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MacArthur's Far East Headquarters, the "No. 1 Building" located in the center of Tokyo on the other side of the moat of the Emperor's Palace, was shrouded in a gloomy fog due to the defeat of the "United Nations Army" in the Korean battlefield.
During this time, MacArthur's excessively pretending style aroused criticism and disgust from many people in the United States.
1. MacArthur's "Dumping the Pot"
Well-known war correspondent Haberstam wrote:
In Tokyo, when the dream of victory was shattered, the dignified and disheartened were stunned and disheartened, and MacArthur faced another crisis of confidence in himself, or a crisis of image.
Previously, those around him saw him as omnipotent, but now he had lost to an Asian army led by a peasant-turned-general. The last thing he was willing to do was admit that he had made a mistake. Earlier, he liked to talk about the face of Asians, believing that a white man like him should never lose face in front of a yellow-skinned person, but now he has lost face not only in front of the whole world, but also in his own army.
Worse still, instead of admitting defeat and taking responsibility, he presented himself as a victim of Washington's policies.
Sitting in a luxurious office in Tokyo, he was not exposed to the wind and rain, let alone the danger of bullets, until two weeks after the Chinese army launched an offensive, he made a circle on the battlefield. All he did was send telegrams to Washington constantly, and the cables still had a hint of daydreaming.
He claimed: When the Chinese attacked, those US troops who were almost facing extinction did not fight to save their lives, but pinned down 6~8 divisions of Chinese troops, thereby weakening their offensive against the 8th Army.
In this regard, Li Qiwei sneered:
"That's just crazy crazy words made up out of thin air."
At 6:15 a.m. on November 28, Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, telephoned Truman and reported the bad news from MacArthur that "all hope of a localization of the Korean War must now be completely abandoned, and that he is now faced with a situation beyond his control and beyond the strength of his existing army." ”
A discerning person can see at once that MacArthur is shirking responsibility for himself in a special way, not only shirking the responsibility for his previous erroneous judgment and decision, but also shirking the responsibility of relying on his own strength to correct his mistakes and save the crisis in the next step.
According to MacArthur, he himself did not go wrong, and he did everything he should and could do as commander-in-chief of the theater; The U.S. military suffered setbacks on the battlefield not because he untimely launched the so-called "general offensive to end the war before Christmas," but because the damned war situation did not follow the lines he had planned, and further down, it was Washington's decision-makers who had gone wrong in formulating war policy.
On the same day, Truman presided over a meeting of the National Security Council to analyze the situation in North Korea.
At the meeting, Vice President Barkley, who usually speaks seldom, could not help but lash out at the widely circulated reference to a "general offensive to end the war before Christmas," pointing the finger at MacArthur.
He asked causticly:
One wonders if MacArthur actually said something like this? If he did, did he know what the consequences would be? If he knew, why did he say that? How could someone of his stature make such a reckless mistake?
Military sources at the meeting confirmed that MacArthur had indeed said that "soldiers can go home for Christmas," but this was misinterpreted and exaggerated by reporters.
Bradley came out to play a round and said that MacArthur's remarks were for the Chinese, but it was just to show that the United States did not intend to fight the war for a long time.
Barkley is still thrilled, saying it's a ridiculous joke.
Truman interrupted the topic and asked everyone not to take this matter too seriously, so as not to attack MacArthur's prestige in front of the Chinese and tear down his platform.
Secretary of Defense Marshall agreed.
He said:
MacArthur's statement about coming home at Christmas should be seen as "an embarrassing thing that we must somehow avoid mentioning."
2. Continue to "shake the pot" without shame
MacArthur himself, however, did not show any self-reflection, and instead continued to speak openly and privately, "in a hurry to rewrite the history of the previous week, which is undoubtedly the most rapid revision ever made."
First, he defended the unwinnable general offensive, saying that the Chinese army had intended to attack the "United Nations Army" only in the spring of the following year, and that it was his general offensive that "forced the Chinese into battle prematurely" and thus undermined the Chinese's "plan to surprise our positions with overwhelming forces."
The implication is that the general offensive that he hastily launched, which has become a laughing stock, is not only not wrong, but has the magical function of destroying the opponent's strategic plan.
Second, MacArthur declared:
The Korean War has now become a whole new war against a completely new opponent in a completely new situation. In the past, the U.S. military was adversarial against North Korea, but now it is facing an "all-out attack by communist China, reinforced by a large supply of supplies from the Soviet Union."
As a result, "the strategic ideas that were previously very successfully used to guide the fight against the North Korean army will no longer be able to continue to be used against such a powerful country."
That is to say, the defeat of the US military was not a mistake in command, but a change in the objective situation and insufficient forces invested by the United States.
Finally, he claimed:
He himself has made all the efforts within the authority of the theater commander, and the current situation is beyond his control, so he can only turn the contradictions to the table, asking Washington to "reformulate a feasible political decision and strategic plan sufficient to deal with the real problems concerned", and quickly, "because the enemy's strength is growing by the hour, and ours is depleting."
In addition, MacArthur publicly complained that Washington would not allow American planes to cross the Yalu River to bomb northeast China, that it did not agree to a blockade of Chinese mainland with naval and air forces, and that it did not agree to allow Taiwan's Nationalist troops to fight in Korea, calling these restrictions "an unprecedented and huge obstacle" on the road to victory.
MacArthur's above statement caused displeasure in Washington.
Years later, Bradley was still angry when he talked about the situation, saying that MacArthur "treated us like furry children."
Truman believed that MacArthur's approach was "unforgivable."
He accused MacArthur:
At the time, MacArthur himself had said that "there was no danger of Chinese interference" and assured to his face that "if the Chinese Communist Party did get into the new world, he would be able to deal with them easily" and that "even before he launched the unfortunate offensive of November 24, he spoke in a tone that nothing was a problem." But when things don't go that way, he declares to the whole world that he could have won, but we won't let him do what he wants."
However, no matter how much MacArthur tried to defend himself, he could not escape the embarrassment of being a loser.
The crushing defeat on the battlefield marked the downfall of his image as a military genius in the minds of Americans. Domestic newspapers even appeared sarcastic remarks such as "MacArthur shivered in the cold wind like a withered dog's tail grass", which would have been absolutely unthinkable a week ago.
The former famous generals have become the object of ridicule, ridicule, and derogation by everyone for a while, which cannot but be said to be a very ironic tragedy.
3. Walker's "Tropinophobia"
As for how to stabilize the position under the offensive of the Chinese army, MacArthur initially envisaged continuing to maintain the existing two-front combat pattern, allowing the 10th Army on the Eastern Front to take action and provide support to the 8th Army on the Western Front, so as to reduce the pressure on its right flank and avoid paralyzing the entire front due to the breakthrough of the flank.
At the Tokyo Conference on 28 November, he consulted Almond on this, and Wright, deputy chief of staff of the US Forces Command in the Far East, suggested to Almond, commander of the 10th Army, who was still the chief of staff of the command, that the US 3rd Division stationed in Hamhung could be sent across the Taibai Mountains to launch a flank attack on the Chinese troops operating on the right flank of the 8th Army.
Almond was unimpressed, tapping his finger on the map and saying to Wright:
The horizontal road marked on this did not actually exist at all, allowing the 3rd Division to pass through the roadless Taibai Mountains, not to mention the obstacles caused by the bad ice and snow weather, once it encountered the Chinese troops ambushed here, this expedition for the purpose of rescue was bound to become a "gamble of pure luck", and the result was only the burial of the entire 3rd Division.
However, Almond did not say anything to death, but put forward an impossible precondition, saying that if the 8th Army could provide support for the 3rd Division's operations, he could also take the risk of giving it a try.
Walker, who was in a difficult situation and had no time to take care of him, certainly could not promise to provide him with such protection.
In this way, the idea of allowing the 10th Army of the Eastern Front to support the 8th Army of the Western Front in the operation was not a matter of fact.
MacArthur finally decided:
"Immediately shift from offense to defense, and make some adjustments in specific areas according to the changing needs of the situation."
According to the history of the U.S. military, at the Tokyo Conference, Walker was "much more optimistic than people think," and until then, he was quite confident in holding Pyongyang.
However, only two days later, his attitude changed sharply, arguing that Pyongyang must give up and that the 8th Army must withdraw further south, all the way to the area around Seoul.
Here's why:
First, the defeat and fear caused by the failure of the offensive spread rapidly on the Western Front, so that the whole army had no intention of fighting again; Second, the incoming intelligence continues to transmit and amplify such a terrible signal: the Chinese army is engaged in a new and larger build-up, ready to launch a new and greater attack on the retreating 8th Army.
According to the original plan, after the withdrawal of the 8th Army from the Cheongchon River, a new line of defense would be established on the Suchon-Suncheon-Sunchon line, north of Pyongyang.
In fact, the retreat of the US troops, except for the heavy losses of the 2nd Division south of the Yuanchuan River, the 2nd Army Corps of the ROK Army, and the Turkish Brigade, the whole operation was quite smooth.
The 1st Army, which withdrew along the Anju-Sinanju-Suchon route, basically retreated in its entirety, and the 9th Army, which retreated along the Valcheon-Suncheon route, was attacked by the Volunteers and suffered heavy losses, but the division and regimental structure were not disrupted, and they soon disengaged from the Chinese army.
However, at this time, Walker became more and more unconfident, and more and more frustration dominated his mind, and also affected the spirit of the entire army.
In those days, Walker flew around the battlefield in light planes whenever he had time. Flight records indicate that he spent an average of 4 hours a day wandering in the air. On December 1, he flew to Zhennampo, west of Pyongyang, and then turned around and flew eastward, along the line of Sucheon, Suncheon, and Suncheon.
As the plane flew over Suncheon, he saw through the porthole a troop moving south along the road, and some of them raised their heads and waved at the plane.
Walker decided that it was a Chinese army that had penetrated deep into the place without any resistance.
4. Abandoning Pyongyang's intentions
This discovery played a key role in Walker's determination to abandon Pyongyang. Based on this, he believed that the Chinese army had caught up, and the next step was to repeat the old trick of completing the encirclement of the 8th Army in Pyongyang and north of Pyongyang with heavy troops.
According to Walker's estimates, in addition to the 165,000 troops of the 6 armies and 18 divisions that have been identified on the battlefield, there are also a large number of follow-up troops that cannot be verified, with a total strength of 400,000~500,000 people.
At present, the 8th Army still has 3 divisions of the US Army (1st Cavalry Division and the 24th and 25th Divisions), 1 division of the ROK Army (1st Division) and 2 brigades of the British Army. The three divisions of the ROK 2nd Army Corps have all been disabled, and the US 2nd Division and the Turkish Brigade have also suffered heavy losses, and they will not be able to continue fighting until large-scale rearmament is completed.
The other four ROK divisions as reserves could not be put into use immediately on the front line due to lack of training; The rest of the reserve forces are only the 187th Airborne Regiment, which is responsible for the rear garrison, and one battalion each of the Philippines, Thailand, the Netherlands, and France under the "United Nations Forces." Some of them have just completed their training and some have just disembarked in Busan.
Faced with such a comparison of forces, Walker believed that it was impossible to hold the Sucheon-Suncheon-Chengcheon line as originally planned; In order to avoid being surrounded and annihilated by the overwhelmingly superior Chinese army, the 8th Army could only switch from "static defense" to "delayed warfare" in which it fought and retreated.
According to the several "hysteresis lines" he drawn, they moved south in turn. On 2 December, Walker received another intelligence and aerial reconnaissance report that Chinese troops were moving east of Sungcheon and might occupy the line from Sungchon to Yangdeok and form a flank and outflank north of Pyongyang.
Walker immediately decided: cancel the plan to organize a defense on the Suchon-Sunchon-Chengchon line, retreat before the formation of the outflanking deployment of the Chinese army, and Pyongyang would be abandoned.
5. MacArthur's "reason" for escaping
During this period, the generals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also in the Pentagon, struggling to figure out how to save the front that was already on the verge of collapse.
On 29 November, Chief of Naval Operations Sherman suggested at a discussion that MacArthur should be ordered to withdraw the 10th Army on the Eastern Front to a "solid line" to join the 8th Army; The location of this line of defense should be in the narrow strip of the peninsula, the so-called "bee waist".
Bradley and Army Chief of Staff Collins agreed, but because of the military tradition of inconvenient direct intervention in the command authority of the theater commander, they did not give direct orders to MacArthur, but euphemistically "hinted" at him in a suggestive tone:
"What are your plans regarding the operational coordination of the 8th Army and the 10th Army and the positional deployment of the 10th Army - this force has already stood out in our opinion?"
MacArthur's call back made Bradley furious. The theater commander, who treated his boss in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a "hairy child", in turn taught the Joint Chiefs of Staff a lesson:
The 10th Army was now positioned precisely to "geographically threaten" the important supply lines of the Chinese army, attracting up to 8 divisions of Chinese troops, thereby relieving the pressure on the Western Front; If the position of the 10th Army were to be changed, it would face serious difficulties in terms of mountain blockade and logistical supply, so "any idea of linking the 8th Army and the 10th Army to form a continuous line of defense is unrealistic."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff called MacArthur again and simply made it clear:
"The growing distance between the east and west coasts of your forces will give a large number of enemy forces the opportunity to penetrate south between the 8th and 10th armies. We believe that the troops of the 10th Army must withdraw as soon as possible from their now exposed positions.
The forces on the east and west coasts should be fully coordinated in order to prevent a large number of enemies from passing between them, or to encircle one of our forces from the flank. ”
Marshall also personally wrote on this telegram the words "It is not necessary to maintain the existing battlefield on the Eastern Front" to make MacArthur understand that the purpose of allowing the US troops to withdraw on the Eastern Front was to link the troops on the Eastern and Western Fronts in order to establish a new defensive line at the "waist of the bee."
Faced with the deteriorating battlefield situation, MacArthur's mood fell to the bottom for a time.
On 3 December, he wrote a lengthy telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a very depressed tone, describing the situation on the battlefield in a mess and again rejecting the proposal to connect the eastern and western fronts and to establish a new line of defense at the "waist of the peak."
MacArthur stressed that the entry of the Chinese army into the war had fundamentally changed the entire war situation, and that he was now facing 26 divisions of the Chinese army with another 200,000 reserves, and that if the remnants of the North Korean forces that were being reorganized in the rear were to return to combat, the opponent's strength would be further increased. The special terrain of the Korean battlefield has weakened the advantage of the US military in air supremacy; On the other hand, it was of great help to carry out attacks on enemy units by distancing them.
In short, in his opinion, the Chinese army is at its best, while the US military is continuing to fail.
At the end of this long telegram, Bradley read the message to the hearts of Washington policymakers: "It seems that MacArthur does not want to make even a little more effort to resist, and is ready to throw in the towel." ”
Other generals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also felt the same way. They learned from the front reports that after the American troops abandoned Pyongyang, the Chinese army did not try to re-establish contact with the retreating American forces, and there were no signs of a large-scale pursuit.
They asked:
"Why did the 8th Army retreat so quickly and so quickly? Why didn't MacArthur go to North Korea to stabilize Walker and stir up the morale of his troops with his famously stirring speech? ”
Bradley said angrily, "It's shameful. ”
State Department officials were even more complaining.
Deputy Secretary Rusk asked:
"Has the military done its best?" "Can't we fight a good battle in one or two places in North Korea?"
MacArthur, he argued, had apparently lost control of the battlefield and, possibly, of his nerves.
Officials of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a six-hour joint meeting at the Pentagon on and off, and the topics were scattered and they could not figure out a clue. Bradley later recalled that at this meeting, "we were indeed talking about death." As a result of the discussions, everyone "more or less militarily accepted MacArthur's defeatist view of the situation and his plan" and agreed to withdraw American troops to the three beachheads of Hamhung, Seoul-Incheon, and Pusan.
After the meeting, a short telegram was sent to MacArthur in the name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which read: "We consider the preservation of the strength of your troops to be the primary concern at this time. It was agreed that the troops should withdraw to the beachhead. ”
Bradley went to the White House with the draft of the cable, and Truman approved it without changing a word.
(End of text)
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