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Stalin's illness and coma
On the evening of March 1, 1953, the supreme leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, suddenly suffered a stroke and fell to the ground in his private room in the Kremlin. At the time of the incident, the palace guards quickly noticed the abnormality and immediately notified the nearby medical team. Stalin was rushed to bed, and doctors and nurses busily carried out preliminary first aid measures in an attempt to stabilize his condition. At this time, Stalin was completely unconscious, pale, short of breath, and apparently in an extremely serious condition.
The emergency situation in the Kremlin was quickly reported to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the top echelons of the Soviet government. After receiving the news, senior party officials rushed to the medical site or by telephone to find out about Stalin's state of health and possible political influence. While Stalin's personal physician was nervously diagnosing and treating him, senior party officials began to discuss the response behind the scenes, because Stalin's illness was directly related to the political direction and regime stability of the Soviet Union.
Over the next few days, Stalin's health became one of the most sensitive secrets of the Soviet government and the party. The news was strictly blocked, and the public knew nothing about Stalin's condition. At the same time, the Central Committee of the CPSU began to make urgent adjustments, closely monitoring the reaction at home and abroad, and conducting preliminary discussions and arrangements for possible power vacancies.
While Stalin was in a coma, the medical team went all out to treat him in the hope of regaining consciousness. However, due to Stalin's advanced age, the difficulty and complexity of treatment increased the pressure on the medical team. They are constantly adjusting the treatment plan, administering various drug injections and life support measures in the hope of stabilizing his vital signs.
At the same time, the atmosphere inside the Kremlin is unusually tense. Officials and secretaries at all levels discussed in whispers in the corridors and offices, and from time to time followed the dynamics of the medical room. Important members of the Central Committee of the CPSU – including Malenkov, Beria, Molotov and others – met frequently to discuss how to ensure a smooth transition of the country's leadership if Stalin could not recover.
Power planning of the Central Committee of the CPSU
On 5 March, Stalin, although still alive, was no longer able to carry out any political activity, which forced an important joint meeting of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the middle of the night. The meeting took place in a spacious Kremlin conference room, tightly furnished to prevent any information from leaking to the outside world or the media.
The meeting began, first of all, an overview of Stalin's state of health and its possible impact on the political situation in the country by a secretarial officer of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Subsequently, the discussion turned to how to maintain the continuity of the day-to-day operations of the government and high-level decision-making. The participants included senior leaders from all aspects of the party, government and military, who expressed their views on the current situation and proposed various ways to deal with it.
The meeting focused on how to arrange a political transition if Stalin was unable to resume his duties. This included a possible interim leadership candidate, and how to announce this change to the Soviet people and the international community. Some participants stressed that any transition of power must take place in strict order and stability in order to avoid causing unrest at home and abroad.
After close discussions, the members of the Council of Ministers of the USSR proposed the establishment of a provisional committee to ensure the continued functioning of state institutions during this transitional period. This proposal was supported by the majority of the participants, as it would ensure that important decisions of the state would not stall without Stalin.
Representatives of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR focused on how to manage relations and agreements with foreign countries, especially with the satellite states of Eastern Europe and the Western powers. They discussed a variety of options to ensure that the Soviet Union's position in the international arena was not affected and at the same time to avoid any possible misunderstandings or conflicts.
In addition, there was a discussion on the topic of internal security and stability. Officials in charge of national security noted the need to strengthen domestic and foreign intelligence surveillance to ensure that the Soviet Union was not threatened by any subversive activities during this sensitive period.
As the meeting deepened, the discussions in various aspects gradually became concrete, and a series of emergency measures and long-term plans were formed. In the end, it was decided that in the event of Stalin's death, this series of preparatory programs would be launched immediately to ensure a smooth transition of state power.
Beria's threat and purge
Stalin's funeral was held in Moscow on March 9, 1953, and became an event of widespread concern in the Soviet Union and the international community. The funeral was not only a farewell to Stalin himself, but also symbolized the end of an era. Against this backdrop, the choice of speakers at the funeral was particularly important, as it not only reflected the mourning mood of the time, but also revealed the subtle changes in the power structure within the party.
On the vast Red Square, tens of thousands of Soviet citizens and international representatives gathered to witness this historic moment. The main speakers at the funeral included Malenkov, Beria and Molotov, who spoke in front of Stalin's coffin in their capacities as Prime Minister, Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Each of their speeches was carefully prepared to emphasize Stalin's contribution to the USSR and his decision-making role in domestic and foreign policy.
Despite the fact that Malenkov, Beria and Molotov all appeared as speakers, the real center of power was already gradually shifting to Malenkov and Khrushchev. In his speech, Malenkov emphasized the achievements of the Stalin era and his vision for the future, in an attempt to consolidate and demonstrate his leadership as prime minister. However, Beria's implicit authority and grip on the past as a former head of the secret police still make him a political figure to be reckoned with.
Although Beria's speech was ostensibly a celebration of Stalin, every choice of word was interpreted as an attempt to maintain his influence inside and outside the party. Molotov's speech focused more on international relations, reflecting his role as foreign minister and the Soviet Union's position on the international stage. However, the undercurrent of power was revealed soon after the funeral.
Beria's arrest and liquidation
The events of June 26, 1953 became a turning point in the political history of the Soviet Union. Under the close planning of Khrushchev and Malenkov, an elaborate arrest operation unfolded at a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On this day, the conference room was tense and quiet, and the atmosphere was unusually heavy as the senior party members waited for the meeting to officially begin.
Before the scheduled time of the meeting, Khrushchev and Malenkov had ensured the participation of the military general Zhukov. Zhukov, as a high-ranking officer in the Soviet Union, his military background and authority made him an ideal candidate for this task. The importance of his task to carry out the arrest of Beria, one of the most feared political figures of the Stalin era, cannot be overstated.
As the meeting began, Khrushchev was the first to stand up and speak, and his words clearly expressed the accusations against Beria. During Khrushchev's speech, Zhukov stood quietly on the side of the conference room, his very presence being a self-evident threat. After Khrushchev's speech, the atmosphere in the room reached a climax.
At this moment, Zhukov quickly and decisively walked to the front of the podium and pulled out his pistol. The move shocked everyone present. Zhukov loudly announced Beria's arrest, and then the security personnel in the command room assisted in carrying out the order. Beria was quickly subdued, and although he was an experienced politician and former head of the secret police, he could not resist in the face of a direct threat of military force.
The drama and suddenness of the arrest came as a shock to all. When Beria was taken out of the conference room, other members of the Soviet Politburo realized that a drastic change in the power structure was taking place. Beria's arrest was not only a sanction against him personally, but also a clear sign of the power struggle within the CPSU.
With the removal of Beria, the tension in the conference room gradually subsided, but everything that happened foreshadowed a profound change in the political situation in the USSR. Beria was taken to a prison outside Moscow, where he was tried in secret. During the trial, Beria was charged with a number of crimes, including abuse of power and political persecution. Shortly after the trial, Beria was executed in prison, ending his many years of political career.
Reshaping of power structures
With Beria's arrest and subsequent trial and execution, the main obstacle in the Soviet political arena was removed, creating the conditions for Khrushchev's political rise. Beria has long been regarded as one of the most powerful heirs to Stalin's political legacy, and his sudden loss of power has had a profound impact on the power structure within the party. This event marked the gradual seizure of the supreme power of the party and state by Khrushchev and the beginning of a significant transition of Soviet politics to a centralized core of leadership.
At the 1953 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev further consolidated his power through careful organization and tactics. At this plenum, Khrushchev and his supporters successfully arranged the agenda of the meeting, ensuring control over important positions and influence on party policy. During the meeting, Khrushchev promoted a series of political and organizational reforms aimed at redefining the leadership structure of the CPSU, reducing possible opposition and ensuring his dominance within the party.
Khrushchev's strategy consisted of elevating loyal supporters into key political positions while weakening opponents who could threaten his power. He took advantage of the general discontent within the CPSU over the events in Beria, describing it as a struggle to purge the party of instability, thereby winning the support of more members of the Central Committee. In addition, Khrushchev pushed for policy changes, including increased investment in agriculture and the economy, in an attempt to increase the legitimacy of his leadership by improving the living standards of Soviet citizens.
The political turmoil of this period revealed not only the intensity of the power struggle within the Soviet Union, but also the deep divisions within the party about the future political direction. Khrushchev's rise, although achieved through a series of complex political maneuvers, also brought about certain important adjustments to the policy of the Stalin era. Especially in foreign policy and domestic affairs, Khrushchev tried to steer the Soviet Union in a more moderate and open direction, which gradually manifested itself in later Soviet policy. The successful consolidation of Khrushchev at the plenum meant that Soviet politics had entered a new period.
Resources:
From Zheng Yifan. Spring and Autumn Period of the Soviet Union[M]. 2018