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At the end of November 1950, before the launch of the Second Campaign, Peng Dehuai proposed that the position of the commander should be higher, and said that he would go to the front line to directly command the 38th and 42nd armies, which were tasked with opening the gap in the campaign.
As soon as this remark came out, Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Han Xianchu, and Xie Fang all expressed their opposition. They believed that Peng Dehuai, as the commander of the Volunteer Army, could not leave his post at the headquarters under any circumstances.
Although Peng Dehuai repeatedly insisted, everyone's opinion was even more resolute, unanimously stressing that the party Central Committee had issued an order to the party committee of the Chinese People's Volunteers, demanding that Peng Dehuai's absolute safety must be guaranteed.
The three deputy commanders, Deng, Hong, and Han, all asked to go to the front line to command on behalf of Peng Dehuai, and it was finally decided that Han Xianchu would go to the military headquarters of the 38th Army to represent Peng Dehuai and command the operations of the 38th and 42nd armies in a unified manner.
1. The Tokugawa battle
After the start of the "MacArthur General Offensive," the "United Nations Army" on the Western Front stepped step by step into the preset battlefield of the Volunteers, and its formation was short in depth, its forces were scattered, its flanks were exposed, and its rear was empty, and it was unaware of the Volunteers' counteroffensive attempt.
The 3 divisions of the ROK Army's 2nd Army Corps, which advanced to the Tokugawa and Nyeongwon areas, were located on the right flank of the 8th Army in a rear triangle configuration:
The 7th Division was on the left, moving in the direction of Tokugawa, and the 8th Division was on the right, moving in the direction of Ninen:
The 6th Division followed as a reserve. Since this part of the ROK army had just been dealt a heavy blow by the Volunteer Army in the first battle, its advance was slower than that of the other units of the "United Nations Army" on the left and center, and it was also ignorant of the danger ahead.
On the evening of November 25, the 38th and 42nd armies launched a counterattack at the same time.
The 38th Army attacked and annihilated the 7th Division of the ROK Army in the Tokugawa area. At this time, the division of the Korean army was attacking and advancing in the direction of Myohyangsan and Heecheon, and its three regiments were set out in one line, leaving only one battalion in Tokugawa as a reserve. After on-the-spot reconnaissance, the 38th Army determined the location of the junction of the 7th and 8th divisions of the ROK Army, and found out the situation of the Datong Jiangtu involvement. Army Commander Liang Xingchu and Political Commissar Liu Xingyuan decided to adopt the tactics of combining a roundabout flank and a frontal attack to encircle and annihilate the 7th Division.
After the battle was launched, the 112th Division, which had just completed the task of luring the enemy and had not had time to rest, crossed the Brother Peak at an altitude of 1,200 meters overnight, and plunged into Tokugawa from the enemy's left flank.
The 113th Division made a detour from the enemy's right flank to the west of Tokugawa, using the underwater bridge that had been discovered in advance, braving the icy and biting water of the river to wade through the Datong River, fighting and advancing in a fighting marching posture, defeating many groups of enemies along the way, and advancing to the south of Tokugawa at 8 o'clock on the 26th, cutting off the enemy contact between Tokugawa and Ninto and the enemy's southern retreat route from Tokugawa.
Both forces returned to their positions as planned, completing the encirclement of Tokugawa.
While the flanks were roundabout, the 114th Division, which was responsible for the frontal attack, descended from the north and approached Tokugawa, and was suddenly blocked by heavy enemy artillery fire in the course of its advance.
After interrogation, it was ascertained that the source of the artillery fire was a howitzer position north of Shapingli. Division Commander Zhai Zhongyu immediately ordered the 341st Regiment to advance lightly with one battalion, penetrated into the depth from the flank, and rushed into the artillery position on the morning of the 26th, completely annihilating the 15th howitzer battalion of the ROK army, capturing 11 105-mm howitzers and more than 50 automobiles, and removing the threat of enemy artillery fire. At 11 o'clock, the 114th Division advanced to the line of Beidou Shangdong and Mali to Tokugawa and compressed the enemy to the Tokugawa area.
According to the plan, the general attack on Tokugawa was to be launched on the evening of the 26th, and because it was found that the enemy of Tokugawa showed signs of breaking through, in order to prevent the enemy from escaping, Liang Xingchu decided to launch an attack in advance and take Tokugawa on the same day.
After the general offensive was launched, the besieged Korean army was in great chaos. At 15 o'clock on the 26th, under the cover of 12 US planes, about 5,000 people from the headquarters of the 7th Division and the remnants of the two regiments broke through to the southwest in three ways, and were intercepted by the 112th and 113th divisions.
For a time, skirmishes with stragglers of the ROK army took place at the locations of the command posts. By 19 o'clock on the 26th, most of the besieged enemy had been annihilated.
The battle of Tokugawa lasted one day and night, and all units of the 38th Army advanced 50~70 kilometers respectively, killing and wounding 1,041 enemies, capturing 2,087 enemies, and capturing 156 guns, 218 automobiles, and 33 radio stations. All seven U.S. advisers stationed in the division were taken prisoner.
It is worth mentioning that there is a special component in the combat group of the 38th Army: a reconnaissance detachment consisting of 2 reconnaissance companies and 2 engineer platoons.
The detachment covertly infiltrated the enemy's rear before the battle was launched, blew up the Wulingli Bridge southwest of Tokugawa within the specified time, and closed the passage for the enemy to flee from the south to the north, thus playing an important role in ensuring the victory of the battle.
2. Ningyuan fights
The battle of the 42nd Army to encircle and annihilate the enemy in Ningyuan began at the same time.
The main forces of the army (the 124th and 126th Divisions) began to move to the battlefield on the Western Front on November 16 after completing the tasks of blocking Huangcaoling and Zhanling on the Eastern Front. At that time, it was snowing heavily and the fog was thick, and US planes could not be dispatched for three consecutive days. Taking advantage of this bad weather, the 42nd Army marched day and night, crossed the Wolf Forest Mountains, drove more than 200 kilometers, and advanced to the Jiucangli area in the northeast of Ningyuan on the 20th. The 125th Division, which was previously attached to the 38th Army, was also returned to the army.
The operational deployment of the 42nd Army was similar to that of the 38th Army, both frontal assaults and flank attacks.
The 125th Division was responsible for the frontal attack, which made a breakthrough to Ningyuan from the north, and the 124th and 126th Divisions were responsible for the flank detour, which made a detour from the northeast to the south of Ningyuan. The difference was that the 38th Army made a detour from two directions with 2 divisions, and finally formed a pincer encirclement behind the enemy's flank, while the 2 divisions of the 42nd Army acted in the same direction, one with an inner detour and one with an outer detour, forming a double encirclement behind the enemy's flank.
According to the pre-battle arrangement, after the roundabout troops entered the predetermined position, the main force of the army immediately turned to attack northward, and coordinated with the frontal attack force to annihilate the enemy in Ningyuan City; at the same time, cut off the enemy's retreat route with one part and block the enemy's northern reinforcements, and capture Monsan when conditions permitted.
In order to strengthen the command of the roundabout troops, Commander Wu Ruilin decided that Hu Jicheng, deputy commander of the army, would follow the 124th Division and unify the command of the roundabout operations of the 124th and 126th Divisions. Wu Ruilin himself and political commissar Zhou Biao led the army command post to follow up after the 125th Division. During the attack on Ningyuan, the army command post was located north of Dupingli.
The night before the battle was launched, Han Xianchu came to the command post of the 42nd Army, listened to Wu Ruilin's report on the operational deployment in person, and conveyed Peng Dehuai's requirements for the army:
This battle will destroy more enemies than the last one, and cooperate with other troops to fight a more beautiful battle of annihilation.
At 12 o'clock on the 24th, the 42nd Army issued an attack deployment order, and the initial goal was to "first destroy the enemy in Ningyuan and Monsan, and then completely destroy the enemy in Tokugawa and block the enemy in Beicang."
At 16:30 on the same day, according to Han Xianchu's instructions, the target was focused on the "total annihilation of the puppet Eighth Division", and at the same time it was clear:
The 124th and 125th Divisions all participated in the attack on Ningyuan, and the 126th Division, except for one regiment as the second echelon of the 124th Division, was ready to participate in the attack on Ningyuan, and the other two regiments entered the predetermined position to block the enemy from the north and the west.
At this time, the Korean army in the Ningyuan area had already noticed that the Volunteer Army was making a detour to its flank, and hurriedly contracted its defense, except for one to hold the flank defense line, and the main force retreated to Monsan. The 125th Division, which was responsible for the frontal attack, took advantage of the confusion that occurred when the enemy adjusted its deployment, and suddenly launched an attack in three directions.
The 374th Regiment slashed into the gap between the enemy's defense lines, plunged directly into the city of Ningyuan, and knocked out a regimental command post of the South Korean army in a fierce street battle. The Korean army in the city lost command and immediately dispersed. Other units of the 125th Division took advantage of the situation to launch a fierce attack and annihilated most of the enemy north of Ningyuan.
Unfortunately, due to the detour of the troops on the flanks and rear, the time was delayed due to the entanglement with the enemy on the way, and they could not reach the concealed assembly position before dawn on the 24th, thus revealing their operational intentions.
In the course of the attack, the 376th Regiment of the 126th Division was repeatedly blocked by the enemy, mishandled the situation, and delayed the time, neither opening up a way for the 124th Division to advance on time and ensuring that it would quickly attack Ningyuan, nor did it arrive at the designated blocking position on time, causing the enemy to flee.
After the enemy in Ningyuan was defeated, the 124th Division falsely reported that the enemy was fleeing in the southeast direction (in fact, the enemy was still in Nanzhongli in the division's combat area), and appeased the fatigue of the troops, and failed to actively organize a search and suppression with a part of the army in time to pursue and destroy the remnants of the enemy, so that the 1st Division of the 8th Division of the ROK Army was able to escape through the net. The 42nd Army concluded after the war that the main force of the 8th Division could not be completely annihilated in this battle, and the 124th Division should bear the main responsibility.
At dawn on the 26th, the battle of Ningyuan ended. When the 42nd Army captured Ningyuan, it was reported that most of the 8th Division of the ROK Army had been annihilated, but in fact it only defeated and scattered the division, and most of the personnel were broken into pieces, scattered and evacuated to the predetermined location, and then gathered and assembled, or hid in valleys, dense forests, and caves, looking for opportunities to disrupt the attack. The command post of the 124th Division was attacked and harassed by the enemy three times, and more than a dozen people were killed or wounded.
3. The 40th Army divided the battle between the South Korean and American forces
When the 38th and 42nd armies launched an attack on the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions, the 40th Army, which was tasked with supporting and supporting the Tokugawa direction, also launched an attack on the US 2nd Division, cutting off the ROK 2nd Army Corps from the US forces on the western flank.
According to the deployment of the Zhisi, the 40th Army should move to Sumin-dong, Xinxing-dong and the area north of the east bank of the Cheongchon River on the night of the 24th, and complete the assembly at dawn on the 26th, except for a division to take over the defense of the 112th Division of the 38th Army north of Xinxingdong, the main force of the army cooperated with the 38th and 42nd armies to attack the enemy at Longmensan and Pauriling on the evening of the 26th, and then inserted into Xichang, 10 kilometers west of Tokugawa, to block the enemy's western or northern reinforcements.
However, just as the 40th Army began to operate according to this deployment, the main force of the 2nd Division of the US Army had already taken the lead in occupying the line of Sumin-dong and Xinxing-dong, blocking the army's way.
In response to this situation, Han Xianchu ordered the 40th Army to insert a section through Duri Ridge to the west warehouse, and the main force counterattacked from the front. After receiving the order, Wen Yucheng quickly revised his operational arrangements and decided to use the 119th Division to attack and annihilate the enemy at Sumindong and Yongshuidong, and after succeeding, he would advance to Xicang through Duililing and Jiuzhengli, "in order to fight side by side with the 112th Division and divide the enemy between Tokugawa and Yuanchuan"; the 118th Division would encircle and annihilate the enemy at Xinxingdong in the south through Huaping Station; and the 120th Division would force the Qingchuan River from the vicinity of Yongyuan-ri with one regiment, and first capture Yulongpu and control the first-line high ground on Yongsan Face." Block the enemy reinforcements from the course to Xinxingdong, and block the enemy who escapes from Xinxingdong, and cooperate with the 118th Division to annihilate the enemy at Xinxingdong", and use a part of "feints to clamp the enemy on the course".
The attack was launched on the night of the 25th. The 118th Division fought fiercely with the 9th Regiment of the U.S. Army at Sinsing-dong, and the 119th Division fought fiercely with the 38th Regiment of the U.S. Army at Somin-dong, both of which were fought quite hard.
In the Xinxingdong area, the strength of the 9th Regiment of the U.S. Army was distributed on both sides of the Cheongchon River, with two battalions fortified on the first ridgeline on the west bank, and the rest of the troops lined up along the line of the Baining River, a tributary of the Cheongcheon River. Behind the regiment was the 23rd Regiment, separated by only 3 kilometers, and it could be supported by fire from 3 artillery battalions during the operation.
The 118th Division launched an attack with two regiments against the enemy at Sinseung-dong. That night, only the outlying positions were captured, and the battle could not be resolved. The next day, the fighting intensified, and the attacking troops "finally suffered heavy casualties under the enemy's artillery and air tank attacks, and most of the two US battalions broke through the encirclement and fled south."
In order to cooperate with the battle of Xinxingdong, the 4 companies of the 359th Regiment of the 120th Division braved the severe cold and risked death to cross the Qingchuan River more than 1 meter deep despite the enemy's artillery fire. The officers and men of the five platoons that rushed to the front were all killed, and the follow-up troops advanced without retreating, stubbornly assaulted, and finally broke through the Jiangfang position. After capturing Yulongpu, they stubbornly held on here, preventing the enemy from fleeing from the north and south, and all the officers and men of the two platoons were killed.
According to the commander of the 359th Regiment, more than 500 enemy soldiers were killed, wounded and captured during the day and night, and more than 800 people were killed or wounded in the whole regiment. The 118th Division was inserted southeast of Xinxingdong, and it was quiet for a quiet day, because the 359th Regiment smashed the enemy's artillery positions and attracted the enemy's air force and infantry.
The regiment's tenacious fighting spirit was commended by the 40th Army and the Volunteer Army Headquarters, saying that it was "resolute and tenacious, and can be a model for the whole army."
In the area of Sumin-dong and Yongshui-dong, the 119th Division launched an attack on the 38th Regiment of the US Army, killing and wounding more than 300 enemies and capturing more than 40 enemies at the cost of more than 500 casualties.
After the war, the division summed up the lessons and said that the battle:
First, it failed to form a tight encirclement; second, after dividing the enemy, it was believed that the enemy had lost its combat team and could not finally solve the problem; third, when encountering the enemy's tanks, they concentrated all their energies on dealing with the tanks, which on the contrary caused the enemy's infantry to take advantage of the gap; fourth, the infantry firepower was weak, and the enemy was mostly automatic firearms, so they could not suppress the enemy when they approached, so they were killed and wounded by the enemy a lot.
He threw his troops out too early to capture prisoners, so that when he later encountered a group of enemies, he did not have the 40th Army in his hands to fight on the banks of the Qingchuan River, and although he failed to complete the scheduled interspersed mission, his tenacious operation still effectively contained the 2nd Division of the US Army, making it unable to come to the east, and played a supporting role in the battles of Tokugawa and Ningyuan.
The battle between Tokugawa and Ninen, in terms of the number of enemies destroyed, can hardly be called a great victory.
The 7th and 8th Divisions of the 2nd Army Corps of the ROK Army were confirmed to be "mostly annihilated" at that time, and the Americans also said that this ROK unit "has completely disappeared", but in the end, the total number of killed, wounded and captured enemies was only more than 5,000.
According to the war history of the ROK army, the personnel of these two divisions are about 10,000, and the losses account for only a quarter of their total strength based on the loss of more than 5,000 people. However, from the perspective of the overall battle, the battles of Tokugawa and Ninenyuan were of great significance. It opened a gap on the flank of the 8th Army's front, exposing the flank of the main force of the US army on the Western Front in front of the attack force of the Volunteers, and creating a favorable situation for the Volunteers to carry out the flank attack and divide the encirclement and annihilate in the next step.
4, Walker leaked "horse's feet"
After the 38th and 42nd armies achieved breakthroughs in the Tokugawa and Ningyuan directions, the initiative on the battlefield was in the hands of the volunteers.
At first, the U.S. military was unpredictable about the intentions of the volunteers to counterattack. Neither Walker nor his staff expected the opponent to launch a full-front counteroffensive. They judged that the Chinese troops confronting the 8th Army were no more than 100,000 men, and that the nature of their actions was nothing more than a "local counterattack" in the overall defense.
So, when the news of the blow to the 2nd Army of the South Korean Army came, Walker was relatively calm. Although the right flank of the 8th Army had been torn open a gap, Walker was not aware of the great danger it contained. At that time, he was still thinking about how to keep the army group's front intact so that he could continue to attack northward after a little tidying up.
He was also a little worried about the possibility that the Chinese army might launch a roundabout attack on the flank of the Eighth Army from the northeast to the west and south through this opening, but he also believed that as long as the US troops with strong firepower and mobility were transferred, this opening could still be blocked.
To this end, he took two contingency measures:
The first is to transfer the 1st Cavalry Division of the Group Army Reserve located in Junyuli to the east of Shunchuan and establish a defensive position along the Shunchuan-Monsan road to block the detour route of the Chinese army;
The second was to instruct the commander of the 9th Army, Kurt, to send troops to recover Tokugawa and plug the hole formed by the collapse of the ROK Army's 2nd Army.
These measures basically exhausted the reserve force in Walker's hands. The situation of the 9th Army was even worse, the two American divisions of the army (the 2nd and 25th Divisions) were all deployed on the front line, and the task of plugging the holes could only be given to the Turkish brigade as a reserve.
However, this brigade has just entered the Korean battlefield, has no experience in coordinating operations with the US military, and has no language barrier and poor communication.
Walker's above disposition is obviously based on his misjudgment of the battlefield situation. He did not realize that at this time, the US forces were not facing a "partial counterattack," but an all-out campaign counteroffensive; it was the two main forces of the Volunteer Army that carried out the breakthrough on the right flank of the Eighth Army, and the only force he sent to block the gap was the weak Turkish brigade, which was really difficult to take on this great task.
On the east bank of the Cheongcheon River, west of Tokugawa and Ninen, there were two transverse roads leading to the rear area of the 8th Army:
One runs from Tokugawa to Gunyu-ri via Kanilyeong-ri and then southwest to Anju and Sinanju at the mouth of the Cheongcheon River, and the other runs from Nyeongwon to Sunchon via Monsan, Bukchang-ri, Sinchang-ri, and finally to Sucheon.
These two highways intersect with two longitudinal railway trunk lines (Gyeongui Line and Manpo Line) from Pyongyang to Sinuiju and Pyongyang to Manpo, forming the backbone of the rear communication line of the 8th Army. After the gates of Tokugawa and Ningyuan were opened, this rear line of communication was completely exposed in front of the attack force of the Volunteer Army.
If the Volunteers took advantage of the situation to advance along the highway to Junyu-ri and Anju, or detoured back to Sunchon and Suchuan, they would block the rear road of the Eighth Army and enclose the main force of the US army west and north of the Cheongchon River in a large encirclement.
Peng Dehuai decided to make full use of the favorable situation after the breakthrough of Tokugawa and Ningyuan, carry out a far-reaching battle detour to the flank and rear of the US army, firmly grasp its vital points, and create a situation of encirclement and annihilation of the enemy in the north and south of the Qingchuan River.
At 8 o'clock on November 26, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to all armies, pointing out:
"The enemy may find out that our attack has begun, and the enemy situation will change greatly on the night of the 26th, and all units should pay special attention to grasping the current enemy situation and seizing the enemy. ”
5. Peng Dehuai's accurate judgment of the enemy's situation
At this time, Walker's 8th Army command was still on the sidelines, and its reaction was rather sluggish.
The official war history of the U.S. military:
Until the night of the 26th, no one in the command of the 8th Army believed that the Chinese army had begun a major offensive. They were concerned only with the rout of the ROK 2nd Army and the possibility that the Chinese would take advantage of the ROK rear. Intelligence increased the number of Chinese troops in front of the 8th Army from 54,000 to 101,000.
The command's forecast is:
The Chinese are most likely to "rely on local stubborn resistance and actively defend in depth along the existing front."
It was not until the evening of the 27th, 40 hours after the launch of the Volunteer Army's counteroffensive, that the headquarters of the 8th Army finally figured out: "The Chinese army is in an offensive posture" and "it seems to have been premeditated."
Walker hurriedly gave the order to adjust the current front:
The 9th Army was to take over the operational command of the ROK Army's 2nd Army Corps' area of responsibility, to redraw the operational demarcation line between the 9th Army and the 1st Army with the Gunyu-ri to Sunchon Highway as the boundary, and to place the 25th Division under the command of the 1st Army, to adjust the demarcation line between the division and the 2nd Division to the demarcation line between the 1st Army and the 9th Army, and to extend the line to the south of Gunyu-ri and Suncheon, so that the above two important towns and the roads connected with them would be included in the 9th Army Defense Zone.
In order to make every effort to prevent the Chinese army from attacking from the east and northeast, Walker also strengthened the 1st Cavalry Division to the 9th Army, and all the units that the ROK 2nd Army Corps was still capable of fighting were also handed over to the 9th Army.
The reorganized 9th Army includes: the 2nd Division of the US Army, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 27th Brigade of the British Army, the Turkish Brigade and the 6th Division of the ROK Army.
The commander of the Kurt army gave the order to his troops to enter the battle on the night of the 27th:
The main force of the 1st Cavalry Division advanced to the east of Suncheon, with one regiment located in Sinchang-ri (20 kilometers east of Suncheon), and the other regiment occupied positions on both sides of the Suncheon Highway and established defensive deployments along the road with the Turkish Brigade and the ROK 6th Division to prevent the advance of the Chinese army.
After such adjustments, the 8th Army assumed a position of first stabilizing its position, and then attacking or retreating depending on the situation.
Peng Dehuai was aware of Walker's intentions and was determined not to give him time to regroup.
At this time, the 9th Corps of the Eastern Front had launched a counterattack in the Changjin Lake area. Peng Dehuai estimated that after the counterattack on the eastern front begins, the US forces on the western front will certainly be shaken, and it is very likely that they will retreat to the east and south of the Qingchuan River again, and by shrinking the battle line to close the gap between the east and west lines, and form a new defense line in the narrow strip between Anju and Wonshan in the "bee waist" of the peninsula.
In order to develop the victory of the campaign, Peng Dehuai decided, on the basis of consolidating the Tokugawa, Ningyuan, and Monsan triangles, to concentrate the main forces on the western front, first attack the US 9th Army, and at the same time advance to Sunchon with a strong force, cut off the retreat of the US troops on the western front, further expand the battle gap east of the Qingchuan River, and carry out fierce pursuit and flanking attacks in the process of the enemy's retreat, so as to seize the enemy and make it impossible to form a new defense line.
Peng Dehuai quite accurately foresaw the enemy's next move. Since then, the situation of the enemy has changed, and it is generally not within the scope of its foresight.
(End of text)
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