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In the smoky postwar international political arena, the interactions between the two national leaders, Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek, were fraught with complexity. The long river of history carries countless "ifs", but for Chiang Kai-shek, these "ifs" are not just fictitious historical assumptions, they are deep regret and unwillingness.
In his reflections in his later years, perhaps an unanswered question often resounds: Was Stalin a "liar" and would history have been different if Chiang Kai-shek had not heeded Stalin's advice?
Background of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance
On August 14, 1945, the government of the Republic of China and the Soviet Union formally signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in Moscow. This event took place near the end of World War II, just as the Soviet Red Army was preparing to enter the Japanese-occupied northeastern regions of China.
The signing ceremony was held in the building of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the teams of representatives of the two sides exchanged texts and opinions in a tense and serious atmosphere. The signing of the treaty was an important moment in the signing of the treaty, led by then-Foreign Minister Soong Tzu-wen, an experienced diplomat.
The Soviet side was represented by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, who was known for his tough diplomatic style. A draft of the treaty was placed on the table, and the two diplomats exchanged texts after reviewing the documents and confirming that the terms were correct.
The main elements of the treaty included the Soviet Union's commitment of military assistance to China, which was crucial for China at that time, as it was trying to recover from a long period of Japanese aggression. Specifically, the Soviet Union promised to provide military assistance, including weapons and military advisers, if necessary, to help China regain control of the Northeast.
In addition, the parties agreed to cooperate in the post-war economic reconstruction, and the USSR would provide China with the necessary economic assistance and technical support. Even more sensitive is the content of the treaty on the independence of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union has always supported the independence movement of Outer Mongolia, while China has reservations about the sovereignty of Outer Mongolia due to historical and geographical factors.
It was clearly mentioned in the treaty that the USSR recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia and would formalize its independent status after a referendum. To this end, the two sides agreed to hold a referendum in Outer Mongolia at an appropriate time to decide whether it would become an independent state.
Controversy over the independence of Outer Mongolia
After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the question of the border for the independence of Outer Mongolia became an unresolved issue in future negotiations. Although the treaty's clause on the independence of Outer Mongolia is politically significant, the ambiguity of its borders poses considerable challenges to diplomatic relations between the two sides in the future.
In the text of the August 1945 treaty, the independence of Outer Mongolia was conditioned on "its present borders as its boundaries", which only formally confirmed the sovereign independence of Outer Mongolia, but did not specify the specific direction and key details of the borders. This formulation actually leaves room for future interpretation and adjustment by both sides, and also foreshadows a possible border dispute.
During the signing process, the discussion of the border by representatives of both sides appeared several times in closed-door meetings.
Although the minutes of the meeting are not fully public, according to reliable sources, both sides tried to protect their national interests during the discussions, with the Soviet side hoping to leave room for possible future geopolitical activity through vague border descriptions, while the Chinese side showed caution in seeking to guarantee the territorial integrity of the country.
Soon after the treaty was signed, the Chinese side began to organize a team of experts to study the historical boundaries and Line of Actual Control of Outer Mongolia, hoping to have a basis for detailed negotiations in the future. These experts gathered from historical documents, maps, and previous border agreements in an attempt to construct a plausible border claim.
At the same time, the Soviet Union did not stop the expansion of its influence in Outer Mongolia. The Soviet government's support for the establishment of a sound defense and administrative system in Outer Mongolia after the signing of the treaty was clearly preparing for the long-term independence of Outer Mongolia. This Soviet action, while based in part on its defense of Japan, also reflected the Soviet Union's desire to maintain strong influence in the region.
In the following years, China and the Soviet Union held several rounds of negotiations on the border issue of Outer Mongolia. These negotiations tend to revolve around the specific definition of the border, the historical basis for the border line, and the security needs of both sides. Each round of negotiations revolved around specific maps, with experts from both sides attempting to interpret and justify their respective historical records and geographical indications.
This ongoing uncertainty greatly affected the stability of Sino-Soviet relations. Over time, the vague formulations that were originally used in the treaty for political and strategic considerations began to manifest their complexity and risk. Against the backdrop of international politics, this border issue not only affects the bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union, but also affects the strategic pattern of the entire East Asian region.
Despite many negotiations and exchanges, the two sides have never been able to reach an agreement on the specific demarcation of the border.
Chiang Kai-shek's Diplomatic Strategies and Challenges
Despite the ostensible recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Chiang Kai-shek and his government still regarded Outer Mongolia as part of Chinese territory. In Chiang Kai-shek's view, the issue of Outer Mongolia was not just a territorial issue, but also a major diplomatic issue involving national sovereignty and international status.
In order to cope with the expansion and influence of the Soviet Union, Chiang Kai-shek decided to engage in a series of diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union, with the aim of maintaining superficially friendly relations while actually gaining more favorable conditions and support for China.
The Nationalist Government sent a group of diplomats and experts to the Soviet Union to discuss with Soviet officials on a range of issues, including the independence of Outer Mongolia and military and political arrangements in northeastern China and Xinjiang.
During the negotiation process, the interaction between the two sides is complex and delicate. During the discussions, the Chinese delegation emphasized the unity and territorial integrity of the Chinese nation and tried to get the Soviet side to understand and support the Chinese government's sovereignty claims over these lost territories.
At the same time, the Chinese side also tried its best to show its willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in other regions, such as proposing cooperation plans in economic reconstruction and technological exchanges, in order to balance and ease the differences between the two sides on sensitive issues.
In these diplomatic activities, the Nationalist Government also emphasized the one-China policy, that is, all Chinese territories, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Outer Mongolia, should be an inalienable part of China.
Although this policy received some international support, in the specific negotiations with the Soviet Union, Chiang Kai-shek was clear that this position could hardly be fully supported by the Soviet Union, especially since the Soviet Union had already established a solid political and military influence in Outer Mongolia.
Stalin's promises and betrayals
As the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party intensified, the Nationalist government's grip on Chinese mainland weakened. Especially in the two strategic locations of Northeast China and Xinjiang, the challenges faced by the Nationalist Government are particularly severe. As China's industrial center, Northeast China has always been the focus of contention between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist Party.
Due to its geographical importance and abundant natural resources, Xinjiang has also become a key area for bipartisan contention. Against this background, the Nationalist Government placed some of the blame on the Soviet Union, arguing that the Soviet Union, through its political and military influence in the region, indirectly supported the Chinese Communist Party and exacerbated the unfavorable situation of the Nationalist Government.
In the Northeast, although Stalin promised to withdraw Soviet troops after the war, in reality the Soviet troops did not withdraw completely, but to some extent helped the Chinese Communist Party to establish control. The Soviet army dismantled a large number of industrial facilities and shipped them back to the Soviet Union before evacuating, severely damaging the local economic base while also leaving a political and military environment favorable to the Communists.
In Xinjiang, the Soviet Union's influence was equally significant, and by supporting local ethnic separatist forces, the Soviet Union weakened the authority of the Nationalist government to some extent, complicating the political situation in the region. Faced with these challenges, in August 1949, the Nationalist Government decided to take action in the international arena and submitted a "bill against the Soviet Union" to the United Nations General Assembly.
The move was intended to expose the Soviet Union's role in the Northeast and its support for the Chinese Communist Party, and to try to change the situation through pressure from the international community.
In the documents submitted to the United Nations, the Nationalist Government listed in detail the various acts of the Soviet Union in violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and pointed out in particular that the Soviet Union's military operations in Northeast China and its support for the Chinese Communist Party directly violated the spirit of the Treaty and undermined the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nationalist Government.
This action of the Nationalist Government caused a certain amount of international attention, and many countries expressed concern about the behavior of the Soviet Union in East Asia. In the years that followed, the Nationalist Government continued to articulate its position to UN member states in an attempt to win more international support.
Finally, in 1952, after the tireless efforts of the Nationalist Government and extensive diplomatic activities, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 505, which formally condemned the Soviet Union's actions on the Northeast issue and its breach of contract in support of the Chinese Communist Party.
The failure of the treaty and the reflection of the national government
In the early 1950s, the Chiang Kai-shek government declared the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and all its related agreements null and void, and reaffirmed that it no longer recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia. This move was of great significance in international law, as it showed that Chiang Kai-shek's government still insisted on the territorial integrity of China and did not recognize the status of Outer Mongolia as an independent state.
This decision also reflects the entrenched position of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, although in practice they have lost the ability to have a significant impact on the international standing of Outer Mongolia in the international arena. In October 1961, Outer Mongolia's international status was further consolidated. With the strong support of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia was officially admitted as a member of the United Nations.
This event is regarded internationally as the final confirmation of Outer Mongolia's independent status, and it is also an important change in the global political map during the Cold War. The accession of Outer Mongolia not only provided formal recognition of the country's legal and political status internationally, but also marked the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia.
For Chiang Kai-shek's government, Outer Mongolia's membership in the United Nations was a major diplomatic setback. This incident further shows that although the Nationalist Government has a firm political stance and international policy on Taiwan, its ability to influence international decision-making and the regional political landscape has been greatly weakened.
The Nationalist Government could only continue to assert its claim to China's reunification on the island of Taiwan while witnessing the gradual decline of its influence in the international arena.
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Resources:
- Yan Shengju.On the process and influence of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance[J].Siberian Studies,2007,34(2):78-80