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The third campaign was launched at dusk on December 31, the last day of 1950.
1. The "Moonlit Night Offensive" of the Volunteer Army
There are two considerations for setting the general offensive at this point in time:
First of all, at this time, it is the end of the year, Christmas has just passed, and then it will usher in New Year's Day, and the time before and after is only a week, and the continuous festive atmosphere is objectively easy to make people feel lax.
Secondly, this is also the need of the "moonlit night offensive" of the Volunteer Army. In the Korean battlefield, because the US military has absolute air supremacy, the air threat is extremely great during the day, and the volunteers can only use the night to fight, and the moonlit night can give full play to its combat might. The first two battles were launched on the night of the full moon.
The first campaign was launched on October 25, which coincided with the fifteenth day of the ninth month of the lunar calendar; The second campaign was launched on November 25, the 16th day of the 10th month of the lunar calendar, which was the day when the moon was the fullest.
The third campaign was launched on the twenty-third day of the eleventh month of the lunar calendar, although it had passed the night of the full moon, but there was still a half-moon to use in the second half of the night, and seven days later, when it entered the new day when the moonlight was completely gone, the campaign also reached the final stage.
The order of attack of the 4 corps of the right group (right column) was:
The 38th and 39th armies, located on the left and right flanks, began artillery preparations at 16:40, and the infantry attacked 30 minutes later; The 40th Army, located in the center, and the 50th Army at the western end of the front moved later. Adopt a combination of two flanks and middle attacks, first break through from the left and right flanks, and then detour to the flanks and rear; The frontal troops seized the enemy, and after the roundabout troops cut off the enemy's retreat, they cooperated with him to achieve encirclement and annihilation.
This is what Han Xianchu said:
"There should not be too many frontal troops, and they should not be too hasty, but they should be closely monitored and caught by the enemy in front of them; When the roundabout troops arrive, they will attack in concert (both in terms of campaign and tactics). ”
The main force that served as the breakthrough on the right flank was the 39th Army. The immediate enemy of the army was the 1st Division of the ROK Army, which was fortified along the south bank of the Imjin River.
The Imjin River originates on the western slope of the Taebaek Mountains, and its runoff flows from northeast to southwest, from the west of Yeoncheon River to the section of Golangpuri, meandering along the 38th parallel, flowing into the Han River in the southwest of Wensan, and then flowing westward into the sea. The lower reaches of the Imjin River are 75 kilometers away from Seoul, and the river is 60~170 meters wide.
The 39th Army broke through the section, starting from Xinfa in the south and reaching Doi in the north, which happened to be located in the section of the Imjin River flowing through the 38th parallel, with a narrow front and steep cliffs along the river. The ROK defense troops fortified the river, built fortifications layer by layer, and defended them against danger. The front of the position is covered with obstacles, with 2~3 barbed wires, and anti-infantry mines are buried along the river and at the crossing.
Two or three kilometers across the river, there are two highlands (147.7 and 182.0 highlands, located on the east and west sides of Jicheng), like two iron locks, controlling the road passage to the depth.
According to the telegram order of Zhi Si and Han Zhi, Wu Xinquan, commander of the 39th Army, and Xu Binzhou, political commissar, determined the following deployments:
On the day of the launch of the campaign, the Xindai and Dojing sections broke through the river defense, and the first step was to annihilate the 2 regiments of the 1st Division of the ROK Army, and with a force to attack and destroy the enemy in the Hetao south of Gaolangpuri, and then meet the 50th Army to cross the river; The second step is to enter the reinforcement position, block the enemy sent by the Uijeong, and cooperate with the 40th Army to annihilate the 6th Division of the Korean Army west of Dongdoucheon-ri; After that, the whole army marched to the Wenshan area to block the enemy from the north.
It was estimated before the war that after the attack was launched, it could advance 7.5~8 kilometers in the first night, and deploy 5 regiments.
Judging from this deployment, the 39th Army paid equal attention to destroying the enemy and blocking reinforcements in this operation. Wu Xinquan held that whether or not these two points can be achieved will have a great bearing on the actions of the 40th Army on the left and the 50th Army on the right, and will also have an overall impact on the entire campaign.
When studying the combat plan, Wu Xinquan initially planned to use the 116th and 117th divisions to carry out a breakthrough side by side, and each division would strengthen one artillery regiment.
When studying the plan at the army's operational meeting, Wang Yang, commander of the 116th Division, proposed that the breakthrough task could be completed by his division alone for four reasons:
First, the division was the first unit to reach the Imjin River, and after five days and nights of reconnaissance, it had already mastered the enemy situation and the terrain in front of it;
Second, the main attack task is undertaken by one division, which can be strengthened by two artillery regiments at the same time, which is convenient for concentrating firepower and organizing coordination;
Third, the division had previously fought with the 1st Division of the ROK Army in front of it and was familiar with its tactical characteristics;
Fourth, the whole division has a high mood of seeking war, and it is sure that it will complete its tasks.
Judging from the troop configuration and battle formation at that time, in addition to the above four points, there should be another reason, that is, the width of the 39th Army's breakthrough section was limited, and the front was only 5 kilometers from Xindai to Dojing.
Deploying two divisions at the same time in such a narrow area will inevitably result in a crowded formation, and if they are hit by the enemy's intensive fire, they will inevitably cause serious casualties.
Wu Xinquan adopted Wang Yang's suggestion and decided to use the 116th Division as the main attack of the first echelon; The 117th Division was changed to the second echelon, and after the breakthrough of the first echelon, it was interspersed from the left flank; The 115th Division is in reserve.
At 13 o'clock on the 28th, Han Xianchu telegraphed Wu Xinquan:
Shiji's intention was to first annihilate the 6th Division of the ROK Army and seize the 1st Division of the ROK Army, therefore, "Your army should not fight too many enemies"; At the same time, it was instructed that after the breakthrough, the main force should advance rapidly, "control the advantageous position in the northeast of the court, strive to arrive on the first night, and prepare to destroy reinforcements or flee the enemy in Wenshan"; The 50th Army moved after the 39th Army, which was also arranged by Wu Xinquan and Xu Binzhou.
2. The uniqueness of reconnaissance and concealment
After the attack was launched, the breakthrough of the 39th Army went quite smoothly. Summing up experience after the war, we believe that this is mainly due to the thorough preparation before the war, especially the good reconnaissance and clever concealment.
In terms of reconnaissance, before the main force of the army reached the offensive position, it dispatched six companies of the advance regiment to carry out powerful reconnaissance and capture the enemy in front of them, basically grasping the enemy situation and the situation along the river, and providing an important basis for the army commander to make a decision to fight.
After selecting the direction of the main attack, they also dispatched capable cadres to set up forward observation posts and use telescopes and artillery observation scopes to observe the front of the battle day and night to gain a detailed understanding of the daily movements of the defending enemy, the construction of fortifications, and the deployment of troops and firepower. By the time the general attack was launched, the location of all the bunkers defending the enemy in front of him had been completely understood.
Commanders at all levels, from division commanders and regiment commanders to squad leaders and platoon commanders, spent three nights sneaking into the front of the formation to carry out reconnaissance at close range, ascertaining the thickness of the ice on the river surface and the depth of the river water in the breakthrough section, selecting the breakthrough point, the passage for the troops to cross the river, the position of climbing the cliff after going ashore, and the target for suppressing firepower.
In terms of concealment and camouflage, Wang Yang stressed that the key to the success of this battle was that the troops would not be detected by the enemy when they entered the attack position during the day on the last day (December 31).
To this end, he arranged for his troops to build fortifications and shelter areas in concealment by using natural landforms such as hills and mountain packs and rain fissures and ditches at a distance of 150~2,500 meters from the enemy. In an area 2 kilometers wide and 2.5 kilometers deep, 316 improvised shelters, more than 3,000 meters of trenches and communication trenches, 18 battalion, regimental, and division command posts, and more than 50 covered artillery firing positions have been constructed.
It was the middle of winter, the ground was frozen, the troops lacked construction tools, and the construction of the project began on the 29th and ended on the night of the 30th, and it was a miracle in itself that such a large amount of earthwork was completed in such a short time.
On December 30, the day before the attack was launched, the assault force of the 116th Division (including attached artillery), a total of 7 infantry battalions, 7 mountain, field, and howitzer battalions, 8 regimental infantry artillery batteries, and all the divisional command organs, covertly entered the starting position of the attack under the cover of night.
Wu Xinquan ordered: "Whoever wants to expose the target, regardless of the cadres and soldiers, will be subject to the highest discipline on the battlefield." ”
He called Wang Yang and said, "This is a death order, be sure to let everyone know." ”
The attacking troops carried out secrecy discipline without any deviation, and quietly ambushed more than 7,500 people and more than 70 artillery pieces in an area of 3.5 square kilometers 150~300 meters away from the enemy.
That night, there was a light snowfall, and at dawn the next day, all traces of entering the position were covered with snow, and there was not a single person, a gun, a cannon, a horse, or a telephone line on the ground.
After dawn, enemy planes circled at low altitude all day long and reconnoitred but found nothing. This is another miracle.
3. Break through the battle of the Imjin River
In order to attract the attention of the enemy defending on the other side of the Imjin River, Wu Xinquan also ordered the 115th Division in Gaolangpuri to take a diversion action with a small number of troops, and did not hesitate to expose his unit to enemy artillery fire, and exchanged local sacrifices for overall success.
Since this operation strengthened a considerable amount of artillery for the front-line troops, the 116th Division paid special attention to organizing coordination between infantry and artillery during combat preparations. The reinforced artillery and divisional artillery are mixed into 3 artillery groups, and the 2 artillery groups on the first line mainly carry out direct aiming and shooting, respectively, to support the first echelon and 2 regiments to break through the front line; The divisional artillery group is located in the second line, which is mainly used to suppress enemy artillery and support in-depth operations.
At 16:40 p.m. on December 31, artillery preparations began. The 34 direct-aim guns adopted the method of "repeated fire" and carried out sabotage fire on 40 firing points on the enemy's 2-kilometer front, destroying 80 percent of the targets in the enemy's front line.
At 17 o'clock, a signal of rapid fire was issued, and heavy artillery fire was used to suppress the enemy's living forces in and near the first line of trenches. After 3 minutes, all artillery fire was aimed at the breakthrough and concentrated fire, while suppressing the enemy artillery positions so that they could not fire a single shell. At this time, the first echelon regiment launched an attack, passed through the minefield in 5~11 minutes, waded through the glacier, climbed the steep cliff, and broke through the enemy's defense line.
After a night of fighting, the 116th Division had already penetrated more than 10 kilometers deep into the enemy's depth before dawn on January 1, 1951, before the first rays of dawn on New Year's Day 1951 appeared on the eastern horizon.
The 117th Division, which was tasked with a roundabout mission, entered the battle on the left side of the 116th Division, and moved more quickly, and by 5 o'clock in the morning of the 1st, it smashed the enemy in front of it five times in succession, broke through to a depth of 15 kilometers, and made a detour to the south of Dongdoucheon-ri, severing the connection between the 1st Division of the ROK Army and the 6th Division of the ROK Army on its right.
After the war, the 116th Division's operational experience in breaking through the Imjin River was selected and sent to a joint meeting of senior cadres of the Chinese and North Korean armies for presentation.
When Liu Bo undertook the Nanjing Military Academy, he included this example in the teaching content of the campaign department, and said that he could give it "a full score."
4. The Battle of the Hantan River of the 38th Army
The 38th Army was the main force for the breakthrough on the left flank of the Right Group.
The enemy in front of the army was the 6th Division of the ROK Army, and its basic position was on the line of the Hantan River.
According to the deployment of the Korean command, the first target of this battle was the 6th Division of the South Korean Army. The task of the 38th Army was to break through the Hantan River from the Loudai and Banjuli sections, and then the main force quickly attacked south and east of Dongdouchuan, and coordinated with the frontal attack and the right flank detour troops to encircle and annihilate the 6th Division.
The attack of the 38th Army was launched at the same time as the 39th Army. After a short artillery preparation, two divisions of the first echelon acted simultaneously. The 113th Division forcibly crossed the Hantan River in only 20 minutes and attacked the 6th Division of the ROK Army.
The 114th Division also quickly made a breakthrough, and then quickly penetrated into depth. At 18:30, Army Commander Liang Xingchu reported to Han (Xianchu) and Zhisi:
"The 113th Division and the 114th Division broke through the 38th parallel at 17:30 and 18:00 respectively and are now attacking and advancing in the upper and upper caves... The enemy's resistance was not strong, and we only used artillery fire to block our advance. ”
As for the battles of the various units of the Volunteer Army that forcibly involved the Imjin River and the Hantan River, there are generally not many written works on the history of the war, and people often underestimate the difficulties involved.
According to the military history of the 38th Army:
Although this battle was not as tense and brutal as the previous two battles, it was more difficult than any other battle since the entry into Korea. On the night when the army broke through the Hantan River, the wind and snow were combined, and the temperature dropped to about minus 20 degrees Celsius, and the officers and men endured the strange cold, wading waist-deep ice and water, and facing not only the enemy's minefields, barbed wire, and bullets and bullets, but also continuous ice cliffs and snow slopes.
The shoes and socks froze together with the ice water, and the biting cold wind blew onto the body, and soon a layer of ice shell formed on the soaked clothes, and the whole body was like a knife. The officers and soldiers jokingly called it "a race against the enemy in armor".
During the battle, we had to overcome many difficulties such as lack of supplies, broken clothes and shoes, malnutrition, and physical exhaustion, which was really a bitter and vicious battle.
Such a battle cannot be fought without an iron will to fight.
At 12 o'clock on January 1, the 114th Division, which was tasked with a roundabout mission, broke through to a depth of about 20 kilometers into the enemy's depth and occupied Qifeng Mountain southeast of Dongdouchuan; Prior to this, the 117th Division of the 39th Army on the right flank broke through to a depth of 15 kilometers at 5 o'clock on the same day, and detoured back to the Xiangshuili and Xianyanli areas south of Dongdouchuan.
The two roundabout armies on the left and right had reached the line south of Dongdocheon, where the 6th Division of the ROK Army should be encircled, according to the predetermined plan.
However, when the 114th Division advanced to Qifeng Mountain, it found only a team of more than 1,000 South Korean troops retreating in the direction of the Ui government, and a blocking battle was defeated, killing and capturing more than 400 enemies. Although the 117th Division, which took a detour to its position first, successfully cut off the connection between the 6th Division and the 1st Division of the ROK Army, it did not capture the main force of the 6th Division, and only intercepted and annihilated more than 600 fleeing enemies.
At 17 o'clock on the 1st, the 38th Army reported: "Most of the Dongdouchuan Puppet Sixth Division fled south. ”
The goal of destroying the 6th Division of the ROK Army for the first time was not achieved, and the problem mainly lay in the area of the 40th Army, which was tasked with a frontal breakthrough.
5. The "mistakes" of the 40th Army
According to Han Zhi's deployment, the 40th Army was located between the 38th Army and the 39th Army, and it was originally planned to start the operation three hours after the attack by the adjacent forces on the left and right, but in fact it was put into battle ahead of schedule after 40 minutes.
The 40th Army was initially tasked with attacking in the direction of Gapyeong, in the center of the front. On December 25, Han adjusted his mission to break through the defense line of the Imjin River and the Hantan River from the front.
Han Xianchu specifically instructed:
"In order to enable the 40th Army to advance to the exact position of the attack, the 39th Army should cede the areas east of the Waiemei, Gwangdong-ri, and Dongzhongli lines (inclusive), and the 38th Army should cede the southwest areas of the Shuihui-dong, Lidong, and Myluo-dong lines (inclusive) to the 40th Army."
After such deployment adjustments, the 40th Army completed the assembly time far behind the other armies, and Han Zhi also extended the preparation time for the entire campaign.
Even so, before the attack was launched, only one of the two artillery regiments attached to the 40th Army was still in place, and the other regiment was blocked by enemy air raids on the way, and only one artillery company caught up.
The 40th Army broke through the section from Emeili to Gaotan, and defended the enemy with 2 divisions and 5 battalions, with an absolute advantage in strength. After the attack was launched, the 118th Division was fiercely fought, with strong enemy fortifications and firepower. By dawn on January 1, the defending enemy fled south under the cover of American aircraft, and the 118th Division pursued southward.
The 119th Division made a breakthrough at the contact between the 6th Division and the 1st Division of the ROK Army, and the development was also smooth, and the advance of 12 kilometers that night was carried out, and at dawn, the troops reached the east-west line of Dongdoucheon-ri.
However, at this point, something went wrong.
According to the summary materials of the 40th Army's campaign:
After the main force of the 119th Division advanced to the area of Anxingli and Shangpai-ri north of Dongdouchuan, it immediately occupied Dongsan-ri in Dongdouchuan-ri with one company, and intercepted a South Korean convoy composed of more than 100 vehicles in the Fengyan-ri area.
However, "the battalion commander did not understand the situation and thought that Dongdouchuan was invincible, and there would be no enemy to the north, so he ordered the company that had occupied Dongdouchuan to be withdrawn... By the time the regiment ascertained the situation and returned to the army to destroy the enemy, most of the enemy had already fled south, and the opportunity to destroy the enemy was lost." After the 118th Division broke through, "because it did not dare to fight during the day and did not take advantage of the victory to attack the enemy, the enemy took the opportunity to calmly break away from our frontal attack and fled."
According to the history of the U.S. military:
At that time, the ROK 6th Division "had been broken up and became disorganized," and by the evening of January 1, the division commander had "completely lost control of the troops." By 9 a.m. on the morning of the 3rd, the US army had gathered about 6,000 officers and men, accounting for half of the division's personnel, but only 2,500 of them were combatants.
For the Volunteer Army, this can only be counted as a rout. At the end of the campaign, the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission made a statistical table of battle results, and in the column of "Enemy Annihilation and Formation," there was not a single battalion or state-level unit of the ROK Army's 6th Division.
Nevertheless, on the whole, the breakthrough of the Right Group's defense line on the Imjin River and the Hantancheon River was successful.
After the attack was launched, it was as short as 30 minutes and as long as 1 hour, and the troops on both flanks broke through the river defenses; After 2~3 hours, the frontal troops also achieved a breakthrough. The 50th Army, which moved later, also crossed the Imjin River with the help of the 39th Army. In just one night, the campaign breakthrough mission was completed.
(End of text)
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