I'm Tang Tang, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me, talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
At 22 o'clock on November 5, 1950, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, making it clear that the 9th Corps would be under the command of the Volunteer Army Headquarters after entering the DPRK.
At 10 o'clock on the 6th, Peng Dehuai issued tasks and operational arrangements to Song Shilun and Tao Yong, and at the same time, the telegram was sent to the 42nd Army, which was covering the advance of the 9th Corps in the area of Huangcaoling.
1. Peng Dehuai's Changjin Lake Battle Plan
This was the first complete concept put forward by Peng Dehuai for the Eastern Front after he took over the command of the 9th Corps:
With the 1st Marine Division as the main target of annihilation, first seek out and annihilate its two regiments; the battlefield is preset in the area on the east and west sides of Changjin Lake, and it is best to be on the Jiujinli and Changjin lines, and it would be better if it could go a little further north; the tactics were to lure the enemy into depth, combining frontal blocking with flank and rear attacks; and the combat force was mainly composed of the two armies of the 9th Corps, which were assembled in the areas west and north of Changjin Lake respectively, and coordinated with the 42nd Army already there.
Two specific options were initially proposed:
In the first plan, for example, the U.S. Army would advance to Jiujin-ri and its north, and the two corps of the 9th Corps would block it head-on with one division and attack the rear of the seven divisions on the flank; the 42nd Army would penetrate deep into Wulao-ri, 12 kilometers north of Hamxing, to cut off the enemy's retreat and prevent the enemy from reinforcing it.
The second plan is that if the US forces do not advance to the line of Jiujinli and Huangcaoling, the 9th Corps will use one corps to advance east of Changjin Lake and along Xinxing to Wulaoli to cut off the rear route of the US troops; one corps west of Changjin Lake will cooperate with the 42nd Army to annihilate the two regiments of the 1st Marine Division in the Liutanli area and south of it.
These two plans are Peng Dehuai's basic design for the Battle of Changjin Lake.
In his view, in the case of a reckless advance by the US troops, it would be best to put the 1st Marine Division in Jiujin-ri and the area north of it to fight, so as to lengthen its battle line so that the volunteers on the eastern front could carry out a roundabout attack on its flank and rear with heavy troops; if the US troops did not advance rashly, they would move the focus of their attack to Wulao-ri in the south and cut off their retreat route in their far-reaching rear, thus creating a situation in which the main force of the 1st Marine Division would be encircled and annihilated on the east and west sides of Changjin Lake and south of it.
However, the course of the later operation did not go according to this design, the main reasons:
First, after the 1st Marine Division entered the Changjin Lake area, the direction of the main attack changed: it was not to the north but to the west, so that the combat center of gravity of the 9th Corps could only move westward;
Second, due to the needs of operations on the Western Front, the 42nd Army, which was originally fighting on the Eastern Front, did not stay behind to coordinate the actions of the 9th Corps in the Changjin Lake area, but all of them withdrew from the Eastern Front and were transferred to the Tokugawa and Ningyuan battlefields on the Western Front.
From the perspective of the overall situation of the campaign, the 42nd Army's westward transfer further strengthened the combat strength of the Western Front and laid the foundation for smoothly opening the gap in the campaign in the direction of Tokugawa and Ningyuan and winning the battle of the Qingchuan River. However, the army's westward movement was a weakening of the Eastern Front.
The main force of the 42nd Army fought on the Eastern Front after entering Korea, and was already familiar with the local enemy situation and battlefield environment, and occupied a relatively favorable position, which could not only block the enemy from the front, but also pose a threat to the enemy's rear from the flank.
After the army was transferred to the west, its position was hastily handed over to the troops of the 9th Corps, which had just entered the Changjin Lake battlefield, which not only made it difficult to connect the operations, but also forced the 9th Corps to divide its troops to fill the vacancy left by the 42nd Army's westward departure, resulting in the dispersion of the attacking forces.
This point had an impact on the later Battle of Changjin Lake.
2. Wu Ruilin's suggestion
A review of the Volunteer Army's operational documents and telegrams during this period found that the leaders of the 42nd Army had made suggestions at that time on the issue of the army continuing to fight on the Eastern Front.
By 6 November, the 42nd Army had been holding back the enemy in the Huangcaoling area for more than 10 days, with serious troop losses and the position facing the danger of being broken through.
At 6 o'clock on the same day, army commander Wu Ruilin reported to the Zhi Division that the 124th Division "could still hold out for several days" at Huangcaoling, and reported again at 12 o'clock: "Huangcaoling may be broken through."
Wu Ruilin was worried that if the Huangcaoling position was broken through, the entire eastern front defense area would be washed out of order, and if the US rapid troops took advantage of the situation to insert themselves into the river boundary, it would be extremely unfavorable to the entire war situation. Therefore, he decided to transfer his troops to the north and south of the line of Liutan-ri, Jiuzhen (Jiujin-ri), and Guang-ri to occupy positions and continue to block the enemy; at the same time, he suggested that Zhiji transfer troops to control the favorable terrain west of Liutan-ri to guard against the enemy's westward attack.
After receiving Peng Dehuai's telegram order at 10 o'clock on the 6th, Wu Ruilin re-clarified the tasks of his army:
"Lure the enemy deep into the Jiujinli belt, gain time for the main force of the Song Corps to arrive, encircle and annihilate the enemy, and cover the two lines (the line from Yuanwuli to Sanpuli and the line from Liutanli to Wupingli)", and adjusted the deployment accordingly.
On the 9th, Shiji determined that the 42nd Army would move west as soon as the 9th Corps arrived. Peng Dehuai's telegram to the 38th Army and the 125th Division at 4 p.m. on November 9 stated:
"The main force of the 42nd Army also had to assemble in the Ningyuan area around the 20th, and the entire eastern front would be handed over to the Ninth Corps. ”
At this time, Wu Ruilin was still considering the issue of staying in the Changjin Lake area to fight with the 9th Corps.
At 12 o'clock on the 11th, Wu Ruilin called Zhiji and reported his thoughts.
Wu Ruilin believed that in the next battle, the eastern front should first fight Wulao-ri, and the western front should first attack Tokugawa.
Wulaoli is a transportation hub in the north of Hamxing, and the two roads from Hamxing to the north start from Wulaoli, one road leads to Changjin Lake and the other road leads to Zhan Lake. The U.S. military on the Eastern Front attacked from here, and it was from here that the troops were divided to the north.
Wu Ruilin believes:
With the strength of five to six divisions, according to the terrain conditions, the enemy can be annihilated in a day and night, and after the Song Corps succeeds, it will be more mobile to fight on the eastern front.
Here, Wu Ruilin's focus and thinking far beyond the scope of the 42nd Army's own tasks, and his vision has been enlarged to the entire Eastern Front battlefield, as well as the campaign coordination between the eastern and western fronts. His view of Golao-ri as the center of gravity of operations on the Eastern Front is valuable.
On the 15th, the first two divisions of the 9th Corps advanced to the intended area, and the 42nd Army completed the blocking task and was ordered to withdraw from the Eastern Front. Wu Ruilin's idea of staying on the Eastern Front to cooperate with the 9th Corps and fighting the enemy in Wulaoli first failed to materialize.
3. Peng Dehuai's concept of "7 divisions to annihilate the enemy and 3 regiments".
During this period, Peng Dehuai constantly adjusted his operational concept on the Eastern Front in light of changes in the enemy's situation. After 6 November, he continued to generate electricity to give instructions on the operational deployment on the Eastern Front.
According to Song Shilun's account, from the 6th to the 8th, within three days, the 9th Corps received five telegrams from the Zhisi, which were at 10 o'clock on the 6th, 15 o'clock and 18 o'clock on the 7th, and 10 o'clock and 20 o'clock on the 8th.
In a telegram at 10 o'clock on 8 November, Peng Dehuai set the operational target of the 9th Corps as the annihilation of four regiments of the US army, which was to be carried out in two steps: the first step was to destroy two regiments of the 1st Marine Division, and the second step was to annihilate two regiments of the 7th Division.
Peng Dehuai pointed out that "this battle is very important and cannot be delayed", this sentence should be heavy for Song Shilun.
The 9th Corps hastily moved into Korea under the condition that all preparations were insufficient, and this situation had a great impact on the subsequent combat operations, resulting in serious losses.
At the end of the campaign, the troops showed that there was a feeling of complaint, believing that the leaders of the corps were inconsiderate of their subordinates, that they "only cared about the feelings of their superiors and did not care about the feelings of their subordinates," and that they had "personal heroism."
Song Shilun explained:
"At that time, the situation was critical, and if we did not quickly enter the DPRK to fight, an accident would occur on the eastern front, which would affect the fighting on the western front, and it would directly affect the entire Korean war situation. Therefore, for the urgent needs of the situation, our corps had to rush into the DPRK. ”
On 11 November, the 1st Marine Division advanced to Fushengli (near Xiajieyuli), south of Changjin Lake.
Peng Dehuai and others judged that after the 1st Marine Division entered Jiujinli, it might turn to Liutanli and advance westward, which left a large gap between it and the 7th Division, which was conducive to the annihilation of the enemy by the Volunteer Army. For this reason, Peng Dehuai telegraphed Song Shilun at 10:30 on the 12th and reported it to the Central Military Commission.
This telegram caught the attention of Mao Zedong. Although Mao Zedong had previously determined that the 9th Corps would be under the command of Zhi Si after entering the DPRK, and said that "we will not be remote", Mao Zedong was still concerned about the use of the corps. When he saw Peng Dehuai's report on the Eastern Front's operational plan, Mao Zedong believed that the deployment of the 1st Marine Division's annihilation did not meet the requirements for sufficient use of troops, so he sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua on the 12th, pointing out:
The combat strength of the 1st Marine Division of the US Army is said to be the strongest among the US troops, and it seems that it is not enough for our army to encircle and annihilate two of its regiments with four divisions, and one or two divisions should be used as reserves. The 26th Army of the Ninth Corps should be close to the front line, the combat preparations must be sufficient, and the campaign command must be carefully organized.
Later, some people arbitrarily believed that Mao Zedong used his experience in fighting a war of annihilation in the civil war to guide the Chinese Volunteers to fight in Korea, and that when determining the target of annihilating the enemy, he opened his mouth too wide and put forward too high targets.
Peng Dehuai deployed 4 divisions to fight 2 regiments of the US army, but Mao Zedong still felt that he was not sure, thinking that the strength of the army "did not seem to be enough", and he had to add one or two more divisions as reserves.
Therefore, Peng Dehuai also proposed to first use seven divisions to annihilate the enemy's three regiments, which was an adjustment to the previous plan to use four divisions to annihilate the enemy's two regiments, and embodied the spirit of Mao Zedong's instructions to use a sufficient number of troops.
4. Song Shilun's "Three Plans"
In accordance with the instructions of Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, the 9th Corps carried out detailed research and specific arrangements for the combat operations in North Korea.
On 5 November, Song Shilun received a written order from the Central Military Commission that the Ninth Corps should immediately enter Korea and assume combat missions in the direction of Changjin in the Jiangjie, and at the same time received a warrant from Mao Zedong conveyed by Li Tao, director of operations of the Central Military Commission: "Song Shilun should go to Jiangjie to command. ”
In accordance with the needs of the operation in Korea, the headquarters of the 9th Corps immediately organized two command posts, one in the front and one in the rear. Song Shilun personally led the forward command post to set out first so that he could understand the battlefield situation as soon as possible and study and determine the operational arrangements; Deputy Commander Tao Yong and Chief of Staff Qin Jian led the rear command post to organize the troops to advance behind.
Song Shilun judged that there may be three movements after the US military enters the Changjin Lake area:
It may attack westward along Changjin Lake, or attack northward, or it may stop at the Jiujinli line.
In view of these three possibilities, the Corps Front Commander put forward three plans for destroying the enemy at 18 o'clock on the 19th.
The first plan is for example, the 1st Marine Division and two regiments advance to Desili and Xindaili, the 20th Army uses one division to occupy the positions on the east and west sides of the old Changjin and north of the Fengliuli River and Xindaili, blocking the enemy's retreat and attacking the enemy's northern reinforcements; the 27th Army resolutely blocks the US 7th Division with one division in and south of Yunshanli, severs the connection between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Division with one division, and uses one division to attack the enemy in Desili and Shushali.
The second plan is that when the 1st Marine Division's 2 regiments or 1 regiment advances west of Liutanli, the 20th Army will occupy the positions on the east and west sides of the Changjin River and the north of the Fengliuli River and Xindaili with one division, and the main forces of the army will concentrate and first annihilate the enemy at Jiujinli and Liutanli; Occupy positions between Fengliuli, block the western reinforcement of the US 7th Division and block the eastward escape of the 1st Marine Division, and use the main force of 1 division to encircle and annihilate the enemy in Jiujinri and its north, and after succeeding, attack the reinforcements of the 1st Marine Division or a part of the 7th Division as appropriate.
The third plan is to concentrate the 20th and 27th Armies and the 2nd Marine Division, which are to destroy the two regiments of the 1st Marine Division, in the area of Jiujinli and Gutushui (i.e., Gutushui). The 20th Army seized the position near Huangcaoling with one division south of Gutushui, and the main force, except for a small part of the enemy surrounding Xiajieyuli, first annihilated the enemy between Gutushui and Shangpingli, and then attacked Yunshanli and the area south of it, so as to seize the 7th Division of the US Army, and annihilate the enemy at Xindaili and Jiujinli, and then annihilate the 1st Marine Division and a part of the 7th Division after success.
The basic determination is to "seek to annihilate two regiments of the 1st US Army Division, clamp down on the 2 regiments of the 7th US Division, and strive to annihilate one regiment."
The above plan is based on a prediction of the direction of the US military's actions, and whether the US military will act as expected depends on the actual situation.
As of November 24, the 9th Corps had learned of the following enemy situation:
The 26th Regiment of the ROK Army's 3rd Division advanced to Shecang-ri in advance and possibly attacked Cangli and New Delhi in order to cooperate with the 1st Marine Division; the vanguard of the 1st Marine Division advanced to the line of Xindai-ri and Xinxing-ri in the east of Changjin Lake and was advancing toward Liutan-ri in the west of Huxi; the main force of the 7th Division of the US Army advanced to Hyesan-ri, and its 31st Regiment was still in the area of Guangda-ri and Yuanfeng-ri northeast of Changjin Lake and began to attack northward by separate routes.
At 20 o'clock on the same day, the 9th Corps issued a combat deployment telegram, determining:
With the Xiajieyuli, Liutanli, and Xinxingli areas on the east, west, and south sides of Changjin Lake as the main battlefields for annihilating the enemy, "concentrate the main forces of our 20th Army (owed to the 59th Division) and the 27th Army, and first annihilate the main forces of the 1st US Army Division in Xiajieyuli, Xindaili, Jiujin, Liutan, and Xinxingli, and after succeeding, annihilate the 31st Regiment of the 7th US Division and the reinforcements of the 1st US Army Division."
5. Three postponements of the offensive launch time
At 17:30 on the 25th, Song Shilun reported to the Zhi Division: All armies have adjusted their deployment according to the order.
At 1 o'clock on the 26th, Song Shilun and Tao Yong telegraphed the 27th and 20th armies to make further adjustments to the operational deployment, pointing out:
If the enemy still did not occupy Liutan-ri at 16 o'clock on the same day, the troops of the 27th Army, which had originally planned to attack Liutan-ri, were changed to attack the enemy in and around Surabaya-ri (south of Liutan-ri), and after succeeding, they advanced to Sinsing-ri, and the troops originally scheduled to monitor the enemy at Jiujin-ri were changed to divide and encircle the enemy in Neidongzhi, and the main force of the 59th Division of the 20th Army was changed to seize the advantageous positions in Xixing-ri and its vicinity.
If the enemy enters and occupies Liutanli, it will still be carried out according to the 20 o'clock on the 23rd, and all departments can act according to the changes in the situation on the spot. The time of the start of the operation has been changed three times.
At first, Peng Dehuai proposed that the second battle could be considered on the Eastern Front first. On November 20, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua telegraphed to Song Shilun that the Western Front planned to launch a counterattack on the evening of the 25th, and when the Eastern Front counterattack would be launched.
"If the two regiments (5th Regiment and 7th Regiment) of the American Army (5th Regiment and 7th Regiment) of the Eastern Front advance to Xiajieyuli and Gutushui do not advance again, can your corps use the main force to encircle the enemy on the line and annihilate it on the night of the 24th or 25th, otherwise the enemy on the Eastern Front may quickly retreat after the first attack on the Western Front is successful. ”
This shows that before the launch of the second campaign, Peng Dehuai had considered the linkage between the combat operations on the eastern and western fronts.
At the time, he had a concern:
If the Western Front had been attacked first and succeeded, the enemy on the Eastern Front would have retreated quickly, and the intended goal of destroying the enemy would not have been achieved. Therefore, he once imagined that the battle on the Eastern Front could start a day earlier on the 24th, or it could be launched at the same time as the Western Front on the 25th, and the specific time was left to Song Shilun's discretion.
As a matter of fact, at this time, the eastern and western fronts of the "United Nations Army" were completely isolated, and a considerable gap appeared in the junction of the two lines, turning the two fronts into two independent battlefields.
Under such circumstances, when an operation on the Eastern Front is launched does not necessarily have to be synchronized with the Western Front, and it is entirely possible to make its own arrangements according to the situation on the ground.
Judging from the battlefield situation, on the one hand, because the enemy's offensive on the Western Front was relatively fast, the enemy had already entered the planned combat area of the People's Volunteers before the enemy on the Eastern Front, and could no longer wait; on the other hand, the Ninth Corps hastily entered Korea, and until the Western Front began, the various units of the Corps had not yet moved in place, and it was really difficult to match the time for launching the operation with the Western Front, still less to start the battle before the Western Front.
Therefore, at the request of Song Shilun, Peng Dehuai agreed to postpone the launch of the Eastern Front operation.
The first postponement was changed from the first launch of the eastern front to the simultaneous launch of the east and west lines on the 25th.
The second postponement postponed the launch of the attack on the Eastern Front from the 25th to the 26th.
At 17:10 on the 21st, Song Shilun reported to the Zhisi: The 20th Army could only enter the predetermined position on the evening of the 22nd, and after arriving, it should have two days and nights to rest, mobilize, and complete various preparations, and two days and nights should also advance from its current position to the rear of the enemy's flank, so "the battle can only be launched on the evening of the 26th at the earliest."
Chiji approved and agreed. Song Shilun then set the time of the attack as 16:30 on November 26.
The third delay was due to problems in the process of advancing and deploying the troops of the 20th Army, and the 58th Division, which was responsible for the task of attacking and destroying Xiajieyuli, was blocked by a large mountain during its advance, and the road was closed by deep snow, so it could not pass, so it had to make a detour and could not reach the starting position of the attack on time. Song Shilun had no choice but to ask Shiji again for permission to postpone the launch of the attack until 24 o'clock on the 27th.
At 14 o'clock on the 26th, two and a half hours before the scheduled launch of the attack, the 9th Corps issued an order to "attack the 1st Army Division of the United States and start the battle on the evening of the 27th." ”
In hindsight, if the counterattack on the Eastern Front had been postponed for one or two days, and the US forces had continued to move forward for a certain distance, so that their offensive formation would have been longer and more dispersed, and it might have been easier to fight; at the same time, it would have been possible to shorten the advance distance of the troops of the Ninth Corps, so that more combat forces could be assembled on the battlefield, and greater superiority in forces would have been formed, and more adequate combat preparations would have been made, and the counterattack would have been more effective.
Of course, this is just an afterthought.
Judging from the actual situation on the battlefield at that time, it was not an easy thing to do to lure the enemy into the 1st Marine Division.
On November 11, after the US 10th Army resumed its offensive in the Changjin Lake area, the 1st Marine Division continued to advance slowly at a "snail" pace, and it was not until the 24th that it fully entered the Changjin Lake area.
Divisional Commander Smith was calm and cautious, he did not have the optimistic optimism of MacArthur and Almond, on the contrary, he was hesitant to let the Marines go north in such harsh terrain and climatic conditions.
He believes that a more reasonable offensive route for the Marine Corps would be to advance along the northeastern coast, where it can receive all kinds of support from the sea and facilitate the use of the amphibious encirclement attack tactics that the Marine Corps is best at.
And now, this Marine Division is being sent to the high mountains and deep valleys far from the coast, and is being used as an ordinary mountain unit, with its flanks exposed and the rear empty, which cannot but arouse his dissatisfaction and passive resistance. Under his control, the 1st Marine Division repeatedly slowed down its advance in order to avoid sinking too deep and too far into the places where it was reluctant to fight.
On November 25, the Volunteer Army launched a counterattack on the Western Front. MacArthur demanded that Almond take immediate action to support the 8th Army in the operation. Almond set the 1st Marine Division's offensive for 26 November, but had to postpone it until 27 November because preparations for the attack were not completed.
In this way, both the Chinese and American armies set the time for the offensive on the Eastern Front to be launched on November 27, with the only difference being that the US offensive was scheduled to be launched early that morning, while the time for the Chinese Volunteers to launch the offensive was set for the evening of that day.
(End of text)
If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply as soon as possible.