflects the frequency of the fund's trading operations and market activity in a certain period of time. For example, the annual turnover rate of a fund is 100%, which is basically equivalent to the fund changing all the stocks held in a year, or it may be that some individual stocks are traded more frequently, or in order to cope with the daily subscription and redemption of the fund.

In 2023, the average turnover rate of 4,264 active equity funds is 450%, with a median value of 323%, meaning that on average, the total amount of stocks bought or sold by the fund is 3-5 times the market value of the stock holdings.

Last year, there were 339 active equity funds with a turnover rate of more than 10 times, accounting for 8%. Among them, only 49 funds have positive returns, accounting for 14.45%, which is equivalent to every 7 funds with high turnover rate, and only 1 fund has achieved positive returns. In addition, there were 989 active equity funds with a turnover rate of 5-10 times last year, accounting for 23%.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

The fund with the highest turnover rate in 2023 is Penghua Hongxin A, with a turnover rate of 319.36 times in 2023, and it is the only fund with more than 100 times, with the then fund manager Li Yunyi. As a flexible allocation fund, Penghua Hongxin A stock position has a large adjustment range, and in 2023, the fund will almost "liquidate" the stocks it holds, and the low market value of stock holdings (low denominator) is the main reason for its abnormal turnover rate.

According to the data, at the end of each quarter of 2023, Penghua Hongxin A's allocation ratio to stocks is only 0.18%, 0.25%, 0.00%, and 0.27% respectively, mainly holding cash and buying and selling back financial assets. In the middle of the year and at the end of the year, the fund held 1,000 shares of Hangyang shares and 1,600 shares of Wen's shares, and the market value of the stock holdings was 34,400 yuan and 32,100 yuan respectively - the scale is not as large as that of ordinary retail investors.

In the case of lying flat, Penghua Hongxin A's annual performance fluctuations are relatively small, and even obtained a positive return of 0.77%, which also outperformed the CSI 300 with negative returns, which can be said to be a model of lying to win. It is worth mentioning that in 2024, Penghua Hongxin A will buy stocks on a large scale after replacing it with a new fund manager, Xiao Jiaqian, and the stock position will increase to 95%, and the performance will rise by 35% in 27 trading days, and then withdraw 20% in 21 trading days, and the net value will go from a pool of stagnant water to big ups and downs.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times
What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

50 times turnover and 45% loss

Compared with Penghua Hongxin A Li Yunyi's immobility, Niu Zhiyuan, the manager of Nord Preferred 30 Fund, has gone to the other extreme.

In 2023, the turnover rate of Nord Preferred 30 is as high as 51.92 times, ranking 5th out of 4,264 active equity funds, while the annual return loss is 44.90%.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

Let's take a look at how he does it.

In 2023, the stock position of Nord Preferred 30 is basically more than 70%, so there is no situation of lying flat. Behind the high turnover rate is Niu Zhiyuan's almost crazy rebalancing, which has to replace 7 or 8 heavy stocks every quarter, and basically no stock can stay for more than 2 quarters.

In the first quarter, Niu Zhiyuan aimed at the photovoltaic sector, at the end of the quarter, the heavy position of Oujing Technology, Sungrow, Jiejia Weichuang, Junda shares, Jingshan Light Machine, Quartz shares, Jingsheng Electromechanical, Deye shares, GoodWe, JA Technology, most of them are upstream and downstream companies in the photovoltaic industry, as a result, the photovoltaic industry overcapacity, the plate began to enter the downward channel, in the first quarter, only Oujing Technology and Jingshan Light Machine had a significant increase in its heavy stocks, and the remaining 8 stocks had 6 declines and 2 rose slightly. For the quarter, the fund returned -6.57%.

In the second quarter, Niu Zhiyuan transferred new faces such as Juhe Materials, Trina Solar, iFLYTEK, Tongling Shares, Yijiahe, Huadian International, and Inovance Technology, and 7 of the top 10 heavy positions were replaced. From the perspective of all shareholdings, there are also new faces such as Yubang New Materials, Jinko Solar, Zhongke Sanhuan, Aixu Shares, and Dingtong Technology. 8 of the top 10 heavy stocks rose in the quarter, but the net value of the fund fell slightly by 0.52%.

In the first half of the year, the turnover rate of Nord Preferred 30 reached 22 times. In the second half of the year, the fund ushered in its darkest moment. In the third quarter, Niu Zhiyuan repeated his old skills, replaced 8 of the top ten heavy stocks, rebought Sungrow, and also re-positioned Huarui Precision, Dike Shares, Oukeyi, Weice Technology, Tianfu Communication, Dier Laser, and Anhui Heli, and was slapped in the face again. Taking Sungrow as an example, there was still an increase of 11.46% in the second quarter, but it fell sharply in the third quarter, falling by 23.25%. During the quarter, the net value of Nord Preferred 30 fell by 34.60%.

In the fourth quarter, in desperation, Nord preferred 30 full-position AI tracks, bought stocks such as Saiteng shares, Montage Technology, Zhongji Innolight, Xiechuang Data, and BIWIN Storage, and the top ten heavy positions were replaced by 9, and ninety percent were companies in the information technology industry, but they were unable to return to the sky, and the net value of the fund fell by 9.35%.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

Behind Niu Zhiyuan's desperate gamble is the embodiment of the fund's will to survive. Since its inception, the size of the NORD Preferred 30 Mixed Fund has been shrinking. The scale of the fund was 1.181 billion yuan at the beginning of its establishment, and as of the end of 2023, the scale of the fund is only 20 million yuan, and it is on the verge of liquidation at any time.

After the failure of the bet investment, NORD Preferred 30 announced on May 7 this year that it planned to convene a general meeting of fund unit holders of the fund by means of communication to consider the proposal to terminate the fund's "fund contract" and officially move towards liquidation.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

Transaction costs are high

Similar to NORD Preferred 30, most of the ultra-high turnover funds are mini funds struggling on the verge of liquidation, trying to win excess returns through "betting" style, and finally achieve "shelling".

For example, Guojin Xinrui managed by Du Zhe, Jiutai Tianyi quantitative value managed by Li Xiang, Bank of Communications Rongxin managed by Yu Liping, and Pioneer Juyou managed by Liu Zhiqiang will have turnover rates of 105 times, 64 times, 57 times, and 40 times respectively in 2023, ranking 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, with a scale of 12.78 million yuan, 850,000 yuan, 53.49 million yuan, and 46.23 million yuan at the end of last year, respectively.

In fact, among the 339 funds with a turnover rate of more than 10 times last year, the average size at the end of the year was 178 million yuan, and only 11 funds with a scale of more than 1 billion yuan, the largest Bodao Growth Zhihang managed by Yang Meng, 3.464 billion yuan. A total of 123 funds had a scale of less than 50 million yuan at the end of the year, touching the red line of liquidation, accounting for more than one-third. The smallest is the quantitative value of Jiutai Tianyi, only 850,000 yuan.

So, what are the results of these fund gambles?

According to the data, the average return of the above 339 high turnover funds was -11.57%, underperforming the CSI 300 by -11.38%, and the median return was -10.88%. There are only 49 funds with positive returns, among which the best fund is Qianhai United Runfeng managed by Xiong Yu, with a scale of 81.31 million yuan, a turnover rate of 12 times in 2023, and a class A return of 18.68%. Xiong Yu will have a heavy position in the information technology sector in 2023, buying stocks such as Sanqi Mutual Entertainment, Kaiying Network, Skyworth Digital, Giant Network, Zhongji Innolight, Kingsoft Office, iFLYTEK, Tianfu Communication, Tuopu Group, etc., and the heavy stocks continue to rotate.

In addition to Qianhai United Runfeng, 7 funds, including Guoxin Guocheng Xinli, Oriental Quantitative Growth A, and Tianzhi Research Drive A, returned more than 10% last year, and most of them were heavily invested in the information technology sector.

Of the 339 funds, 290 had negative 2023 results, with 72 of them returning less than 20%. The worst performance is the above-mentioned Nord Preferred 30, with a full-year performance loss of 44.90%. There is also the basic industry of Da Mo managed by Chen Xiuzhu, which had a turnover rate of 10 times last year and a performance loss of 41.39%; The bi-weekly regular redeemable A of the Bank of Shanghai Technology driven by Zhai Yunfei was 12 times the turnover rate last year, and the performance loss was 38.96%.

Although funds with a low turnover rate did not create much success last year, funds with a high turnover rate also have to pay a large price in transaction commissions.

For example, Nord Preferred 30 had a total of 1.5088 million yuan in trading commissions last year. In the context of the fund size of about 20 million yuan, the commission scale ratio reached 6.96%, which is roughly equivalent to every 15 yuan invested by the people, 1 yuan was paid to the brokerage as a transaction commission. Another example is the quantitative value of Jiutai Tianyi, with a trading commission of 217,800 yuan in 2023, which is a quarter of the fund size at the end of the year.

On the whole, the above-mentioned 339 funds with a high turnover rate will pay a trading commission of 956 million yuan in 2023, accounting for 1.58% of the end of the period in rough calculation, and the average trading commission of each fund will reach 2.83 million yuan. Among them, 23 funds have annual trading commissions of more than 10 million yuan, such as 41.42 million yuan for CEIBS Quantitative Drive, 27.9 million yuan for Ping An Quality Enterprise, and 25.54 million yuan for Bodao Growth Intelligent Aviation. From the perspective of commission scale ratio, a total of 62 funds exceeded 2%, accounting for nearly one-fifth.

What is the significance of the existence of public offering managers who have become large retail investors, with a maximum turnover of more than 300 times

Generally speaking, the turnover rate will generate more trading commissions, increase the cost of portfolio management, and affect the net value performance of the fund to a certain extent. Facts have proved that in the market in 2023, in addition to bringing benefits to brokers, frequent operations will not bring much of a good experience to the people.

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